diff --git a/go.mod b/go.mod index 6655f83..3f87f34 100644 --- a/go.mod +++ b/go.mod @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ module github.com/gabrie30/ghorg go 1.20 require ( - code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.15.1 + code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.16.0 github.com/MichaelMure/go-term-markdown v0.1.4 github.com/bradleyfalzon/ghinstallation/v2 v2.6.0 github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc @@ -25,10 +25,12 @@ require ( github.com/alecthomas/chroma v0.7.1 // indirect github.com/cloudflare/circl v1.3.3 // indirect github.com/danwakefield/fnmatch v0.0.0-20160403171240-cbb64ac3d964 // indirect + github.com/davidmz/go-pageant v1.0.2 // indirect github.com/disintegration/imaging v1.6.2 // indirect github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.1.6 // indirect github.com/eliukblau/pixterm/pkg/ansimage v0.0.0-20191210081756-9fb6cf8c2f75 // indirect github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0 // indirect + github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0 // indirect github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.0 // indirect github.com/golang/protobuf v1.5.3 // indirect github.com/gomarkdown/markdown v0.0.0-20191123064959-2c17d62f5098 // indirect diff --git a/go.sum b/go.sum index c937953..118d332 100644 --- a/go.sum +++ b/go.sum @@ -594,9 +594,8 @@ cloud.google.com/go/workflows v1.7.0/go.mod h1:JhSrZuVZWuiDfKEFxU0/F1PQjmpnpcoIS cloud.google.com/go/workflows v1.8.0/go.mod h1:ysGhmEajwZxGn1OhGOGKsTXc5PyxOc0vfKf5Af+to4M= cloud.google.com/go/workflows v1.9.0/go.mod h1:ZGkj1aFIOd9c8Gerkjjq7OW7I5+l6cSvT3ujaO/WwSA= cloud.google.com/go/workflows v1.10.0/go.mod h1:fZ8LmRmZQWacon9UCX1r/g/DfAXx5VcPALq2CxzdePw= -code.gitea.io/gitea-vet v0.2.1/go.mod h1:zcNbT/aJEmivCAhfmkHOlT645KNOf9W2KnkLgFjGGfE= -code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.15.1 h1:WJreC7YYuxbn0UDaPuWIe/mtiNKTvLN8MLkaw71yx/M= -code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.15.1/go.mod h1:klY2LVI3s3NChzIk/MzMn7G1FHrfU7qd63iSMVoHRBA= +code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.16.0 h1:gAfssETO1Hv9QbE+/nhWu7EjoFQYKt6kPoyDytQgw00= +code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.16.0/go.mod h1:ndkDk99BnfiUCCYEUhpNzi0lpmApXlwRFqClBlOlEBg= dmitri.shuralyov.com/gpu/mtl v0.0.0-20190408044501-666a987793e9/go.mod h1:H6x//7gZCb22OMCxBHrMx7a5I7Hp++hsVxbQ4BYO7hU= gioui.org v0.0.0-20210308172011-57750fc8a0a6/go.mod h1:RSH6KIUZ0p2xy5zHDxgAM4zumjgTw83q2ge/PI+yyw8= git.sr.ht/~sbinet/gg v0.3.1/go.mod h1:KGYtlADtqsqANL9ueOFkWymvzUvLMQllU5Ixo+8v3pc= @@ -668,6 +667,8 @@ github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.0/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSs github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.1/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38= github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc h1:U9qPSI2PIWSS1VwoXQT9A3Wy9MM3WgvqSxFWenqJduM= github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc/go.mod h1:J7Y8YcW2NihsgmVo/mv3lAwl/skON4iLHjSsI+c5H38= +github.com/davidmz/go-pageant v1.0.2 h1:bPblRCh5jGU+Uptpz6LgMZGD5hJoOt7otgT454WvHn0= +github.com/davidmz/go-pageant v1.0.2/go.mod h1:P2EDDnMqIwG5Rrp05dTRITj9z2zpGcD9efWSkTNKLIE= github.com/disintegration/imaging v1.6.2 h1:w1LecBlG2Lnp8B3jk5zSuNqd7b4DXhcjwek1ei82L+c= github.com/disintegration/imaging v1.6.2/go.mod h1:44/5580QXChDfwIclfc/PCwrr44amcmDAg8hxG0Ewe4= github.com/dlclark/regexp2 v1.1.6 h1:CqB4MjHw0MFCDj+PHHjiESmHX+N7t0tJzKvC6M97BRg= @@ -700,6 +701,8 @@ github.com/frankban/quicktest v1.14.4 h1:g2rn0vABPOOXmZUj+vbmUp0lPoXEMuhTpIluN0X github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0 h1:n+5WquG0fcWoWp6xPWfHdbskMCQaFnG6PfBrh1Ky4HY= github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0/go.mod h1:sl3t1tCWJFWoRz9R8WJCbQihKKwmorjAbSClcnxKAGw= github.com/ghodss/yaml v1.0.0/go.mod h1:4dBDuWmgqj2HViK6kFavaiC9ZROes6MMH2rRYeMEF04= +github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0 h1:9M+hb0jkEICD8/cAiNqEB66R87tTINszBRTjwjQzWcI= +github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0/go.mod h1:RCMrTZvN1bJYtofsG4rd5NaO5obxQ5xBkdiS7xsT7bM= github.com/go-fonts/dejavu v0.1.0/go.mod h1:4Wt4I4OU2Nq9asgDCteaAaWZOV24E+0/Pwo0gppep4g= github.com/go-fonts/latin-modern v0.2.0/go.mod h1:rQVLdDMK+mK1xscDwsqM5J8U2jrRa3T0ecnM9pNujks= github.com/go-fonts/liberation v0.1.1/go.mod h1:K6qoJYypsmfVjWg8KOVDQhLc8UDgIK2HYqyqAO9z7GY= @@ -836,7 +839,7 @@ github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog v0.9.2/go.mod h1:5CU+agLiy3J7N7QjHK5d05KxGsuXiQLrj github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog v1.5.0 h1:bI2ocEMgcVlz55Oj1xZNBsVi900c7II+fWDyV9o+13c= github.com/hashicorp/go-retryablehttp v0.7.2 h1:AcYqCvkpalPnPF2pn0KamgwamS42TqUDDYFRKq/RAd0= github.com/hashicorp/go-retryablehttp v0.7.2/go.mod h1:Jy/gPYAdjqffZ/yFGCFV2doI5wjtH1ewM9u8iYVjtX8= -github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.2.1/go.mod h1:fltr4n8CU8Ke44wwGCBoEymUuxUHl09ZGVZPK5anwXA= +github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.5.0/go.mod h1:fltr4n8CU8Ke44wwGCBoEymUuxUHl09ZGVZPK5anwXA= github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.6.0 h1:feTTfFNnjP967rlCxM/I9g701jU+RN74YKx2mOkIeek= github.com/hashicorp/go-version v1.6.0/go.mod h1:fltr4n8CU8Ke44wwGCBoEymUuxUHl09ZGVZPK5anwXA= github.com/hashicorp/golang-lru v0.5.0/go.mod h1:/m3WP610KZHVQ1SGc6re/UDhFvYD7pJ4Ao+sR/qLZy8= @@ -1002,10 +1005,12 @@ golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20190820162420-60c769a6c586/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8U golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191011191535-87dc89f01550/go.mod h1:yigFU9vqHzYiE8UmvKecakEJjdnWj3jj499lnFckfCI= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20200622213623-75b288015ac9/go.mod h1:LzIPMQfyMNhhGPhUkYOs5KpL4U8rLKemX1yGLhDgUto= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210421170649-83a5a9bb288b/go.mod h1:T9bdIzuCu7OtxOm1hfPfRQxPLYneinmdGuTeoZ9dtd4= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210513164829-c07d793c2f9a/go.mod h1:P+XmwS30IXTQdn5tA2iutPOUgjI07+tq3H3K9MVA1s8= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210817164053-32db794688a5/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20210921155107-089bfa567519/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20211108221036-ceb1ce70b4fa/go.mod h1:GvvjBRRGRdwPK5ydBHafDWAxML/pGHZbMvKqRZ5+Abc= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220314234659-1baeb1ce4c0b/go.mod h1:IxCIyHEi3zRg3s0A5j5BB6A9Jmi73HwBIUl50j+osU4= +golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220525230936-793ad666bf5e/go.mod h1:IxCIyHEi3zRg3s0A5j5BB6A9Jmi73HwBIUl50j+osU4= golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20220722155217-630584e8d5aa/go.mod h1:IxCIyHEi3zRg3s0A5j5BB6A9Jmi73HwBIUl50j+osU4= golang.org/x/crypto v0.1.0/go.mod h1:RecgLatLF4+eUMCP1PoPZQb+cVrJcOPbHkTkbkB9sbw= golang.org/x/crypto v0.3.1-0.20221117191849-2c476679df9a/go.mod h1:hebNnKkNXi2UzZN1eVRvBB7co0a+JxK6XbPiWVs/3J4= @@ -1284,6 +1289,7 @@ golang.org/x/term v0.5.0/go.mod h1:jMB1sMXY+tzblOD4FWmEbocvup2/aLOaQEp7JmGp78k= golang.org/x/term v0.6.0/go.mod h1:m6U89DPEgQRMq3DNkDClhWw02AUbt2daBVO4cn4Hv9U= golang.org/x/term v0.7.0/go.mod h1:P32HKFT3hSsZrRxla30E9HqToFYAQPCMs/zFMBUFqPY= golang.org/x/term v0.8.0/go.mod h1:xPskH00ivmX89bAKVGSKKtLOWNx2+17Eiy94tnKShWo= +golang.org/x/term v0.13.0 h1:bb+I9cTfFazGW51MZqBVmZy7+JEJMouUHTUSKVQLBek= golang.org/x/term v0.13.0/go.mod h1:LTmsnFJwVN6bCy1rVCoS+qHT1HhALEFxKncY3WNNh4U= golang.org/x/text v0.0.0-20170915032832-14c0d48ead0c/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ= golang.org/x/text v0.3.0/go.mod h1:NqM8EUOU14njkJ3fqMW+pc6Ldnwhi/IjpwHt7yyuwOQ= @@ -1345,7 +1351,6 @@ golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200224181240-023911ca70b2/go.mod h1:TB2adYChydJhpapK golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200227222343-706bc42d1f0d/go.mod h1:TB2adYChydJhpapKDTa4BR/hXlZSLoq2Wpct/0txZ28= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200304193943-95d2e580d8eb/go.mod h1:o4KQGtdN14AW+yjsvvwRTJJuXz8XRtIHtEnmAXLyFUw= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200312045724-11d5b4c81c7d/go.mod h1:o4KQGtdN14AW+yjsvvwRTJJuXz8XRtIHtEnmAXLyFUw= -golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200325010219-a49f79bcc224/go.mod h1:Sl4aGygMT6LrqrWclx+PTx3U+LnKx/seiNR+3G19Ar8= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200331025713-a30bf2db82d4/go.mod h1:Sl4aGygMT6LrqrWclx+PTx3U+LnKx/seiNR+3G19Ar8= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200501065659-ab2804fb9c9d/go.mod h1:EkVYQZoAsY45+roYkvgYkIh4xh/qjgUK9TdY2XT94GE= golang.org/x/tools v0.0.0-20200512131952-2bc93b1c0c88/go.mod h1:EkVYQZoAsY45+roYkvgYkIh4xh/qjgUK9TdY2XT94GE= diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7622ece --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent.go @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !windows + +package gitea + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent" +) + +// hasAgent returns true if the ssh agent is available +func hasAgent() bool { + if _, err := os.Stat(os.Getenv("SSH_AUTH_SOCK")); err != nil { + return false + } + + return true +} + +// GetAgent returns a ssh agent +func GetAgent() (agent.Agent, error) { + if !hasAgent() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no ssh agent available") + } + + sshAgent, err := net.Dial("unix", os.Getenv("SSH_AUTH_SOCK")) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return agent.NewClient(sshAgent), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent_windows.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent_windows.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..135dc4f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/agent_windows.go @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build windows + +package gitea + +import ( + "fmt" + + "github.com/davidmz/go-pageant" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent" +) + +// hasAgent returns true if pageant is available +func hasAgent() bool { + return pageant.Available() +} + +// GetAgent returns a ssh agent +func GetAgent() (agent.Agent, error) { + if !hasAgent() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no pageant available") + } + + return pageant.New(), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/attachment.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/attachment.go index 24c57ba..f02c721 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/attachment.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/attachment.go @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ func (c *Client) ListReleaseAttachments(user, repo string, release int64, opt Li } // GetReleaseAttachment returns the requested attachment -func (c *Client) GetReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release int64, id int64) (*Attachment, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) GetReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release, id int64) (*Attachment, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ type EditAttachmentOptions struct { } // EditReleaseAttachment updates the given attachment with the given options -func (c *Client) EditReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release int64, attachment int64, form EditAttachmentOptions) (*Attachment, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) EditReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release, attachment int64, form EditAttachmentOptions) (*Attachment, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ func (c *Client) EditReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release int64, attachm } // DeleteReleaseAttachment deletes the given attachment including the uploaded file -func (c *Client) DeleteReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release int64, id int64) (*Response, error) { +func (c *Client) DeleteReleaseAttachment(user, repo string, release, id int64) (*Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { return nil, err } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/client.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/client.go index 3fe3e8b..22f0eed 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/client.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/client.go @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ package gitea import ( + "bytes" "context" "encoding/json" "errors" @@ -24,22 +25,22 @@ var jsonHeader = http.Header{"content-type": []string{"application/json"}} // Version return the library version func Version() string { - return "0.15.1" + return "0.16.0" } // Client represents a thread-safe Gitea API client. type Client struct { - url string - accessToken string - username string - password string - otp string - sudo string - debug bool - client *http.Client - ctx context.Context - mutex sync.RWMutex - + url string + accessToken string + username string + password string + otp string + sudo string + debug bool + httpsigner *HTTPSign + client *http.Client + ctx context.Context + mutex sync.RWMutex serverVersion *version.Version getVersionOnce sync.Once ignoreVersion bool // only set by SetGiteaVersion so don't need a mutex lock @@ -67,8 +68,12 @@ func NewClient(url string, options ...ClientOption) (*Client, error) { } } if err := client.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_11_0); err != nil { + if errors.Is(err, &ErrUnknownVersion{}) { + return client, err + } return nil, err } + return client, nil } @@ -112,6 +117,52 @@ func SetBasicAuth(username, password string) ClientOption { } } +// UseSSHCert is an option for NewClient to enable SSH certificate authentication via HTTPSign +// If you want to auth against the ssh-agent you'll need to set a principal, if you want to +// use a file on disk you'll need to specify sshKey. +// If you have an encrypted sshKey you'll need to also set the passphrase. +func UseSSHCert(principal, sshKey, passphrase string) ClientOption { + return func(client *Client) error { + if err := client.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_17_0); err != nil { + return err + } + + client.mutex.Lock() + defer client.mutex.Unlock() + + var err error + client.httpsigner, err = NewHTTPSignWithCert(principal, sshKey, passphrase) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil + } +} + +// UseSSHPubkey is an option for NewClient to enable SSH pubkey authentication via HTTPSign +// If you want to auth against the ssh-agent you'll need to set a fingerprint, if you want to +// use a file on disk you'll need to specify sshKey. +// If you have an encrypted sshKey you'll need to also set the passphrase. +func UseSSHPubkey(fingerprint, sshKey, passphrase string) ClientOption { + return func(client *Client) error { + if err := client.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_17_0); err != nil { + return err + } + + client.mutex.Lock() + defer client.mutex.Unlock() + + var err error + client.httpsigner, err = NewHTTPSignWithPubkey(fingerprint, sshKey, passphrase) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil + } +} + // SetBasicAuth sets username and password func (c *Client) SetBasicAuth(username, password string) { c.mutex.Lock() @@ -199,14 +250,20 @@ func (c *Client) getWebResponse(method, path string, body io.Reader) ([]byte, *R if debug { fmt.Printf("Response: %v\n\n", resp) } - return data, &Response{resp}, nil + return data, &Response{resp}, err } func (c *Client) doRequest(method, path string, header http.Header, body io.Reader) (*Response, error) { c.mutex.RLock() debug := c.debug if debug { - fmt.Printf("%s: %s\nHeader: %v\nBody: %s\n", method, c.url+"/api/v1"+path, header, body) + var bodyStr string + if body != nil { + bs, _ := ioutil.ReadAll(body) + body = bytes.NewReader(bs) + bodyStr = string(bs) + } + fmt.Printf("%s: %s\nHeader: %v\nBody: %s\n", method, c.url+"/api/v1"+path, header, bodyStr) } req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(c.ctx, method, c.url+"/api/v1"+path, body) if err != nil { @@ -233,6 +290,13 @@ func (c *Client) doRequest(method, path string, header http.Header, body io.Read req.Header[k] = v } + if c.httpsigner != nil { + err = c.SignRequest(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + resp, err := client.Do(req) if err != nil { return nil, err @@ -262,33 +326,44 @@ func statusCodeToErr(resp *Response) (body []byte, err error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("body read on HTTP error %d: %v", resp.StatusCode, err) } - switch resp.StatusCode { - case 403: - return data, errors.New("403 Forbidden") - case 404: - return data, errors.New("404 Not Found") - case 409: - return data, errors.New("409 Conflict") - case 422: - return data, fmt.Errorf("422 Unprocessable Entity: %s", string(data)) - } - - path := resp.Request.URL.Path - method := resp.Request.Method - header := resp.Request.Header + // Try to unmarshal and get an error message errMap := make(map[string]interface{}) if err = json.Unmarshal(data, &errMap); err != nil { // when the JSON can't be parsed, data was probably empty or a // plain string, so we try to return a helpful error anyway + path := resp.Request.URL.Path + method := resp.Request.Method + header := resp.Request.Header return data, fmt.Errorf("Unknown API Error: %d\nRequest: '%s' with '%s' method '%s' header and '%s' body", resp.StatusCode, path, method, header, string(data)) } - return data, errors.New(errMap["message"].(string)) + + if msg, ok := errMap["message"]; ok { + return data, fmt.Errorf("%v", msg) + } + + // If no error message, at least give status and data + return data, fmt.Errorf("%s: %s", resp.Status, string(data)) +} + +func (c *Client) getResponseReader(method, path string, header http.Header, body io.Reader) (io.ReadCloser, *Response, error) { + resp, err := c.doRequest(method, path, header, body) + if err != nil { + return nil, resp, err + } + + // check for errors + data, err := statusCodeToErr(resp) + if err != nil { + return io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(data)), resp, err + } + + return resp.Body, resp, nil } func (c *Client) getResponse(method, path string, header http.Header, body io.Reader) ([]byte, *Response, error) { resp, err := c.doRequest(method, path, header, body) if err != nil { - return nil, nil, err + return nil, resp, err } defer resp.Body.Close() diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/doc.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/doc.go index 6bd327d..777ad2f 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/doc.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/doc.go @@ -2,4 +2,8 @@ // Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style // license that can be found in the LICENSE file. +// Package gitea implements a client for the Gitea API. +// The version corresponds to the highest supported version +// of the gitea API, but backwards-compatibility is mostly +// given. package gitea // import "code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea" diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/fork.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/fork.go index c8e5323..0373c35 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/fork.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/fork.go @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type ListForksOptions struct { } // ListForks list a repository's forks -func (c *Client) ListForks(user string, repo string, opt ListForksOptions) ([]*Repository, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) ListForks(user, repo string, opt ListForksOptions) ([]*Repository, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ func (c *Client) ListForks(user string, repo string, opt ListForksOptions) ([]*R type CreateForkOption struct { // organization name, if forking into an organization Organization *string `json:"organization"` + // name of the forked repository + Name *string `json:"name"` } // CreateFork create a fork of a repository diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/hook_validate.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/hook_validate.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ef6149 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/hook_validate.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha256" + "encoding/hex" + "io" + "net/http" +) + +// VerifyWebhookSignature verifies that a payload matches the X-Gitea-Signature based on a secret +func VerifyWebhookSignature(secret, expected string, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + hash := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(secret)) + if _, err := hash.Write(payload); err != nil { + return false, err + } + expectedSum, err := hex.DecodeString(expected) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + return hmac.Equal(hash.Sum(nil), expectedSum), nil +} + +// VerifyWebhookSignatureMiddleware is a http.Handler for verifying X-Gitea-Signature on incoming webhooks +func VerifyWebhookSignatureMiddleware(secret string) func(http.Handler) http.Handler { + return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler { + return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + var b bytes.Buffer + if _, err := io.Copy(&b, r.Body); err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + expected := r.Header.Get("X-Gitea-Signature") + if expected == "" { + http.Error(w, "no signature found", http.StatusBadRequest) + return + } + + ok, err := VerifyWebhookSignature(secret, expected, b.Bytes()) + if err != nil { + http.Error(w, err.Error(), http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + if !ok { + http.Error(w, "invalid payload", http.StatusUnauthorized) + return + } + + r.Body = io.NopCloser(&b) + next.ServeHTTP(w, r) + }) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/httpsign.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/httpsign.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49b0059 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/httpsign.go @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import ( + "crypto" + "encoding/base64" + "fmt" + "io" + "net/http" + "os" + "strings" + "time" + + "github.com/go-fed/httpsig" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// HTTPSign contains the signer used for signing requests +type HTTPSign struct { + ssh.Signer + cert bool +} + +// HTTPSignConfig contains the configuration for creating a HTTPSign +type HTTPSignConfig struct { + fingerprint string + principal string + pubkey bool + cert bool + sshKey string + passphrase string +} + +// NewHTTPSignWithPubkey can be used to create a HTTPSign with a public key +// if no fingerprint is specified it returns the first public key found +func NewHTTPSignWithPubkey(fingerprint, sshKey, passphrase string) (*HTTPSign, error) { + return newHTTPSign(&HTTPSignConfig{ + fingerprint: fingerprint, + pubkey: true, + sshKey: sshKey, + passphrase: passphrase, + }) +} + +// NewHTTPSignWithCert can be used to create a HTTPSign with a certificate +// if no principal is specified it returns the first certificate found +func NewHTTPSignWithCert(principal, sshKey, passphrase string) (*HTTPSign, error) { + return newHTTPSign(&HTTPSignConfig{ + principal: principal, + cert: true, + sshKey: sshKey, + passphrase: passphrase, + }) +} + +// NewHTTPSign returns a new HTTPSign +// It will check the ssh-agent or a local file is config.sshKey is set. +// Depending on the configuration it will either use a certificate or a public key +func newHTTPSign(config *HTTPSignConfig) (*HTTPSign, error) { + var signer ssh.Signer + + if config.sshKey != "" { + priv, err := os.ReadFile(config.sshKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if config.passphrase == "" { + signer, err = ssh.ParsePrivateKey(priv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } else { + signer, err = ssh.ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(priv, []byte(config.passphrase)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + if config.cert { + certbytes, err := os.ReadFile(config.sshKey + "-cert.pub") + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pub, _, _, _, err := ssh.ParseAuthorizedKey(certbytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cert, ok := pub.(*ssh.Certificate) + if !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse certificate") + } + + signer, err = ssh.NewCertSigner(cert, signer) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } else { + // if no sshKey is specified, check if we have a ssh-agent and use it + agent, err := GetAgent() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + signers, err := agent.Signers() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(signers) == 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no signers found") + } + + if config.cert { + signer = findCertSigner(signers, config.principal) + if signer == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no certificate found for %s", config.principal) + } + } + + if config.pubkey { + signer = findPubkeySigner(signers, config.fingerprint) + if signer == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no public key found for %s", config.fingerprint) + } + } + } + + return &HTTPSign{ + Signer: signer, + cert: config.cert, + }, nil +} + +// SignRequest signs a HTTP request +func (c *Client) SignRequest(r *http.Request) error { + var contents []byte + + headersToSign := []string{httpsig.RequestTarget, "(created)", "(expires)"} + + if c.httpsigner.cert { + // add our certificate to the headers to sign + pubkey, _ := ssh.ParsePublicKey(c.httpsigner.Signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) + if cert, ok := pubkey.(*ssh.Certificate); ok { + certString := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(cert.Marshal()) + r.Header.Add("x-ssh-certificate", certString) + + headersToSign = append(headersToSign, "x-ssh-certificate") + } else { + return fmt.Errorf("no ssh certificate found") + } + } + + // if we have a body, the Digest header will be added and we'll include this also in + // our signature. + if r.Body != nil { + body, err := r.GetBody() + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("getBody() failed: %s", err) + } + + contents, err = io.ReadAll(body) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed reading body: %s", err) + } + + headersToSign = append(headersToSign, "Digest") + } + + // create a signer for the request and headers, the signature will be valid for 10 seconds + signer, _, err := httpsig.NewSSHSigner(c.httpsigner.Signer, httpsig.DigestSha512, headersToSign, httpsig.Signature, 10) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("httpsig.NewSSHSigner failed: %s", err) + } + + // sign the request, use the fingerprint if we don't have a certificate + keyID := "gitea" + if !c.httpsigner.cert { + keyID = ssh.FingerprintSHA256(c.httpsigner.Signer.PublicKey()) + } + + err = signer.SignRequest(keyID, r, contents) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("httpsig.Signrequest failed: %s", err) + } + + return nil +} + +// findCertSigner returns the Signer containing a valid certificate +// if no principal is specified it returns the first certificate found +func findCertSigner(sshsigners []ssh.Signer, principal string) ssh.Signer { + for _, s := range sshsigners { + // Check if the key is a certificate + if !strings.Contains(s.PublicKey().Type(), "cert-v01@openssh.com") { + continue + } + + // convert the ssh.Signer to a ssh.Certificate + mpubkey, _ := ssh.ParsePublicKey(s.PublicKey().Marshal()) + cryptopub := mpubkey.(crypto.PublicKey) + cert := cryptopub.(*ssh.Certificate) + t := time.Unix(int64(cert.ValidBefore), 0) + + // make sure the certificate is at least 10 seconds valid + if time.Until(t) <= time.Second*10 { + continue + } + + if principal == "" { + return s + } + + for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals { + if p == principal { + return s + } + } + } + + return nil +} + +// findPubkeySigner returns the Signer containing a valid public key +// if no fingerprint is specified it returns the first public key found +func findPubkeySigner(sshsigners []ssh.Signer, fingerprint string) ssh.Signer { + for _, s := range sshsigners { + // Check if the key is a certificate + if strings.Contains(s.PublicKey().Type(), "cert-v01@openssh.com") { + continue + } + + if fingerprint == "" { + return s + } + + if strings.TrimSpace(string(ssh.MarshalAuthorizedKey(s.PublicKey()))) == fingerprint { + return s + } + + if ssh.FingerprintSHA256(s.PublicKey()) == fingerprint { + return s + } + } + + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue.go index c33856a..603d23d 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue.go @@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ type ListIssueOption struct { AssignedBy string // filter by username mentioned MentionedBy string + // filter by owner (only works on ListIssues on User) + Owner string + // filter by team (requires organization owner parameter to be provided and only works on ListIssues on User) + Team string } // StateType issue state type @@ -135,6 +139,12 @@ func (opt *ListIssueOption) QueryEncode() string { if len(opt.MentionedBy) > 0 { query.Add("mentioned_by", opt.MentionedBy) } + if len(opt.Owner) > 0 { + query.Add("owner", opt.Owner) + } + if len(opt.Team) > 0 { + query.Add("team", opt.MentionedBy) + } return query.Encode() } @@ -279,6 +289,17 @@ func (c *Client) EditIssue(owner, repo string, index int64, opt EditIssueOption) return issue, resp, err } +// DeleteIssue delete a issue from a repository +func (c *Client) DeleteIssue(user, repo string, id int64) (*Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + _, resp, err := c.getResponse("DELETE", + fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/issues/%d", user, repo, id), + nil, nil) + return resp, err +} + func (c *Client) issueBackwardsCompatibility(issue *Issue) { if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_12_0) != nil { c.mutex.RLock() diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_milestone.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_milestone.go index dfb5720..4e0d79a 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_milestone.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_milestone.go @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ func (c *Client) GetMilestone(owner, repo string, id int64) (*Milestone, *Respon } // GetMilestoneByName get one milestone by repo and milestone name -func (c *Client) GetMilestoneByName(owner, repo string, name string) (*Milestone, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) GetMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name string) (*Milestone, *Response, error) { if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0) != nil { // backwards compatibility mode m, resp, err := c.resolveMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name) @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ func (c *Client) EditMilestone(owner, repo string, id int64, opt EditMilestoneOp } // EditMilestoneByName modify milestone with options -func (c *Client) EditMilestoneByName(owner, repo string, name string, opt EditMilestoneOption) (*Milestone, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) EditMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name string, opt EditMilestoneOption) (*Milestone, *Response, error) { if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0) != nil { // backwards compatibility mode m, _, err := c.resolveMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name) @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeleteMilestone(owner, repo string, id int64) (*Response, error } // DeleteMilestoneByName delete one milestone by name -func (c *Client) DeleteMilestoneByName(owner, repo string, name string) (*Response, error) { +func (c *Client) DeleteMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name string) (*Response, error) { if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0) != nil { // backwards compatibility mode m, _, err := c.resolveMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name) @@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ func (c *Client) resolveMilestoneByName(owner, repo, name string) (*Milestone, * return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("milestone '%s' do not exist", name) } for _, m := range miles { - if strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(m.Title)) == strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name)) { + if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(m.Title), strings.TrimSpace(name)) { return m, resp, nil } } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_template.