Originally, we didn't trust the firmware to provide these functions from
a standard library. Now, with coreboot, we do.
BUG=chromium:611535
BRANCH=none
TEST=make runtests; emerge-kevin coreboot depthcharge
Change-Id: I4e624c40085f2b665275a38624340b2f6aabcf11
Signed-off-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/399120
Reviewed-by: Daisuke Nojiri <dnojiri@chromium.org>
mount-encrypted needs to be aware of TPM ownership status, and
will also want to issue a read lock for the early access NVRAM
index.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chromium:625037
TEST=mount-encrypted shows ownership at boot with kevin
Change-Id: I42f43f91d892137e1c46c7cacd88e3b749ce7f04
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/366443
Commit-Ready: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
As discussed in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/361381/,
instead of being a synonym to 'tpmc pplock', the 'tpmc block' command
should protect just the FW index using WriteLock.
Additionally, both TlclSetGlobalLock and TlclLockPhysicalPresence in
tlcl (which are used by 'tpmc block' and 'tpmc pplock') are updated
to first check if the platform hierarchy is already disabled and
return success, if so. That's needed to prevent command failures
when rollback protection is already on.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:55210
BUG=chrome-os-partner:55250
TEST=boot on kevin, verify that 'tpmc block' and 'tpmc pplock'
work as expected:
- pplock is possible after block
- pplock and block succeed both for enabled and disabled PH
- block locks FW index
- pplock disables PH
Change-Id: I32bff2b590a51315b11da361b97c684dcce8ab36
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/362772
Commit-Ready: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Let's use an earlier version of CL 360944 that relies on the
global flag to decide if the platform authorization is to
be used.
As it turned out, we can't read NVRAM with empty
password authorization if platform hierarchy is still enabled
(as it is in firmware), so we keep platform authorization for
firmware, and use empty password only for userland utilities,
like tpmc.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:55531
TEST=Run 'initctl stop trunksd; tpmc read 0x1008 0xd" on
kevin, verify that it returns the right output.
Change-Id: Ic878ebde9086e803d2487d90c55c0f19001cf94b
Signed-off-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@google.com>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/362520
Reviewed-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Build a special version of TPM Lightweight Command Library in
libvboot_host for TPM2. Create the framework for implementation, stub
functions for now. libvboot_host is used by tpmc and other user-space
utilities that talk directly to tpm bypassing trunks/trousers.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:54981
BUG=chrome-os-partner:55210
TEST=Boot on kevin, verify that 'tpmc read' works.
Change-Id: I4cc41028041193041defc319687697eb9edb1f3e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358623
Commit-Ready: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Andrey Pronin <apronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Barber <smbarber@chromium.org>
The firmware needs to lock the kernel rollback index before starting
up the kernel. The TPM2_NV_WriteLock command is used for that.
We also want to limit the amount of control the user space apps have
over TPM. With TPM1.2 it was achieved by deasserting physical
presence. TPM2 specification allows to achieve the same goal by
disabling Platform Hierarchy, which is active out of reset.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:50465
TEST=verified that all commands succeed and chrome OS boots up fine.
Change-Id: Ia5893460e0b29f1945cb2aae45a5f10b08fe1ed1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358351
Commit-Ready: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org>
There is no point in checking and reporting error code in each
function calling tpm_process_command(), let's do it in one place for
all commands.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645
TEST=Kevin still boots to chrome os
Change-Id: I10f45bd15df293f63401c295c5dce833543c50da
Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/358174
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Darren Krahn <dkrahn@chromium.org>
The marshaling code is a port of the coreboot patch
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/353915. The only supported
commands at this time are NV_read and NV_write.
The tlcl layer includes functions necessary to satisfy compilation
requirements of rollback_index.c, functions to lock spaces and clear
TPM are not yet implemented, they just report being invoked.
The missing functions implementation is coming, but even without it it
is possible to boot Chrome OS with firmware and kernel rollback
counters maintained in the TPM NVRAM.
BRANCH=none
BUG=chrome-os-partner:50645
TEST=with depthcharge patches applied kevin/gru boards boot into
chrome OS with rollback counters read from/written to TPM2
Change-Id: I29fe9069d7c37c33d354f36c93bda15d439bf74f
Signed-off-by: Vadim Bendebury <vbendeb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/356753
Reviewed-by: Randall Spangler <rspangler@chromium.org>
