/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be * found in the LICENSE file. * * Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices * stored in the TPM NVRAM. */ #include "rollback_index.h" #include "tlcl.h" #include "tss_constants.h" #include "utility.h" /* TPM PCR to use for storing dev mode measurements */ #define DEV_MODE_PCR 0 /* Input digests for PCR extend */ #define DEV_MODE_ON_SHA1_DIGEST ((uint8_t*) "\xbf\x8b\x45\x30\xd8\xd2\x46\xdd" \ "\x74\xac\x53\xa1\x34\x71\xbb\xa1\x79\x41" \ "\xdf\xf7") /* SHA1("\x01") */ #define DEV_MODE_OFF_SHA1_DIGEST ((uint8_t*) "\x5b\xa9\x3c\x9d\xb0\xcf\xf9\x3f"\ "\x52\xb5\x21\xd7\x42\x0e\x43\xf6\xed\xa2" \ "\x78\x4f") /* SHA1("\x00") */ static int g_rollback_recovery_mode = 0; /* disable MSVC warning on const logical expression (as in } while(0);) */ __pragma(warning (disable: 4127)) #define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_command) do { \ uint32_t result; \ if ((result = (tpm_command)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \ VBDEBUG(("Rollback: %08x returned by " #tpm_command "\n", (int)result)); \ return result; \ } \ } while (0) uint32_t TPMClearAndReenable(void) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clear and re-enable\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclForceClear()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetDeactivated(0)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* Like TlclWrite(), but checks for write errors due to hitting the 64-write * limit and clears the TPM when that happens. This can only happen when the * TPM is unowned, so it is OK to clear it (and we really have no choice). * This is not expected to happen frequently, but it could happen. */ static uint32_t SafeWrite(uint32_t index, const void* data, uint32_t length) { uint32_t result = TlclWrite(index, data, length); if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); return TlclWrite(index, data, length); } else { return result; } } /* Similarly to SafeWrite(), this ensures we don't fail a DefineSpace because * we hit the TPM write limit. This is even less likely to happen than with * writes because we only define spaces once at initialization, but we'd rather * be paranoid about this. */ static uint32_t SafeDefineSpace(uint32_t index, uint32_t perm, uint32_t size) { uint32_t result = TlclDefineSpace(index, perm, size); if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); return TlclDefineSpace(index, perm, size); } else { return result; } } /* Functions to read and write firmware and kernel spaces. */ static uint32_t ReadSpaceFirmware(RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { return TlclRead(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, rsf, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); } static uint32_t WriteSpaceFirmware(const RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { return SafeWrite(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, rsf, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); } #ifndef DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM static uint32_t ReadSpaceKernel(RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { return TlclRead(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, rsk, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); } #endif static uint32_t WriteSpaceKernel(const RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { return SafeWrite(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, rsk, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); } /* Performs one-time initializations. Creates the NVRAM spaces, and sets their * initial values as needed. Sets the nvLocked bit and ensures the physical * presence command is enabled and locked. */ static uint32_t OneTimeInitializeTPM(RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf, RollbackSpaceKernel* rsk) { static const RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf_init = { ROLLBACK_SPACE_FIRMWARE_VERSION, 0, 0, 0}; static const RollbackSpaceKernel rsk_init = { ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_VERSION, ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_UID, 0, 0}; TPM_PERMANENT_FLAGS pflags; uint32_t result; VBDEBUG(("TPM: One-time initialization\n")); result = TlclGetPermanentFlags(&pflags); if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) return result; /* TPM may come from the factory without physical presence finalized. Fix * if necessary. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: physicalPresenceLifetimeLock=%d\n", pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock)); if (!pflags.physicalPresenceLifetimeLock) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Finalizing physical presence\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclFinalizePhysicalPresence()); } /* The TPM will not enforce the NV authorization restrictions until the * execution of a TPM_NV_DefineSpace with the handle of TPM_NV_INDEX_LOCK. * Here we create that space if it doesn't already exist. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: nvLocked=%d\n", pflags.nvLocked)); if (!pflags.nvLocked) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Enabling NV locking\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetNvLocked()); } /* Clear TPM owner, in case the TPM is already owned for some reason. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: Clearing owner\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); /* Initializes the firmware and kernel spaces */ Memcpy(rsf, &rsf_init, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware)); Memcpy(rsk, &rsk_init, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel)); /* Defines and sets firmware and kernel spaces */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SafeDefineSpace(FIRMWARE_NV_INDEX, TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK | TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, sizeof(RollbackSpaceFirmware))); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceFirmware(rsf)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SafeDefineSpace(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, sizeof(RollbackSpaceKernel))); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceKernel(rsk)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* SetupTPM starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the * anti-rollback mechanism. SetupTPM can fail for three reasons. 1 A bug. 2 a * TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack. In * general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is * to reboot in recovery mode in all cases. The recovery mode calls SetupTPM * again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations. There is a * good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the * failure will repeat itself. (In general this is impossible to guarantee * because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the * previous boot.) In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus * giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set * bGlobalLock). The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a * bricked device. * * As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using * the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces. We do this to avoid writing * to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about * the durability of the NVRAM. */ uint32_t SetupTPM(int recovery_mode, int developer_mode, RollbackSpaceFirmware* rsf) { int rsf_dirty = 0; uint8_t new_flags = 0; uint8_t disable; uint8_t deactivated; uint32_t result; VBDEBUG(("TPM: SetupTPM(r%d, d%d)\n", recovery_mode, developer_mode)); /* TODO: TlclLibInit() should be able to return failure */ TlclLibInit(); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclStartup()); /* Use ContinueSelfTest rather than SelfTestFull(). It enables * access to the subset of TPM commands we need in the firmware, and * allows the full self test to run in paralle with firmware * startup. By the time we get to the OS, self test will have * completed. */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclContinueSelfTest()); result = TlclAssertPhysicalPresence(); if (result != 0) { /* It is possible that the TPM was delivered with the physical presence * command disabled. This tries enabling it, then tries asserting PP * again. */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclPhysicalPresenceCMDEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclAssertPhysicalPresence()); } /* Checks that the TPM is enabled and activated. */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetFlags(&disable, &deactivated, NULL)); if (disable || deactivated) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: disabled (%d) or deactivated (%d). Fixing...\n", disable, deactivated)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetEnable()); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetDeactivated(0)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: Must reboot to re-enable\n")); return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT; } /* Reads the firmware space. */ result = ReadSpaceFirmware(rsf); if (TPM_E_BADINDEX == result) { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; /* This is the first time we've run, and the TPM has not been * initialized. This initializes it. */ VBDEBUG(("TPM: Not initialized yet.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(OneTimeInitializeTPM(rsf, &rsk)); } else if (TPM_SUCCESS != result) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Firmware space in a bad state; giving up.\n")); return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; } VBDEBUG(("TPM: Firmware space sv%d f%x v%x\n", rsf->struct_version, rsf->flags, rsf->fw_versions)); /* Clears ownership if developer flag has toggled */ if ((developer_mode ? FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER : 0) != (rsf->flags & FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER)) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Developer flag changed; clearing owner.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TPMClearAndReenable()); } /* Updates flags */ if (developer_mode) new_flags |= FLAG_LAST_BOOT_DEVELOPER; if (recovery_mode) g_rollback_recovery_mode = 1; /* Global variables are usable in * recovery mode */ if (rsf->flags != new_flags) { rsf->flags = new_flags; rsf_dirty = 1; } /* If firmware space is dirty, this flushes it back to the TPM */ if (rsf_dirty) { VBDEBUG(("TPM: Updating firmware space.