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_template.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e6ac1e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/issue_template.go @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// Copyright 2020 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import ( + "fmt" +) + +// IssueTemplate provides metadata and content on an issue template. +// There are two types of issue templates: .Markdown- and .Form-based. +type IssueTemplate struct { + Name string `json:"name"` + About string `json:"about"` + Filename string `json:"file_name"` + IssueTitle string `json:"title"` + IssueLabels []string `json:"labels"` + IssueRef string `json:"ref"` + // If non-nil, this is a form-based template + Form []IssueFormElement `json:"body"` + // Should only be used when .Form is nil. + MarkdownContent string `json:"content"` +} + +// IssueFormElement describes a part of a IssueTemplate form +type IssueFormElement struct { + ID string `json:"id"` + Type IssueFormElementType `json:"type"` + Attributes IssueFormElementAttributes `json:"attributes"` + Validations IssueFormElementValidations `json:"validations"` +} + +// IssueFormElementAttributes contains the combined set of attributes available on all element types. +type IssueFormElementAttributes struct { + // required for all element types. + // A brief description of the expected user input, which is also displayed in the form. + Label string `json:"label"` + // required for element types "dropdown", "checkboxes" + // for dropdown, contains the available options + Options []string `json:"options"` + // for element types "markdown", "textarea", "input" + // Text that is pre-filled in the input + Value string `json:"value"` + // for element types "textarea", "input", "dropdown", "checkboxes" + // A description of the text area to provide context or guidance, which is displayed in the form. + Description string `json:"description"` + // for element types "textarea", "input" + // A semi-opaque placeholder that renders in the text area when empty. + Placeholder string `json:"placeholder"` + // for element types "textarea" + // A language specifier. If set, the input is rendered as codeblock with syntax highlighting. + SyntaxHighlighting string `json:"render"` + // for element types "dropdown" + Multiple bool `json:"multiple"` +} + +// IssueFormElementValidations contains the combined set of validations available on all element types. +type IssueFormElementValidations struct { + // for all element types + Required bool `json:"required"` + // for element types "input" + IsNumber bool `json:"is_number"` + // for element types "input" + Regex string `json:"regex"` +} + +// IssueFormElementType is an enum +type IssueFormElementType string + +const ( + // IssueFormElementMarkdown is markdown rendered to the form for context, but omitted in the resulting issue + IssueFormElementMarkdown IssueFormElementType = "markdown" + // IssueFormElementTextarea is a multi line input + IssueFormElementTextarea IssueFormElementType = "textarea" + // IssueFormElementInput is a single line input + IssueFormElementInput IssueFormElementType = "input" + // IssueFormElementDropdown is a select form + IssueFormElementDropdown IssueFormElementType = "dropdown" + // IssueFormElementCheckboxes are a multi checkbox input + IssueFormElementCheckboxes IssueFormElementType = "checkboxes" +) + +// GetIssueTemplates lists all issue templates of the repository +func (c *Client) GetIssueTemplates(owner, repo string) ([]*IssueTemplate, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + templates := new([]*IssueTemplate) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/issue_templates", owner, repo), nil, nil, templates) + return *templates, resp, err +} + +// IsForm tells if this template is a form instead of a markdown-based template. +func (t IssueTemplate) IsForm() bool { + return t.Form != nil +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/list_options.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/list_options.go index 6f3ffb2..fb1aff4 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/list_options.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/list_options.go @@ -9,12 +9,13 @@ import ( "net/url" ) -const defaultPageSize = 10 -const maxPageSize = 50 - // ListOptions options for using Gitea's API pagination type ListOptions struct { - Page int + // Setting Page to -1 disables pagination on endpoints that support it. + // Page numbering starts at 1. + Page int + // The default value depends on the server config DEFAULT_PAGING_NUM + // The highest valid value depends on the server config MAX_RESPONSE_ITEMS PageSize int } @@ -26,8 +27,9 @@ func (o ListOptions) getURLQuery() url.Values { return query } -// setDefaults set default pagination options if none or wrong are set -// if you set -1 as page it will set all to 0 +// setDefaults applies default pagination options. +// If .Page is set to -1, it will disable pagination. +// WARNING: This function is not idempotent, make sure to never call this method twice! func (o *ListOptions) setDefaults() { if o.Page < 0 { o.Page, o.PageSize = 0, 0 @@ -35,8 +37,4 @@ func (o *ListOptions) setDefaults() { } else if o.Page == 0 { o.Page = 1 } - - if o.PageSize < 0 || o.PageSize > maxPageSize { - o.PageSize = defaultPageSize - } } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/notifications.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/notifications.go index 8b1ffa7..640cc4d 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/notifications.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/notifications.go @@ -8,12 +8,6 @@ import ( "fmt" "net/url" "time" - - "github.com/hashicorp/go-version" -) - -var ( - version1_12_3, _ = version.NewVersion("1.12.3") ) // NotificationThread expose Notification on API @@ -29,11 +23,13 @@ type NotificationThread struct { // NotificationSubject contains the notification subject (Issue/Pull/Commit) type NotificationSubject struct { - Title string `json:"title"` - URL string `json:"url"` - LatestCommentURL string `json:"latest_comment_url"` - Type NotifySubjectType `json:"type"` - State NotifySubjectState `json:"state"` + Title string `json:"title"` + URL string `json:"url"` + HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"` + LatestCommentURL string `json:"latest_comment_url"` + LatestCommentHTMLURL string `json:"latest_comment_html_url"` + Type NotifySubjectType `json:"type"` + State NotifySubjectState `json:"state"` } // NotifyStatus notification status type @@ -164,16 +160,22 @@ func (c *Client) GetNotification(id int64) (*NotificationThread, *Response, erro // ReadNotification mark notification thread as read by ID // It optionally takes a second argument if status has to be set other than 'read' -func (c *Client) ReadNotification(id int64, status ...NotifyStatus) (*Response, error) { +// The relevant notification will be returned as the first parameter when the Gitea server is 1.16.0 or higher. +func (c *Client) ReadNotification(id int64, status ...NotifyStatus) (*NotificationThread, *Response, error) { if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_12_0); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } link := fmt.Sprintf("/notifications/threads/%d", id) if len(status) != 0 { link += fmt.Sprintf("?to-status=%s", status[0]) } + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err == nil { + thread := &NotificationThread{} + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("PATCH", link, nil, nil, thread) + return thread, resp, err + } _, resp, err := c.getResponse("PATCH", link, nil, nil) - return resp, err + return nil, resp, err } // ListNotifications list users's notification threads @@ -192,17 +194,24 @@ func (c *Client) ListNotifications(opt ListNotificationOptions) ([]*Notification } // ReadNotifications mark notification threads as read -func (c *Client) ReadNotifications(opt MarkNotificationOptions) (*Response, error) { +// The relevant notifications will only be returned as the first parameter when the Gitea server is 1.16.0 or higher. +func (c *Client) ReadNotifications(opt MarkNotificationOptions) ([]*NotificationThread, *Response, error) { if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_12_0); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } if err := opt.Validate(c); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } link, _ := url.Parse("/notifications") link.RawQuery = opt.QueryEncode() + + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err == nil { + threads := make([]*NotificationThread, 0, 10) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("PUT", link.String(), nil, nil, &threads) + return threads, resp, err + } _, resp, err := c.getResponse("PUT", link.String(), nil, nil) - return resp, err + return nil, resp, err } // ListRepoNotifications list users's notification threads on a specific repo @@ -224,18 +233,25 @@ func (c *Client) ListRepoNotifications(owner, repo string, opt ListNotificationO } // ReadRepoNotifications mark notification threads as read on a specific repo -func (c *Client) ReadRepoNotifications(owner, repo string, opt MarkNotificationOptions) (*Response, error) { +// The relevant notifications will only be returned as the first parameter when the Gitea server is 1.16.0 or higher. +func (c *Client) ReadRepoNotifications(owner, repo string, opt MarkNotificationOptions) ([]*NotificationThread, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_12_0); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } if err := opt.Validate(c); err != nil { - return nil, err + return nil, nil, err } link, _ := url.Parse(fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/notifications", owner, repo)) link.RawQuery = opt.QueryEncode() + + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err == nil { + threads := make([]*NotificationThread, 0, 10) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("PUT", link.String(), nil, nil, &threads) + return threads, resp, err + } _, resp, err := c.getResponse("PUT", link.String(), nil, nil) - return resp, err + return nil, resp, err } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/oauth2.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/oauth2.go index bbdfdaf..86e2568 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/oauth2.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/oauth2.go @@ -13,12 +13,13 @@ import ( // Oauth2 represents an Oauth2 Application type Oauth2 struct { - ID int64 `json:"id"` - Name string `json:"name"` - ClientID string `json:"client_id"` - ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"` - RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"` - Created time.Time `json:"created"` + ID int64 `json:"id"` + Name string `json:"name"` + ClientID string `json:"client_id"` + ClientSecret string `json:"client_secret"` + RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"` + ConfidentialClient bool `json:"confidential_client"` + Created time.Time `json:"created"` } // ListOauth2Option for listing Oauth2 Applications @@ -28,8 +29,9 @@ type ListOauth2Option struct { // CreateOauth2Option required options for creating an Application type CreateOauth2Option struct { - Name string `json:"name"` - RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"` + Name string `json:"name"` + ConfidentialClient bool `json:"confidential_client"` + RedirectURIs []string `json:"redirect_uris"` } // CreateOauth2 create an Oauth2 Application and returns a completed Oauth2 object. diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_action.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_action.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a1dec28 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_action.go @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import ( + "fmt" + "net/url" +) + +// ListOrgMembershipOption list OrgMembership options +type ListOrgActionSecretOption struct { + ListOptions +} + +// ListOrgMembership list an organization's members +func (c *Client) ListOrgActionSecret(org string, opt ListOrgActionSecretOption) ([]*Secret, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&org); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + opt.setDefaults() + secrets := make([]*Secret, 0, opt.PageSize) + + link, _ := url.Parse(fmt.Sprintf("/orgs/%s/actions/secrets", org)) + link.RawQuery = opt.getURLQuery().Encode() + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", link.String(), jsonHeader, nil, &secrets) + return secrets, resp, err +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_member.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_member.go index 1eed90f..79dad4e 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_member.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_member.go @@ -117,3 +117,26 @@ func (c *Client) SetPublicOrgMembership(org, user string, visible bool) (*Respon return resp, fmt.Errorf("unexpected Status: %d", status) } } + +// OrgPermissions represents the permissions for an user in an organization +type OrgPermissions struct { + CanCreateRepository bool `json:"can_create_repository"` + CanRead bool `json:"can_read"` + CanWrite bool `json:"can_write"` + IsAdmin bool `json:"is_admin"` + IsOwner bool `json:"is_owner"` +} + +// GetOrgPermissions returns user permissions for specific organization. +func (c *Client) GetOrgPermissions(org, user string) (*OrgPermissions, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&org, &user); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + perm := &OrgPermissions{} + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/users/%s/orgs/%s/permissions", user, org), jsonHeader, nil, &perm) + if err != nil { + return nil, resp, err + } + return perm, resp, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_team.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_team.go index 4b1b27b..e7caa5a 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_team.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/org_team.go @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ import ( "bytes" "encoding/json" "fmt" + "net/url" ) // Team represents a team in an organization @@ -42,6 +43,8 @@ const ( RepoUnitReleases RepoUnitType = "repo.releases" // RepoUnitProjects represent projects of a repository RepoUnitProjects RepoUnitType = "repo.projects" + // RepoUnitPackages represents packages of a repository + RepoUnitPackages RepoUnitType = "repo.packages" ) // ListTeamsOptions options for listing teams @@ -75,6 +78,44 @@ func (c *Client) GetTeam(id int64) (*Team, *Response, error) { return t, resp, err } +// SearchTeamsOptions options for searching teams. +type SearchTeamsOptions struct { + ListOptions + Query string + IncludeDescription bool +} + +func (o SearchTeamsOptions) getURLQuery() url.Values { + query := make(url.Values) + query.Add("page", fmt.Sprintf("%d", o.Page)) + query.Add("limit", fmt.Sprintf("%d", o.PageSize)) + query.Add("q", o.Query) + query.Add("include_desc", fmt.Sprintf("%t", o.IncludeDescription)) + + return query +} + +// TeamSearchResults is the JSON struct that is returned from Team search API. +type TeamSearchResults struct { + OK bool `json:"ok"` + Error string `json:"error"` + Data []*Team `json:"data"` +} + +// SearchOrgTeams search for teams in a org. +func (c *Client) SearchOrgTeams(org string, opt *SearchTeamsOptions) ([]*Team, *Response, error) { + responseBody := TeamSearchResults{} + opt.setDefaults() + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/orgs/%s/teams/search?%s", org, opt.getURLQuery().Encode()), nil, nil, &responseBody) + if err != nil { + return nil, resp, err + } + if !responseBody.OK { + return nil, resp, fmt.Errorf("gitea error: %v", responseBody.Error) + } + return responseBody.Data, resp, err +} + // CreateTeamOption options for creating a team type CreateTeamOption struct { Name string `json:"name"` @@ -86,7 +127,7 @@ type CreateTeamOption struct { } // Validate the CreateTeamOption struct -func (opt CreateTeamOption) Validate() error { +func (opt *CreateTeamOption) Validate() error { if opt.Permission == AccessModeOwner { opt.Permission = AccessModeAdmin } else if opt.Permission != AccessModeRead && opt.Permission != AccessModeWrite && opt.Permission != AccessModeAdmin { @@ -109,7 +150,7 @@ func (c *Client) CreateTeam(org string, opt CreateTeamOption) (*Team, *Response, if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&org); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } - if err := opt.Validate(); err != nil { + if err := (&opt).Validate(); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } body, err := json.Marshal(&opt) @@ -132,7 +173,7 @@ type EditTeamOption struct { } // Validate the EditTeamOption struct -func (opt EditTeamOption) Validate() error { +func (opt *EditTeamOption) Validate() error { if opt.Permission == AccessModeOwner { opt.Permission = AccessModeAdmin } else if opt.Permission != AccessModeRead && opt.Permission != AccessModeWrite && opt.Permission != AccessModeAdmin { @@ -152,7 +193,7 @@ func (opt EditTeamOption) Validate() error { // EditTeam edits a team of an organization func (c *Client) EditTeam(id int64, opt EditTeamOption) (*Response, error) { - if err := opt.Validate(); err != nil { + if err := (&opt).Validate(); err != nil { return nil, err } body, err := json.Marshal(&opt) diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/package.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/package.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df3bd3c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/package.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import ( + "fmt" + "time" +) + +// Package represents a package +type Package struct { + // the package's id + ID int64 `json:"id"` + // the package's owner + Owner User `json:"owner"` + // the repo this package belongs to (if any) + Repository *string `json:"repository"` + // the package's creator + Creator User `json:"creator"` + // the type of package: + Type string `json:"type"` + // the name of the package + Name string `json:"name"` + // the version of the package + Version string `json:"version"` + // the date the package was uploaded + CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"` +} + +// PackageFile represents a file from a package +type PackageFile struct { + // the file's ID + ID int64 `json:"id"` + // the size of the file in bytes + Size int64 `json:"size"` + // the name of the file + Name string `json:"name"` + // the md5 hash of the file + MD5 string `json:"md5"` + // the sha1 hash of the file + SHA1 string `json:"sha1"` + // the sha256 hash of the file + SHA256 string `json:"sha256"` + // the sha512 hash of the file + SHA512 string `json:"sha512"` +} + +// ListPackagesOptions options for listing packages +type ListPackagesOptions struct { + ListOptions +} + +// ListPackages lists all the packages owned by a given owner (user, organisation) +func (c *Client) ListPackages(owner string, opt ListPackagesOptions) ([]*Package, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + opt.setDefaults() + packages := make([]*Package, 0, opt.PageSize) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/packages/%s?%s", owner, opt.getURLQuery().Encode()), nil, nil, &packages) + return packages, resp, err +} + +// GetPackage gets the details of a specific package version +func (c *Client) GetPackage(owner, packageType, name, version string) (*Package, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &packageType, &name, &version); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + foundPackage := new(Package) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/packages/%s/%s/%s/%s", owner, packageType, name, version), nil, nil, foundPackage) + return foundPackage, resp, err +} + +// DeletePackage deletes a specific package version +func (c *Client) DeletePackage(owner, packageType, name, version string) (*Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &packageType, &name, &version); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + _, resp, err := c.getResponse("DELETE", fmt.Sprintf("/packages/%s/%s/%s/%s", owner, packageType, name, version), nil, nil) + return resp, err +} + +// ListPackageFiles lists the files within a package +func (c *Client) ListPackageFiles(owner, packageType, name, version string) ([]*PackageFile, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &packageType, &name, &version); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + packageFiles := make([]*PackageFile, 0) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/packages/%s/%s/%s/%s/files", owner, packageType, name, version), nil, nil, &packageFiles) + return packageFiles, resp, err +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull.go index e0198c2..8ca8164 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull.go @@ -12,8 +12,6 @@ import ( "net/url" "strings" "time" - - "github.com/hashicorp/go-version" ) // PRBranchInfo information about a branch @@ -45,11 +43,12 @@ type PullRequest struct { DiffURL string `json:"diff_url"` PatchURL string `json:"patch_url"` - Mergeable bool `json:"mergeable"` - HasMerged bool `json:"merged"` - Merged *time.Time `json:"merged_at"` - MergedCommitID *string `json:"merge_commit_sha"` - MergedBy *User `json:"merged_by"` + Mergeable bool `json:"mergeable"` + HasMerged bool `json:"merged"` + Merged *time.Time `json:"merged_at"` + MergedCommitID *string `json:"merge_commit_sha"` + MergedBy *User `json:"merged_by"` + AllowMaintainerEdit bool `json:"allow_maintainer_edit"` Base *PRBranchInfo `json:"base"` Head *PRBranchInfo `json:"head"` @@ -61,6 +60,19 @@ type PullRequest struct { Closed *time.Time `json:"closed_at"` } +// ChangedFile is a changed file in a diff +type ChangedFile struct { + Filename string `json:"filename"` + PreviousFilename string `json:"previous_filename"` + Status string `json:"status"` + Additions int `json:"additions"` + Deletions int `json:"deletions"` + Changes int `json:"changes"` + HTMLURL string `json:"html_url"` + ContentsURL string `json:"contents_url"` + RawURL string `json:"raw_url"` +} + // ListPullRequestsOptions options for listing pull requests type ListPullRequestsOptions struct { ListOptions @@ -166,15 +178,17 @@ func (c *Client) CreatePullRequest(owner, repo string, opt CreatePullRequestOpti // EditPullRequestOption options when modify pull request type EditPullRequestOption struct { - Title string `json:"title"` - Body string `json:"body"` - Base string `json:"base"` - Assignee string `json:"assignee"` - Assignees []string `json:"assignees"` - Milestone int64 `json:"milestone"` - Labels []int64 `json:"labels"` - State *StateType `json:"state"` - Deadline *time.Time `json:"due_date"` + Title string `json:"title"` + Body string `json:"body"` + Base string `json:"base"` + Assignee string `json:"assignee"` + Assignees []string `json:"assignees"` + Milestone int64 `json:"milestone"` + Labels []int64 `json:"labels"` + State *StateType `json:"state"` + Deadline *time.Time `json:"due_date"` + RemoveDeadline *bool `json:"unset_due_date"` + AllowMaintainerEdit *bool `json:"allow_maintainer_edit"` } // Validate the EditPullRequestOption struct @@ -211,13 +225,16 @@ func (c *Client) EditPullRequest(owner, repo string, index int64, opt EditPullRe // MergePullRequestOption options when merging a pull request type MergePullRequestOption struct { - Style MergeStyle `json:"Do"` - Title string `json:"MergeTitleField"` - Message string `json:"MergeMessageField"` + Style MergeStyle `json:"Do"` + MergeCommitID string `json:"MergeCommitID"` + Title string `json:"MergeTitleField"` + Message string `json:"MergeMessageField"` + DeleteBranchAfterMerge bool `json:"delete_branch_after_merge"` + ForceMerge bool `json:"force_merge"` + HeadCommitId string `json:"head_commit_id"` + MergeWhenChecksSucceed bool `json:"merge_when_checks_succeed"` } -var version1_11_5, _ = version.NewVersion("1.11.5") - // Validate the MergePullRequestOption struct func (opt MergePullRequestOption) Validate(c *Client) error { if opt.Style == MergeStyleSquash { @@ -253,7 +270,6 @@ func (c *Client) IsPullRequestMerged(owner, repo string, index int64) (bool, *Re return false, nil, err } status, resp, err := c.getStatusCode("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d/merge", owner, repo, index), nil, nil) - if err != nil { return false, resp, err } @@ -261,9 +277,29 @@ func (c *Client) IsPullRequestMerged(owner, repo string, index int64) (bool, *Re return status == 204, resp, nil } +// PullRequestDiffOptions options for GET /repos///pulls/.[diff|patch] +type PullRequestDiffOptions struct { + // Include binary file changes when requesting a .diff + Binary bool +} + +// QueryEncode converts the options to a query string +func (o PullRequestDiffOptions) QueryEncode() string { + query := make(url.Values) + query.Add("binary", fmt.Sprintf("%v", o.Binary)) + return query.Encode() +} + +type pullRequestDiffType string + +const ( + pullRequestDiffTypeDiff pullRequestDiffType = "diff" + pullRequestDiffTypePatch pullRequestDiffType = "patch" +) + // getPullRequestDiffOrPatch gets the patch or diff file as bytes for a PR -func (c *Client) getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, kind string, index int64) ([]byte, *Response, error) { - if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo, &kind); err != nil { +func (c *Client) getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo string, kind pullRequestDiffType, index int64, opts PullRequestDiffOptions) ([]byte, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0); err != nil { @@ -274,19 +310,20 @@ func (c *Client) getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, kind string, index int64 if r.Private { return nil, nil, err } - return c.getWebResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/%s/%s/pulls/%d.%s", owner, repo, index, kind), nil) + url := fmt.Sprintf("/%s/%s/pulls/%d.%s?%s", owner, repo, index, kind, opts.QueryEncode()) + return c.getWebResponse("GET", url, nil) } return c.getResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d.%s", owner, repo, index, kind), nil, nil) } -// GetPullRequestPatch gets the .patch file as bytes for a PR +// GetPullRequestPatch gets the git patchset of a PR func (c *Client) GetPullRequestPatch(owner, repo string, index int64) ([]byte, *Response, error) { - return c.getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, "patch", index) + return c.getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, pullRequestDiffTypePatch, index, PullRequestDiffOptions{}) } -// GetPullRequestDiff gets the .diff file as bytes for a PR -func (c *Client) GetPullRequestDiff(owner, repo string, index int64) ([]byte, *Response, error) { - return c.getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, "diff", index) +// GetPullRequestDiff gets the diff of a PR. For Gitea >= 1.16, you must set includeBinary to get an applicable diff +func (c *Client) GetPullRequestDiff(owner, repo string, index int64, opts PullRequestDiffOptions) ([]byte, *Response, error) { + return c.getPullRequestDiffOrPatch(owner, repo, pullRequestDiffTypeDiff, index, opts) } // ListPullRequestCommitsOptions options for listing pull requests @@ -326,3 +363,21 @@ func fixPullHeadSha(client *Client, pr *PullRequest) error { } return nil } + +// ListPullRequestFilesOptions options for listing pull request files +type ListPullRequestFilesOptions struct { + ListOptions +} + +// ListPullRequestFiles list changed files for a pull request +func (c *Client) ListPullRequestFiles(owner, repo string, index int64, opt ListPullRequestFilesOptions) ([]*ChangedFile, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + link, _ := url.Parse(fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/pulls/%d/files", owner, repo, index)) + opt.setDefaults() + files := make([]*ChangedFile, 0, opt.PageSize) + link.RawQuery = opt.getURLQuery().Encode() + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", link.String(), nil, nil, &files) + return files, resp, err +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull_review.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull_review.go index a484dfd..6d32c4f 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull_review.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/pull_review.go @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ type ListPullReviewsOptions struct { // Validate the CreatePullReviewOptions struct func (opt CreatePullReviewOptions) Validate() error { - if opt.State != ReviewStateApproved && len(strings.TrimSpace(opt.Body)) == 0 { + if opt.State != ReviewStateApproved && len(opt.Comments) == 0 && len(strings.TrimSpace(opt.Body)) == 0 { return fmt.Errorf("body is empty") } for i := range opt.Comments { diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/release.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/release.go index c8e7681..3200f20 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/release.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/release.go @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ func (opt *ListReleasesOptions) QueryEncode() string { query.Add("draft", fmt.Sprintf("%t", *opt.IsDraft)) } if opt.IsPreRelease != nil { - query.Add("draft", fmt.Sprintf("%t", *opt.IsPreRelease)) + query.Add("pre-release", fmt.Sprintf("%t", *opt.IsPreRelease)) } return query.Encode() @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ func (c *Client) GetRelease(owner, repo string, id int64) (*Release, *Response, } // GetReleaseByTag get a release of a repository by tag -func (c *Client) GetReleaseByTag(owner, repo string, tag string) (*Release, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) GetReleaseByTag(owner, repo, tag string) (*Release, *Response, error) { if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0) != nil { return c.fallbackGetReleaseByTag(owner, repo, tag) } @@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeleteRelease(user, repo string, id int64) (*Response, error) { } // DeleteReleaseByTag deletes a release frm a repository by tag -func (c *Client) DeleteReleaseByTag(user, repo string, tag string) (*Response, error) { +func (c *Client) DeleteReleaseByTag(user, repo, tag string) (*Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo, &tag); err != nil { return nil, err } @@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeleteReleaseByTag(user, repo string, tag string) (*Response, e } // fallbackGetReleaseByTag is fallback for old gitea installations ( < 1.13.0 ) -func (c *Client) fallbackGetReleaseByTag(owner, repo string, tag string) (*Release, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) fallbackGetReleaseByTag(owner, repo, tag string) (*Release, *Response, error) { for i := 1; ; i++ { rl, resp, err := c.ListReleases(owner, repo, ListReleasesOptions{ListOptions: ListOptions{Page: i}}) if err != nil { diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo.go index 62d13a3..8f0e346 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo.go @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ type Repository struct { AvatarURL string `json:"avatar_url"` Internal bool `json:"internal"` MirrorInterval string `json:"mirror_interval"` + MirrorUpdated time.Time `json:"mirror_updated,omitempty"` DefaultMergeStyle MergeStyle `json:"default_merge_style"` } @@ -286,7 +287,9 @@ func (c *Client) SearchRepos(opt SearchRepoOptions) ([]*Repository, *Response, e // private repos only not supported on gitea <= 1.11.x return nil, nil, err } - link.Query().Add("private", "false") + newQuery := link.Query() + newQuery.Add("private", "false") + link.RawQuery = newQuery.Encode() } } @@ -329,10 +332,10 @@ func (opt CreateRepoOption) Validate(c *Client) error { return fmt.Errorf("name has more than 100 chars") } if len(opt.Description) > 255 { - return fmt.Errorf("name has more than 255 chars") + return fmt.Errorf("description has more than 255 chars") } if len(opt.DefaultBranch) > 100 { - return fmt.Errorf("name has more than 100 chars") + return fmt.Errorf("default branch name has more than 100 chars") } if len(opt.TrustModel) != 0 { if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_13_0); err != nil { diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_branch_protection.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_branch_protection.go index 22bd7b9..3196d03 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_branch_protection.