Files
chatwoot/config/initializers/rack_attack.rb
Vishnu Narayanan fa8f1d9b6f fix: throttle reports api endpoint (#10620)
- Throttle reports API requests at the account level
- Throttle reports API requests at the user level for dashboard users as
well as API users

Co-authored-by: Sojan Jose <sojan@pepalo.com>
2025-01-08 15:43:33 +05:30

207 lines
9.0 KiB
Ruby

class Rack::Attack
### Configure Cache ###
# If you don't want to use Rails.cache (Rack::Attack's default), then
# configure it here.
#
# Note: The store is only used for throttling (not blocklisting and
# safelisting). It must implement .increment and .write like
# ActiveSupport::Cache::Store
# Rack::Attack.cache.store = ActiveSupport::Cache::MemoryStore.new
# https://github.com/rack/rack-attack/issues/102
Rack::Attack.cache.store = ActiveSupport::Cache::RedisCacheStore.new(redis: $velma)
class Request < ::Rack::Request
# You many need to specify a method to fetch the correct remote IP address
# if the web server is behind a load balancer.
def remote_ip
@remote_ip ||= (env['action_dispatch.remote_ip'] || ip).to_s
end
def allowed_ip?
allowed_ips = ['127.0.0.1', '::1']
allowed_ips.include?(remote_ip)
end
# Rails would allow requests to paths with extentions, so lets compare against the path with extention stripped
# example /auth & /auth.json would both work
def path_without_extentions
path[/^[^.]+/]
end
end
### Throttle Spammy Clients ###
# If any single client IP is making tons of requests, then they're
# probably malicious or a poorly-configured scraper. Either way, they
# don't deserve to hog all of the app server's CPU. Cut them off!
#
# Note: If you're serving assets through rack, those requests may be
# counted by rack-attack and this throttle may be activated too
# quickly. If so, enable the condition to exclude them from tracking.
# Throttle all requests by IP (60rpm)
#
# Key: "rack::attack:#{Time.now.to_i/:period}:req/ip:#{req.ip}"
throttle('req/ip', limit: ENV.fetch('RACK_ATTACK_LIMIT', '3000').to_i, period: 1.minute, &:ip)
###-----------------------------------------------###
###-----Authentication Related Throttling---------###
###-----------------------------------------------###
### Prevent Brute-Force Super Admin Login Attacks ###
throttle('super_admin_login/ip', limit: 5, period: 5.minutes) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/super_admin/sign_in' && req.post?
end
throttle('super_admin_login/email', limit: 5, period: 15.minutes) do |req|
if req.path_without_extentions == '/super_admin/sign_in' && req.post?
# NOTE: This line used to throw ArgumentError /rails/action_mailbox/sendgrid/inbound_emails : invalid byte sequence in UTF-8
# Hence placed in the if block
# ref: https://github.com/rack/rack-attack/issues/399
email = req.params['email'].presence || ActionDispatch::Request.new(req.env).params['email'].presence
email.to_s.downcase.gsub(/\s+/, '')
end
end
# ### Prevent Brute-Force Login Attacks ###
throttle('login/ip', limit: 5, period: 5.minutes) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/auth/sign_in' && req.post?
end
throttle('login/email', limit: 10, period: 15.minutes) do |req|
if req.path_without_extentions == '/auth/sign_in' && req.post?
# ref: https://github.com/rack/rack-attack/issues/399
# NOTE: This line used to throw ArgumentError /rails/action_mailbox/sendgrid/inbound_emails : invalid byte sequence in UTF-8
# Hence placed in the if block
email = req.params['email'].presence || ActionDispatch::Request.new(req.env).params['email'].presence
email.to_s.downcase.gsub(/\s+/, '')
end
end
## Reset password throttling
throttle('reset_password/ip', limit: 5, period: 30.minutes) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/auth/password' && req.post?
end
throttle('reset_password/email', limit: 5, period: 1.hour) do |req|
if req.path_without_extentions == '/auth/password' && req.post?
email = req.params['email'].presence || ActionDispatch::Request.new(req.env).params['email'].presence
email.to_s.downcase.gsub(/\s+/, '')
end
end
## Resend confirmation throttling
throttle('resend_confirmation/ip', limit: 5, period: 30.minutes) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/api/v1/profile/resend_confirmation' && req.post?
end
## Prevent Brute-Force Signup Attacks ###
throttle('accounts/ip', limit: 5, period: 30.minutes) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/api/v1/accounts' && req.post?
end
##-----------------------------------------------##
###-----------------------------------------------###
###-----------Widget API Throttling---------------###
###-----------------------------------------------###
