Files
OpenCellular/firmware/lib/vboot_firmware.c
Aaron Durbin 952c2d3245 Fix recovery mode entry due to invalid FW hash.
If FW hash is invalid, it is possible for boot to continue as normal
because the shared recovery reason is not updated. Update the shared
recovery reason to ensure the bootloader knows to do a recovery boot.

This change affects only systems that do not support RO_NORMAL (ex.
Haswell systems).

BUG=chrome-os-partner:20518.
TEST=Run firmware_CorruptBothFwSigAB on Peppy, verify PASS.
BRANCH=None.
Signed-off-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Nematbakhsh <shawnn@chromium.org>

Change-Id: I3b311416bf8c504deb4154e5850d967253c9dc17
Reviewed-on: https://gerrit.chromium.org/gerrit/60148
Reviewed-by: Aaron Durbin <adurbin@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shawn Nematbakhsh <shawnn@chromium.org>
Tested-by: Shawn Nematbakhsh <shawnn@chromium.org>
2013-06-26 17:44:44 -07:00

359 lines
10 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved.
* Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
* found in the LICENSE file.
*
* High-level firmware API for loading and verifying rewritable firmware.
* (Firmware portion)
*/
#include "sysincludes.h"
#include "gbb_header.h"
#include "load_firmware_fw.h"
#include "utility.h"
#include "vboot_api.h"
#include "vboot_common.h"
#include "vboot_nvstorage.h"
/*
* Static variables for UpdateFirmwareBodyHash(). It's less than optimal to
* have static variables in a library, but in UEFI the caller is deep inside a
* different firmware stack and doesn't have a good way to pass the params
* struct back to us.
*/
typedef struct VbLoadFirmwareInternal {
DigestContext body_digest_context;
uint32_t body_size_accum;
} VbLoadFirmwareInternal;
void VbUpdateFirmwareBodyHash(VbCommonParams *cparams, uint8_t *data,
uint32_t size)
{
VbLoadFirmwareInternal *lfi =
(VbLoadFirmwareInternal*)cparams->vboot_context;
DigestUpdate(&lfi->body_digest_context, data, size);
lfi->body_size_accum += size;
}
int LoadFirmware(VbCommonParams *cparams, VbSelectFirmwareParams *fparams,
VbNvContext *vnc)
{
VbSharedDataHeader *shared =
(VbSharedDataHeader *)cparams->shared_data_blob;
GoogleBinaryBlockHeader *gbb =
(GoogleBinaryBlockHeader *)cparams->gbb_data;
VbPublicKey *root_key;
VbLoadFirmwareInternal *lfi;
uint32_t try_b_count;
uint32_t lowest_version = 0xFFFFFFFF;
int good_index = -1;
int is_dev;
int index;
int i;
int retval = VBERROR_UNKNOWN;
int recovery = VBNV_RECOVERY_RO_UNSPECIFIED;
/* Clear output params in case we fail */
shared->firmware_index = 0xFF;
VBDEBUG(("LoadFirmware started...\n"));
/* Must have a root key from the GBB */
if (!gbb) {
VBDEBUG(("No GBB\n"));
retval = VBERROR_INVALID_GBB;
goto LoadFirmwareExit;
}
root_key = (VbPublicKey *)((uint8_t *)gbb + gbb->rootkey_offset);
/* Parse flags */
is_dev = (shared->flags & VBSD_BOOT_DEV_SWITCH_ON ? 1 : 0);
if (is_dev)
shared->flags |= VBSD_LF_DEV_SWITCH_ON;
/* Read try-b count and decrement if necessary */
VbNvGet(vnc, VBNV_TRY_B_COUNT, &try_b_count);
if (0 != try_b_count) {
VbNvSet(vnc, VBNV_TRY_B_COUNT, try_b_count - 1);
shared->flags |= VBSD_FWB_TRIED;
}
/* Allocate our internal data */
lfi = (VbLoadFirmwareInternal *)
VbExMalloc(sizeof(VbLoadFirmwareInternal));
cparams->vboot_context = lfi;
/* Loop over indices */
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
VbKeyBlockHeader *key_block;
uint32_t vblock_size;
VbFirmwarePreambleHeader *preamble;
RSAPublicKey *data_key;
uint64_t key_version;
uint32_t combined_version;
uint8_t *body_digest;
uint8_t *check_result;
/* If try B count is non-zero try firmware B first */
index = (try_b_count ? 1 - i : i);
if (0 == index) {
key_block = (VbKeyBlockHeader *)
fparams->verification_block_A;
vblock_size = fparams->verification_size_A;
check_result = &shared->check_fw_a_result;
} else {
key_block = (VbKeyBlockHeader *)
fparams->verification_block_B;
vblock_size = fparams->verification_size_B;
check_result = &shared->check_fw_b_result;
}
/*
* Check the key block flags against the current boot mode. Do
* this before verifying the key block, since flags are faster
* to check than the RSA signature.
