mirror of
https://github.com/Telecominfraproject/OpenCellular.git
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363 lines
14 KiB
C
363 lines
14 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2010 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
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* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
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* found in the LICENSE file.
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*
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* Functions for querying, manipulating and locking rollback indices
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* stored in the TPM NVRAM.
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*/
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#include "rollback_index.h"
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#include "tlcl.h"
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#include "tss_constants.h"
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#include "utility.h"
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uint16_t g_firmware_key_version = 0;
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uint16_t g_firmware_version = 0;
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uint16_t g_kernel_key_version = 0;
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uint16_t g_kernel_version = 0;
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#define RETURN_ON_FAILURE(tpm_command) do { \
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uint32_t result; \
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if ((result = (tpm_command)) != TPM_SUCCESS) { \
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return result; \
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} \
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} while (0)
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static uint32_t InitializeKernelVersionsSpaces(void) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE, KERNEL_SPACE_SIZE));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX, KERNEL_SPACE_INIT_DATA,
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KERNEL_SPACE_SIZE));
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* When the return value is TPM_SUCCESS, this function sets *|initialized| to 1
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* if the spaces have been fully initialized, to 0 if not. Otherwise
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* *|initialized| is not changed.
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*/
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static uint32_t GetSpacesInitialized(int* initialized) {
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uint32_t space_holder;
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uint32_t result;
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result = TlclRead(TPM_IS_INITIALIZED_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &space_holder, sizeof(space_holder));
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switch (result) {
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case TPM_SUCCESS:
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*initialized = 1;
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break;
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case TPM_E_BADINDEX:
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*initialized = 0;
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result = TPM_SUCCESS;
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break;
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}
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return result;
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}
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/* Creates the NVRAM spaces, and sets their initial values as needed.
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*/
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static uint32_t InitializeSpaces(void) {
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uint32_t zero = 0;
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uint32_t firmware_perm = TPM_NV_PER_GLOBALLOCK | TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE;
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debug("Initializing spaces\n");
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetNvLocked());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(FIRMWARE_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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firmware_perm, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(FIRMWARE_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(InitializeKernelVersionsSpaces());
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/* The space KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX is used to protect the kernel
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* versions. The content of space KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP determines whether
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* only the backup value should be trusted.
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*/
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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firmware_perm, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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firmware_perm, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(DEVELOPER_MODE_NV_INDEX,
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firmware_perm, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(DEVELOPER_MODE_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &zero, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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/* The space TPM_IS_INITIALIZED_NV_INDEX is used to indicate that the TPM
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* initialization has completed. Without it we cannot be sure that the last
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* space to be created was also initialized (power could have been lost right
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* after its creation).
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*/
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclDefineSpace(TPM_IS_INITIALIZED_NV_INDEX,
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firmware_perm, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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static uint32_t SetDistrustKernelSpaceAtNextBoot(uint32_t distrust) {
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uint32_t must_use_backup;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &must_use_backup, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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if (must_use_backup != distrust) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &distrust, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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static uint32_t GetTPMRollbackIndices(int type) {
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uint32_t firmware_versions;
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uint32_t kernel_versions;
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/* We perform the reads, making sure they succeed. A failure means that the
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* rollback index locations are missing or somehow messed up. We let the
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* caller deal with that.
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*/
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switch (type) {
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case FIRMWARE_VERSIONS:
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(FIRMWARE_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &firmware_versions,
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sizeof(firmware_versions)));
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g_firmware_key_version = (uint16_t) (firmware_versions >> 16);
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g_firmware_version = (uint16_t) (firmware_versions & 0xffff);
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break;
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case KERNEL_VERSIONS:
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &kernel_versions,
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sizeof(kernel_versions)));
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g_kernel_key_version = (uint16_t) (kernel_versions >> 16);
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g_kernel_version = (uint16_t) (kernel_versions & 0xffff);
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break;
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* Checks if the kernel version space has been mucked with. If it has,
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* reconstructs it using the backup value.
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*/
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uint32_t RecoverKernelSpace(void) {
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uint32_t perms = 0;
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uint8_t buffer[KERNEL_SPACE_SIZE];
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int read_OK = 0;
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int perms_OK = 0;
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uint32_t backup_combined_versions;
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uint32_t must_use_backup;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &must_use_backup, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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/* must_use_backup is true if the previous boot entered recovery mode. */
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read_OK = TlclRead(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX, (uint8_t*) &buffer,
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KERNEL_SPACE_SIZE) == TPM_SUCCESS;
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if (read_OK) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetPermissions(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX, &perms));
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perms_OK = perms == TPM_NV_PER_PPWRITE;
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}
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if (!must_use_backup && read_OK && perms_OK &&
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!Memcmp(buffer + sizeof(uint32_t), KERNEL_SPACE_UID,
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KERNEL_SPACE_UID_SIZE)) {
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/* Everything is fine. This is the normal, frequent path. */
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* Either we detected that something went wrong, or we cannot trust the
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* PP-protected kernel space. Attempts to fix. It is not always necessary
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* to redefine the space, but we might as well, since this path should be
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* taken quite seldom (after recovery mode and after an attack).
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*/
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(InitializeKernelVersionsSpaces());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &backup_combined_versions,
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sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &backup_combined_versions,
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sizeof(uint32_t)));
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if (must_use_backup) {
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uint32_t zero = 0;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_MUST_USE_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &zero, 0));
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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static uint32_t BackupKernelSpace(void) {
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uint32_t kernel_versions;
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uint32_t backup_versions;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &kernel_versions, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &backup_versions, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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if (kernel_versions == backup_versions) {
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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} else if (kernel_versions < backup_versions) {
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/* This cannot happen. We're screwed. */
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return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
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}
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_VERSIONS_BACKUP_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &kernel_versions, sizeof(uint32_t)));
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* Checks for transitions between protected mode to developer mode. When going
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* into developer mode, clear the TPM.