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_branch_protection.go @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import ( // BranchProtection represents a branch protection for a repository type BranchProtection struct { BranchName string `json:"branch_name"` + RuleName string `json:"rule_name"` EnablePush bool `json:"enable_push"` EnablePushWhitelist bool `json:"enable_push_whitelist"` PushWhitelistUsernames []string `json:"push_whitelist_usernames"` @@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ type BranchProtection struct { DismissStaleApprovals bool `json:"dismiss_stale_approvals"` RequireSignedCommits bool `json:"require_signed_commits"` ProtectedFilePatterns string `json:"protected_file_patterns"` + UnprotectedFilePatterns string `json:"unprotected_file_patterns"` Created time.Time `json:"created_at"` Updated time.Time `json:"updated_at"` } @@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ type BranchProtection struct { // CreateBranchProtectionOption options for creating a branch protection type CreateBranchProtectionOption struct { BranchName string `json:"branch_name"` + RuleName string `json:"rule_name"` EnablePush bool `json:"enable_push"` EnablePushWhitelist bool `json:"enable_push_whitelist"` PushWhitelistUsernames []string `json:"push_whitelist_usernames"` @@ -62,6 +65,7 @@ type CreateBranchProtectionOption struct { DismissStaleApprovals bool `json:"dismiss_stale_approvals"` RequireSignedCommits bool `json:"require_signed_commits"` ProtectedFilePatterns string `json:"protected_file_patterns"` + UnprotectedFilePatterns string `json:"unprotected_file_patterns"` } // EditBranchProtectionOption options for editing a branch protection @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ type EditBranchProtectionOption struct { DismissStaleApprovals *bool `json:"dismiss_stale_approvals"` RequireSignedCommits *bool `json:"require_signed_commits"` ProtectedFilePatterns *string `json:"protected_file_patterns"` + UnprotectedFilePatterns *string `json:"unprotected_file_patterns"` } // ListBranchProtectionsOptions list branch protection options diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_collaborator.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_collaborator.go index c766250..41e2576 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_collaborator.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_collaborator.go @@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ type ListCollaboratorsOptions struct { ListOptions } +// CollaboratorPermissionResult result type for CollaboratorPermission +type CollaboratorPermissionResult struct { + Permission AccessMode `json:"permission"` + Role string `json:"role_name"` + User *User `json:"user"` +} + // ListCollaborators list a repository's collaborators func (c *Client) ListCollaborators(user, repo string, opt ListCollaboratorsOptions) ([]*User, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { @@ -44,6 +51,26 @@ func (c *Client) IsCollaborator(user, repo, collaborator string) (bool, *Respons return false, resp, nil } +// CollaboratorPermission gets collaborator permission of a repository +func (c *Client) CollaboratorPermission(user, repo, collaborator string) (*CollaboratorPermissionResult, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo, &collaborator); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + rv := new(CollaboratorPermissionResult) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", + fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/collaborators/%s/permission", user, repo, collaborator), + nil, + nil, + rv) + if err != nil { + return nil, resp, err + } + if resp.StatusCode != 200 { + rv = nil + } + return rv, resp, nil +} + // AddCollaboratorOption options when adding a user as a collaborator of a repository type AddCollaboratorOption struct { Permission *AccessMode `json:"permission"` @@ -66,7 +93,7 @@ const ( ) // Validate the AddCollaboratorOption struct -func (opt AddCollaboratorOption) Validate() error { +func (opt *AddCollaboratorOption) Validate() error { if opt.Permission != nil { if *opt.Permission == AccessModeOwner { *opt.Permission = AccessModeAdmin @@ -88,7 +115,7 @@ func (c *Client) AddCollaborator(user, repo, collaborator string, opt AddCollabo if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo, &collaborator); err != nil { return nil, err } - if err := opt.Validate(); err != nil { + if err := (&opt).Validate(); err != nil { return nil, err } body, err := json.Marshal(&opt) diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_commit.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_commit.go index 9bb65b3..62c0ab3 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_commit.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_commit.go @@ -32,11 +32,19 @@ type CommitUser struct { // RepoCommit contains information of a commit in the context of a repository. type RepoCommit struct { - URL string `json:"url"` - Author *CommitUser `json:"author"` - Committer *CommitUser `json:"committer"` - Message string `json:"message"` - Tree *CommitMeta `json:"tree"` + URL string `json:"url"` + Author *CommitUser `json:"author"` + Committer *CommitUser `json:"committer"` + Message string `json:"message"` + Tree *CommitMeta `json:"tree"` + Verification *PayloadCommitVerification `json:"verification"` +} + +// CommitStats contains stats from a Git commit +type CommitStats struct { + Total int `json:"total"` + Additions int `json:"additions"` + Deletions int `json:"deletions"` } // Commit contains information generated from a Git commit. @@ -48,6 +56,7 @@ type Commit struct { Committer *User `json:"committer"` Parents []*CommitMeta `json:"parents"` Files []*CommitAffectedFiles `json:"files"` + Stats *CommitStats `json:"stats"` } // CommitDateOptions store dates for GIT_AUTHOR_DATE and GIT_COMMITTER_DATE @@ -74,16 +83,21 @@ func (c *Client) GetSingleCommit(user, repo, commitID string) (*Commit, *Respons // ListCommitOptions list commit options type ListCommitOptions struct { ListOptions - //SHA or branch to start listing commits from (usually 'master') + // SHA or branch to start listing commits from (usually 'master') SHA string + // Path indicates that only commits that include the path's file/dir should be returned. + Path string } // QueryEncode turns options into querystring argument func (opt *ListCommitOptions) QueryEncode() string { - query := opt.ListOptions.getURLQuery() + query := opt.getURLQuery() if opt.SHA != "" { query.Add("sha", opt.SHA) } + if opt.Path != "" { + query.Add("path", opt.Path) + } return query.Encode() } @@ -99,3 +113,29 @@ func (c *Client) ListRepoCommits(user, repo string, opt ListCommitOptions) ([]*C resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", link.String(), nil, nil, &commits) return commits, resp, err } + +// GetCommitDiff returns the commit's raw diff. +func (c *Client) GetCommitDiff(user, repo, commitID string) ([]byte, *Response, error) { + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return c.getResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/git/commits/%s.%s", user, repo, commitID, pullRequestDiffTypeDiff), nil, nil) +} + +// GetCommitPatch returns the commit's raw patch. +func (c *Client) GetCommitPatch(user, repo, commitID string) ([]byte, *Response, error) { + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&user, &repo); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return c.getResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/git/commits/%s.%s", user, repo, commitID, pullRequestDiffTypePatch), nil, nil) +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_file.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_file.go index 6f99ea0..bcba705 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_file.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_file.go @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import ( "bytes" "encoding/json" "fmt" + "io" + "io/ioutil" "net/url" "strings" ) @@ -117,17 +119,46 @@ type FileDeleteResponse struct { } // GetFile downloads a file of repository, ref can be branch/tag/commit. +// it optional can resolve lfs pointers and server the file instead // e.g.: ref -> master, filepath -> README.md (no leading slash) -func (c *Client) GetFile(owner, repo, ref, filepath string) ([]byte, *Response, error) { +func (c *Client) GetFile(owner, repo, ref, filepath string, resolveLFS ...bool) ([]byte, *Response, error) { + reader, resp, err := c.GetFileReader(owner, repo, ref, filepath, resolveLFS...) + if reader == nil { + return nil, resp, err + } + defer reader.Close() + + data, err2 := ioutil.ReadAll(reader) + if err2 != nil { + return nil, resp, err2 + } + + return data, resp, err +} + +// GetFileReader return reader for download a file of repository, ref can be branch/tag/commit. +// it optional can resolve lfs pointers and server the file instead +// e.g.: ref -> master, filepath -> README.md (no leading slash) +func (c *Client) GetFileReader(owner, repo, ref, filepath string, resolveLFS ...bool) (io.ReadCloser, *Response, error) { if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &repo); err != nil { return nil, nil, err } + + // resolve lfs + if len(resolveLFS) != 0 && resolveLFS[0] { + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_17_0); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return c.getResponseReader("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/media/%s?ref=%s", owner, repo, filepath, url.QueryEscape(ref)), nil, nil) + } + + // normal get filepath = pathEscapeSegments(filepath) if c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_14_0) != nil { ref = pathEscapeSegments(ref) - return c.getResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/raw/%s/%s", owner, repo, ref, filepath), nil, nil) + return c.getResponseReader("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/raw/%s/%s", owner, repo, ref, filepath), nil, nil) } - return c.getResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/raw/%s?ref=%s", owner, repo, filepath, url.QueryEscape(ref)), nil, nil) + return c.getResponseReader("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/raw/%s?ref=%s", owner, repo, filepath, url.QueryEscape(ref)), nil, nil) } // GetContents get the metadata and contents of a file in a repository diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_migrate.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_migrate.go index cd0fe44..3ab690e 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_migrate.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_migrate.go @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type GitServiceType string const ( // GitServicePlain represents a plain git service GitServicePlain GitServiceType = "git" - //GitServiceGithub represents github.com + // GitServiceGithub represents github.com GitServiceGithub GitServiceType = "github" // GitServiceGitlab represents a gitlab service GitServiceGitlab GitServiceType = "gitlab" diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_transfer.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_transfer.go index be06010..534a6e4 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_transfer.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_transfer.go @@ -34,3 +34,29 @@ func (c *Client) TransferRepo(owner, reponame string, opt TransferRepoOption) (* resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("POST", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/transfer", owner, reponame), jsonHeader, bytes.NewReader(body), repo) return repo, resp, err } + +// AcceptRepoTransfer accepts a repo transfer. +func (c *Client) AcceptRepoTransfer(owner, reponame string) (*Repository, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &reponame); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + repo := new(Repository) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("POST", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/transfer/accept", owner, reponame), jsonHeader, nil, repo) + return repo, resp, err +} + +// RejectRepoTransfer rejects a repo transfer. +func (c *Client) RejectRepoTransfer(owner, reponame string) (*Repository, *Response, error) { + if err := escapeValidatePathSegments(&owner, &reponame); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + if err := c.checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(version1_16_0); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + repo := new(Repository) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("POST", fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/transfer/reject", owner, reponame), jsonHeader, nil, repo) + return repo, resp, err +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_tree.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_tree.go index 452394a..c9ffc55 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_tree.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_tree.go @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ func (c *Client) GetTrees(user, repo, ref string, recursive bool) (*GitTreeRespo return nil, nil, err } trees := new(GitTreeResponse) - var path = fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/git/trees/%s", user, repo, ref) + path := fmt.Sprintf("/repos/%s/%s/git/trees/%s", user, repo, ref) if recursive { path += "?recursive=1" } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_watch.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_watch.go index f499aff..c36ca64 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_watch.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/repo_watch.go @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func (c *Client) GetWatchedRepos(user string) ([]*Repository, *Response, error) // GetMyWatchedRepos list repositories watched by the authenticated user func (c *Client) GetMyWatchedRepos() ([]*Repository, *Response, error) { repos := make([]*Repository, 0, 10) - resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", fmt.Sprintf("/user/subscriptions"), nil, nil, &repos) + resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", "/user/subscriptions", nil, nil, &repos) return repos, resp, err } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/secret.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/secret.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f544a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/secret.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Copyright 2023 The Gitea Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a MIT-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package gitea + +import "time" + +type Secret struct { + // the secret's name + Name string `json:"name"` + // Date and Time of secret creation + Created time.Time `json:"created_at"` +} diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user.go index c37627b..67208fb 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user.go @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ func (c *Client) GetUserByID(id int64) (*User, *Response, error) { query := make(url.Values) query.Add("uid", strconv.FormatInt(id, 10)) users, resp, err := c.searchUsers(query.Encode()) - if err != nil { return nil, resp, err } diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user_app.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user_app.go index 88b01ed..92a3a26 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user_app.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/user_app.go @@ -13,12 +13,64 @@ import ( "reflect" ) +// AccessTokenScope represents the scope for an access token. +type AccessTokenScope string + +const ( + AccessTokenScopeAll AccessTokenScope = "all" + + AccessTokenScopeRepo AccessTokenScope = "repo" + AccessTokenScopeRepoStatus AccessTokenScope = "repo:status" + AccessTokenScopePublicRepo AccessTokenScope = "public_repo" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminOrg AccessTokenScope = "admin:org" + AccessTokenScopeWriteOrg AccessTokenScope = "write:org" + AccessTokenScopeReadOrg AccessTokenScope = "read:org" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminPublicKey AccessTokenScope = "admin:public_key" + AccessTokenScopeWritePublicKey AccessTokenScope = "write:public_key" + AccessTokenScopeReadPublicKey AccessTokenScope = "read:public_key" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminRepoHook AccessTokenScope = "admin:repo_hook" + AccessTokenScopeWriteRepoHook AccessTokenScope = "write:repo_hook" + AccessTokenScopeReadRepoHook AccessTokenScope = "read:repo_hook" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminOrgHook AccessTokenScope = "admin:org_hook" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminUserHook AccessTokenScope = "admin:user_hook" + + AccessTokenScopeNotification AccessTokenScope = "notification" + + AccessTokenScopeUser AccessTokenScope = "user" + AccessTokenScopeReadUser AccessTokenScope = "read:user" + AccessTokenScopeUserEmail AccessTokenScope = "user:email" + AccessTokenScopeUserFollow AccessTokenScope = "user:follow" + + AccessTokenScopeDeleteRepo AccessTokenScope = "delete_repo" + + AccessTokenScopePackage AccessTokenScope = "package" + AccessTokenScopeWritePackage AccessTokenScope = "write:package" + AccessTokenScopeReadPackage AccessTokenScope = "read:package" + AccessTokenScopeDeletePackage AccessTokenScope = "delete:package" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminGPGKey AccessTokenScope = "admin:gpg_key" + AccessTokenScopeWriteGPGKey AccessTokenScope = "write:gpg_key" + AccessTokenScopeReadGPGKey AccessTokenScope = "read:gpg_key" + + AccessTokenScopeAdminApplication AccessTokenScope = "admin:application" + AccessTokenScopeWriteApplication AccessTokenScope = "write:application" + AccessTokenScopeReadApplication AccessTokenScope = "read:application" + + AccessTokenScopeSudo AccessTokenScope = "sudo" +) + // AccessToken represents an API access token. type AccessToken struct { - ID int64 `json:"id"` - Name string `json:"name"` - Token string `json:"sha1"` - TokenLastEight string `json:"token_last_eight"` + ID int64 `json:"id"` + Name string `json:"name"` + Token string `json:"sha1"` + TokenLastEight string `json:"token_last_eight"` + Scopes []AccessTokenScope `json:"scopes"` } // ListAccessTokensOptions options for listing a users's access tokens @@ -42,7 +94,8 @@ func (c *Client) ListAccessTokens(opts ListAccessTokensOptions) ([]*AccessToken, // CreateAccessTokenOption options when create access token type CreateAccessTokenOption struct { - Name string `json:"name"` + Name string `json:"name"` + Scopes []AccessTokenScope `json:"scopes"` } // CreateAccessToken create one access token with options @@ -71,7 +124,7 @@ func (c *Client) DeleteAccessToken(value interface{}) (*Response, error) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("\"username\" not set: only BasicAuth allowed") } - var token = "" + token := "" switch reflect.ValueOf(value).Kind() { case reflect.Int64: diff --git a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/version.go b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/version.go index 1f41c77..e8df511 100644 --- a/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/version.go +++ b/vendor/code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea/version.go @@ -6,13 +6,14 @@ package gitea import ( "fmt" + "strings" "github.com/hashicorp/go-version" ) // ServerVersion returns the version of the server func (c *Client) ServerVersion() (string, *Response, error) { - var v = struct { + v := struct { Version string `json:"version"` }{} resp, err := c.getParsedResponse("GET", "/version", nil, nil, &v) @@ -52,7 +53,6 @@ func SetGiteaVersion(v string) ClientOption { return func(c *Client) (err error) { c.getVersionOnce.Do(func() { c.serverVersion, err = version.NewVersion(v) - return }) return } @@ -60,13 +60,33 @@ func SetGiteaVersion(v string) ClientOption { // predefined versions only have to be parsed by library once var ( - version1_11_0, _ = version.NewVersion("1.11.0") - version1_12_0, _ = version.NewVersion("1.12.0") - version1_13_0, _ = version.NewVersion("1.13.0") - version1_14_0, _ = version.NewVersion("1.14.0") - version1_15_0, _ = version.NewVersion("1.15.0") + version1_11_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.11.0")) + version1_11_5 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.11.5")) + version1_12_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.12.0")) + version1_12_3 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.12.3")) + version1_13_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.13.0")) + version1_14_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.14.0")) + version1_15_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.15.0")) + version1_16_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.16.0")) + version1_17_0 = version.Must(version.NewVersion("1.17.0")) ) +// ErrUnknownVersion is an unknown version from the API +type ErrUnknownVersion struct { + raw string +} + +// Error fulfills error +func (e ErrUnknownVersion) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("unknown version: %s", e.raw) +} + +func (_ ErrUnknownVersion) Is(target error) bool { + _, ok1 := target.(*ErrUnknownVersion) + _, ok2 := target.(ErrUnknownVersion) + return ok1 || ok2 +} + // checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual is the canonical way in the SDK to check for versions for API compatibility reasons func (c *Client) checkServerVersionGreaterThanOrEqual(v *version.Version) error { if c.ignoreVersion { @@ -94,6 +114,11 @@ func (c *Client) loadServerVersion() (err error) { return } if c.serverVersion, err = version.NewVersion(raw); err != nil { + if strings.TrimSpace(raw) != "" { + // Version was something, just not recognized + c.serverVersion = version1_11_0 + err = &ErrUnknownVersion{raw: raw} + } return } }) diff --git a/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/LICENSE.txt b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bbe93b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +Copyright (c) 2014 David Mzareulyan + +Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this software +and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, +including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, +sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software +is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + +The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in all copies or substantial +portions of the Software. + +THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING +BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND +NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, +DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, +OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/README.md b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..23a352e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +[![GoDoc](https://godoc.org/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant?status.svg)](https://godoc.org/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant) + +Package pageant provides an interface to PyTTY pageant.exe utility. + +This package is windows-only. + +See documentation on [GoDoc](http://godoc.org/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant) + +License: MIT \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/io_windows.go b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/io_windows.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f37551 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/io_windows.go @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +package pageant + +import ( + "io" + "sync" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent" +) + +// New returns new ssh-agent instance (see http://golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent) +func New() agent.Agent { + return agent.NewClient(&conn{}) +} + +type conn struct { + sync.Mutex + buf []byte +} + +func (c *conn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + + resp, err := query(p) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + c.buf = append(c.buf, resp...) + return len(p), nil +} + +func (c *conn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + + if len(c.buf) == 0 { + return 0, io.EOF + } + n := copy(p, c.buf) + c.buf = c.buf[n:] + return n, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/pageant_windows.go b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/pageant_windows.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..520e8f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/davidmz/go-pageant/pageant_windows.go @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +// Package pageant provides an interface to PyTTY pageant.exe utility. +// This package is windows-only +package pageant + +// see https://github.com/Yasushi/putty/blob/master/windows/winpgntc.c#L155 +// see https://github.com/paramiko/paramiko/blob/master/paramiko/win_pageant.py + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "sync" + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +// MaxMessageLen defines maximum size of message can be sent to pageant +const MaxMessageLen = 8192 + +var ( + // ErrPageantNotFound returns when pageant process not found + ErrPageantNotFound = errors.New("pageant process not found") + // ErrSendMessage returns when message to pageant cannt be sent + ErrSendMessage = errors.New("error sending message") + + // ErrMessageTooLong returns when message is too long (see MaxMessageLen) + ErrMessageTooLong = errors.New("message too long") + // ErrInvalidMessageFormat returns when message have invalid fomat + ErrInvalidMessageFormat = errors.New("invalid message format") + // ErrResponseTooLong returns when response from pageant is too long + ErrResponseTooLong = errors.New("response too long") +) + +///////////////////////// + +const ( + agentCopydataID = 0x804e50ba + wmCopydata = 74 +) + +type copyData struct { + dwData uintptr + cbData uint32 + lpData unsafe.Pointer +} + +var ( + lock sync.Mutex + + winFindWindow = winAPI("user32.dll", "FindWindowW") + winGetCurrentThreadID = winAPI("kernel32.dll", "GetCurrentThreadId") + winSendMessage = winAPI("user32.dll", "SendMessageW") +) + +func winAPI(dllName, funcName string) func(...uintptr) (uintptr, uintptr, error) { + proc := syscall.MustLoadDLL(dllName).MustFindProc(funcName) + return func(a ...uintptr) (uintptr, uintptr, error) { return proc.Call(a...) } +} + +// Available returns true if Pageant is started +func Available() bool { return pageantWindow() != 0 } + +// Query sends message msg to Pageant and returns response or error. +// 'msg' is raw agent request with length prefix +// Response is raw agent response with length prefix +func query(msg []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(msg) > MaxMessageLen { + return nil, ErrMessageTooLong + } + + msgLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg[:4]) + if len(msg) != int(msgLen)+4 { + return nil, ErrInvalidMessageFormat + } + + lock.Lock() + defer lock.Unlock() + + paWin := pageantWindow() + + if paWin == 0 { + return nil, ErrPageantNotFound + } + + thID, _, _ := winGetCurrentThreadID() + mapName := fmt.Sprintf("PageantRequest%08x", thID) + pMapName, _ := syscall.UTF16PtrFromString(mapName) + + mmap, err := syscall.CreateFileMapping(syscall.InvalidHandle, nil, syscall.PAGE_READWRITE, 0, MaxMessageLen+4, pMapName) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer syscall.CloseHandle(mmap) + + ptr, err := syscall.MapViewOfFile(mmap, syscall.FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0, 0, 0) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + defer syscall.UnmapViewOfFile(ptr) + + mmSlice := (*(*[MaxMessageLen]byte)(unsafe.Pointer(ptr)))[:] + + copy(mmSlice, msg) + + mapNameBytesZ := append([]byte(mapName), 0) + + cds := copyData{ + dwData: agentCopydataID, + cbData: uint32(len(mapNameBytesZ)), + lpData: unsafe.Pointer(&(mapNameBytesZ[0])), + } + + resp, _, _ := winSendMessage(paWin, wmCopydata, 0, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&cds))) + + if resp == 0 { + return nil, ErrSendMessage + } + + respLen := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(mmSlice[:4]) + if respLen > MaxMessageLen-4 { + return nil, ErrResponseTooLong + } + + respData := make([]byte, respLen+4) + copy(respData, mmSlice) + + return respData, nil +} + +func pageantWindow() uintptr { + nameP, _ := syscall.UTF16PtrFromString("Pageant") + h, _, _ := winFindWindow(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(nameP)), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(nameP))) + return h +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/LICENSE b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/LICENSE new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9e8aef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/LICENSE @@ -0,0 +1,29 @@ +BSD 3-Clause License + +Copyright (c) 2018, go-fed +All rights reserved. + +Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: + +* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this + list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + +* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, + this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation + and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + +* Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its + contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from + this software without specific prior written permission. + +THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" +AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE +IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE +DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE +FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL +DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR +SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER +CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, +OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE +OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/README.md b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b83854 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +# httpsig + +`go get github.com/go-fed/httpsig` + +Implementation of [HTTP Signatures](https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures). + +Supports many different combinations of MAC, HMAC signing of hash, or RSA +signing of hash schemes. Its goals are: + +* Have a very simple interface for signing and validating +* Support a variety of signing algorithms and combinations +* Support setting either headers (`Authorization` or `Signature`) +* Remaining flexible with headers included in the signing string +* Support both HTTP requests and responses +* Explicitly not support known-cryptographically weak algorithms +* Support automatic signing and validating Digest headers + +## How to use + +`import "github.com/go-fed/httpsig"` + +### Signing + +Signing a request or response requires creating a new `Signer` and using it: + +``` +func sign(privateKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r *http.Request) error { + prefs := []httpsig.Algorithm{httpsig.RSA_SHA512, httpsig.RSA_SHA256} + digestAlgorithm := DigestSha256 + // The "Date" and "Digest" headers must already be set on r, as well as r.URL. + headersToSign := []string{httpsig.RequestTarget, "date", "digest"} + signer, chosenAlgo, err := httpsig.NewSigner(prefs, digestAlgorithm, headersToSign, httpsig.Signature) + if err != nil { + return err + } + // To sign the digest, we need to give the signer a copy of the body... + // ...but it is optional, no digest will be signed if given "nil" + body := ... + // If r were a http.ResponseWriter, call SignResponse instead. + return signer.SignRequest(privateKey, pubKeyId, r, body) +} +``` + +`Signer`s are not safe for concurrent use by goroutines, so be sure to guard +access: + +``` +type server struct { + signer httpsig.Signer + mu *sync.Mutex +} + +func (s *server) handlerFunc(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) { + privateKey := ... + pubKeyId := ... + // Set headers and such on w + s.mu.Lock() + defer s.mu.Unlock() + // To sign the digest, we need to give the signer a copy of the response body... + // ...but it is optional, no digest will be signed if given "nil" + body := ... + err := s.signer.SignResponse(privateKey, pubKeyId, w, body) + if err != nil { + ... + } + ... +} +``` + +The `pubKeyId` will be used at verification time. + +### Verifying + +Verifying requires an application to use the `pubKeyId` to both retrieve the key +needed for verification as well as determine the algorithm to use. Use a +`Verifier`: + +``` +func verify(r *http.Request) error { + verifier, err := httpsig.NewVerifier(r) + if err != nil { + return err + } + pubKeyId := verifier.KeyId() + var algo httpsig.Algorithm = ... + var pubKey crypto.PublicKey = ... + // The verifier will verify the Digest in addition to the HTTP signature + return verifier.Verify(pubKey, algo) +} +``` + +`Verifier`s are not safe for concurrent use by goroutines, but since they are +constructed on a per-request or per-response basis it should not be a common +restriction. diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/algorithms.go b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/algorithms.