*/
if (!(key_block->key_block_flags &
(is_dev ? KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_DEVELOPER_1 :
KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_DEVELOPER_0))) {
VBDEBUG(("Developer flag mismatch.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_DEV_MISMATCH;
continue;
}
/* RW firmware never runs in recovery mode. */
if (!(key_block->key_block_flags & KEY_BLOCK_FLAG_RECOVERY_0)) {
VBDEBUG(("Recovery flag mismatch.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_REC_MISMATCH;
continue;
}
/* Verify the key block */
if ((0 != KeyBlockVerify(key_block, vblock_size,
root_key, 0))) {
VBDEBUG(("Key block verification failed.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_VERIFY_KEYBLOCK;
continue;
}
/* Check for rollback of key version. */
key_version = key_block->data_key.key_version;
if (!(gbb->flags & GBB_FLAG_DISABLE_FW_ROLLBACK_CHECK)) {
if (key_version < (shared->fw_version_tpm >> 16)) {
VBDEBUG(("Key rollback detected.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_KEY_ROLLBACK;
continue;
}
if (key_version > 0xFFFF) {
/*
* Key version is stored in 16 bits in the TPM,
* so key versions greater than 0xFFFF can't be
* stored properly.
*/
VBDEBUG(("Key version > 0xFFFF.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_KEY_ROLLBACK;
continue;
}
}
/* Get key for preamble/data verification from the key block. */
data_key = PublicKeyToRSA(&key_block->data_key);
if (!data_key) {
VBDEBUG(("Unable to parse data key.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_DATA_KEY_PARSE;
continue;
}
/* Verify the preamble, which follows the key block. */
preamble = (VbFirmwarePreambleHeader *)
((uint8_t *)key_block + key_block->key_block_size);
if ((0 != VerifyFirmwarePreamble(
preamble,
vblock_size - key_block->key_block_size,
data_key))) {
VBDEBUG(("Preamble verfication failed.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_VERIFY_PREAMBLE;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
/* Check for rollback of firmware version. */
combined_version = (uint32_t)((key_version << 16) |
(preamble->firmware_version & 0xFFFF));
if (combined_version < shared->fw_version_tpm &&
!(gbb->flags & GBB_FLAG_DISABLE_FW_ROLLBACK_CHECK)) {
VBDEBUG(("Firmware version rollback detected.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_FW_ROLLBACK;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
/* Header for this firmware is valid */
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_HEADER_VALID;
/* Check for lowest key version from a valid header. */
if (lowest_version > combined_version)
lowest_version = combined_version;
/*
* If we already have good firmware, no need to read another
* one; we only needed to look at the versions to check for
* rollback.