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*/
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static uint32_t CheckDeveloperModeTransition(uint32_t current_developer) {
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uint32_t past_developer;
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int must_clear;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclRead(DEVELOPER_MODE_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &past_developer,
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sizeof(past_developer)));
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must_clear = current_developer != past_developer;
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if (must_clear) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclForceClear());
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}
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if (past_developer != current_developer) {
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/* (Unauthorized) writes to the TPM succeed even when the TPM is disabled
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* and deactivated.
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*/
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(DEVELOPER_MODE_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) ¤t_developer,
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sizeof(current_developer)));
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}
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return must_clear ? TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT : TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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static uint32_t SetupTPM_(int mode, int developer_flag) {
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uint8_t disable;
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uint8_t deactivated;
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TlclLibInit();
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclStartup());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclContinueSelfTest());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclAssertPhysicalPresence());
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/* Checks that the TPM is enabled and activated. */
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclGetFlags(&disable, &deactivated));
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if (disable || deactivated) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetEnable());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclSetDeactivated(0));
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return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
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}
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/* We expect this to fail the first time we run on a device, because the TPM
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* has not been initialized yet.
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*/
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if (RecoverKernelSpace() != TPM_SUCCESS) {
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int initialized = 0;
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(GetSpacesInitialized(&initialized));
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if (initialized) {
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return TPM_E_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
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} else {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(InitializeSpaces());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(RecoverKernelSpace());
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}
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}
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(BackupKernelSpace());
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(SetDistrustKernelSpaceAtNextBoot(mode == RO_RECOVERY_MODE));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(GetTPMRollbackIndices(FIRMWARE_VERSIONS));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(GetTPMRollbackIndices(KERNEL_VERSIONS));
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(CheckDeveloperModeTransition(developer_flag));
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/* As a courtesy (I hope) to the caller, lock the firmware versions if we are
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* in recovery mode. The normal mode may need to update the firmware
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* versions, so they cannot be locked here.
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*/
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if (mode == RO_RECOVERY_MODE) {
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(LockFirmwareVersions());
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* SetupTPM starts the TPM and establishes the root of trust for the
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* anti-rollback mechanism. SetupTPM can fail for three reasons. 1 A bug. 2 a
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* TPM hardware failure. 3 An unexpected TPM state due to some attack. In
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* general we cannot easily distinguish the kind of failure, so our strategy is
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* to reboot in recovery mode in all cases. The recovery mode calls SetupTPM
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* again, which executes (almost) the same sequence of operations. There is a
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* good chance that, if recovery mode was entered because of a TPM failure, the
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* failure will repeat itself. (In general this is impossible to guarantee
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* because we have no way of creating the exact TPM initial state at the
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* previous boot.) In recovery mode, we ignore the failure and continue, thus
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* giving the recovery kernel a chance to fix things (that's why we don't set
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* bGlobalLock). The choice is between a knowingly insecure device and a
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* bricked device.
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*
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* As a side note, observe that we go through considerable hoops to avoid using
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* the STCLEAR permissions for the index spaces. We do this to avoid writing
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* to the TPM flashram at every reboot or wake-up, because of concerns about
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* the durability of the NVRAM.
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*/
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uint32_t SetupTPM(int mode, int developer_flag) {
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switch (mode) {
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case RO_RECOVERY_MODE:
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case RO_NORMAL_MODE: {
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uint32_t result = SetupTPM_(mode, developer_flag);
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if (result == TPM_E_MAXNVWRITES) {
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/* ForceClears and reboots */
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclForceClear());
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return TPM_E_MUST_REBOOT;
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} else if (mode == RO_NORMAL_MODE) {
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return result;
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} else {
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/* In recovery mode we want to keep going even if there are errors. */
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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}
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case RW_NORMAL_MODE:
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/* There are no TPM writes here, so no need to check for write limit errors.
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*/
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(GetTPMRollbackIndices(KERNEL_VERSIONS));
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default:
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return TPM_E_INTERNAL_INCONSISTENCY;
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}
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}
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uint32_t GetStoredVersions(int type, uint16_t* key_version, uint16_t* version) {
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/* TODO: should verify that SetupTPM() has been called.
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*
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* Note that SetupTPM() does hardware setup AND sets global variables. When
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* we get down into kernel verification, the hardware setup persists, but we
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* lose the global variables.
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*/
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switch (type) {
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case FIRMWARE_VERSIONS:
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*key_version = g_firmware_key_version;
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*version = g_firmware_version;
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break;
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case KERNEL_VERSIONS:
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*key_version = g_kernel_key_version;
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*version = g_kernel_version;
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break;
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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uint32_t WriteStoredVersions(int type, uint16_t key_version, uint16_t version) {
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uint32_t combined_version = (key_version << 16) & version;
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switch (type) {
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case FIRMWARE_VERSIONS:
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(FIRMWARE_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &combined_version,
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sizeof(uint32_t)));
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break;
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case KERNEL_VERSIONS:
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RETURN_ON_FAILURE(TlclWrite(KERNEL_VERSIONS_NV_INDEX,
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(uint8_t*) &combined_version,
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sizeof(uint32_t)));
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}
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return TPM_SUCCESS;
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}
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uint32_t LockFirmwareVersions() {
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return TlclSetGlobalLock();
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}
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uint32_t LockKernelVersionsByLockingPP() {
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return TlclLockPhysicalPresence();
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}
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