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9595941 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/algorithms.go @@ -0,0 +1,532 @@ +package httpsig + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "crypto/subtle" // Use should trigger great care + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "io" + "math/big" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b" + "golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160" + "golang.org/x/crypto/sha3" + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +const ( + hmacPrefix = "hmac" + rsaPrefix = "rsa" + sshPrefix = "ssh" + ecdsaPrefix = "ecdsa" + ed25519Prefix = "ed25519" + md4String = "md4" + md5String = "md5" + sha1String = "sha1" + sha224String = "sha224" + sha256String = "sha256" + sha384String = "sha384" + sha512String = "sha512" + md5sha1String = "md5sha1" + ripemd160String = "ripemd160" + sha3_224String = "sha3-224" + sha3_256String = "sha3-256" + sha3_384String = "sha3-384" + sha3_512String = "sha3-512" + sha512_224String = "sha512-224" + sha512_256String = "sha512-256" + blake2s_256String = "blake2s-256" + blake2b_256String = "blake2b-256" + blake2b_384String = "blake2b-384" + blake2b_512String = "blake2b-512" +) + +var blake2Algorithms = map[crypto.Hash]bool{ + crypto.BLAKE2s_256: true, + crypto.BLAKE2b_256: true, + crypto.BLAKE2b_384: true, + crypto.BLAKE2b_512: true, +} + +var hashToDef = map[crypto.Hash]struct { + name string + new func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) // Only MACers will accept a key +}{ + // Which standard names these? + // The spec lists the following as a canonical reference, which is dead: + // http://www.iana.org/assignments/signature-algorithms + // + // Note that the forbidden hashes have an invalid 'new' function. + crypto.MD4: {md4String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return nil, nil }}, + crypto.MD5: {md5String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return nil, nil }}, + // Temporarily enable SHA1 because of issue https://github.com/golang/go/issues/37278 + crypto.SHA1: {sha1String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha1.New(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA224: {sha224String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha256.New224(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA256: {sha256String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha256.New(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA384: {sha384String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha512.New384(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA512: {sha512String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha512.New(), nil }}, + crypto.MD5SHA1: {md5sha1String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return nil, nil }}, + crypto.RIPEMD160: {ripemd160String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return ripemd160.New(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA3_224: {sha3_224String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha3.New224(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA3_256: {sha3_256String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha3.New256(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA3_384: {sha3_384String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha3.New384(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA3_512: {sha3_512String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha3.New512(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA512_224: {sha512_224String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha512.New512_224(), nil }}, + crypto.SHA512_256: {sha512_256String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return sha512.New512_256(), nil }}, + crypto.BLAKE2s_256: {blake2s_256String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return blake2s.New256(key) }}, + crypto.BLAKE2b_256: {blake2b_256String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return blake2b.New256(key) }}, + crypto.BLAKE2b_384: {blake2b_384String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return blake2b.New384(key) }}, + crypto.BLAKE2b_512: {blake2b_512String, func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return blake2b.New512(key) }}, +} + +var stringToHash map[string]crypto.Hash + +const ( + defaultAlgorithm = RSA_SHA256 + defaultAlgorithmHashing = sha256String +) + +func init() { + stringToHash = make(map[string]crypto.Hash, len(hashToDef)) + for k, v := range hashToDef { + stringToHash[v.name] = k + } + // This should guarantee that at runtime the defaultAlgorithm will not + // result in errors when fetching a macer or signer (see algorithms.go) + if ok, err := isAvailable(string(defaultAlgorithmHashing)); err != nil { + panic(err) + } else if !ok { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("the default httpsig algorithm is unavailable: %q", defaultAlgorithm)) + } +} + +func isForbiddenHash(h crypto.Hash) bool { + switch h { + // Not actually cryptographically secure + case crypto.MD4: + fallthrough + case crypto.MD5: + fallthrough + case crypto.MD5SHA1: // shorthand for crypto/tls, not actually implemented + return true + } + // Still cryptographically secure + return false +} + +// signer is an internally public type. +type signer interface { + Sign(rand io.Reader, p crypto.PrivateKey, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) + Verify(pub crypto.PublicKey, toHash, signature []byte) error + String() string +} + +// macer is an internally public type. +type macer interface { + Sign(sig, key []byte) ([]byte, error) + Equal(sig, actualMAC, key []byte) (bool, error) + String() string +} + +var _ macer = &hmacAlgorithm{} + +type hmacAlgorithm struct { + fn func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) + kind crypto.Hash +} + +func (h *hmacAlgorithm) Sign(sig, key []byte) ([]byte, error) { + hs, err := h.fn(key) + if err = setSig(hs, sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return hs.Sum(nil), nil +} + +func (h *hmacAlgorithm) Equal(sig, actualMAC, key []byte) (bool, error) { + hs, err := h.fn(key) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + defer hs.Reset() + err = setSig(hs, sig) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + expected := hs.Sum(nil) + return hmac.Equal(actualMAC, expected), nil +} + +func (h *hmacAlgorithm) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", hmacPrefix, hashToDef[h.kind].name) +} + +var _ signer = &rsaAlgorithm{} + +type rsaAlgorithm struct { + hash.Hash + kind crypto.Hash + sshSigner ssh.Signer +} + +func (r *rsaAlgorithm) setSig(b []byte) error { + n, err := r.Write(b) + if err != nil { + r.Reset() + return err + } else if n != len(b) { + r.Reset() + return fmt.Errorf("could only write %d of %d bytes of signature to hash", n, len(b)) + } + return nil +} + +func (r *rsaAlgorithm) Sign(rand io.Reader, p crypto.PrivateKey, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if r.sshSigner != nil { + sshsig, err := r.sshSigner.Sign(rand, sig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return sshsig.Blob, nil + } + defer r.Reset() + + if err := r.setSig(sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + rsaK, ok := p.(*rsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("crypto.PrivateKey is not *rsa.PrivateKey") + } + return rsa.SignPKCS1v15(rand, rsaK, r.kind, r.Sum(nil)) +} + +func (r *rsaAlgorithm) Verify(pub crypto.PublicKey, toHash, signature []byte) error { + defer r.Reset() + rsaK, ok := pub.(*rsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("crypto.PublicKey is not *rsa.PublicKey") + } + if err := r.setSig(toHash); err != nil { + return err + } + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaK, r.kind, r.Sum(nil), signature) +} + +func (r *rsaAlgorithm) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", rsaPrefix, hashToDef[r.kind].name) +} + +var _ signer = &ed25519Algorithm{} + +type ed25519Algorithm struct { + sshSigner ssh.Signer +} + +func (r *ed25519Algorithm) Sign(rand io.Reader, p crypto.PrivateKey, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if r.sshSigner != nil { + sshsig, err := r.sshSigner.Sign(rand, sig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return sshsig.Blob, nil + } + ed25519K, ok := p.(ed25519.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("crypto.PrivateKey is not ed25519.PrivateKey") + } + return ed25519.Sign(ed25519K, sig), nil +} + +func (r *ed25519Algorithm) Verify(pub crypto.PublicKey, toHash, signature []byte) error { + ed25519K, ok := pub.(ed25519.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("crypto.PublicKey is not ed25519.PublicKey") + } + + if ed25519.Verify(ed25519K, toHash, signature) { + return nil + } + + return errors.New("ed25519 verify failed") +} + +func (r *ed25519Algorithm) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s", ed25519Prefix) +} + +var _ signer = &ecdsaAlgorithm{} + +type ecdsaAlgorithm struct { + hash.Hash + kind crypto.Hash +} + +func (r *ecdsaAlgorithm) setSig(b []byte) error { + n, err := r.Write(b) + if err != nil { + r.Reset() + return err + } else if n != len(b) { + r.Reset() + return fmt.Errorf("could only write %d of %d bytes of signature to hash", n, len(b)) + } + return nil +} + +type ECDSASignature struct { + R, S *big.Int +} + +func (r *ecdsaAlgorithm) Sign(rand io.Reader, p crypto.PrivateKey, sig []byte) ([]byte, error) { + defer r.Reset() + if err := r.setSig(sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ecdsaK, ok := p.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("crypto.PrivateKey is not *ecdsa.PrivateKey") + } + R, S, err := ecdsa.Sign(rand, ecdsaK, r.Sum(nil)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + signature := ECDSASignature{R: R, S: S} + bytes, err := asn1.Marshal(signature) + + return bytes, err +} + +func (r *ecdsaAlgorithm) Verify(pub crypto.PublicKey, toHash, signature []byte) error { + defer r.Reset() + ecdsaK, ok := pub.(*ecdsa.PublicKey) + if !ok { + return errors.New("crypto.PublicKey is not *ecdsa.PublicKey") + } + if err := r.setSig(toHash); err != nil { + return err + } + + sig := new(ECDSASignature) + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, sig) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if ecdsa.Verify(ecdsaK, r.Sum(nil), sig.R, sig.S) { + return nil + } else { + return errors.New("Invalid signature") + } +} + +func (r *ecdsaAlgorithm) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s-%s", ecdsaPrefix, hashToDef[r.kind].name) +} + +var _ macer = &blakeMacAlgorithm{} + +type blakeMacAlgorithm struct { + fn func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) + kind crypto.Hash +} + +func (r *blakeMacAlgorithm) Sign(sig, key []byte) ([]byte, error) { + hs, err := r.fn(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err = setSig(hs, sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return hs.Sum(nil), nil +} + +func (r *blakeMacAlgorithm) Equal(sig, actualMAC, key []byte) (bool, error) { + hs, err := r.fn(key) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + defer hs.Reset() + err = setSig(hs, sig) + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + expected := hs.Sum(nil) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(actualMAC, expected) == 1, nil +} + +func (r *blakeMacAlgorithm) String() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("%s", hashToDef[r.kind].name) +} + +func setSig(a hash.Hash, b []byte) error { + n, err := a.Write(b) + if err != nil { + a.Reset() + return err + } else if n != len(b) { + a.Reset() + return fmt.Errorf("could only write %d of %d bytes of signature to hash", n, len(b)) + } + return nil +} + +// IsSupportedHttpSigAlgorithm returns true if the string is supported by this +// library, is not a hash known to be weak, and is supported by the hardware. +func IsSupportedHttpSigAlgorithm(algo string) bool { + a, err := isAvailable(algo) + return a && err == nil +} + +// isAvailable is an internally public function +func isAvailable(algo string) (bool, error) { + c, ok := stringToHash[algo] + if !ok { + return false, fmt.Errorf("no match for %q", algo) + } + if isForbiddenHash(c) { + return false, fmt.Errorf("forbidden hash type in %q", algo) + } + return c.Available(), nil +} + +func newAlgorithmConstructor(algo string) (fn func(k []byte) (hash.Hash, error), c crypto.Hash, e error) { + ok := false + c, ok = stringToHash[algo] + if !ok { + e = fmt.Errorf("no match for %q", algo) + return + } + if isForbiddenHash(c) { + e = fmt.Errorf("forbidden hash type in %q", algo) + return + } + algoDef, ok := hashToDef[c] + if !ok { + e = fmt.Errorf("have crypto.Hash %v but no definition", c) + return + } + fn = func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { + h, err := algoDef.new(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return h, nil + } + return +} + +func newAlgorithm(algo string, key []byte) (hash.Hash, crypto.Hash, error) { + fn, c, err := newAlgorithmConstructor(algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, c, err + } + h, err := fn(key) + return h, c, err +} + +func signerFromSSHSigner(sshSigner ssh.Signer, s string) (signer, error) { + switch { + case strings.HasPrefix(s, rsaPrefix): + return &rsaAlgorithm{ + sshSigner: sshSigner, + }, nil + case strings.HasPrefix(s, ed25519Prefix): + return &ed25519Algorithm{ + sshSigner: sshSigner, + }, nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no signer matching %q", s) + } +} + +// signerFromString is an internally public method constructor +func signerFromString(s string) (signer, error) { + s = strings.ToLower(s) + isEcdsa := false + isEd25519 := false + var algo string = "" + if strings.HasPrefix(s, ecdsaPrefix) { + algo = strings.TrimPrefix(s, ecdsaPrefix+"-") + isEcdsa = true + } else if strings.HasPrefix(s, rsaPrefix) { + algo = strings.TrimPrefix(s, rsaPrefix+"-") + } else if strings.HasPrefix(s, ed25519Prefix) { + isEd25519 = true + algo = "sha512" + } else { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no signer matching %q", s) + } + hash, cHash, err := newAlgorithm(algo, nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if isEd25519 { + return &ed25519Algorithm{}, nil + } + if isEcdsa { + return &ecdsaAlgorithm{ + Hash: hash, + kind: cHash, + }, nil + } + return &rsaAlgorithm{ + Hash: hash, + kind: cHash, + }, nil +} + +// macerFromString is an internally public method constructor +func macerFromString(s string) (macer, error) { + s = strings.ToLower(s) + if strings.HasPrefix(s, hmacPrefix) { + algo := strings.TrimPrefix(s, hmacPrefix+"-") + hashFn, cHash, err := newAlgorithmConstructor(algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Ensure below does not panic + _, err = hashFn(nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &hmacAlgorithm{ + fn: func(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { + return hmac.New(func() hash.Hash { + h, e := hashFn(nil) + if e != nil { + panic(e) + } + return h + }, key), nil + }, + kind: cHash, + }, nil + } else if bl, ok := stringToHash[s]; ok && blake2Algorithms[bl] { + hashFn, cHash, err := newAlgorithmConstructor(s) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &blakeMacAlgorithm{ + fn: hashFn, + kind: cHash, + }, nil + } else { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no MACer matching %q", s) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/digest.go b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/digest.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf9e3a9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/digest.go @@ -0,0 +1,120 @@ +package httpsig + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "encoding/base64" + "fmt" + "hash" + "net/http" + "strings" +) + +type DigestAlgorithm string + +const ( + DigestSha256 DigestAlgorithm = "SHA-256" + DigestSha512 = "SHA-512" +) + +var digestToDef = map[DigestAlgorithm]crypto.Hash{ + DigestSha256: crypto.SHA256, + DigestSha512: crypto.SHA512, +} + +// IsSupportedDigestAlgorithm returns true if hte string is supported by this +// library, is not a hash known to be weak, and is supported by the hardware. +func IsSupportedDigestAlgorithm(algo string) bool { + uc := DigestAlgorithm(strings.ToUpper(algo)) + c, ok := digestToDef[uc] + return ok && c.Available() +} + +func getHash(alg DigestAlgorithm) (h hash.Hash, toUse DigestAlgorithm, err error) { + upper := DigestAlgorithm(strings.ToUpper(string(alg))) + c, ok := digestToDef[upper] + if !ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("unknown or unsupported Digest algorithm: %s", alg) + } else if !c.Available() { + err = fmt.Errorf("unavailable Digest algorithm: %s", alg) + } else { + h = c.New() + toUse = upper + } + return +} + +const ( + digestHeader = "Digest" + digestDelim = "=" +) + +func addDigest(r *http.Request, algo DigestAlgorithm, b []byte) (err error) { + _, ok := r.Header[digestHeader] + if ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("cannot add Digest: Digest is already set") + return + } + var h hash.Hash + var a DigestAlgorithm + h, a, err = getHash(algo) + if err != nil { + return + } + h.Write(b) + sum := h.Sum(nil) + r.Header.Add(digestHeader, + fmt.Sprintf("%s%s%s", + a, + digestDelim, + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:]))) + return +} + +func addDigestResponse(r http.ResponseWriter, algo DigestAlgorithm, b []byte) (err error) { + _, ok := r.Header()[digestHeader] + if ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("cannot add Digest: Digest is already set") + return + } + var h hash.Hash + var a DigestAlgorithm + h, a, err = getHash(algo) + if err != nil { + return + } + h.Write(b) + sum := h.Sum(nil) + r.Header().Add(digestHeader, + fmt.Sprintf("%s%s%s", + a, + digestDelim, + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:]))) + return +} + +func verifyDigest(r *http.Request, body *bytes.Buffer) (err error) { + d := r.Header.Get(digestHeader) + if len(d) == 0 { + err = fmt.Errorf("cannot verify Digest: request has no Digest header") + return + } + elem := strings.SplitN(d, digestDelim, 2) + if len(elem) != 2 { + err = fmt.Errorf("cannot verify Digest: malformed Digest: %s", d) + return + } + var h hash.Hash + h, _, err = getHash(DigestAlgorithm(elem[0])) + if err != nil { + return + } + h.Write(body.Bytes()) + sum := h.Sum(nil) + encSum := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sum[:]) + if encSum != elem[1] { + err = fmt.Errorf("cannot verify Digest: header Digest does not match the digest of the request body") + return + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/httpsig.go b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/httpsig.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1a6b954 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/httpsig.go @@ -0,0 +1,361 @@ +// Implements HTTP request and response signing and verification. Supports the +// major MAC and asymmetric key signature algorithms. It has several safety +// restrictions: One, none of the widely known non-cryptographically safe +// algorithms are permitted; Two, the RSA SHA256 algorithms must be available in +// the binary (and it should, barring export restrictions); Finally, the library +// assumes either the 'Authorizationn' or 'Signature' headers are to be set (but +// not both). +package httpsig + +import ( + "crypto" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "strings" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// Algorithm specifies a cryptography secure algorithm for signing HTTP requests +// and responses. +type Algorithm string + +const ( + // MAC-based algoirthms. + HMAC_SHA224 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha224String + HMAC_SHA256 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha256String + HMAC_SHA384 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha384String + HMAC_SHA512 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha512String + HMAC_RIPEMD160 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + ripemd160String + HMAC_SHA3_224 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha3_224String + HMAC_SHA3_256 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha3_256String + HMAC_SHA3_384 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha3_384String + HMAC_SHA3_512 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha3_512String + HMAC_SHA512_224 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha512_224String + HMAC_SHA512_256 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + sha512_256String + HMAC_BLAKE2S_256 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + blake2s_256String + HMAC_BLAKE2B_256 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + blake2b_256String + HMAC_BLAKE2B_384 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + blake2b_384String + HMAC_BLAKE2B_512 Algorithm = hmacPrefix + "-" + blake2b_512String + BLAKE2S_256 Algorithm = blake2s_256String + BLAKE2B_256 Algorithm = blake2b_256String + BLAKE2B_384 Algorithm = blake2b_384String + BLAKE2B_512 Algorithm = blake2b_512String + // RSA-based algorithms. + RSA_SHA1 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha1String + RSA_SHA224 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha224String + // RSA_SHA256 is the default algorithm. + RSA_SHA256 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha256String + RSA_SHA384 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha384String + RSA_SHA512 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha512String + RSA_RIPEMD160 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + ripemd160String + // ECDSA algorithms + ECDSA_SHA224 Algorithm = ecdsaPrefix + "-" + sha224String + ECDSA_SHA256 Algorithm = ecdsaPrefix + "-" + sha256String + ECDSA_SHA384 Algorithm = ecdsaPrefix + "-" + sha384String + ECDSA_SHA512 Algorithm = ecdsaPrefix + "-" + sha512String + ECDSA_RIPEMD160 Algorithm = ecdsaPrefix + "-" + ripemd160String + // ED25519 algorithms + // can only be SHA512 + ED25519 Algorithm = ed25519Prefix + + // Just because you can glue things together, doesn't mean they will + // work. The following options are not supported. + rsa_SHA3_224 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha3_224String + rsa_SHA3_256 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha3_256String + rsa_SHA3_384 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha3_384String + rsa_SHA3_512 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha3_512String + rsa_SHA512_224 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha512_224String + rsa_SHA512_256 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + sha512_256String + rsa_BLAKE2S_256 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + blake2s_256String + rsa_BLAKE2B_256 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + blake2b_256String + rsa_BLAKE2B_384 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + blake2b_384String + rsa_BLAKE2B_512 Algorithm = rsaPrefix + "-" + blake2b_512String +) + +// HTTP Signatures can be applied to different HTTP headers, depending on the +// expected application behavior. +type SignatureScheme string + +const ( + // Signature will place the HTTP Signature into the 'Signature' HTTP + // header. + Signature SignatureScheme = "Signature" + // Authorization will place the HTTP Signature into the 'Authorization' + // HTTP header. + Authorization SignatureScheme = "Authorization" +) + +const ( + // The HTTP Signatures specification uses the "Signature" auth-scheme + // for the Authorization header. This is coincidentally named, but not + // semantically the same, as the "Signature" HTTP header value. + signatureAuthScheme = "Signature" +) + +// There are subtle differences to the values in the header. The Authorization +// header has an 'auth-scheme' value that must be prefixed to the rest of the +// key and values. +func (s SignatureScheme) authScheme() string { + switch s { + case Authorization: + return signatureAuthScheme + default: + return "" + } +} + +// Signers will sign HTTP requests or responses based on the algorithms and +// headers selected at creation time. +// +// Signers are not safe to use between multiple goroutines. +// +// Note that signatures do set the deprecated 'algorithm' parameter for +// backwards compatibility. +type Signer interface { + // SignRequest signs the request using a private key. The public key id + // is used by the HTTP server to identify which key to use to verify the + // signature. + // + // If the Signer was created using a MAC based algorithm, then the key + // is expected to be of type []byte. If the Signer was created using an + // RSA based algorithm, then the private key is expected to be of type + // *rsa.PrivateKey. + // + // A Digest (RFC 3230) will be added to the request. The body provided + // must match the body used in the request, and is allowed to be nil. + // The Digest ensures the request body is not tampered with in flight, + // and if the signer is created to also sign the "Digest" header, the + // HTTP Signature will then ensure both the Digest and body are not both + // modified to maliciously represent different content. + SignRequest(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r *http.Request, body []byte) error + // SignResponse signs the response using a private key. The public key + // id is used by the HTTP client to identify which key to use to verify + // the signature. + // + // If the Signer was created using a MAC based algorithm, then the key + // is expected to be of type []byte. If the Signer was created using an + // RSA based algorithm, then the private key is expected to be of type + // *rsa.PrivateKey. + // + // A Digest (RFC 3230) will be added to the response. The body provided + // must match the body written in the response, and is allowed to be + // nil. The Digest ensures the response body is not tampered with in + // flight, and if the signer is created to also sign the "Digest" + // header, the HTTP Signature will then ensure both the Digest and body + // are not both modified to maliciously represent different content. + SignResponse(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r http.ResponseWriter, body []byte) error +} + +// NewSigner creates a new Signer with the provided algorithm preferences to +// make HTTP signatures. Only the first available algorithm will be used, which +// is returned by this function along with the Signer. If none of the preferred +// algorithms were available, then the default algorithm is used. The headers +// specified will be included into the HTTP signatures. +// +// The Digest will also be calculated on a request's body using the provided +// digest algorithm, if "Digest" is one of the headers listed. +// +// The provided scheme determines which header is populated with the HTTP +// Signature. +// +// An error is returned if an unknown or a known cryptographically insecure +// Algorithm is provided. +func NewSigner(prefs []Algorithm, dAlgo DigestAlgorithm, headers []string, scheme SignatureScheme, expiresIn int64) (Signer, Algorithm, error) { + for _, pref := range prefs { + s, err := newSigner(pref, dAlgo, headers, scheme, expiresIn) + if err != nil { + continue + } + return s, pref, err + } + s, err := newSigner(defaultAlgorithm, dAlgo, headers, scheme, expiresIn) + return s, defaultAlgorithm, err +} + +// Signers will sign HTTP requests or responses based on the algorithms and +// headers selected at creation time. +// +// Signers are not safe to use between multiple goroutines. +// +// Note that signatures do set the deprecated 'algorithm' parameter for +// backwards compatibility. +type SSHSigner interface { + // SignRequest signs the request using ssh.Signer. + // The public key id is used by the HTTP server to identify which key to use + // to verify the signature. + // + // A Digest (RFC 3230) will be added to the request. The body provided + // must match the body used in the request, and is allowed to be nil. + // The Digest ensures the request body is not tampered with in flight, + // and if the signer is created to also sign the "Digest" header, the + // HTTP Signature will then ensure both the Digest and body are not both + // modified to maliciously represent different content. + SignRequest(pubKeyId string, r *http.Request, body []byte) error + // SignResponse signs the response using ssh.Signer. The public key + // id is used by the HTTP client to identify which key to use to verify + // the signature. + // + // A Digest (RFC 3230) will be added to the response. The body provided + // must match the body written in the response, and is allowed to be + // nil. The Digest ensures the response body is not tampered with in + // flight, and if the signer is created to also sign the "Digest" + // header, the HTTP Signature will then ensure both the Digest and body + // are not both modified to maliciously represent different content. + SignResponse(pubKeyId string, r http.ResponseWriter, body []byte) error +} + +// NewwSSHSigner creates a new Signer using the specified ssh.Signer +// At the moment only ed25519 ssh keys are supported. +// The headers specified will be included into the HTTP signatures. +// +// The Digest will also be calculated on a request's body using the provided +// digest algorithm, if "Digest" is one of the headers listed. +// +// The provided scheme determines which header is populated with the HTTP +// Signature. +func NewSSHSigner(s ssh.Signer, dAlgo DigestAlgorithm, headers []string, scheme SignatureScheme, expiresIn int64) (SSHSigner, Algorithm, error) { + sshAlgo := getSSHAlgorithm(s.PublicKey().Type()) + if sshAlgo == "" { + return nil, "", fmt.Errorf("key type: %s not supported yet.", s.PublicKey().Type()) + } + + signer, err := newSSHSigner(s, sshAlgo, dAlgo, headers, scheme, expiresIn) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + + return signer, sshAlgo, nil +} + +func getSSHAlgorithm(pkType string) Algorithm { + switch { + case strings.HasPrefix(pkType, sshPrefix+"-"+ed25519Prefix): + return ED25519 + case strings.HasPrefix(pkType, sshPrefix+"-"+rsaPrefix): + return RSA_SHA1 + } + + return "" +} + +// Verifier verifies HTTP Signatures. +// +// It will determine which of the supported headers has the parameters +// that define the signature. +// +// Verifiers are not safe to use between multiple goroutines. +// +// Note that verification ignores the deprecated 'algorithm' parameter. +type Verifier interface { + // KeyId gets the public key id that the signature is signed with. + // + // Note that the application is expected to determine the algorithm + // used based on metadata or out-of-band information for this key id. + KeyId() string + // Verify accepts the public key specified by KeyId and returns an + // error if verification fails or if the signature is malformed. The + // algorithm must be the one used to create the signature in order to + // pass verification. The algorithm is determined based on metadata or + // out-of-band information for the key id. + // + // If the signature was created using a MAC based algorithm, then the + // key is expected to be of type []byte. If the signature was created + // using an RSA based algorithm, then the public key is expected to be + // of type *rsa.PublicKey. + Verify(pKey crypto.PublicKey, algo Algorithm) error +} + +const ( + // host is treated specially because golang may not include it in the + // request header map on the server side of a request. + hostHeader = "Host" +) + +// NewVerifier verifies the given request. It returns an error if the HTTP +// Signature parameters are not present in any headers, are present in more than +// one header, are malformed, or are missing required parameters. It ignores +// unknown HTTP Signature parameters. +func NewVerifier(r *http.Request) (Verifier, error) { + h := r.Header + if _, hasHostHeader := h[hostHeader]; len(r.Host) > 0 && !hasHostHeader { + h[hostHeader] = []string{r.Host} + } + return newVerifier(h, func(h http.Header, toInclude []string, created int64, expires int64) (string, error) { + return signatureString(h, toInclude, addRequestTarget(r), created, expires) + }) +} + +// NewResponseVerifier verifies the given response. It returns errors under the +// same conditions as NewVerifier. +func NewResponseVerifier(r *http.Response) (Verifier, error) { + return newVerifier(r.Header, func(h http.Header, toInclude []string, created int64, expires int64) (string, error) { + return signatureString(h, toInclude, requestTargetNotPermitted, created, expires) + }) +} + +func newSSHSigner(sshSigner ssh.Signer, algo Algorithm, dAlgo DigestAlgorithm, headers []string, scheme SignatureScheme, expiresIn int64) (SSHSigner, error) { + var expires, created int64 = 0, 0 + + if expiresIn != 0 { + created = time.Now().Unix() + expires = created + expiresIn + } + + s, err := signerFromSSHSigner(sshSigner, string(algo)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no crypto implementation available for ssh algo %q", algo) + } + + a := &asymmSSHSigner{ + asymmSigner: &asymmSigner{ + s: s, + dAlgo: dAlgo, + headers: headers, + targetHeader: scheme, + prefix: scheme.authScheme(), + created: created, + expires: expires, + }, + } + + return a, nil +} + +func newSigner(algo Algorithm, dAlgo DigestAlgorithm, headers []string, scheme SignatureScheme, expiresIn int64) (Signer, error) { + + var expires, created int64 = 0, 0 + if expiresIn != 0 { + created = time.Now().Unix() + expires = created + expiresIn + } + + s, err := signerFromString(string(algo)) + if err == nil { + a := &asymmSigner{ + s: s, + dAlgo: dAlgo, + headers: headers, + targetHeader: scheme, + prefix: scheme.authScheme(), + created: created, + expires: expires, + } + return a, nil + } + m, err := macerFromString(string(algo)) + if err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("no crypto implementation available for %q", algo) + } + c := &macSigner{ + m: m, + dAlgo: dAlgo, + headers: headers, + targetHeader: scheme, + prefix: scheme.authScheme(), + created: created, + expires: expires, + } + return c, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/signing.go b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/signing.