Files
OpenCellular/common/curve25519.c
Nicolas Boichat edc668ea6c core/cortex-m0/curve25519: Integrate fast curve25519 implementation
- Move generic implementation to curve25519-generic.o
- Always use optimized version on cortex-m0.

- Rename .s files to .S, remove unnecessary lines in assembly files.
- Rename crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 to x25519_scalar_mult to match
  the signature provided by the generic implementation.
- Replace some handcoded memcpy with function calls
- Remove unnecessary "volatile" specifications in the code.

BRANCH=none
BUG=b:62813194
TEST=To test old implementation only:
        - Increase CONFIG_RO_SIZE to 60kb
        - Increase console stack size to 2048
     make BOARD=hammer PROJECT=x25519 TEST_BUILD=y
     ./util/flash_ec --board=hammer --image=build/hammer/x25519.bin
     EC console: runtest, taskinfo
     => Used to takes ~4'17" to run (X25519 duration 256347 us).
        1496/2048 stack size usage in CONSOLE task
     => Now takes ~1'25" to run (X25519 duration 84520 us)
        732/2048 stack size usage in CONSOLE task
TEST=In test/x25519.c, uncomment #define TEST_X25519_1M_ITERATIONS
     make BOARD=hammer PROJECT=x25519 TEST_BUILD=y
     ./util/flash_ec --board=hammer --image=build/hammer/x25519.bin
     EC console: runtest, wait ~23 hours, test passes.
TEST=- Define CONFIG_CURVE25519_CORTEXM0 (next patch)
     makes newsizes
     build/hammer/RW/ec.RW.flat shrank by 1888 bytes: (52208 to 50320)

Change-Id: Icce38d3c32f431a85ac0f951cf34456b490dc665
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/540962
Commit-Ready: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicolas Boichat <drinkcat@chromium.org>
2017-07-03 21:44:34 -07:00

66 lines
2.7 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2015, Google Inc.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and/or distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY
* SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */
/* This code is mostly taken from the ref10 version of Ed25519 in SUPERCOP
* 20141124 (http://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html). That code is released as
* public domain but this file has the ISC license just to keep licencing
* simple.
*
* The field functions are shared by Ed25519 and X25519 where possible. */
#include "common.h"
#include "curve25519.h"
#include "trng.h"
#include "util.h"
#define CRYPTO_memcmp safe_memcmp
#ifdef CONFIG_RNG
void X25519_keypair(uint8_t out_public_value[32], uint8_t out_private_key[32]) {
rand_bytes(out_private_key, 32);
/* All X25519 implementations should decode scalars correctly (see
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7748#section-5). However, if an
* implementation doesn't then it might interoperate with random keys a
* fraction of the time because they'll, randomly, happen to be correctly
* formed.
*
* Thus we do the opposite of the masking here to make sure that our private
* keys are never correctly masked and so, hopefully, any incorrect
* implementations are deterministically broken.
*
* This does not affect security because, although we're throwing away
* entropy, a valid implementation of scalarmult should throw away the exact
* same bits anyway. */
out_private_key[0] |= 7;
out_private_key[31] &= 63;
out_private_key[31] |= 128;
X25519_public_from_private(out_public_value, out_private_key);
}
#endif
int X25519(uint8_t out_shared_key[32], const uint8_t private_key[32],
const uint8_t peer_public_value[32]) {
static const uint8_t kZeros[32] = {0};
x25519_scalar_mult(out_shared_key, private_key, peer_public_value);
/* The all-zero output results when the input is a point of small order. */
return CRYPTO_memcmp(kZeros, out_shared_key, 32) != 0;
}
void X25519_public_from_private(uint8_t out_public_value[32],
const uint8_t private_key[32]) {
static const uint8_t kMongomeryBasePoint[32] = {9};
x25519_scalar_mult(out_public_value, private_key, kMongomeryBasePoint);
}