# Rack attack on widget APIs can be disabled by setting ENABLE_RACK_ATTACK_WIDGET_API to false
# For clients using the widgets in specific conditions like inside and iframe
# TODO: Deprecate this feature in future after finding a better solution
if ActiveModel::Type::Boolean.new.cast(ENV.fetch('ENABLE_RACK_ATTACK_WIDGET_API', true))
## Prevent Conversation Bombing on Widget APIs ###
throttle('api/v1/widget/conversations', limit: 6, period: 12.hours) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/api/v1/widget/conversations' && req.post?
end
## Prevent Contact update Bombing in Widget API ###
throttle('api/v1/widget/contacts', limit: 60, period: 1.hour) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/api/v1/widget/contacts' && (req.patch? || req.put?)
end
## Prevent Conversation Bombing through multiple sessions
throttle('widget?website_token={website_token}&cw_conversation={x-auth-token}', limit: 5, period: 1.hour) do |req|
req.ip if req.path_without_extentions == '/widget' && ActionDispatch::Request.new(req.env).params['cw_conversation'].blank?
end
end
##-----------------------------------------------##
###-----------------------------------------------###
###----------Application API Throttling-----------###
###-----------------------------------------------###
## Prevent Abuse of Converstion Transcript APIs ###
throttle('/api/v1/accounts/:account_id/conversations/:conversation_id/transcript', limit: 30, period: 1.hour) do |req|
match_data = %r{/api/v1/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)/conversations/(?<conversation_id>\d+)/transcript}.match(req.path)
match_data[:account_id] if match_data.present?
end
## Prevent Abuse of attachment upload APIs ##
throttle('/api/v1/accounts/:account_id/upload', limit: 60, period: 1.hour) do |req|
match_data = %r{/api/v1/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)/upload}.match(req.path)
match_data[:account_id] if match_data.present?
end
## Prevent abuse of contact search api
throttle('/api/v1/accounts/:account_id/contacts/search', limit: ENV.fetch('RATE_LIMIT_CONTACT_SEARCH', '100').to_i, period: 1.minute) do |req|
match_data = %r{/api/v1/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)/contacts/search}.match(req.path)
match_data[:account_id] if match_data.present?
end
# Throttle by individual user (based on uid)
throttle('/api/v2/accounts/:account_id/reports/user', limit: ENV.fetch('RATE_LIMIT_REPORTS_API_USER_LEVEL', '100').to_i, period: 1.minute) do |req|
match_data = %r{/api/v2/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)/reports}.match(req.path)
# Extract user identification (uid for web, api_access_token for API requests)
user_uid = req.get_header('HTTP_UID')
api_access_token = req.get_header('HTTP_API_ACCESS_TOKEN') || req.get_header('api_access_token')
# Use uid if present, otherwise fallback to api_access_token for tracking
user_identifier = user_uid.presence || api_access_token.presence
"#{user_identifier}:#{match_data[:account_id]}" if match_data.present? && user_identifier.present?
end
## Prevent abuse of reports api at account level
throttle('/api/v2/accounts/:account_id/reports', limit: ENV.fetch('RATE_LIMIT_REPORTS_API_ACCOUNT_LEVEL', '1000').to_i, period: 1.minute) do |req|
match_data = %r{/api/v2/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)/reports}.match(req.path)
match_data[:account_id] if match_data.present?
end
## ----------------------------------------------- ##
end
# Log blocked events
ActiveSupport::Notifications.subscribe('throttle.rack_attack') do |_name, _start, _finish, _request_id, payload|
req = payload[:request]
user_uid = req.get_header('HTTP_UID')
api_access_token = req.get_header('HTTP_API_ACCESS_TOKEN') || req.get_header('api_access_token')
# Mask the token if present
masked_api_token = api_access_token.present? ? "#{api_access_token[0..4]}...[REDACTED]" : nil
# Use uid if present, otherwise fallback to masked api_access_token for tracking
user_identifier = user_uid.presence || masked_api_token.presence || 'unknown_user'
# Extract account ID if present
account_match = %r{/accounts/(?<account_id>\d+)}.match(req.path)
account_id = account_match ? account_match[:account_id] : 'unknown_account'
Rails.logger.warn(
"[Rack::Attack][Blocked] remote_ip: \"#{req.remote_ip}\", " \
"path: \"#{req.path}\", " \
"user_identifier: \"#{user_identifier}\", " \
"account_id: \"#{account_id}\", " \
"method: \"#{req.request_method}\", " \
"user_agent: \"#{req.user_agent}\""
)
end
Rack::Attack.enabled = Rails.env.production? ? ActiveModel::Type::Boolean.new.cast(ENV.fetch('ENABLE_RACK_ATTACK', true)) : false