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vboot1 kept track of an internal "LoadFirmware() check" value for both firmware slots and encoded the value for the slot that managed to go further in the verification flow into a special range of recovery reasons. vboot2 instead uses the generic "invalid RW" reason for all firmware verification failures and communicates further information through the subcode. While the subcode may be good enough for developers, it's difficult to communicate failure reasons to "normal" users (like non-firmware developers) on the TAB screen. Currently we just display a couple of numbers that people won't know how to interpret and "RW firmware failed signature check" for any verification error (including rollback, which might be the most commonly encountered in practice). Since our recovery reason space is big enough (and we don't reuse old numbers anyway), we might as well reuse the more precise numbers (and strings) from vboot1 to communicate the failure reason, even if we don't implement its "which slot came further" algorithm. This patch translates the most common/useful VBSD_LF_CHECK numbers into plain VB2_RECOVERY reasons and uses them where appropriate. CQ-DEPEND=CL:248400 BRANCH=veyron BUG=None TEST=make runtests VBOOT2=1 test_that my_jerry firmware_CorruptBothFwSigAB firmware_CorruptBothFwBodyAB firmware_RollbackFirmware (Confirmed that matched recovery reasons are the more precise ones in the 0x10-0x1F range.) Change-Id: I51ecf1b820d1faa40405cb84377380d6f3f6ca1d Signed-off-by: Julius Werner <jwerner@chromium.org> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/248392 Reviewed-by: Bill Richardson <wfrichar@chromium.org>
196 lines
5.1 KiB
C
196 lines
5.1 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2014 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
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* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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* found in the LICENSE file.
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*
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* Externally-callable APIs
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* (Firmware portion)
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*/
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#include "2sysincludes.h"
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#include "2api.h"
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#include "2misc.h"
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#include "2nvstorage.h"
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#include "2secdata.h"
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#include "2sha.h"
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#include "2rsa.h"
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#include "vb2_common.h"
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int vb2api_fw_phase3(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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{
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int rv;
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/* Verify firmware keyblock */
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rv = vb2_load_fw_keyblock(ctx);
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if (rv) {
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vb2_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW, rv);
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return rv;
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}
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/* Verify firmware preamble */
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rv = vb2_load_fw_preamble(ctx);
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if (rv) {
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vb2_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW, rv);
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return rv;
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}
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return VB2_SUCCESS;
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}
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int vb2api_init_hash(struct vb2_context *ctx, uint32_t tag, uint32_t *size)
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{
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struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx);
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const struct vb2_fw_preamble *pre;
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struct vb2_digest_context *dc;
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struct vb2_public_key key;
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struct vb2_workbuf wb;
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int rv;
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vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb);
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if (tag == VB2_HASH_TAG_INVALID)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_INIT_HASH_TAG;
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/* Get preamble pointer */
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if (!sd->workbuf_preamble_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_INIT_HASH_PREAMBLE;
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pre = (const struct vb2_fw_preamble *)
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(ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_preamble_offset);
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/* For now, we only support the firmware body tag */
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if (tag != VB2_HASH_TAG_FW_BODY)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_INIT_HASH_TAG;
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/* Allocate workbuf space for the hash */
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if (sd->workbuf_hash_size) {
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dc = (struct vb2_digest_context *)
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(ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_hash_offset);
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} else {
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uint32_t dig_size = sizeof(*dc);
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dc = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, dig_size);
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if (!dc)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_INIT_HASH_WORKBUF;
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sd->workbuf_hash_offset = vb2_offset_of(ctx->workbuf, dc);
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sd->workbuf_hash_size = dig_size;
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ctx->workbuf_used = sd->workbuf_hash_offset + dig_size;
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}
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/*
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* Unpack the firmware data key to see which hashing algorithm we
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* should use.
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*
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* TODO: really, the firmware body should be hashed, and not signed,
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* because the signature we're checking is already signed as part of
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* the firmware preamble. But until we can change the signing scripts,
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* we're stuck with a signature here instead of a hash.
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*/
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if (!sd->workbuf_data_key_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_INIT_HASH_DATA_KEY;
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rv = vb2_unpack_key(&key,
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ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_data_key_offset,
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sd->workbuf_data_key_size);
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if (rv)
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return rv;
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sd->hash_tag = tag;
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sd->hash_remaining_size = pre->body_signature.data_size;
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if (size)
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*size = pre->body_signature.data_size;
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if (!(pre->flags & VB2_FIRMWARE_PREAMBLE_DISALLOW_HWCRYPTO)) {
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rv = vb2ex_hwcrypto_digest_init(key.hash_alg,
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pre->body_signature.data_size);
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if (!rv) {
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VB2_DEBUG("Using HW crypto engine for hash_alg %d\n",
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key.hash_alg);
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dc->hash_alg = key.hash_alg;
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dc->using_hwcrypto = 1;
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return VB2_SUCCESS;
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}
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if (rv != VB2_ERROR_EX_HWCRYPTO_UNSUPPORTED)
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return rv;
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VB2_DEBUG("HW crypto for hash_alg %d not supported, using SW\n",
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key.hash_alg);
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} else {
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VB2_DEBUG("HW crypto forbidden by preamble, using SW\n");
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}
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return vb2_digest_init(dc, key.hash_alg);
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}
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int vb2api_check_hash(struct vb2_context *ctx)
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{
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struct vb2_shared_data *sd = vb2_get_sd(ctx);
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struct vb2_digest_context *dc = (struct vb2_digest_context *)
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(ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_hash_offset);
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struct vb2_workbuf wb;
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uint8_t *digest;
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uint32_t digest_size = vb2_digest_size(dc->hash_alg);
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struct vb2_fw_preamble *pre;
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struct vb2_public_key key;
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int rv;
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vb2_workbuf_from_ctx(ctx, &wb);
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/* Get preamble pointer */
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if (!sd->workbuf_preamble_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_PREAMBLE;
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pre = (struct vb2_fw_preamble *)
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(ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_preamble_offset);
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/* Must have initialized hash digest work area */
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if (!sd->workbuf_hash_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_WORKBUF;
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/* Should have hashed the right amount of data */
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if (sd->hash_remaining_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_SIZE;
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/* Allocate the digest */
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digest = vb2_workbuf_alloc(&wb, digest_size);
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if (!digest)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_WORKBUF_DIGEST;
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/* Finalize the digest */
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if (dc->using_hwcrypto)
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rv = vb2ex_hwcrypto_digest_finalize(digest, digest_size);
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else
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rv = vb2_digest_finalize(dc, digest, digest_size);
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if (rv)
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return rv;
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/* The code below is specific to the body signature */
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if (sd->hash_tag != VB2_HASH_TAG_FW_BODY)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_TAG;
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/*
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* The body signature is currently a *signature* of the body data, not
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* just its hash. So we need to verify the signature.
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*/
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/* Unpack the data key */
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if (!sd->workbuf_data_key_size)
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return VB2_ERROR_API_CHECK_HASH_DATA_KEY;
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rv = vb2_unpack_key(&key,
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ctx->workbuf + sd->workbuf_data_key_offset,
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sd->workbuf_data_key_size);
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if (rv)
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return rv;
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/*
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* Check digest vs. signature. Note that this destroys the signature.
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* That's ok, because we only check each signature once per boot.
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*/
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rv = vb2_verify_digest(&key, &pre->body_signature, digest, &wb);
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if (rv)
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vb2_fail(ctx, VB2_RECOVERY_FW_BODY, rv);
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return rv;
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}
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