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e18db41 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/signing.go @@ -0,0 +1,334 @@ +package httpsig + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "encoding/base64" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "net/textproto" + "strconv" + "strings" +) + +const ( + // Signature Parameters + keyIdParameter = "keyId" + algorithmParameter = "algorithm" + headersParameter = "headers" + signatureParameter = "signature" + prefixSeparater = " " + parameterKVSeparater = "=" + parameterValueDelimiter = "\"" + parameterSeparater = "," + headerParameterValueDelim = " " + // RequestTarget specifies to include the http request method and + // entire URI in the signature. Pass it as a header to NewSigner. + RequestTarget = "(request-target)" + createdKey = "created" + expiresKey = "expires" + dateHeader = "date" + + // Signature String Construction + headerFieldDelimiter = ": " + headersDelimiter = "\n" + headerValueDelimiter = ", " + requestTargetSeparator = " " +) + +var defaultHeaders = []string{dateHeader} + +var _ Signer = &macSigner{} + +type macSigner struct { + m macer + makeDigest bool + dAlgo DigestAlgorithm + headers []string + targetHeader SignatureScheme + prefix string + created int64 + expires int64 +} + +func (m *macSigner) SignRequest(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r *http.Request, body []byte) error { + if body != nil { + err := addDigest(r, m.dAlgo, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + s, err := m.signatureString(r) + if err != nil { + return err + } + enc, err := m.signSignature(pKey, s) + if err != nil { + return err + } + setSignatureHeader(r.Header, string(m.targetHeader), m.prefix, pubKeyId, m.m.String(), enc, m.headers, m.created, m.expires) + return nil +} + +func (m *macSigner) SignResponse(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r http.ResponseWriter, body []byte) error { + if body != nil { + err := addDigestResponse(r, m.dAlgo, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + s, err := m.signatureStringResponse(r) + if err != nil { + return err + } + enc, err := m.signSignature(pKey, s) + if err != nil { + return err + } + setSignatureHeader(r.Header(), string(m.targetHeader), m.prefix, pubKeyId, m.m.String(), enc, m.headers, m.created, m.expires) + return nil +} + +func (m *macSigner) signSignature(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, s string) (string, error) { + pKeyBytes, ok := pKey.([]byte) + if !ok { + return "", fmt.Errorf("private key for MAC signing must be of type []byte") + } + sig, err := m.m.Sign([]byte(s), pKeyBytes) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sig) + return enc, nil +} + +func (m *macSigner) signatureString(r *http.Request) (string, error) { + return signatureString(r.Header, m.headers, addRequestTarget(r), m.created, m.expires) +} + +func (m *macSigner) signatureStringResponse(r http.ResponseWriter) (string, error) { + return signatureString(r.Header(), m.headers, requestTargetNotPermitted, m.created, m.expires) +} + +var _ Signer = &asymmSigner{} + +type asymmSigner struct { + s signer + makeDigest bool + dAlgo DigestAlgorithm + headers []string + targetHeader SignatureScheme + prefix string + created int64 + expires int64 +} + +func (a *asymmSigner) SignRequest(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r *http.Request, body []byte) error { + if body != nil { + err := addDigest(r, a.dAlgo, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + s, err := a.signatureString(r) + if err != nil { + return err + } + enc, err := a.signSignature(pKey, s) + if err != nil { + return err + } + setSignatureHeader(r.Header, string(a.targetHeader), a.prefix, pubKeyId, a.s.String(), enc, a.headers, a.created, a.expires) + return nil +} + +func (a *asymmSigner) SignResponse(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, pubKeyId string, r http.ResponseWriter, body []byte) error { + if body != nil { + err := addDigestResponse(r, a.dAlgo, body) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + s, err := a.signatureStringResponse(r) + if err != nil { + return err + } + enc, err := a.signSignature(pKey, s) + if err != nil { + return err + } + setSignatureHeader(r.Header(), string(a.targetHeader), a.prefix, pubKeyId, a.s.String(), enc, a.headers, a.created, a.expires) + return nil +} + +func (a *asymmSigner) signSignature(pKey crypto.PrivateKey, s string) (string, error) { + sig, err := a.s.Sign(rand.Reader, pKey, []byte(s)) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + enc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sig) + return enc, nil +} + +func (a *asymmSigner) signatureString(r *http.Request) (string, error) { + return signatureString(r.Header, a.headers, addRequestTarget(r), a.created, a.expires) +} + +func (a *asymmSigner) signatureStringResponse(r http.ResponseWriter) (string, error) { + return signatureString(r.Header(), a.headers, requestTargetNotPermitted, a.created, a.expires) +} + +var _ SSHSigner = &asymmSSHSigner{} + +type asymmSSHSigner struct { + *asymmSigner +} + +func (a *asymmSSHSigner) SignRequest(pubKeyId string, r *http.Request, body []byte) error { + return a.asymmSigner.SignRequest(nil, pubKeyId, r, body) +} + +func (a *asymmSSHSigner) SignResponse(pubKeyId string, r http.ResponseWriter, body []byte) error { + return a.asymmSigner.SignResponse(nil, pubKeyId, r, body) +} + +func setSignatureHeader(h http.Header, targetHeader, prefix, pubKeyId, algo, enc string, headers []string, created int64, expires int64) { + if len(headers) == 0 { + headers = defaultHeaders + } + var b bytes.Buffer + // KeyId + b.WriteString(prefix) + if len(prefix) > 0 { + b.WriteString(prefixSeparater) + } + b.WriteString(keyIdParameter) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString(pubKeyId) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString(parameterSeparater) + // Algorithm + b.WriteString(algorithmParameter) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString("hs2019") //real algorithm is hidden, see newest version of spec draft + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString(parameterSeparater) + + hasCreated := false + hasExpires := false + for _, h := range headers { + val := strings.ToLower(h) + if val == "("+createdKey+")" { + hasCreated = true + } else if val == "("+expiresKey+")" { + hasExpires = true + } + } + + // Created + if hasCreated == true { + b.WriteString(createdKey) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(created, 10)) + b.WriteString(parameterSeparater) + } + + // Expires + if hasExpires == true { + b.WriteString(expiresKey) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(expires, 10)) + b.WriteString(parameterSeparater) + } + + // Headers + b.WriteString(headersParameter) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + for i, h := range headers { + b.WriteString(strings.ToLower(h)) + if i != len(headers)-1 { + b.WriteString(headerParameterValueDelim) + } + } + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString(parameterSeparater) + // Signature + b.WriteString(signatureParameter) + b.WriteString(parameterKVSeparater) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + b.WriteString(enc) + b.WriteString(parameterValueDelimiter) + h.Add(targetHeader, b.String()) +} + +func requestTargetNotPermitted(b *bytes.Buffer) error { + return fmt.Errorf("cannot sign with %q on anything other than an http request", RequestTarget) +} + +func addRequestTarget(r *http.Request) func(b *bytes.Buffer) error { + return func(b *bytes.Buffer) error { + b.WriteString(RequestTarget) + b.WriteString(headerFieldDelimiter) + b.WriteString(strings.ToLower(r.Method)) + b.WriteString(requestTargetSeparator) + b.WriteString(r.URL.Path) + + if r.URL.RawQuery != "" { + b.WriteString("?") + b.WriteString(r.URL.RawQuery) + } + + return nil + } +} + +func signatureString(values http.Header, include []string, requestTargetFn func(b *bytes.Buffer) error, created int64, expires int64) (string, error) { + if len(include) == 0 { + include = defaultHeaders + } + var b bytes.Buffer + for n, i := range include { + i := strings.ToLower(i) + if i == RequestTarget { + err := requestTargetFn(&b) + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + } else if i == "("+expiresKey+")" { + if expires == 0 { + return "", fmt.Errorf("missing expires value") + } + b.WriteString(i) + b.WriteString(headerFieldDelimiter) + b.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(expires, 10)) + } else if i == "("+createdKey+")" { + if created == 0 { + return "", fmt.Errorf("missing created value") + } + b.WriteString(i) + b.WriteString(headerFieldDelimiter) + b.WriteString(strconv.FormatInt(created, 10)) + } else { + hv, ok := values[textproto.CanonicalMIMEHeaderKey(i)] + if !ok { + return "", fmt.Errorf("missing header %q", i) + } + b.WriteString(i) + b.WriteString(headerFieldDelimiter) + for i, v := range hv { + b.WriteString(strings.TrimSpace(v)) + if i < len(hv)-1 { + b.WriteString(headerValueDelimiter) + } + } + } + if n < len(include)-1 { + b.WriteString(headersDelimiter) + } + } + return b.String(), nil +} diff --git a/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/verifying.go b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/verifying.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d8df02 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/github.com/go-fed/httpsig/verifying.go @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +package httpsig + +import ( + "crypto" + "encoding/base64" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net/http" + "strconv" + "strings" + "time" +) + +var _ Verifier = &verifier{} + +type verifier struct { + header http.Header + kId string + signature string + created int64 + expires int64 + headers []string + sigStringFn func(http.Header, []string, int64, int64) (string, error) +} + +func newVerifier(h http.Header, sigStringFn func(http.Header, []string, int64, int64) (string, error)) (*verifier, error) { + scheme, s, err := getSignatureScheme(h) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + kId, sig, headers, created, expires, err := getSignatureComponents(scheme, s) + if created != 0 { + //check if created is not in the future, we assume a maximum clock offset of 10 seconds + now := time.Now().Unix() + if created-now > 10 { + return nil, errors.New("created is in the future") + } + } + if expires != 0 { + //check if expires is in the past, we assume a maximum clock offset of 10 seconds + now := time.Now().Unix() + if now-expires > 10 { + return nil, errors.New("signature expired") + } + } + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &verifier{ + header: h, + kId: kId, + signature: sig, + created: created, + expires: expires, + headers: headers, + sigStringFn: sigStringFn, + }, nil +} + +func (v *verifier) KeyId() string { + return v.kId +} + +func (v *verifier) Verify(pKey crypto.PublicKey, algo Algorithm) error { + s, err := signerFromString(string(algo)) + if err == nil { + return v.asymmVerify(s, pKey) + } + m, err := macerFromString(string(algo)) + if err == nil { + return v.macVerify(m, pKey) + } + return fmt.Errorf("no crypto implementation available for %q", algo) +} + +func (v *verifier) macVerify(m macer, pKey crypto.PublicKey) error { + key, ok := pKey.([]byte) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("public key for MAC verifying must be of type []byte") + } + signature, err := v.sigStringFn(v.header, v.headers, v.created, v.expires) + if err != nil { + return err + } + actualMAC, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(v.signature) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ok, err = m.Equal([]byte(signature), actualMAC, key) + if err != nil { + return err + } else if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid http signature") + } + return nil +} + +func (v *verifier) asymmVerify(s signer, pKey crypto.PublicKey) error { + toHash, err := v.sigStringFn(v.header, v.headers, v.created, v.expires) + if err != nil { + return err + } + signature, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(v.signature) + if err != nil { + return err + } + err = s.Verify(pKey, []byte(toHash), signature) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +func getSignatureScheme(h http.Header) (scheme SignatureScheme, val string, err error) { + s := h.Get(string(Signature)) + sigHasAll := strings.Contains(s, keyIdParameter) || + strings.Contains(s, headersParameter) || + strings.Contains(s, signatureParameter) + a := h.Get(string(Authorization)) + authHasAll := strings.Contains(a, keyIdParameter) || + strings.Contains(a, headersParameter) || + strings.Contains(a, signatureParameter) + if sigHasAll && authHasAll { + err = fmt.Errorf("both %q and %q have signature parameters", Signature, Authorization) + return + } else if !sigHasAll && !authHasAll { + err = fmt.Errorf("neither %q nor %q have signature parameters", Signature, Authorization) + return + } else if sigHasAll { + val = s + scheme = Signature + return + } else { // authHasAll + val = a + scheme = Authorization + return + } +} + +func getSignatureComponents(scheme SignatureScheme, s string) (kId, sig string, headers []string, created int64, expires int64, err error) { + if as := scheme.authScheme(); len(as) > 0 { + s = strings.TrimPrefix(s, as+prefixSeparater) + } + params := strings.Split(s, parameterSeparater) + for _, p := range params { + kv := strings.SplitN(p, parameterKVSeparater, 2) + if len(kv) != 2 { + err = fmt.Errorf("malformed http signature parameter: %v", kv) + return + } + k := kv[0] + v := strings.Trim(kv[1], parameterValueDelimiter) + switch k { + case keyIdParameter: + kId = v + case createdKey: + created, err = strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return + } + case expiresKey: + expires, err = strconv.ParseInt(v, 10, 64) + if err != nil { + return + } + case algorithmParameter: + // Deprecated, ignore + case headersParameter: + headers = strings.Split(v, headerParameterValueDelim) + case signatureParameter: + sig = v + default: + // Ignore unrecognized parameters + } + } + if len(kId) == 0 { + err = fmt.Errorf("missing %q parameter in http signature", keyIdParameter) + } else if len(sig) == 0 { + err = fmt.Errorf("missing %q parameter in http signature", signatureParameter) + } else if len(headers) == 0 { // Optional + headers = defaultHeaders + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2e98d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b.go @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package blake2b implements the BLAKE2b hash algorithm defined by RFC 7693 +// and the extendable output function (XOF) BLAKE2Xb. +// +// BLAKE2b is optimized for 64-bit platforms—including NEON-enabled ARMs—and +// produces digests of any size between 1 and 64 bytes. +// For a detailed specification of BLAKE2b see https://blake2.net/blake2.pdf +// and for BLAKE2Xb see https://blake2.net/blake2x.pdf +// +// If you aren't sure which function you need, use BLAKE2b (Sum512 or New512). +// If you need a secret-key MAC (message authentication code), use the New512 +// function with a non-nil key. +// +// BLAKE2X is a construction to compute hash values larger than 64 bytes. It +// can produce hash values between 0 and 4 GiB. +package blake2b + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "hash" +) + +const ( + // The blocksize of BLAKE2b in bytes. + BlockSize = 128 + // The hash size of BLAKE2b-512 in bytes. + Size = 64 + // The hash size of BLAKE2b-384 in bytes. + Size384 = 48 + // The hash size of BLAKE2b-256 in bytes. + Size256 = 32 +) + +var ( + useAVX2 bool + useAVX bool + useSSE4 bool +) + +var ( + errKeySize = errors.New("blake2b: invalid key size") + errHashSize = errors.New("blake2b: invalid hash size") +) + +var iv = [8]uint64{ + 0x6a09e667f3bcc908, 0xbb67ae8584caa73b, 0x3c6ef372fe94f82b, 0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1, + 0x510e527fade682d1, 0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f, 0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b, 0x5be0cd19137e2179, +} + +// Sum512 returns the BLAKE2b-512 checksum of the data. +func Sum512(data []byte) [Size]byte { + var sum [Size]byte + checkSum(&sum, Size, data) + return sum +} + +// Sum384 returns the BLAKE2b-384 checksum of the data. +func Sum384(data []byte) [Size384]byte { + var sum [Size]byte + var sum384 [Size384]byte + checkSum(&sum, Size384, data) + copy(sum384[:], sum[:Size384]) + return sum384 +} + +// Sum256 returns the BLAKE2b-256 checksum of the data. +func Sum256(data []byte) [Size256]byte { + var sum [Size]byte + var sum256 [Size256]byte + checkSum(&sum, Size256, data) + copy(sum256[:], sum[:Size256]) + return sum256 +} + +// New512 returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2b-512 checksum. A non-nil +// key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must be between zero and 64 bytes long. +func New512(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return newDigest(Size, key) } + +// New384 returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2b-384 checksum. A non-nil +// key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must be between zero and 64 bytes long. +func New384(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return newDigest(Size384, key) } + +// New256 returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2b-256 checksum. A non-nil +// key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must be between zero and 64 bytes long. +func New256(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return newDigest(Size256, key) } + +// New returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2b checksum with a custom length. +// A non-nil key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must be between zero and 64 bytes long. +// The hash size can be a value between 1 and 64 but it is highly recommended to use +// values equal or greater than: +// - 32 if BLAKE2b is used as a hash function (The key is zero bytes long). +// - 16 if BLAKE2b is used as a MAC function (The key is at least 16 bytes long). +// When the key is nil, the returned hash.Hash implements BinaryMarshaler +// and BinaryUnmarshaler for state (de)serialization as documented by hash.Hash. +func New(size int, key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return newDigest(size, key) } + +func newDigest(hashSize int, key []byte) (*digest, error) { + if hashSize < 1 || hashSize > Size { + return nil, errHashSize + } + if len(key) > Size { + return nil, errKeySize + } + d := &digest{ + size: hashSize, + keyLen: len(key), + } + copy(d.key[:], key) + d.Reset() + return d, nil +} + +func checkSum(sum *[Size]byte, hashSize int, data []byte) { + h := iv + h[0] ^= uint64(hashSize) | (1 << 16) | (1 << 24) + var c [2]uint64 + + if length := len(data); length > BlockSize { + n := length &^ (BlockSize - 1) + if length == n { + n -= BlockSize + } + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0, data[:n]) + data = data[n:] + } + + var block [BlockSize]byte + offset := copy(block[:], data) + remaining := uint64(BlockSize - offset) + if c[0] < remaining { + c[1]-- + } + c[0] -= remaining + + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, block[:]) + + for i, v := range h[:(hashSize+7)/8] { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(sum[8*i:], v) + } +} + +type digest struct { + h [8]uint64 + c [2]uint64 + size int + block [BlockSize]byte + offset int + + key [BlockSize]byte + keyLen int +} + +const ( + magic = "b2b" + marshaledSize = len(magic) + 8*8 + 2*8 + 1 + BlockSize + 1 +) + +func (d *digest) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) { + if d.keyLen != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("crypto/blake2b: cannot marshal MACs") + } + b := make([]byte, 0, marshaledSize) + b = append(b, magic...) + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + b = appendUint64(b, d.h[i]) + } + b = appendUint64(b, d.c[0]) + b = appendUint64(b, d.c[1]) + // Maximum value for size is 64 + b = append(b, byte(d.size)) + b = append(b, d.block[:]...) + b = append(b, byte(d.offset)) + return b, nil +} + +func (d *digest) UnmarshalBinary(b []byte) error { + if len(b) < len(magic) || string(b[:len(magic)]) != magic { + return errors.New("crypto/blake2b: invalid hash state identifier") + } + if len(b) != marshaledSize { + return errors.New("crypto/blake2b: invalid hash state size") + } + b = b[len(magic):] + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + b, d.h[i] = consumeUint64(b) + } + b, d.c[0] = consumeUint64(b) + b, d.c[1] = consumeUint64(b) + d.size = int(b[0]) + b = b[1:] + copy(d.block[:], b[:BlockSize]) + b = b[BlockSize:] + d.offset = int(b[0]) + return nil +} + +func (d *digest) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +func (d *digest) Size() int { return d.size } + +func (d *digest) Reset() { + d.h = iv + d.h[0] ^= uint64(d.size) | (uint64(d.keyLen) << 8) | (1 << 16) | (1 << 24) + d.offset, d.c[0], d.c[1] = 0, 0, 0 + if d.keyLen > 0 { + d.block = d.key + d.offset = BlockSize + } +} + +func (d *digest) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + n = len(p) + + if d.offset > 0 { + remaining := BlockSize - d.offset + if n <= remaining { + d.offset += copy(d.block[d.offset:], p) + return + } + copy(d.block[d.offset:], p[:remaining]) + hashBlocks(&d.h, &d.c, 0, d.block[:]) + d.offset = 0 + p = p[remaining:] + } + + if length := len(p); length > BlockSize { + nn := length &^ (BlockSize - 1) + if length == nn { + nn -= BlockSize + } + hashBlocks(&d.h, &d.c, 0, p[:nn]) + p = p[nn:] + } + + if len(p) > 0 { + d.offset += copy(d.block[:], p) + } + + return +} + +func (d *digest) Sum(sum []byte) []byte { + var hash [Size]byte + d.finalize(&hash) + return append(sum, hash[:d.size]...) +} + +func (d *digest) finalize(hash *[Size]byte) { + var block [BlockSize]byte + copy(block[:], d.block[:d.offset]) + remaining := uint64(BlockSize - d.offset) + + c := d.c + if c[0] < remaining { + c[1]-- + } + c[0] -= remaining + + h := d.h + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, block[:]) + + for i, v := range h { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(hash[8*i:], v) + } +} + +func appendUint64(b []byte, x uint64) []byte { + var a [8]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(a[:], x) + return append(b, a[:]...) +} + +func appendUint32(b []byte, x uint32) []byte { + var a [4]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(a[:], x) + return append(b, a[:]...) +} + +func consumeUint64(b []byte) ([]byte, uint64) { + x := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b) + return b[8:], x +} + +func consumeUint32(b []byte) ([]byte, uint32) { + x := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b) + return b[4:], x +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..56bfaaa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego + +package blake2b + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +func init() { + useAVX2 = cpu.X86.HasAVX2 + useAVX = cpu.X86.HasAVX + useSSE4 = cpu.X86.HasSSE41 +} + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksAVX2(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksAVX(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSE4(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) { + switch { + case useAVX2: + hashBlocksAVX2(h, c, flag, blocks) + case useAVX: + hashBlocksAVX(h, c, flag, blocks) + case useSSE4: + hashBlocksSSE4(h, c, flag, blocks) + default: + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b9daa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2bAVX2_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,745 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +DATA ·AVX2_iv0<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x6a09e667f3bcc908 +DATA ·AVX2_iv0<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xbb67ae8584caa73b +DATA ·AVX2_iv0<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x3c6ef372fe94f82b +DATA ·AVX2_iv0<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1 +GLOBL ·AVX2_iv0<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 + +DATA ·AVX2_iv1<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x510e527fade682d1 +DATA ·AVX2_iv1<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f +DATA ·AVX2_iv1<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b +DATA ·AVX2_iv1<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x5be0cd19137e2179 +GLOBL ·AVX2_iv1<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 + +DATA ·AVX2_c40<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0201000706050403 +DATA ·AVX2_c40<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0a09080f0e0d0c0b +DATA ·AVX2_c40<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0201000706050403 +DATA ·AVX2_c40<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0a09080f0e0d0c0b +GLOBL ·AVX2_c40<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 + +DATA ·AVX2_c48<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0100070605040302 +DATA ·AVX2_c48<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x09080f0e0d0c0b0a +DATA ·AVX2_c48<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0100070605040302 +DATA ·AVX2_c48<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x09080f0e0d0c0b0a +GLOBL ·AVX2_c48<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $32 + +DATA ·AVX_iv0<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x6a09e667f3bcc908 +DATA ·AVX_iv0<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xbb67ae8584caa73b +GLOBL ·AVX_iv0<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·AVX_iv1<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3c6ef372fe94f82b +DATA ·AVX_iv1<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1 +GLOBL ·AVX_iv1<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·AVX_iv2<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x510e527fade682d1 +DATA ·AVX_iv2<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f +GLOBL ·AVX_iv2<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·AVX_iv3<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b +DATA ·AVX_iv3<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x5be0cd19137e2179 +GLOBL ·AVX_iv3<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·AVX_c40<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0201000706050403 +DATA ·AVX_c40<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0a09080f0e0d0c0b +GLOBL ·AVX_c40<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·AVX_c48<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0100070605040302 +DATA ·AVX_c48<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x09080f0e0d0c0b0a +GLOBL ·AVX_c48<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +#define VPERMQ_0x39_Y1_Y1 BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0x39 +#define VPERMQ_0x93_Y1_Y1 BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0xc9; BYTE $0x93 +#define VPERMQ_0x4E_Y2_Y2 BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0xd2; BYTE $0x4e +#define VPERMQ_0x93_Y3_Y3 BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x93 +#define VPERMQ_0x39_Y3_Y3 BYTE $0xc4; BYTE $0xe3; BYTE $0xfd; BYTE $0x00; BYTE $0xdb; BYTE $0x39 + +#define ROUND_AVX2(m0, m1, m2, m3, t, c40, c48) \ + VPADDQ m0, Y0, Y0; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y0, Y0; \ + VPXOR Y0, Y3, Y3; \ + VPSHUFD $-79, Y3, Y3; \ + VPADDQ Y3, Y2, Y2; \ + VPXOR Y2, Y1, Y1; \ + VPSHUFB c40, Y1, Y1; \ + VPADDQ m1, Y0, Y0; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y0, Y0; \ + VPXOR Y0, Y3, Y3; \ + VPSHUFB c48, Y3, Y3; \ + VPADDQ Y3, Y2, Y2; \ + VPXOR Y2, Y1, Y1; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y1, t; \ + VPSRLQ $63, Y1, Y1; \ + VPXOR t, Y1, Y1; \ + VPERMQ_0x39_Y1_Y1; \ + VPERMQ_0x4E_Y2_Y2; \ + VPERMQ_0x93_Y3_Y3; \ + VPADDQ m2, Y0, Y0; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y0, Y0; \ + VPXOR Y0, Y3, Y3; \ + VPSHUFD $-79, Y3, Y3; \ + VPADDQ Y3, Y2, Y2; \ + VPXOR Y2, Y1, Y1; \ + VPSHUFB c40, Y1, Y1; \ + VPADDQ m3, Y0, Y0; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y0, Y0; \ + VPXOR Y0, Y3, Y3; \ + VPSHUFB c48, Y3, Y3; \ + VPADDQ Y3, Y2, Y2; \ + VPXOR Y2, Y1, Y1; \ + VPADDQ Y1, Y1, t; \ + VPSRLQ $63, Y1, Y1; \ + VPXOR t, Y1, Y1; \ + VPERMQ_0x39_Y3_Y3; \ + VPERMQ_0x4E_Y2_Y2; \ + VPERMQ_0x93_Y1_Y1 + +#define VMOVQ_SI_X11_0 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x1E +#define VMOVQ_SI_X12_0 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x26 +#define VMOVQ_SI_X13_0 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x2E +#define VMOVQ_SI_X14_0 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x36 +#define VMOVQ_SI_X15_0 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x3E + +#define VMOVQ_SI_X11(n) BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x5E; BYTE $n +#define VMOVQ_SI_X12(n) BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x66; BYTE $n +#define VMOVQ_SI_X13(n) BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x6E; BYTE $n +#define VMOVQ_SI_X14(n) BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x76; BYTE $n +#define VMOVQ_SI_X15(n) BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x7A; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $n + +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11_0 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0xA1; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x1E; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12_0 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x99; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x26; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13_0 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x91; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x2E; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14_0 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x89; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x36; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15_0 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x81; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x3E; BYTE $0x01 + +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(n) BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0xA1; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x5E; BYTE $n; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(n) BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x99; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x66; BYTE $n; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(n) BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x91; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x6E; BYTE $n; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(n) BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x89; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x76; BYTE $n; BYTE $0x01 +#define VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(n) BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x63; BYTE $0x81; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0x7E; BYTE $n; BYTE $0x01 + +#define VMOVQ_R8_X15 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0xF9; BYTE $0x6E; BYTE $0xF8 +#define VPINSRQ_1_R9_X15 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x43; BYTE $0x81; BYTE $0x22; BYTE $0xF9; BYTE $0x01 + +// load msg: Y12 = (i0, i1, i2, i3) +// i0, i1, i2, i3 must not be 0 +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(i0, i1, i2, i3) \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(i0*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(i2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(i1*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(i3*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y12, Y12 + +// load msg: Y13 = (i0, i1, i2, i3) +// i0, i1, i2, i3 must not be 0 +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(i0, i1, i2, i3) \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(i0*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(i2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(i1*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(i3*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y13, Y13 + +// load msg: Y14 = (i0, i1, i2, i3) +// i0, i1, i2, i3 must not be 0 +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(i0, i1, i2, i3) \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(i0*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(i2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(i1*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(i3*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y14, Y14 + +// load msg: Y15 = (i0, i1, i2, i3) +// i0, i1, i2, i3 must not be 0 +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(i0, i1, i2, i3) \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(i0*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(i2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(i1*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(i3*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y15, Y15 + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7_8_10_12_14_9_11_13_15() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(4*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(6*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y12, Y12; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(1, 3, 5, 7); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(8, 10, 12, 14); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(9, 11, 13, 15) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_14_4_9_13_10_8_15_6_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(14, 4, 9, 13); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(10, 8, 15, 6); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(11*8); \ + VPSHUFD $0x4E, 0*8(SI), X14; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(5*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y14, Y14; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(12, 2, 7, 3) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_11_12_5_15_8_0_2_13_10_3_7_9_14_6_1_4() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(5*8); \ + VMOVDQU 11*8(SI), X12; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(15*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y12, Y12; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(8*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(13*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y13, Y13; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(10, 3, 7, 9); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(14, 6, 1, 4) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_7_3_13_11_9_1_12_14_2_5_4_15_6_10_0_8() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(7, 3, 13, 11); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(9, 1, 12, 14); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(2, 5, 4, 15); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(6*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(10*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(8*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y15, Y15 + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_9_5_2_10_0_7_4_15_14_11_6_3_1_12_8_13() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(9, 5, 2, 10); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(4*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(7*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(15*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y13, Y13; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(14, 11, 6, 3); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(1, 12, 8, 13) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_2_6_0_8_12_10_11_3_4_7_15_1_13_5_14_9() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(2*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(8*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y12, Y12; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(12, 10, 11, 3); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(4, 7, 15, 1); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(13, 5, 14, 9) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_12_1_14_4_5_15_13_10_0_6_9_8_7_3_2_11() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(12, 1, 14, 4); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(5, 15, 13, 10); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14_0; \ + VPSHUFD $0x4E, 8*8(SI), X11; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(6*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y14, Y14; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y15(7, 3, 2, 11) + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_13_7_12_3_11_14_1_9_5_15_8_2_0_4_6_10() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(13, 7, 12, 3); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(11, 14, 1, 9); \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(5, 15, 8, 2); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(4*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(10*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y15, Y15 + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_6_14_11_0_15_9_3_8_12_13_1_10_2_7_4_5() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(6*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(11*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(14*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11_0; \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y12, Y12; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y13(15, 9, 3, 8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(1*8); \ + VMOVDQU 12*8(SI), X14; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11(10*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y14, Y14; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(2*8); \ + VMOVDQU 4*8(SI), X11; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(7*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y15, Y15 + +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX2_10_8_7_1_2_4_6_5_15_9_3_13_11_14_12_0() \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y12(10, 8, 7, 1); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(2*8); \ + VPSHUFD $0x4E, 5*8(SI), X11; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(4*8); \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y13, Y13; \ + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_Y14(15, 9, 3, 13); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(11*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X11(12*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(14*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X11_0; \ + VINSERTI128 $1, X11, Y15, Y15 + +// func hashBlocksAVX2(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX2(SB), 4, $320-48 // frame size = 288 + 32 byte alignment + MOVQ h+0(FP), AX + MOVQ c+8(FP), BX + MOVQ flag+16(FP), CX + MOVQ blocks_base+24(FP), SI + MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI + + MOVQ SP, DX + ADDQ $31, DX + ANDQ $~31, DX + + MOVQ CX, 16(DX) + XORQ CX, CX + MOVQ CX, 24(DX) + + VMOVDQU ·AVX2_c40<>(SB), Y4 + VMOVDQU ·AVX2_c48<>(SB), Y5 + + VMOVDQU 0(AX), Y8 + VMOVDQU 32(AX), Y9 + VMOVDQU ·AVX2_iv0<>(SB), Y6 + VMOVDQU ·AVX2_iv1<>(SB), Y7 + + MOVQ 0(BX), R8 + MOVQ 8(BX), R9 + MOVQ R9, 8(DX) + +loop: + ADDQ $128, R8 + MOVQ R8, 0(DX) + CMPQ R8, $128 + JGE noinc + INCQ R9 + MOVQ R9, 8(DX) + +noinc: + VMOVDQA Y8, Y0 + VMOVDQA Y9, Y1 + VMOVDQA Y6, Y2 + VPXOR 0(DX), Y7, Y3 + + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7_8_10_12_14_9_11_13_15() + VMOVDQA Y12, 32(DX) + VMOVDQA Y13, 64(DX) + VMOVDQA Y14, 96(DX) + VMOVDQA Y15, 128(DX) + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_14_4_9_13_10_8_15_6_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3() + VMOVDQA Y12, 160(DX) + VMOVDQA Y13, 192(DX) + VMOVDQA Y14, 224(DX) + VMOVDQA Y15, 256(DX) + + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_11_12_5_15_8_0_2_13_10_3_7_9_14_6_1_4() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_7_3_13_11_9_1_12_14_2_5_4_15_6_10_0_8() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_9_5_2_10_0_7_4_15_14_11_6_3_1_12_8_13() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_2_6_0_8_12_10_11_3_4_7_15_1_13_5_14_9() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_12_1_14_4_5_15_13_10_0_6_9_8_7_3_2_11() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_13_7_12_3_11_14_1_9_5_15_8_2_0_4_6_10() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_6_14_11_0_15_9_3_8_12_13_1_10_2_7_4_5() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + LOAD_MSG_AVX2_10_8_7_1_2_4_6_5_15_9_3_13_11_14_12_0() + ROUND_AVX2(Y12, Y13, Y14, Y15, Y10, Y4, Y5) + + ROUND_AVX2(32(DX), 64(DX), 96(DX), 128(DX), Y10, Y4, Y5) + ROUND_AVX2(160(DX), 192(DX), 224(DX), 256(DX), Y10, Y4, Y5) + + VPXOR Y0, Y8, Y8 + VPXOR Y1, Y9, Y9 + VPXOR Y2, Y8, Y8 + VPXOR Y3, Y9, Y9 + + LEAQ 128(SI), SI + SUBQ $128, DI + JNE loop + + MOVQ R8, 0(BX) + MOVQ R9, 8(BX) + + VMOVDQU Y8, 0(AX) + VMOVDQU Y9, 32(AX) + VZEROUPPER + + RET + +#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X2_X2_X15 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x69; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFA +#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X3_X3_X15 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x61; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFB +#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X7_X7_X15 BYTE $0xC5; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFF +#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X13_X13_X15 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x11; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFD +#define VPUNPCKLQDQ_X14_X14_X15 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x09; BYTE $0x6C; BYTE $0xFE + +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X2_X2 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x69; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xD7 +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X3_X3 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x61; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xDF +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X6_X6 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x49; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xF7 +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X7_X7 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xFF +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X3_X2 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x61; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xD7 +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X7_X6 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x41; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xF7 +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X13_X3 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x11; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xDF +#define VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X13_X7 BYTE $0xC4; BYTE $0xC1; BYTE $0x11; BYTE $0x6D; BYTE $0xFF + +#define SHUFFLE_AVX() \ + VMOVDQA X6, X13; \ + VMOVDQA X2, X14; \ + VMOVDQA X4, X6; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X13_X13_X15; \ + VMOVDQA X5, X4; \ + VMOVDQA X6, X5; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X7_X6; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X7_X7_X15; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X13_X7; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X3_X3_X15; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X2_X2; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X14_X14_X15; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X3_X3; \ + +#define SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() \ + VMOVDQA X2, X13; \ + VMOVDQA X4, X14; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X2_X2_X15; \ + VMOVDQA X5, X4; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X3_X2; \ + VMOVDQA X14, X5; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X3_X3_X15; \ + VMOVDQA X6, X14; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X13_X3; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X7_X7_X15; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X6_X6; \ + VPUNPCKLQDQ_X14_X14_X15; \ + VPUNPCKHQDQ_X15_X7_X7; \ + +#define HALF_ROUND_AVX(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, m0, m1, m2, m3, t0, c40, c48) \ + VPADDQ m0, v0, v0; \ + VPADDQ v2, v0, v0; \ + VPADDQ m1, v1, v1; \ + VPADDQ v3, v1, v1; \ + VPXOR v0, v6, v6; \ + VPXOR v1, v7, v7; \ + VPSHUFD $-79, v6, v6; \ + VPSHUFD $-79, v7, v7; \ + VPADDQ v6, v4, v4; \ + VPADDQ v7, v5, v5; \ + VPXOR v4, v2, v2; \ + VPXOR v5, v3, v3; \ + VPSHUFB c40, v2, v2; \ + VPSHUFB c40, v3, v3; \ + VPADDQ m2, v0, v0; \ + VPADDQ v2, v0, v0; \ + VPADDQ m3, v1, v1; \ + VPADDQ v3, v1, v1; \ + VPXOR v0, v6, v6; \ + VPXOR v1, v7, v7; \ + VPSHUFB c48, v6, v6; \ + VPSHUFB c48, v7, v7; \ + VPADDQ v6, v4, v4; \ + VPADDQ v7, v5, v5; \ + VPXOR v4, v2, v2; \ + VPXOR v5, v3, v3; \ + VPADDQ v2, v2, t0; \ + VPSRLQ $63, v2, v2; \ + VPXOR t0, v2, v2; \ + VPADDQ v3, v3, t0; \ + VPSRLQ $63, v3, v3; \ + VPXOR t0, v3, v3 + +// load msg: X12 = (i0, i1), X13 = (i2, i3), X14 = (i4, i5), X15 = (i6, i7) +// i0, i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7 must not be 0 +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX(i0, i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7) \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(i0*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(i2*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(i4*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(i6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(i1*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(i3*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(i5*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(i7*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (0, 2), X13 = (4, 6), X14 = (1, 3), X15 = (5, 7) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(4*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(1*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(5*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(3*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(7*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (1, 0), X13 = (11, 5), X14 = (12, 2), X15 = (7, 3) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3() \ + VPSHUFD $0x4E, 0*8(SI), X12; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(11*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(12*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(7*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(5*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(3*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (11, 12), X13 = (5, 15), X14 = (8, 0), X15 = (2, 13) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_11_12_5_15_8_0_2_13() \ + VMOVDQU 11*8(SI), X12; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(5*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(8*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(15*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(13*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (2, 5), X13 = (4, 15), X14 = (6, 10), X15 = (0, 8) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_2_5_4_15_6_10_0_8() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(2*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(4*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(6*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(5*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(15*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(10*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(8*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (9, 5), X13 = (2, 10), X14 = (0, 7), X15 = (4, 15) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_9_5_2_10_0_7_4_15() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(9*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13(2*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(4*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(5*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(10*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(7*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(15*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (2, 6), X13 = (0, 8), X14 = (12, 10), X15 = (11, 3) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_2_6_0_8_12_10_11_3() \ + VMOVQ_SI_X12(2*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X13_0; \ + VMOVQ_SI_X14(12*8); \ + VMOVQ_SI_X15(11*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(8*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(10*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(3*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (0, 6), X13 = (9, 8), X14 = (7, 3), X15 = (2, 11) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_0_6_9_8_7_3_2_11() \ + MOVQ 0*8(SI), X12; \ + VPSHUFD $0x4E, 8*8(SI), X13; \ + MOVQ 7*8(SI), X14; \ + MOVQ 2*8(SI), X15; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(6*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(3*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(11*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (6, 14), X13 = (11, 0), X14 = (15, 9), X15 = (3, 8) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_6_14_11_0_15_9_3_8() \ + MOVQ 6*8(SI), X12; \ + MOVQ 11*8(SI), X13; \ + MOVQ 15*8(SI), X14; \ + MOVQ 3*8(SI), X15; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(14*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13_0; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(9*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(8*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (5, 15), X13 = (8, 2), X14 = (0, 4), X15 = (6, 10) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_5_15_8_2_0_4_6_10() \ + MOVQ 5*8(SI), X12; \ + MOVQ 8*8(SI), X13; \ + MOVQ 0*8(SI), X14; \ + MOVQ 6*8(SI), X15; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(15*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(2*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(4*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15(10*8) + +// load msg: X12 = (12, 13), X13 = (1, 10), X14 = (2, 7), X15 = (4, 5) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_12_13_1_10_2_7_4_5() \ + VMOVDQU 12*8(SI), X12; \ + MOVQ 1*8(SI), X13; \ + MOVQ 2*8(SI), X14; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(10*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(7*8); \ + VMOVDQU 4*8(SI), X15 + +// load msg: X12 = (15, 9), X13 = (3, 13), X14 = (11, 14), X15 = (12, 0) +#define LOAD_MSG_AVX_15_9_3_13_11_14_12_0() \ + MOVQ 15*8(SI), X12; \ + MOVQ 3*8(SI), X13; \ + MOVQ 11*8(SI), X14; \ + MOVQ 12*8(SI), X15; \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X12(9*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X13(13*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X14(14*8); \ + VPINSRQ_1_SI_X15_0 + +// func hashBlocksAVX(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksAVX(SB), 4, $288-48 // frame size = 272 + 16 byte alignment + MOVQ h+0(FP), AX + MOVQ c+8(FP), BX + MOVQ flag+16(FP), CX + MOVQ blocks_base+24(FP), SI + MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI + + MOVQ SP, R10 + ADDQ $15, R10 + ANDQ $~15, R10 + + VMOVDQU ·AVX_c40<>(SB), X0 + VMOVDQU ·AVX_c48<>(SB), X1 + VMOVDQA X0, X8 + VMOVDQA X1, X9 + + VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv3<>(SB), X0 + VMOVDQA X0, 0(R10) + XORQ CX, 0(R10) // 0(R10) = ·AVX_iv3 ^ (CX || 0) + + VMOVDQU 0(AX), X10 + VMOVDQU 16(AX), X11 + VMOVDQU 32(AX), X2 + VMOVDQU 48(AX), X3 + + MOVQ 0(BX), R8 + MOVQ 8(BX), R9 + +loop: + ADDQ $128, R8 + CMPQ R8, $128 + JGE noinc + INCQ R9 + +noinc: + VMOVQ_R8_X15 + VPINSRQ_1_R9_X15 + + VMOVDQA X10, X0 + VMOVDQA X11, X1 + VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv0<>(SB), X4 + VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv1<>(SB), X5 + VMOVDQU ·AVX_iv2<>(SB), X6 + + VPXOR X15, X6, X6 + VMOVDQA 0(R10), X7 + + LOAD_MSG_AVX_0_2_4_6_1_3_5_7() + VMOVDQA X12, 16(R10) + VMOVDQA X13, 32(R10) + VMOVDQA X14, 48(R10) + VMOVDQA X15, 64(R10) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX(8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15) + VMOVDQA X12, 80(R10) + VMOVDQA X13, 96(R10) + VMOVDQA X14, 112(R10) + VMOVDQA X15, 128(R10) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX(14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6) + VMOVDQA X12, 144(R10) + VMOVDQA X13, 160(R10) + VMOVDQA X14, 176(R10) + VMOVDQA X15, 192(R10) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_1_0_11_5_12_2_7_3() + VMOVDQA X12, 208(R10) + VMOVDQA X13, 224(R10) + VMOVDQA X14, 240(R10) + VMOVDQA X15, 256(R10) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX_11_12_5_15_8_0_2_13() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX(10, 3, 7, 9, 14, 6, 1, 4) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX(7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_2_5_4_15_6_10_0_8() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX_9_5_2_10_0_7_4_15() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX(14, 11, 6, 3, 1, 12, 8, 13) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX_2_6_0_8_12_10_11_3() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX(4, 7, 15, 1, 13, 5, 14, 9) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX(12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_0_6_9_8_7_3_2_11() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX(13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_5_15_8_2_0_4_6_10() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX_6_14_11_0_15_9_3_8() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_12_13_1_10_2_7_4_5() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + LOAD_MSG_AVX(10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5) + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + LOAD_MSG_AVX_15_9_3_13_11_14_12_0() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X12, X13, X14, X15, X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(R10), 32(R10), 48(R10), 64(R10), X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(R10), 96(R10), 112(R10), 128(R10), X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(R10), 160(R10), 176(R10), 192(R10), X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX() + HALF_ROUND_AVX(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(R10), 224(R10), 240(R10), 256(R10), X15, X8, X9) + SHUFFLE_AVX_INV() + + VMOVDQU 32(AX), X14 + VMOVDQU 48(AX), X15 + VPXOR X0, X10, X10 + VPXOR X1, X11, X11 + VPXOR X2, X14, X14 + VPXOR X3, X15, X15 + VPXOR X4, X10, X10 + VPXOR X5, X11, X11 + VPXOR X6, X14, X2 + VPXOR X7, X15, X3 + VMOVDQU X2, 32(AX) + VMOVDQU X3, 48(AX) + + LEAQ 128(SI), SI + SUBQ $128, DI + JNE loop + + VMOVDQU X10, 0(AX) + VMOVDQU X11, 16(AX) + + MOVQ R8, 0(BX) + MOVQ R9, 8(BX) + VZEROUPPER + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fa1b32 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !go1.7 && amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build !go1.7,amd64,gc,!purego + +package blake2b + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +func init() { + useSSE4 = cpu.X86.HasSSE41 +} + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSE4(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) { + if useSSE4 { + hashBlocksSSE4(h, c, flag, blocks) + } else { + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae75eb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,279 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +DATA ·iv0<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x6a09e667f3bcc908 +DATA ·iv0<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xbb67ae8584caa73b +GLOBL ·iv0<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·iv1<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3c6ef372fe94f82b +DATA ·iv1<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1 +GLOBL ·iv1<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·iv2<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x510e527fade682d1 +DATA ·iv2<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x9b05688c2b3e6c1f +GLOBL ·iv2<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·iv3<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x1f83d9abfb41bd6b +DATA ·iv3<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x5be0cd19137e2179 +GLOBL ·iv3<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·c40<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0201000706050403 +DATA ·c40<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0a09080f0e0d0c0b +GLOBL ·c40<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA ·c48<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0100070605040302 +DATA ·c48<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x09080f0e0d0c0b0a +GLOBL ·c48<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +#define SHUFFLE(v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, t1, t2) \ + MOVO v4, t1; \ + MOVO v5, v4; \ + MOVO t1, v5; \ + MOVO v6, t1; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v6, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ v7, v6; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v6; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v7, t2; \ + MOVO t1, v7; \ + MOVO v2, t1; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v7; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v3, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v2; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ t1, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v3 + +#define SHUFFLE_INV(v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, t1, t2) \ + MOVO v4, t1; \ + MOVO v5, v4; \ + MOVO t1, v5; \ + MOVO v2, t1; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v2, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ v3, v2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v2; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v3, t2; \ + MOVO t1, v3; \ + MOVO v6, t1; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v3; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ v7, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v6; \ + PUNPCKLQDQ t1, t2; \ + PUNPCKHQDQ t2, v7 + +#define HALF_ROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7, m0, m1, m2, m3, t0, c40, c48) \ + PADDQ m0, v0; \ + PADDQ m1, v1; \ + PADDQ v2, v0; \ + PADDQ v3, v1; \ + PXOR v0, v6; \ + PXOR v1, v7; \ + PSHUFD $0xB1, v6, v6; \ + PSHUFD $0xB1, v7, v7; \ + PADDQ v6, v4; \ + PADDQ v7, v5; \ + PXOR v4, v2; \ + PXOR v5, v3; \ + PSHUFB c40, v2; \ + PSHUFB c40, v3; \ + PADDQ m2, v0; \ + PADDQ m3, v1; \ + PADDQ v2, v0; \ + PADDQ v3, v1; \ + PXOR v0, v6; \ + PXOR v1, v7; \ + PSHUFB c48, v6; \ + PSHUFB c48, v7; \ + PADDQ v6, v4; \ + PADDQ v7, v5; \ + PXOR v4, v2; \ + PXOR v5, v3; \ + MOVOU v2, t0; \ + PADDQ v2, t0; \ + PSRLQ $63, v2; \ + PXOR t0, v2; \ + MOVOU v3, t0; \ + PADDQ v3, t0; \ + PSRLQ $63, v3; \ + PXOR t0, v3 + +#define LOAD_MSG(m0, m1, m2, m3, src, i0, i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7) \ + MOVQ i0*8(src), m0; \ + PINSRQ $1, i1*8(src), m0; \ + MOVQ i2*8(src), m1; \ + PINSRQ $1, i3*8(src), m1; \ + MOVQ i4*8(src), m2; \ + PINSRQ $1, i5*8(src), m2; \ + MOVQ i6*8(src), m3; \ + PINSRQ $1, i7*8(src), m3 + +// func hashBlocksSSE4(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE4(SB), 4, $288-48 // frame size = 272 + 16 byte alignment + MOVQ h+0(FP), AX + MOVQ c+8(FP), BX + MOVQ flag+16(FP), CX + MOVQ blocks_base+24(FP), SI + MOVQ blocks_len+32(FP), DI + + MOVQ SP, R10 + ADDQ $15, R10 + ANDQ $~15, R10 + + MOVOU ·iv3<>(SB), X0 + MOVO X0, 0(R10) + XORQ CX, 0(R10) // 0(R10) = ·iv3 ^ (CX || 0) + + MOVOU ·c40<>(SB), X13 + MOVOU ·c48<>(SB), X14 + + MOVOU 0(AX), X12 + MOVOU 16(AX), X15 + + MOVQ 0(BX), R8 + MOVQ 8(BX), R9 + +loop: + ADDQ $128, R8 + CMPQ R8, $128 + JGE noinc + INCQ R9 + +noinc: + MOVQ R8, X8 + PINSRQ $1, R9, X8 + + MOVO X12, X0 + MOVO X15, X1 + MOVOU 32(AX), X2 + MOVOU 48(AX), X3 + MOVOU ·iv0<>(SB), X4 + MOVOU ·iv1<>(SB), X5 + MOVOU ·iv2<>(SB), X6 + + PXOR X8, X6 + MOVO 0(R10), X7 + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7) + MOVO X8, 16(R10) + MOVO X9, 32(R10) + MOVO X10, 48(R10) + MOVO X11, 64(R10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15) + MOVO X8, 80(R10) + MOVO X9, 96(R10) + MOVO X10, 112(R10) + MOVO X11, 128(R10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6) + MOVO X8, 144(R10) + MOVO X9, 160(R10) + MOVO X10, 176(R10) + MOVO X11, 192(R10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3) + MOVO X8, 208(R10) + MOVO X9, 224(R10) + MOVO X10, 240(R10) + MOVO X11, 256(R10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 11, 12, 5, 15, 8, 0, 2, 13) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 10, 3, 7, 9, 14, 6, 1, 4) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 2, 5, 4, 15, 6, 10, 0, 8) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 9, 5, 2, 10, 0, 7, 4, 15) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 14, 11, 6, 3, 1, 12, 8, 13) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 2, 6, 0, 8, 12, 10, 11, 3) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 4, 7, 15, 1, 13, 5, 14, 9) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2, 11) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 5, 15, 8, 2, 0, 4, 6, 10) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 6, 14, 11, 0, 15, 9, 3, 8) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 12, 13, 1, 10, 2, 7, 4, 5) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + LOAD_MSG(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 15, 9, 3, 13, 11, 14, 12, 0) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(R10), 32(R10), 48(R10), 64(R10), X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 80(R10), 96(R10), 112(R10), 128(R10), X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 144(R10), 160(R10), 176(R10), 192(R10), X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + HALF_ROUND(X0, X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, 208(R10), 224(R10), 240(R10), 256(R10), X11, X13, X14) + SHUFFLE_INV(X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9) + + MOVOU 32(AX), X10 + MOVOU 48(AX), X11 + PXOR X0, X12 + PXOR X1, X15 + PXOR X2, X10 + PXOR X3, X11 + PXOR X4, X12 + PXOR X5, X15 + PXOR X6, X10 + PXOR X7, X11 + MOVOU X10, 32(AX) + MOVOU X11, 48(AX) + + LEAQ 128(SI), SI + SUBQ $128, DI + JNE loop + + MOVOU X12, 0(AX) + MOVOU X15, 16(AX) + + MOVQ R8, 0(BX) + MOVQ R9, 8(BX) + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3168a8a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blake2b + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "math/bits" +) + +// the precomputed values for BLAKE2b +// there are 12 16-byte arrays - one for each round +// the entries are calculated from the sigma constants. +var precomputed = [12][16]byte{ + {0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15}, + {14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3}, + {11, 12, 5, 15, 8, 0, 2, 13, 10, 3, 7, 9, 14, 6, 1, 4}, + {7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14, 2, 5, 4, 15, 6, 10, 0, 8}, + {9, 5, 2, 10, 0, 7, 4, 15, 14, 11, 6, 3, 1, 12, 8, 13}, + {2, 6, 0, 8, 12, 10, 11, 3, 4, 7, 15, 1, 13, 5, 14, 9}, + {12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2, 11}, + {13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9, 5, 15, 8, 2, 0, 4, 6, 10}, + {6, 14, 11, 0, 15, 9, 3, 8, 12, 13, 1, 10, 2, 7, 4, 5}, + {10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5, 15, 9, 3, 13, 11, 14, 12, 0}, + {0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15}, // equal to the first + {14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3}, // equal to the second +} + +func hashBlocksGeneric(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) { + var m [16]uint64 + c0, c1 := c[0], c[1] + + for i := 0; i < len(blocks); { + c0 += BlockSize + if c0 < BlockSize { + c1++ + } + + v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4], h[5], h[6], h[7] + v8, v9, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15 := iv[0], iv[1], iv[2], iv[3], iv[4], iv[5], iv[6], iv[7] + v12 ^= c0 + v13 ^= c1 + v14 ^= flag + + for j := range m { + m[j] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(blocks[i:]) + i += 8 + } + + for j := range precomputed { + s := &(precomputed[j]) + + v0 += m[s[0]] + v0 += v4 + v12 ^= v0 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft64(v12, -32) + v8 += v12 + v4 ^= v8 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft64(v4, -24) + v1 += m[s[1]] + v1 += v5 + v13 ^= v1 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft64(v13, -32) + v9 += v13 + v5 ^= v9 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft64(v5, -24) + v2 += m[s[2]] + v2 += v6 + v14 ^= v2 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft64(v14, -32) + v10 += v14 + v6 ^= v10 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft64(v6, -24) + v3 += m[s[3]] + v3 += v7 + v15 ^= v3 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft64(v15, -32) + v11 += v15 + v7 ^= v11 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft64(v7, -24) + + v0 += m[s[4]] + v0 += v4 + v12 ^= v0 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft64(v12, -16) + v8 += v12 + v4 ^= v8 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft64(v4, -63) + v1 += m[s[5]] + v1 += v5 + v13 ^= v1 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft64(v13, -16) + v9 += v13 + v5 ^= v9 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft64(v5, -63) + v2 += m[s[6]] + v2 += v6 + v14 ^= v2 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft64(v14, -16) + v10 += v14 + v6 ^= v10 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft64(v6, -63) + v3 += m[s[7]] + v3 += v7 + v15 ^= v3 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft64(v15, -16) + v11 += v15 + v7 ^= v11 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft64(v7, -63) + + v0 += m[s[8]] + v0 += v5 + v15 ^= v0 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft64(v15, -32) + v10 += v15 + v5 ^= v10 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft64(v5, -24) + v1 += m[s[9]] + v1 += v6 + v12 ^= v1 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft64(v12, -32) + v11 += v12 + v6 ^= v11 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft64(v6, -24) + v2 += m[s[10]] + v2 += v7 + v13 ^= v2 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft64(v13, -32) + v8 += v13 + v7 ^= v8 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft64(v7, -24) + v3 += m[s[11]] + v3 += v4 + v14 ^= v3 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft64(v14, -32) + v9 += v14 + v4 ^= v9 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft64(v4, -24) + + v0 += m[s[12]] + v0 += v5 + v15 ^= v0 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft64(v15, -16) + v10 += v15 + v5 ^= v10 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft64(v5, -63) + v1 += m[s[13]] + v1 += v6 + v12 ^= v1 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft64(v12, -16) + v11 += v12 + v6 ^= v11 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft64(v6, -63) + v2 += m[s[14]] + v2 += v7 + v13 ^= v2 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft64(v13, -16) + v8 += v13 + v7 ^= v8 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft64(v7, -63) + v3 += m[s[15]] + v3 += v4 + v14 ^= v3 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft64(v14, -16) + v9 += v14 + v4 ^= v9 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft64(v4, -63) + + } + + h[0] ^= v0 ^ v8 + h[1] ^= v1 ^ v9 + h[2] ^= v2 ^ v10 + h[3] ^= v3 ^ v11 + h[4] ^= v4 ^ v12 + h[5] ^= v5 ^ v13 + h[6] ^= v6 ^ v14 + h[7] ^= v7 ^ v15 + } + c[0], c[1] = c0, c1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_ref.