\n")); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(WriteSpaceFirmware(rsf)); } VBDEBUG(("TPM: SetupTPM() succeeded\n")); return TPM_SUCCESS; } /* disable MSVC warnings on unused arguments */ __pragma(warning (disable: 4100)) #ifdef DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM /* Dummy implementations which don't support TPM rollback protection */ uint32_t RollbackS3Resume(void) { #ifndef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT /* Initialize the TPM, but ignore return codes. In ChromeOS * environment, don't even talk to the TPM. */ TlclLibInit(); TlclResume(); TlclContinueSelfTest(); #endif return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareSetup(int developer_mode, uint32_t* version) { #ifndef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT /* Initializes the TPM, but ignores return codes. In ChromeOS * environment, doesn't even talk to the TPM. */ TlclLibInit(); TlclStartup(); TlclContinueSelfTest(); #endif *version = 0; return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareWrite(uint32_t version) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareLock(void) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelRecovery(int developer_mode) { #ifndef CHROMEOS_ENVIRONMENT /* Initializes the TPM, but ignore return codes. In ChromeOS * environment, doesn't even talk to the TPM. */ TlclLibInit(); TlclStartup(); TlclSelfTestFull(); #endif return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelRead(uint32_t* version) { *version = 0; return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelWrite(uint32_t version) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelLock(void) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } #else uint32_t RollbackS3Resume(void) { uint32_t result; TlclLibInit(); result = TlclResume(); if (result == TPM_E_INVALID_POSTINIT) { /* We're on a platform where the TPM maintains power in S3, so it's already initialized. No need for a self-test. */ return TPM_SUCCESS; } if (result != TPM_SUCCESS) { return result; } RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclContinueSelfTest()); return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareSetup(int developer_mode, uint32_t* version) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; uint8_t out_digest[20]; /* For PCR extend output */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SetupTPM(0, developer_mode, &rsf)); *version = rsf.fw_versions; VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackFirmwareSetup %x\n", (int)rsf.fw_versions)); if (developer_mode) RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclExtend(DEV_MODE_PCR, DEV_MODE_ON_SHA1_DIGEST, out_digest)); else RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclExtend(DEV_MODE_PCR, DEV_MODE_OFF_SHA1_DIGEST, out_digest)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackFirmwareSetup dev mode PCR out_digest %02x %02x %02x " "%02x\n", out_digest, out_digest+1, out_digest+2, out_digest+3)); return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareWrite(uint32_t version) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceFirmware(&rsf)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackFirmwareWrite %x --> %x\n", (int)rsf.fw_versions, (int)version)); rsf.fw_versions = version; return WriteSpaceFirmware(&rsf); } uint32_t RollbackFirmwareLock(void) { return TlclSetGlobalLock(); } uint32_t RollbackKernelRecovery(int developer_mode) { RollbackSpaceFirmware rsf; uint32_t result = SetupTPM(1, developer_mode, &rsf); /* In recovery mode we ignore TPM malfunctions or corruptions, and leave the * TPM completely unlocked if and only if the dev mode switch is ON. The * recovery kernel will fix the TPM (if needed) and lock it ASAP. We leave * Physical Presence on in either case. */ if (!developer_mode) { RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetGlobalLock()); } /* We still return the result of SetupTPM even though we expect the caller to * ignore it. It's useful in unit testing. */ return result; } uint32_t RollbackKernelRead(uint32_t* version) { if (g_rollback_recovery_mode) { *version = 0; } else { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; uint32_t perms; /* Read the kernel space and verify its permissions. If the kernel * space has the wrong permission, or it doesn't contain the right * identifier, we give up. This will need to be fixed by the * recovery kernel. We have to worry about this because at any time * (even with PP turned off) the TPM owner can remove and redefine a * PP-protected space (but not write to it). */ RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceKernel(&rsk)); RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetPermissions(KERNEL_NV_INDEX, &perms)); if (TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE != perms || ROLLBACK_SPACE_KERNEL_UID != rsk.uid) return TPM_E_CORRUPTED_STATE; *version = rsk.kernel_versions; VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackKernelRead %x\n", (int)rsk.kernel_versions)); } return TPM_SUCCESS; } uint32_t RollbackKernelWrite(uint32_t version) { if (g_rollback_recovery_mode) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } else { RollbackSpaceKernel rsk; RETURN_ON_FAILURE(ReadSpaceKernel(&rsk)); VBDEBUG(("TPM: RollbackKernelWrite %x --> %x\n", (int)rsk.kernel_versions, (int)version)); rsk.kernel_versions = version; return WriteSpaceKernel(&rsk); } } uint32_t RollbackKernelLock(void) { if (g_rollback_recovery_mode) { return TPM_SUCCESS; } else { return TlclLockPhysicalPresence(); } } #endif // DISABLE_ROLLBACK_TPM