*/
if (-1 != good_index) {
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
/* Handle preamble flag for using the RO normal/dev code path */
if (VbGetFirmwarePreambleFlags(preamble) &
VB_FIRMWARE_PREAMBLE_USE_RO_NORMAL) {
/* Fail if calling firmware doesn't support RO normal */
if (!(shared->flags & VBSD_BOOT_RO_NORMAL_SUPPORT)) {
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_NO_RO_NORMAL;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
/* Use the RO normal code path */
shared->flags |= VBSD_LF_USE_RO_NORMAL;
} else {
VbError_t rv;
/* Read the firmware data */
DigestInit(&lfi->body_digest_context,
data_key->algorithm);
lfi->body_size_accum = 0;
rv = VbExHashFirmwareBody(
cparams,
(index ? VB_SELECT_FIRMWARE_B :
VB_SELECT_FIRMWARE_A));
if (VBERROR_SUCCESS != rv) {
VBDEBUG(("VbExHashFirmwareBody() failed for "
"index %d\n", index));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_GET_FW_BODY;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
if (lfi->body_size_accum !=
preamble->body_signature.data_size) {
VBDEBUG(("Hashed %d bytes but expected %d\n",
(int)lfi->body_size_accum,
(int)preamble->body_signature.data_size));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_HASH_WRONG_SIZE;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
continue;
}
/* Verify firmware data */
body_digest = DigestFinal(&lfi->body_digest_context);
if (0 != VerifyDigest(body_digest,
&preamble->body_signature,
data_key)) {
VBDEBUG(("FW body verification failed.\n"));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_VERIFY_BODY;
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
VbExFree(body_digest);
continue;
}
VbExFree(body_digest);
}
/* Done with the data key, so can free it now */
RSAPublicKeyFree(data_key);
/* If we're still here, the firmware is valid. */
VBDEBUG(("Firmware %d is valid.\n", index));
*check_result = VBSD_LF_CHECK_VALID;
if (-1 == good_index) {
/* Save the key we actually used */
if (0 != VbSharedDataSetKernelKey(
shared, &preamble->kernel_subkey)) {
/*
* The firmware signature was good, but the
* public key was bigger that the caller can
* handle.
*/
VBDEBUG(("Unable to save kernel subkey.\n"));
continue;
}
/*
* Save the good index, now that we're sure we can
* actually use this firmware. That's the one we'll
* boot.
*/
good_index = index;
shared->firmware_index = (uint8_t)index;
shared->fw_keyblock_flags = key_block->key_block_flags;
/*
* If the good firmware's key version is the same as
* the tpm, then the TPM doesn't need updating; we can
* stop now. Otherwise, we'll check all the other
* headers to see if they contain a newer key.
*/
if (combined_version == shared->fw_version_tpm)
break;
}
}
/* Free internal data */
VbExFree(lfi);
cparams->vboot_context = NULL;
/* Handle finding good firmware */
if (good_index >= 0) {
/* Save versions we found */
shared->fw_version_lowest = lowest_version;
if (lowest_version > shared->fw_version_tpm)
shared->fw_version_tpm = lowest_version;
/* Success */
VBDEBUG(("Will boot firmware index %d\n",
(int)shared->firmware_index));
retval = VBERROR_SUCCESS;
} else {
uint8_t a = shared->check_fw_a_result;
uint8_t b = shared->check_fw_b_result;
uint8_t best_check;
/* No good firmware, so go to recovery mode. */
VBDEBUG(("Alas, no good firmware.\n"));
recovery = VBNV_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW;
retval = VBERROR_LOAD_FIRMWARE;
/*
* If the best check result fits in the range of recovery
* reasons, provide more detail on how far we got in
* validation.
*/
best_check = (a > b ? a : b) +
VBNV_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW_CHECK_MIN;
if (best_check >= VBNV_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW_CHECK_MIN &&
best_check <= VBNV_RECOVERY_RO_INVALID_RW_CHECK_MAX)
recovery = best_check;
}
LoadFirmwareExit:
/* Store recovery request, if any */
VbNvSet(vnc, VBNV_RECOVERY_REQUEST, VBERROR_SUCCESS != retval ?
recovery : VBNV_RECOVERY_NOT_REQUESTED);
/* If the system does not support RO_NORMAL and LoadFirmware()
* encountered an error, update the shared recovery reason if
* recovery was not previously requested. */
if (!(shared->flags & VBSD_BOOT_RO_NORMAL_SUPPORT) &&
VBNV_RECOVERY_NOT_REQUESTED == shared->recovery_reason &&
VBERROR_SUCCESS != retval)
shared->recovery_reason = recovery;
return retval;
}