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_ref.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0137cd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2b_ref.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !amd64 || purego || !gc +// +build !amd64 purego !gc + +package blake2b + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint64, c *[2]uint64, flag uint64, blocks []byte) { + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2x.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52c414d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/blake2x.go @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blake2b + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "io" +) + +// XOF defines the interface to hash functions that +// support arbitrary-length output. +type XOF interface { + // Write absorbs more data into the hash's state. It panics if called + // after Read. + io.Writer + + // Read reads more output from the hash. It returns io.EOF if the limit + // has been reached. + io.Reader + + // Clone returns a copy of the XOF in its current state. + Clone() XOF + + // Reset resets the XOF to its initial state. + Reset() +} + +// OutputLengthUnknown can be used as the size argument to NewXOF to indicate +// the length of the output is not known in advance. +const OutputLengthUnknown = 0 + +// magicUnknownOutputLength is a magic value for the output size that indicates +// an unknown number of output bytes. +const magicUnknownOutputLength = (1 << 32) - 1 + +// maxOutputLength is the absolute maximum number of bytes to produce when the +// number of output bytes is unknown. +const maxOutputLength = (1 << 32) * 64 + +// NewXOF creates a new variable-output-length hash. The hash either produce a +// known number of bytes (1 <= size < 2**32-1), or an unknown number of bytes +// (size == OutputLengthUnknown). In the latter case, an absolute limit of +// 256GiB applies. +// +// A non-nil key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must between +// zero and 32 bytes long. +func NewXOF(size uint32, key []byte) (XOF, error) { + if len(key) > Size { + return nil, errKeySize + } + if size == magicUnknownOutputLength { + // 2^32-1 indicates an unknown number of bytes and thus isn't a + // valid length. + return nil, errors.New("blake2b: XOF length too large") + } + if size == OutputLengthUnknown { + size = magicUnknownOutputLength + } + x := &xof{ + d: digest{ + size: Size, + keyLen: len(key), + }, + length: size, + } + copy(x.d.key[:], key) + x.Reset() + return x, nil +} + +type xof struct { + d digest + length uint32 + remaining uint64 + cfg, root, block [Size]byte + offset int + nodeOffset uint32 + readMode bool +} + +func (x *xof) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if x.readMode { + panic("blake2b: write to XOF after read") + } + return x.d.Write(p) +} + +func (x *xof) Clone() XOF { + clone := *x + return &clone +} + +func (x *xof) Reset() { + x.cfg[0] = byte(Size) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[4:], uint32(Size)) // leaf length + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[12:], x.length) // XOF length + x.cfg[17] = byte(Size) // inner hash size + + x.d.Reset() + x.d.h[1] ^= uint64(x.length) << 32 + + x.remaining = uint64(x.length) + if x.remaining == magicUnknownOutputLength { + x.remaining = maxOutputLength + } + x.offset, x.nodeOffset = 0, 0 + x.readMode = false +} + +func (x *xof) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if !x.readMode { + x.d.finalize(&x.root) + x.readMode = true + } + + if x.remaining == 0 { + return 0, io.EOF + } + + n = len(p) + if uint64(n) > x.remaining { + n = int(x.remaining) + p = p[:n] + } + + if x.offset > 0 { + blockRemaining := Size - x.offset + if n < blockRemaining { + x.offset += copy(p, x.block[x.offset:]) + x.remaining -= uint64(n) + return + } + copy(p, x.block[x.offset:]) + p = p[blockRemaining:] + x.offset = 0 + x.remaining -= uint64(blockRemaining) + } + + for len(p) >= Size { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[8:], x.nodeOffset) + x.nodeOffset++ + + x.d.initConfig(&x.cfg) + x.d.Write(x.root[:]) + x.d.finalize(&x.block) + + copy(p, x.block[:]) + p = p[Size:] + x.remaining -= uint64(Size) + } + + if todo := len(p); todo > 0 { + if x.remaining < uint64(Size) { + x.cfg[0] = byte(x.remaining) + } + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[8:], x.nodeOffset) + x.nodeOffset++ + + x.d.initConfig(&x.cfg) + x.d.Write(x.root[:]) + x.d.finalize(&x.block) + + x.offset = copy(p, x.block[:todo]) + x.remaining -= uint64(todo) + } + return +} + +func (d *digest) initConfig(cfg *[Size]byte) { + d.offset, d.c[0], d.c[1] = 0, 0, 0 + for i := range d.h { + d.h[i] = iv[i] ^ binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(cfg[i*8:]) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/register.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/register.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d86339 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b/register.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.9 +// +build go1.9 + +package blake2b + +import ( + "crypto" + "hash" +) + +func init() { + newHash256 := func() hash.Hash { + h, _ := New256(nil) + return h + } + newHash384 := func() hash.Hash { + h, _ := New384(nil) + return h + } + + newHash512 := func() hash.Hash { + h, _ := New512(nil) + return h + } + + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.BLAKE2b_256, newHash256) + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.BLAKE2b_384, newHash384) + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.BLAKE2b_512, newHash512) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3f46aa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s.go @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package blake2s implements the BLAKE2s hash algorithm defined by RFC 7693 +// and the extendable output function (XOF) BLAKE2Xs. +// +// BLAKE2s is optimized for 8- to 32-bit platforms and produces digests of any +// size between 1 and 32 bytes. +// For a detailed specification of BLAKE2s see https://blake2.net/blake2.pdf +// and for BLAKE2Xs see https://blake2.net/blake2x.pdf +// +// If you aren't sure which function you need, use BLAKE2s (Sum256 or New256). +// If you need a secret-key MAC (message authentication code), use the New256 +// function with a non-nil key. +// +// BLAKE2X is a construction to compute hash values larger than 32 bytes. It +// can produce hash values between 0 and 65535 bytes. +package blake2s // import "golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s" + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "hash" +) + +const ( + // The blocksize of BLAKE2s in bytes. + BlockSize = 64 + + // The hash size of BLAKE2s-256 in bytes. + Size = 32 + + // The hash size of BLAKE2s-128 in bytes. + Size128 = 16 +) + +var errKeySize = errors.New("blake2s: invalid key size") + +var iv = [8]uint32{ + 0x6a09e667, 0xbb67ae85, 0x3c6ef372, 0xa54ff53a, + 0x510e527f, 0x9b05688c, 0x1f83d9ab, 0x5be0cd19, +} + +// Sum256 returns the BLAKE2s-256 checksum of the data. +func Sum256(data []byte) [Size]byte { + var sum [Size]byte + checkSum(&sum, Size, data) + return sum +} + +// New256 returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2s-256 checksum. A non-nil +// key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must between zero and 32 bytes long. +// When the key is nil, the returned hash.Hash implements BinaryMarshaler +// and BinaryUnmarshaler for state (de)serialization as documented by hash.Hash. +func New256(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { return newDigest(Size, key) } + +// New128 returns a new hash.Hash computing the BLAKE2s-128 checksum given a +// non-empty key. Note that a 128-bit digest is too small to be secure as a +// cryptographic hash and should only be used as a MAC, thus the key argument +// is not optional. +func New128(key []byte) (hash.Hash, error) { + if len(key) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("blake2s: a key is required for a 128-bit hash") + } + return newDigest(Size128, key) +} + +func newDigest(hashSize int, key []byte) (*digest, error) { + if len(key) > Size { + return nil, errKeySize + } + d := &digest{ + size: hashSize, + keyLen: len(key), + } + copy(d.key[:], key) + d.Reset() + return d, nil +} + +func checkSum(sum *[Size]byte, hashSize int, data []byte) { + var ( + h [8]uint32 + c [2]uint32 + ) + + h = iv + h[0] ^= uint32(hashSize) | (1 << 16) | (1 << 24) + + if length := len(data); length > BlockSize { + n := length &^ (BlockSize - 1) + if length == n { + n -= BlockSize + } + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0, data[:n]) + data = data[n:] + } + + var block [BlockSize]byte + offset := copy(block[:], data) + remaining := uint32(BlockSize - offset) + + if c[0] < remaining { + c[1]-- + } + c[0] -= remaining + + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0xFFFFFFFF, block[:]) + + for i, v := range h { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(sum[4*i:], v) + } +} + +type digest struct { + h [8]uint32 + c [2]uint32 + size int + block [BlockSize]byte + offset int + + key [BlockSize]byte + keyLen int +} + +const ( + magic = "b2s" + marshaledSize = len(magic) + 8*4 + 2*4 + 1 + BlockSize + 1 +) + +func (d *digest) MarshalBinary() ([]byte, error) { + if d.keyLen != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("crypto/blake2s: cannot marshal MACs") + } + b := make([]byte, 0, marshaledSize) + b = append(b, magic...) + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + b = appendUint32(b, d.h[i]) + } + b = appendUint32(b, d.c[0]) + b = appendUint32(b, d.c[1]) + // Maximum value for size is 32 + b = append(b, byte(d.size)) + b = append(b, d.block[:]...) + b = append(b, byte(d.offset)) + return b, nil +} + +func (d *digest) UnmarshalBinary(b []byte) error { + if len(b) < len(magic) || string(b[:len(magic)]) != magic { + return errors.New("crypto/blake2s: invalid hash state identifier") + } + if len(b) != marshaledSize { + return errors.New("crypto/blake2s: invalid hash state size") + } + b = b[len(magic):] + for i := 0; i < 8; i++ { + b, d.h[i] = consumeUint32(b) + } + b, d.c[0] = consumeUint32(b) + b, d.c[1] = consumeUint32(b) + d.size = int(b[0]) + b = b[1:] + copy(d.block[:], b[:BlockSize]) + b = b[BlockSize:] + d.offset = int(b[0]) + return nil +} + +func (d *digest) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +func (d *digest) Size() int { return d.size } + +func (d *digest) Reset() { + d.h = iv + d.h[0] ^= uint32(d.size) | (uint32(d.keyLen) << 8) | (1 << 16) | (1 << 24) + d.offset, d.c[0], d.c[1] = 0, 0, 0 + if d.keyLen > 0 { + d.block = d.key + d.offset = BlockSize + } +} + +func (d *digest) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + n = len(p) + + if d.offset > 0 { + remaining := BlockSize - d.offset + if n <= remaining { + d.offset += copy(d.block[d.offset:], p) + return + } + copy(d.block[d.offset:], p[:remaining]) + hashBlocks(&d.h, &d.c, 0, d.block[:]) + d.offset = 0 + p = p[remaining:] + } + + if length := len(p); length > BlockSize { + nn := length &^ (BlockSize - 1) + if length == nn { + nn -= BlockSize + } + hashBlocks(&d.h, &d.c, 0, p[:nn]) + p = p[nn:] + } + + d.offset += copy(d.block[:], p) + return +} + +func (d *digest) Sum(sum []byte) []byte { + var hash [Size]byte + d.finalize(&hash) + return append(sum, hash[:d.size]...) +} + +func (d *digest) finalize(hash *[Size]byte) { + var block [BlockSize]byte + h := d.h + c := d.c + + copy(block[:], d.block[:d.offset]) + remaining := uint32(BlockSize - d.offset) + if c[0] < remaining { + c[1]-- + } + c[0] -= remaining + + hashBlocks(&h, &c, 0xFFFFFFFF, block[:]) + for i, v := range h { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(hash[4*i:], v) + } +} + +func appendUint32(b []byte, x uint32) []byte { + var a [4]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(a[:], x) + return append(b, a[:]...) +} + +func consumeUint32(b []byte) ([]byte, uint32) { + x := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(b) + return b[4:], x +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b4463fb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build 386 && gc && !purego +// +build 386,gc,!purego + +package blake2s + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var ( + useSSE4 = false + useSSSE3 = cpu.X86.HasSSSE3 + useSSE2 = cpu.X86.HasSSE2 +) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSE2(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSSE3(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) { + switch { + case useSSSE3: + hashBlocksSSSE3(h, c, flag, blocks) + case useSSE2: + hashBlocksSSE2(h, c, flag, blocks) + default: + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..603d00c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_386.s @@ -0,0 +1,430 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build 386 && gc && !purego +// +build 386,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +DATA iv0<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x6a09e667 +DATA iv0<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0xbb67ae85 +DATA iv0<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3c6ef372 +DATA iv0<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0xa54ff53a +GLOBL iv0<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA iv1<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x510e527f +DATA iv1<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x9b05688c +DATA iv1<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x1f83d9ab +DATA iv1<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x5be0cd19 +GLOBL iv1<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA rol16<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0504070601000302 +DATA rol16<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0D0C0F0E09080B0A +GLOBL rol16<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA rol8<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0407060500030201 +DATA rol8<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 +GLOBL rol8<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA counter<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x40 +DATA counter<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0 +GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +#define ROTL_SSE2(n, t, v) \ + MOVO v, t; \ + PSLLL $n, t; \ + PSRLL $(32-n), v; \ + PXOR t, v + +#define ROTL_SSSE3(c, v) \ + PSHUFB c, v + +#define ROUND_SSE2(v0, v1, v2, v3, m0, m1, m2, m3, t) \ + PADDL m0, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(16, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m1, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(24, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v1, v1; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v3, v3; \ + PADDL m2, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(16, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m3, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(24, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v3, v3; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v1, v1 + +#define ROUND_SSSE3(v0, v1, v2, v3, m0, m1, m2, m3, t, c16, c8) \ + PADDL m0, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c16, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m1, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c8, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v1, v1; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v3, v3; \ + PADDL m2, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c16, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m3, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c8, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v3, v3; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v1, v1 + +#define PRECOMPUTE(dst, off, src, t) \ + MOVL 0*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 1*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 2*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 3*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 4*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 5*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 6*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 7*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 8*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 9*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 10*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 11*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 12*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 13*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 14*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 0*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 12*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 14*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 2*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 1*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 13*4+off+576(dst); \ + MOVL 15*4(src), t; \ + MOVL t, 15*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL t, 6*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL t, 3*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL t, 11*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL t, 7*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL t, 10*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL t, 5*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL t, 9*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL t, 4*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL t, 8*4+off+576(dst) + +// func hashBlocksSSE2(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE2(SB), 0, $672-24 // frame = 656 + 16 byte alignment + MOVL h+0(FP), AX + MOVL c+4(FP), BX + MOVL flag+8(FP), CX + MOVL blocks_base+12(FP), SI + MOVL blocks_len+16(FP), DX + + MOVL SP, DI + ADDL $15, DI + ANDL $~15, DI + + MOVL CX, 8(DI) + MOVL 0(BX), CX + MOVL CX, 0(DI) + MOVL 4(BX), CX + MOVL CX, 4(DI) + XORL CX, CX + MOVL CX, 12(DI) + + MOVOU 0(AX), X0 + MOVOU 16(AX), X1 + MOVOU counter<>(SB), X2 + +loop: + MOVO X0, X4 + MOVO X1, X5 + MOVOU iv0<>(SB), X6 + MOVOU iv1<>(SB), X7 + + MOVO 0(DI), X3 + PADDQ X2, X3 + PXOR X3, X7 + MOVO X3, 0(DI) + + PRECOMPUTE(DI, 16, SI, CX) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(DI), 32(DI), 48(DI), 64(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(DI), 32+64(DI), 48+64(DI), 64+64(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(DI), 32+128(DI), 48+128(DI), 64+128(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(DI), 32+192(DI), 48+192(DI), 64+192(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(DI), 32+256(DI), 48+256(DI), 64+256(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(DI), 32+320(DI), 48+320(DI), 64+320(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(DI), 32+384(DI), 48+384(DI), 64+384(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(DI), 32+448(DI), 48+448(DI), 64+448(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(DI), 32+512(DI), 48+512(DI), 64+512(DI), X3) + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(DI), 32+576(DI), 48+576(DI), 64+576(DI), X3) + + PXOR X4, X0 + PXOR X5, X1 + PXOR X6, X0 + PXOR X7, X1 + + LEAL 64(SI), SI + SUBL $64, DX + JNE loop + + MOVL 0(DI), CX + MOVL CX, 0(BX) + MOVL 4(DI), CX + MOVL CX, 4(BX) + + MOVOU X0, 0(AX) + MOVOU X1, 16(AX) + + RET + +// func hashBlocksSSSE3(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSSE3(SB), 0, $704-24 // frame = 688 + 16 byte alignment + MOVL h+0(FP), AX + MOVL c+4(FP), BX + MOVL flag+8(FP), CX + MOVL blocks_base+12(FP), SI + MOVL blocks_len+16(FP), DX + + MOVL SP, DI + ADDL $15, DI + ANDL $~15, DI + + MOVL CX, 8(DI) + MOVL 0(BX), CX + MOVL CX, 0(DI) + MOVL 4(BX), CX + MOVL CX, 4(DI) + XORL CX, CX + MOVL CX, 12(DI) + + MOVOU 0(AX), X0 + MOVOU 16(AX), X1 + MOVOU counter<>(SB), X2 + +loop: + MOVO X0, 656(DI) + MOVO X1, 672(DI) + MOVO X0, X4 + MOVO X1, X5 + MOVOU iv0<>(SB), X6 + MOVOU iv1<>(SB), X7 + + MOVO 0(DI), X3 + PADDQ X2, X3 + PXOR X3, X7 + MOVO X3, 0(DI) + + MOVOU rol16<>(SB), X0 + MOVOU rol8<>(SB), X1 + + PRECOMPUTE(DI, 16, SI, CX) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(DI), 32(DI), 48(DI), 64(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(DI), 32+64(DI), 48+64(DI), 64+64(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(DI), 32+128(DI), 48+128(DI), 64+128(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(DI), 32+192(DI), 48+192(DI), 64+192(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(DI), 32+256(DI), 48+256(DI), 64+256(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(DI), 32+320(DI), 48+320(DI), 64+320(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(DI), 32+384(DI), 48+384(DI), 64+384(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(DI), 32+448(DI), 48+448(DI), 64+448(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(DI), 32+512(DI), 48+512(DI), 64+512(DI), X3, X0, X1) + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(DI), 32+576(DI), 48+576(DI), 64+576(DI), X3, X0, X1) + + MOVO 656(DI), X0 + MOVO 672(DI), X1 + PXOR X4, X0 + PXOR X5, X1 + PXOR X6, X0 + PXOR X7, X1 + + LEAL 64(SI), SI + SUBL $64, DX + JNE loop + + MOVL 0(DI), CX + MOVL CX, 0(BX) + MOVL 4(DI), CX + MOVL CX, 4(BX) + + MOVOU X0, 0(AX) + MOVOU X1, 16(AX) + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..becdaa1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +package blake2s + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var ( + useSSE4 = cpu.X86.HasSSE41 + useSSSE3 = cpu.X86.HasSSSE3 + useSSE2 = cpu.X86.HasSSE2 +) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSE2(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSSE3(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) + +//go:noescape +func hashBlocksSSE4(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) { + switch { + case useSSE4: + hashBlocksSSE4(h, c, flag, blocks) + case useSSSE3: + hashBlocksSSSE3(h, c, flag, blocks) + case useSSE2: + hashBlocksSSE2(h, c, flag, blocks) + default: + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e9df7a7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,433 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +DATA iv0<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x6a09e667 +DATA iv0<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0xbb67ae85 +DATA iv0<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3c6ef372 +DATA iv0<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0xa54ff53a +GLOBL iv0<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA iv1<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x510e527f +DATA iv1<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x9b05688c +DATA iv1<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x1f83d9ab +DATA iv1<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x5be0cd19 +GLOBL iv1<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA rol16<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0504070601000302 +DATA rol16<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0D0C0F0E09080B0A +GLOBL rol16<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA rol8<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0407060500030201 +DATA rol8<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 +GLOBL rol8<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +DATA counter<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x40 +DATA counter<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0 +GLOBL counter<>(SB), (NOPTR+RODATA), $16 + +#define ROTL_SSE2(n, t, v) \ + MOVO v, t; \ + PSLLL $n, t; \ + PSRLL $(32-n), v; \ + PXOR t, v + +#define ROTL_SSSE3(c, v) \ + PSHUFB c, v + +#define ROUND_SSE2(v0, v1, v2, v3, m0, m1, m2, m3, t) \ + PADDL m0, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(16, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m1, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(24, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v1, v1; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v3, v3; \ + PADDL m2, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(16, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m3, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSE2(24, t, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v3, v3; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v1, v1 + +#define ROUND_SSSE3(v0, v1, v2, v3, m0, m1, m2, m3, t, c16, c8) \ + PADDL m0, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c16, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m1, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c8, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v1, v1; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v3, v3; \ + PADDL m2, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c16, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(20, t, v1); \ + PADDL m3, v0; \ + PADDL v1, v0; \ + PXOR v0, v3; \ + ROTL_SSSE3(c8, v3); \ + PADDL v3, v2; \ + PXOR v2, v1; \ + ROTL_SSE2(25, t, v1); \ + PSHUFL $0x39, v3, v3; \ + PSHUFL $0x4E, v2, v2; \ + PSHUFL $0x93, v1, v1 + + +#define LOAD_MSG_SSE4(m0, m1, m2, m3, src, i0, i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7, i8, i9, i10, i11, i12, i13, i14, i15) \ + MOVL i0*4(src), m0; \ + PINSRD $1, i1*4(src), m0; \ + PINSRD $2, i2*4(src), m0; \ + PINSRD $3, i3*4(src), m0; \ + MOVL i4*4(src), m1; \ + PINSRD $1, i5*4(src), m1; \ + PINSRD $2, i6*4(src), m1; \ + PINSRD $3, i7*4(src), m1; \ + MOVL i8*4(src), m2; \ + PINSRD $1, i9*4(src), m2; \ + PINSRD $2, i10*4(src), m2; \ + PINSRD $3, i11*4(src), m2; \ + MOVL i12*4(src), m3; \ + PINSRD $1, i13*4(src), m3; \ + PINSRD $2, i14*4(src), m3; \ + PINSRD $3, i15*4(src), m3 + +#define PRECOMPUTE_MSG(dst, off, src, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15) \ + MOVQ 0*4(src), R8; \ + MOVQ 2*4(src), R9; \ + MOVQ 4*4(src), R10; \ + MOVQ 6*4(src), R11; \ + MOVQ 8*4(src), R12; \ + MOVQ 10*4(src), R13; \ + MOVQ 12*4(src), R14; \ + MOVQ 14*4(src), R15; \ + \ + MOVL R8, 0*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 9*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 5*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 14*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 4*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 2*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 8*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 12*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 3*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 15*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R8; \ + MOVL R8, 4*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 8*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 14*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 5*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 12*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 11*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 1*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 6*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 10*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R8, 3*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R9, 1*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 13*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 6*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 8*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 2*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 0*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 14*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 11*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 12*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 4*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R9; \ + MOVL R9, 5*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 15*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 9*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 1*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 