The region API was a way for firmware and kernel verification to get
at various blocks of caller-provided data. In practice, we only used
it internally as a way to get at parts of the GBB. Prune it down to
access only the bits of GBB we still need, from the buffer we already
know we have.
In the long run we should use the same vb2ex_read_resource() API that
vb2 firmware verification does, but that should be done in a follow-up
CL since it'll need to be coordinated with support in depthcharge.
No change in functionality.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make -j runtests; build bob firmware and boot it
Change-Id: I5715cb8d88274164a1a73ed4a56bbd93af46f9bf
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852798
Commit-Ready: ChromeOS CL Exonerator Bot <chromiumos-cl-exonerator@appspot.gserviceaccount.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@chromium.org>
Currently, firmware verification uses entirely vb2 structs, including
vb2_shared_data. This goes through an ugly translation to the old vb1
VbSharedData to pass it to depthcharge. The vboot kernel verification
maintains an equally ugly translation back to the vb2 struct
internally.
Eventually, we want to get rid of all that and use vb2 all the way
down to what crossystem picks up from the OS.
But before we can do that, we need to finish translating kernel
verification code to use the new vb2 structs. This is a step on that
path, using vb2_shared_data equivalents where present and hiding the
old vb1 shared data struct as a member of vb2_shared_data so at least
the vboot functions don't need to pass around cparams to get at it.
This will be followed by more CLs which convert more vboot internals
to use vb2 structs directly, and eventually coreboot/depthcharge CLs
which pass the vb2 structs from firmware verification directly to
kernel verification.
No change in functionality.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make -j runtests; build bob firmware and boot it
Change-Id: I5df8ce81ba3c3ac3f2cb4229db5461757cd89d8d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852856
Commit-Ready: ChromeOS CL Exonerator Bot <chromiumos-cl-exonerator@appspot.gserviceaccount.com>
Tested-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Reinauer <reinauer@chromium.org>
Remove the old vboot1 vboot_nvstorage library (VbNv*() functions) and
use the vboot2 library (vb2_nv_*()) instead. This is needed in
preparation for moving to 64-byte records; no sense in implementing
that change twice...
Should be (better be) no change in system behavior.
BUG=chromium:789276
BRANCH=none
TEST=make runtests
compare output of crossystem before/after change (should be identical)
Change-Id: I10f9975b0824263064b9a74a3c6daadcecc085d3
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794732
Previously, vb2_unpack_key() actually unpacked a key buffer. Callers
that had a vb2_packed_key had to typecast it back to a uint8_t buffer to
unpack it. Rename vb2_unpack_key() to vb2_unpack_key_buffer(), and make
vb2_unpack_key() unpack a vb2_packed_key.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make runtests; emerge-kevin coreboot depthcharge;
emerge-samus and boot it
Change-Id: I9ee38a819c59cc58a72ead78cf5ddf3d0f301ae7
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/400906
Reviewed-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org>
Originally, vboot1 code used VbExMalloc() and VbExFree() since it needed
to talk to EFI firmware that didn't have standard malloc() and free().
Now, coreboot and depthcharge implement them as wrappers around those
standard calls. vboot2 code already calls them directly, so let vboot1
code do that too.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make runtests; emerge-kevin coreboot depthcharge
Change-Id: I49ad0e32e38d278dc3589bfaf494bcf0e4b0a4bd
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/400905
Originally, we didn't trust the firmware to provide these functions from
a standard library. Now, with coreboot, we do.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make runtests; emerge-kevin coreboot depthcharge
Change-Id: I4e624c40085f2b665275a38624340b2f6aabcf11
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/399120
Reviewed-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org>
FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP set
This change allows developers to boot dev-signed boot images in
unlocked mode if DEV_BOOT_FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP is set in VbNvStorage or
GBB_FLAG_FORCE_DEV_BOOT_FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP is set.
BUG=chrome-os-partner:47002
BRANCH=None
TEST=Compiles successfully. make -j runtests
Change-Id: I56e3879594da1b57051dfe242ff347ac970c96bb
Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/309606
Commit-Ready: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
This API allows fastboot boot from memory command to verify that the
image loaded in memory is signed properly using recovery keys. Thus,
only officially signed recovery images can be booted using fastboot
boot command in recovery mode.
However, if GBB_FLAG_FORCE_DEV_BOOT_FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP is set, then
this routine will not perform any check and return okay for any image
sent by fastboot boot.
BUG=chrome-os-partner:40196
BRANCH=None
TEST=Compiles successfully. With GBB override for FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP
set any signed image is allowed to boot. With FASTBOOT_FULL_CAP not
set, then only officially signed image is allowed to boot. (make -j
runtests successful)
Change-Id: I78028853bd1ad09d3c610a687f327560557d5681
Signed-off-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/272696
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org>
Trybot-Ready: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Furquan Shaikh <furquan@chromium.org>
