This patch reintroduces a vb2_secdata->struct_version check similar to
the one that was removed in CL:244846. The CRC is not a reliable way to
detect zeroed buffers, so this check helps vboot fail earlier and more
clearly in certain situations.
BRANCH=kitty,smaug,storm,veyron
BUG=chrome-os-partner:40778
TEST=make runtests. Rebooted Jerry with 'mem w 0xff7601b0 0xfdb9', saw
that recovery reason was now 0x2b (VBNV_RECOVERY_VB2_SECDATA_INIT).
Change-Id: Ic4376d127e6d14d4ef9c2f53c83090040ca4cb68
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/274138
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
This patch adds a check to vboot2 secdata accessor functions that
returns an error if vb2_secdata_init() has not yet been called or
failed for some reason. This avoids a problem where vboot may
misinterpret random garbage (e.g. from transient read failures) as
valid secdata in recovery mode and write it back to the TPM (bricking
the device in a way that requires manual repair).
Also removes VB2_ERROR_SECDATA_VERSION check. This check was not
terribly useful since there should be no way a vboot2 device could ever
have secdata version 1 (and if it did, it should still fail CRC checks).
This error can trigger for cases when secdata contains random garbage
(e.g. all zeroes) and prevent the much more appropriate
VB2_ERROR_SECDATA_CRC error from even being checked for, which just
creates confusion and makes it harder to determine the real problem.
BRANCH=veyron
BUG=chrome-os-partner:34871
TEST=Emulated TPM read errors by just manually memset()ing secdata to 0
in coreboot, verified that vboot does not write back to the TPM and the
device will start working fine again once the disruption is removed.
Change-Id: I76bcbdbcd8106a0d34717cc91a8f2d7cda303c3f
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/244846
This patchs adds a new vb2_shared_data field to store the current
rollback prevention version number stored in secdata (TPM). This
information needs to be retrieved from there by coreboot (current
hack) or vboot2 kernel verification (bright shiny future) so it can be
passed along to the operating system and user space.
BRANCH=veyron
BUG=chrome-os-partner:35941
TEST=make runtests. Booted Jerry in recovery mode (with corresponding
coreboot patch), ensured that crossystem tpm_fwver still shows the
correct value.
Change-Id: I2a0c3e51b158a35ac129d2abce19b40c6c6381a6
Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/244601
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Error codes reported by the crypto and storage APIs are now very
specific, and tests verify the proper errors are reported.
More specific error codes coming to other files next, but I don't want
this CL to get too long.
This also changes test_common.c so TEST_EQ() reports mismatched values
in both decimal and hex, and adds TEST_SUCC() to test for a successful
return value.
BUG=chromium:370082
BRANCH=none
TEST=make clean && VBOOT2=1 COV=1 make
Change-Id: I255c8e5769284fbc286b9d94631b19677a71cdd0
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/202778
Reviewed-by: Bill Richardson <wfrichar@chromium.org>
This is the second of several CLs adding a more memory- and
code-efficient firmware verification library.
BUG=chromium:370082
BRANCH=none
TEST=make clean && COV=1 make
Change-Id: I1dd571e7511bff18469707d5a2e90068e68e0d6f
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/199841
Reviewed-by: Bill Richardson <wfrichar@chromium.org>