11*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 7*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 13*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 3*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 6*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R9, 10*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R10, 2*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 1*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 15*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 10*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 6*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 8*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 3*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 13*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 14*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 5*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R10; \ + MOVL R10, 6*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 11*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 2*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 9*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 1*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 13*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 4*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 8*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 15*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R10, 7*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R11, 3*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 7*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 13*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 12*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 10*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 1*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 9*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 14*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 0*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 6*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R11; \ + MOVL R11, 7*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 14*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 10*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 0*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 5*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 9*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 12*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 1*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 13*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R11, 2*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R12, 8*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 5*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 4*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 15*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 14*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 3*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 11*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 10*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 7*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 1*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R12; \ + MOVL R12, 12*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 2*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 11*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 4*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 0*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 15*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 10*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 7*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 5*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R12, 9*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R13, 9*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 4*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 8*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 13*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 3*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 5*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 7*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 15*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 11*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 0*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R13; \ + MOVL R13, 13*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 10*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 0*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 3*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 9*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 6*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 15*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 4*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 2*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R13, 12*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R14, 10*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 12*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 1*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 6*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 13*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 4*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 0*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 2*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 8*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 14*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R14; \ + MOVL R14, 14*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 3*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 7*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 2*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 15*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 12*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 6*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 0*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 9*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R14, 11*4+off+576(dst); \ + \ + MOVL R15, 11*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 0*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 12*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 7*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 8*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 14*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 2*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 5*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 1*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 13*4+off+576(dst); \ + SHRQ $32, R15; \ + MOVL R15, 15*4+off+0(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 6*4+off+64(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 3*4+off+128(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 11*4+off+192(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 7*4+off+256(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 10*4+off+320(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 5*4+off+384(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 9*4+off+448(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 4*4+off+512(dst); \ + MOVL R15, 8*4+off+576(dst) + +#define BLAKE2s_SSE2() \ + PRECOMPUTE_MSG(BP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(BP), 32(BP), 48(BP), 64(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(BP), 32+64(BP), 48+64(BP), 64+64(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(BP), 32+128(BP), 48+128(BP), 64+128(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(BP), 32+192(BP), 48+192(BP), 64+192(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(BP), 32+256(BP), 48+256(BP), 64+256(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(BP), 32+320(BP), 48+320(BP), 64+320(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(BP), 32+384(BP), 48+384(BP), 64+384(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(BP), 32+448(BP), 48+448(BP), 64+448(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(BP), 32+512(BP), 48+512(BP), 64+512(BP), X8); \ + ROUND_SSE2(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(BP), 32+576(BP), 48+576(BP), 64+576(BP), X8) + +#define BLAKE2s_SSSE3() \ + PRECOMPUTE_MSG(BP, 16, SI, R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R13, R14, R15); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16(BP), 32(BP), 48(BP), 64(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+64(BP), 32+64(BP), 48+64(BP), 64+64(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+128(BP), 32+128(BP), 48+128(BP), 64+128(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+192(BP), 32+192(BP), 48+192(BP), 64+192(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+256(BP), 32+256(BP), 48+256(BP), 64+256(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+320(BP), 32+320(BP), 48+320(BP), 64+320(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+384(BP), 32+384(BP), 48+384(BP), 64+384(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+448(BP), 32+448(BP), 48+448(BP), 64+448(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+512(BP), 32+512(BP), 48+512(BP), 64+512(BP), X8, X13, X14); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, 16+576(BP), 32+576(BP), 48+576(BP), 64+576(BP), X8, X13, X14) + +#define BLAKE2s_SSE4() \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 11, 12, 5, 15, 8, 0, 2, 13, 10, 3, 7, 9, 14, 6, 1, 4); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14, 2, 5, 4, 15, 6, 10, 0, 8); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 9, 5, 2, 10, 0, 7, 4, 15, 14, 11, 6, 3, 1, 12, 8, 13); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 2, 6, 0, 8, 12, 10, 11, 3, 4, 7, 15, 1, 13, 5, 14, 9); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2, 11); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9, 5, 15, 8, 2, 0, 4, 6, 10); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 6, 14, 11, 0, 15, 9, 3, 8, 12, 13, 1, 10, 2, 7, 4, 5); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14); \ + LOAD_MSG_SSE4(X8, X9, X10, X11, SI, 10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5, 15, 9, 3, 13, 11, 14, 12, 0); \ + ROUND_SSSE3(X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X8, X13, X14) + +#define HASH_BLOCKS(h, c, flag, blocks_base, blocks_len, BLAKE2s_FUNC) \ + MOVQ h, AX; \ + MOVQ c, BX; \ + MOVL flag, CX; \ + MOVQ blocks_base, SI; \ + MOVQ blocks_len, DX; \ + \ + MOVQ SP, BP; \ + ADDQ $15, BP; \ + ANDQ $~15, BP; \ + \ + MOVQ 0(BX), R9; \ + MOVQ R9, 0(BP); \ + MOVQ CX, 8(BP); \ + \ + MOVOU 0(AX), X0; \ + MOVOU 16(AX), X1; \ + MOVOU iv0<>(SB), X2; \ + MOVOU iv1<>(SB), X3 \ + \ + MOVOU counter<>(SB), X12; \ + MOVOU rol16<>(SB), X13; \ + MOVOU rol8<>(SB), X14; \ + MOVO 0(BP), X15; \ + \ + loop: \ + MOVO X0, X4; \ + MOVO X1, X5; \ + MOVO X2, X6; \ + MOVO X3, X7; \ + \ + PADDQ X12, X15; \ + PXOR X15, X7; \ + \ + BLAKE2s_FUNC(); \ + \ + PXOR X4, X0; \ + PXOR X5, X1; \ + PXOR X6, X0; \ + PXOR X7, X1; \ + \ + LEAQ 64(SI), SI; \ + SUBQ $64, DX; \ + JNE loop; \ + \ + MOVO X15, 0(BP); \ + MOVQ 0(BP), R9; \ + MOVQ R9, 0(BX); \ + \ + MOVOU X0, 0(AX); \ + MOVOU X1, 16(AX) + +// func hashBlocksSSE2(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE2(SB), 0, $672-48 // frame = 656 + 16 byte alignment + HASH_BLOCKS(h+0(FP), c+8(FP), flag+16(FP), blocks_base+24(FP), blocks_len+32(FP), BLAKE2s_SSE2) + RET + +// func hashBlocksSSSE3(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSSE3(SB), 0, $672-48 // frame = 656 + 16 byte alignment + HASH_BLOCKS(h+0(FP), c+8(FP), flag+16(FP), blocks_base+24(FP), blocks_len+32(FP), BLAKE2s_SSSE3) + RET + +// func hashBlocksSSE4(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) +TEXT ·hashBlocksSSE4(SB), 0, $32-48 // frame = 16 + 16 byte alignment + HASH_BLOCKS(h+0(FP), c+8(FP), flag+16(FP), blocks_base+24(FP), blocks_len+32(FP), BLAKE2s_SSE4) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24a1ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blake2s + +import ( + "math/bits" +) + +// the precomputed values for BLAKE2s +// there are 10 16-byte arrays - one for each round +// the entries are calculated from the sigma constants. +var precomputed = [10][16]byte{ + {0, 2, 4, 6, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 9, 11, 13, 15}, + {14, 4, 9, 13, 10, 8, 15, 6, 1, 0, 11, 5, 12, 2, 7, 3}, + {11, 12, 5, 15, 8, 0, 2, 13, 10, 3, 7, 9, 14, 6, 1, 4}, + {7, 3, 13, 11, 9, 1, 12, 14, 2, 5, 4, 15, 6, 10, 0, 8}, + {9, 5, 2, 10, 0, 7, 4, 15, 14, 11, 6, 3, 1, 12, 8, 13}, + {2, 6, 0, 8, 12, 10, 11, 3, 4, 7, 15, 1, 13, 5, 14, 9}, + {12, 1, 14, 4, 5, 15, 13, 10, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 3, 2, 11}, + {13, 7, 12, 3, 11, 14, 1, 9, 5, 15, 8, 2, 0, 4, 6, 10}, + {6, 14, 11, 0, 15, 9, 3, 8, 12, 13, 1, 10, 2, 7, 4, 5}, + {10, 8, 7, 1, 2, 4, 6, 5, 15, 9, 3, 13, 11, 14, 12, 0}, +} + +func hashBlocksGeneric(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) { + var m [16]uint32 + c0, c1 := c[0], c[1] + + for i := 0; i < len(blocks); { + c0 += BlockSize + if c0 < BlockSize { + c1++ + } + + v0, v1, v2, v3, v4, v5, v6, v7 := h[0], h[1], h[2], h[3], h[4], h[5], h[6], h[7] + v8, v9, v10, v11, v12, v13, v14, v15 := iv[0], iv[1], iv[2], iv[3], iv[4], iv[5], iv[6], iv[7] + v12 ^= c0 + v13 ^= c1 + v14 ^= flag + + for j := range m { + m[j] = uint32(blocks[i]) | uint32(blocks[i+1])<<8 | uint32(blocks[i+2])<<16 | uint32(blocks[i+3])<<24 + i += 4 + } + + for k := range precomputed { + s := &(precomputed[k]) + + v0 += m[s[0]] + v0 += v4 + v12 ^= v0 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft32(v12, -16) + v8 += v12 + v4 ^= v8 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft32(v4, -12) + v1 += m[s[1]] + v1 += v5 + v13 ^= v1 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft32(v13, -16) + v9 += v13 + v5 ^= v9 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft32(v5, -12) + v2 += m[s[2]] + v2 += v6 + v14 ^= v2 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft32(v14, -16) + v10 += v14 + v6 ^= v10 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft32(v6, -12) + v3 += m[s[3]] + v3 += v7 + v15 ^= v3 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft32(v15, -16) + v11 += v15 + v7 ^= v11 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft32(v7, -12) + + v0 += m[s[4]] + v0 += v4 + v12 ^= v0 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft32(v12, -8) + v8 += v12 + v4 ^= v8 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft32(v4, -7) + v1 += m[s[5]] + v1 += v5 + v13 ^= v1 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft32(v13, -8) + v9 += v13 + v5 ^= v9 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft32(v5, -7) + v2 += m[s[6]] + v2 += v6 + v14 ^= v2 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft32(v14, -8) + v10 += v14 + v6 ^= v10 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft32(v6, -7) + v3 += m[s[7]] + v3 += v7 + v15 ^= v3 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft32(v15, -8) + v11 += v15 + v7 ^= v11 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft32(v7, -7) + + v0 += m[s[8]] + v0 += v5 + v15 ^= v0 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft32(v15, -16) + v10 += v15 + v5 ^= v10 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft32(v5, -12) + v1 += m[s[9]] + v1 += v6 + v12 ^= v1 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft32(v12, -16) + v11 += v12 + v6 ^= v11 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft32(v6, -12) + v2 += m[s[10]] + v2 += v7 + v13 ^= v2 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft32(v13, -16) + v8 += v13 + v7 ^= v8 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft32(v7, -12) + v3 += m[s[11]] + v3 += v4 + v14 ^= v3 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft32(v14, -16) + v9 += v14 + v4 ^= v9 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft32(v4, -12) + + v0 += m[s[12]] + v0 += v5 + v15 ^= v0 + v15 = bits.RotateLeft32(v15, -8) + v10 += v15 + v5 ^= v10 + v5 = bits.RotateLeft32(v5, -7) + v1 += m[s[13]] + v1 += v6 + v12 ^= v1 + v12 = bits.RotateLeft32(v12, -8) + v11 += v12 + v6 ^= v11 + v6 = bits.RotateLeft32(v6, -7) + v2 += m[s[14]] + v2 += v7 + v13 ^= v2 + v13 = bits.RotateLeft32(v13, -8) + v8 += v13 + v7 ^= v8 + v7 = bits.RotateLeft32(v7, -7) + v3 += m[s[15]] + v3 += v4 + v14 ^= v3 + v14 = bits.RotateLeft32(v14, -8) + v9 += v14 + v4 ^= v9 + v4 = bits.RotateLeft32(v4, -7) + } + + h[0] ^= v0 ^ v8 + h[1] ^= v1 ^ v9 + h[2] ^= v2 ^ v10 + h[3] ^= v3 ^ v11 + h[4] ^= v4 ^ v12 + h[5] ^= v5 ^ v13 + h[6] ^= v6 ^ v14 + h[7] ^= v7 ^ v15 + } + c[0], c[1] = c0, c1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_ref.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_ref.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..799dba0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2s_ref.go @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!amd64 && !386) || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64,!386 !gc purego + +package blake2s + +var ( + useSSE4 = false + useSSSE3 = false + useSSE2 = false +) + +func hashBlocks(h *[8]uint32, c *[2]uint32, flag uint32, blocks []byte) { + hashBlocksGeneric(h, c, flag, blocks) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2x.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..828749f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/blake2x.go @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blake2s + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "io" +) + +// XOF defines the interface to hash functions that +// support arbitrary-length output. +type XOF interface { + // Write absorbs more data into the hash's state. It panics if called + // after Read. + io.Writer + + // Read reads more output from the hash. It returns io.EOF if the limit + // has been reached. + io.Reader + + // Clone returns a copy of the XOF in its current state. + Clone() XOF + + // Reset resets the XOF to its initial state. + Reset() +} + +// OutputLengthUnknown can be used as the size argument to NewXOF to indicate +// the length of the output is not known in advance. +const OutputLengthUnknown = 0 + +// magicUnknownOutputLength is a magic value for the output size that indicates +// an unknown number of output bytes. +const magicUnknownOutputLength = 65535 + +// maxOutputLength is the absolute maximum number of bytes to produce when the +// number of output bytes is unknown. +const maxOutputLength = (1 << 32) * 32 + +// NewXOF creates a new variable-output-length hash. The hash either produce a +// known number of bytes (1 <= size < 65535), or an unknown number of bytes +// (size == OutputLengthUnknown). In the latter case, an absolute limit of +// 128GiB applies. +// +// A non-nil key turns the hash into a MAC. The key must between +// zero and 32 bytes long. +func NewXOF(size uint16, key []byte) (XOF, error) { + if len(key) > Size { + return nil, errKeySize + } + if size == magicUnknownOutputLength { + // 2^16-1 indicates an unknown number of bytes and thus isn't a + // valid length. + return nil, errors.New("blake2s: XOF length too large") + } + if size == OutputLengthUnknown { + size = magicUnknownOutputLength + } + x := &xof{ + d: digest{ + size: Size, + keyLen: len(key), + }, + length: size, + } + copy(x.d.key[:], key) + x.Reset() + return x, nil +} + +type xof struct { + d digest + length uint16 + remaining uint64 + cfg, root, block [Size]byte + offset int + nodeOffset uint32 + readMode bool +} + +func (x *xof) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if x.readMode { + panic("blake2s: write to XOF after read") + } + return x.d.Write(p) +} + +func (x *xof) Clone() XOF { + clone := *x + return &clone +} + +func (x *xof) Reset() { + x.cfg[0] = byte(Size) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[4:], uint32(Size)) // leaf length + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint16(x.cfg[12:], x.length) // XOF length + x.cfg[15] = byte(Size) // inner hash size + + x.d.Reset() + x.d.h[3] ^= uint32(x.length) + + x.remaining = uint64(x.length) + if x.remaining == magicUnknownOutputLength { + x.remaining = maxOutputLength + } + x.offset, x.nodeOffset = 0, 0 + x.readMode = false +} + +func (x *xof) Read(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if !x.readMode { + x.d.finalize(&x.root) + x.readMode = true + } + + if x.remaining == 0 { + return 0, io.EOF + } + + n = len(p) + if uint64(n) > x.remaining { + n = int(x.remaining) + p = p[:n] + } + + if x.offset > 0 { + blockRemaining := Size - x.offset + if n < blockRemaining { + x.offset += copy(p, x.block[x.offset:]) + x.remaining -= uint64(n) + return + } + copy(p, x.block[x.offset:]) + p = p[blockRemaining:] + x.offset = 0 + x.remaining -= uint64(blockRemaining) + } + + for len(p) >= Size { + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[8:], x.nodeOffset) + x.nodeOffset++ + + x.d.initConfig(&x.cfg) + x.d.Write(x.root[:]) + x.d.finalize(&x.block) + + copy(p, x.block[:]) + p = p[Size:] + x.remaining -= uint64(Size) + } + + if todo := len(p); todo > 0 { + if x.remaining < uint64(Size) { + x.cfg[0] = byte(x.remaining) + } + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(x.cfg[8:], x.nodeOffset) + x.nodeOffset++ + + x.d.initConfig(&x.cfg) + x.d.Write(x.root[:]) + x.d.finalize(&x.block) + + x.offset = copy(p, x.block[:todo]) + x.remaining -= uint64(todo) + } + + return +} + +func (d *digest) initConfig(cfg *[Size]byte) { + d.offset, d.c[0], d.c[1] = 0, 0, 0 + for i := range d.h { + d.h[i] = iv[i] ^ binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(cfg[i*4:]) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/register.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/register.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef79ff3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s/register.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.9 +// +build go1.9 + +package blake2s + +import ( + "crypto" + "hash" +) + +func init() { + newHash256 := func() hash.Hash { + h, _ := New256(nil) + return h + } + + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.BLAKE2s_256, newHash256) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9d80f19 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/block.go @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package blowfish + +// getNextWord returns the next big-endian uint32 value from the byte slice +// at the given position in a circular manner, updating the position. +func getNextWord(b []byte, pos *int) uint32 { + var w uint32 + j := *pos + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + w = w<<8 | uint32(b[j]) + j++ + if j >= len(b) { + j = 0 + } + } + *pos = j + return w +} + +// ExpandKey performs a key expansion on the given *Cipher. Specifically, it +// performs the Blowfish algorithm's key schedule which sets up the *Cipher's +// pi and substitution tables for calls to Encrypt. This is used, primarily, +// by the bcrypt package to reuse the Blowfish key schedule during its +// set up. It's unlikely that you need to use this directly. +func ExpandKey(key []byte, c *Cipher) { + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 18; i++ { + // Using inlined getNextWord for performance. + var d uint32 + for k := 0; k < 4; k++ { + d = d<<8 | uint32(key[j]) + j++ + if j >= len(key) { + j = 0 + } + } + c.p[i] ^= d + } + + var l, r uint32 + for i := 0; i < 18; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.p[i], c.p[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s0[i], c.s0[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s1[i], c.s1[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s2[i], c.s2[i+1] = l, r + } + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s3[i], c.s3[i+1] = l, r + } +} + +// This is similar to ExpandKey, but folds the salt during the key +// schedule. While ExpandKey is essentially expandKeyWithSalt with an all-zero +// salt passed in, reusing ExpandKey turns out to be a place of inefficiency +// and specializing it here is useful. +func expandKeyWithSalt(key []byte, salt []byte, c *Cipher) { + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 18; i++ { + c.p[i] ^= getNextWord(key, &j) + } + + j = 0 + var l, r uint32 + for i := 0; i < 18; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.p[i], c.p[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s0[i], c.s0[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s1[i], c.s1[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s2[i], c.s2[i+1] = l, r + } + + for i := 0; i < 256; i += 2 { + l ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + r ^= getNextWord(salt, &j) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + c.s3[i], c.s3[i+1] = l, r + } +} + +func encryptBlock(l, r uint32, c *Cipher) (uint32, uint32) { + xl, xr := l, r + xl ^= c.p[0] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[1] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[2] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[3] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[4] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[5] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[6] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[7] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[8] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[9] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[10] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[11] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[12] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[13] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[14] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[15] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[16] + xr ^= c.p[17] + return xr, xl +} + +func decryptBlock(l, r uint32, c *Cipher) (uint32, uint32) { + xl, xr := l, r + xl ^= c.p[17] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[16] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[15] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[14] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[13] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[12] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[11] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[10] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[9] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[8] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[7] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[6] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[5] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[4] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[3] + xr ^= ((c.s0[byte(xl>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xl>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xl>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xl)] ^ c.p[2] + xl ^= ((c.s0[byte(xr>>24)] + c.s1[byte(xr>>16)]) ^ c.s2[byte(xr>>8)]) + c.s3[byte(xr)] ^ c.p[1] + xr ^= c.p[0] + return xr, xl +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..213bf20 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/cipher.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package blowfish implements Bruce Schneier's Blowfish encryption algorithm. +// +// Blowfish is a legacy cipher and its short block size makes it vulnerable to +// birthday bound attacks (see https://sweet32.info). It should only be used +// where compatibility with legacy systems, not security, is the goal. +// +// Deprecated: any new system should use AES (from crypto/aes, if necessary in +// an AEAD mode like crypto/cipher.NewGCM) or XChaCha20-Poly1305 (from +// golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305). +package blowfish // import "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish" + +// The code is a port of Bruce Schneier's C implementation. +// See https://www.schneier.com/blowfish.html. + +import "strconv" + +// The Blowfish block size in bytes. +const BlockSize = 8 + +// A Cipher is an instance of Blowfish encryption using a particular key. +type Cipher struct { + p [18]uint32 + s0, s1, s2, s3 [256]uint32 +} + +type KeySizeError int + +func (k KeySizeError) Error() string { + return "crypto/blowfish: invalid key size " + strconv.Itoa(int(k)) +} + +// NewCipher creates and returns a Cipher. +// The key argument should be the Blowfish key, from 1 to 56 bytes. +func NewCipher(key []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + var result Cipher + if k := len(key); k < 1 || k > 56 { + return nil, KeySizeError(k) + } + initCipher(&result) + ExpandKey(key, &result) + return &result, nil +} + +// NewSaltedCipher creates a returns a Cipher that folds a salt into its key +// schedule. For most purposes, NewCipher, instead of NewSaltedCipher, is +// sufficient and desirable. For bcrypt compatibility, the key can be over 56 +// bytes. +func NewSaltedCipher(key, salt []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(salt) == 0 { + return NewCipher(key) + } + var result Cipher + if k := len(key); k < 1 { + return nil, KeySizeError(k) + } + initCipher(&result) + expandKeyWithSalt(key, salt, &result) + return &result, nil +} + +// BlockSize returns the Blowfish block size, 8 bytes. +// It is necessary to satisfy the Block interface in the +// package "crypto/cipher". +func (c *Cipher) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +// Encrypt encrypts the 8-byte buffer src using the key k +// and stores the result in dst. +// Note that for amounts of data larger than a block, +// it is not safe to just call Encrypt on successive blocks; +// instead, use an encryption mode like CBC (see crypto/cipher/cbc.go). +func (c *Cipher) Encrypt(dst, src []byte) { + l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3]) + r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7]) + l, r = encryptBlock(l, r, c) + dst[0], dst[1], dst[2], dst[3] = byte(l>>24), byte(l>>16), byte(l>>8), byte(l) + dst[4], dst[5], dst[6], dst[7] = byte(r>>24), byte(r>>16), byte(r>>8), byte(r) +} + +// Decrypt decrypts the 8-byte buffer src using the key k +// and stores the result in dst. +func (c *Cipher) Decrypt(dst, src []byte) { + l := uint32(src[0])<<24 | uint32(src[1])<<16 | uint32(src[2])<<8 | uint32(src[3]) + r := uint32(src[4])<<24 | uint32(src[5])<<16 | uint32(src[6])<<8 | uint32(src[7]) + l, r = decryptBlock(l, r, c) + dst[0], dst[1], dst[2], dst[3] = byte(l>>24), byte(l>>16), byte(l>>8), byte(l) + dst[4], dst[5], dst[6], dst[7] = byte(r>>24), byte(r>>16), byte(r>>8), byte(r) +} + +func initCipher(c *Cipher) { + copy(c.p[0:], p[0:]) + copy(c.s0[0:], s0[0:]) + copy(c.s1[0:], s1[0:]) + copy(c.s2[0:], s2[0:]) + copy(c.s3[0:], s3[0:]) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d040775 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish/const.go @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// The startup permutation array and substitution boxes. +// They are the hexadecimal digits of PI; see: +// https://www.schneier.com/code/constants.txt. + +package blowfish + +var s0 = [256]uint32{ + 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, + 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, + 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, + 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, + 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, + 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, + 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, + 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, + 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, + 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, + 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, + 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, + 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, + 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, + 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, + 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, + 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, + 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, + 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, + 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, + 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, + 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, + 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, + 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, + 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, + 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, + 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, + 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, + 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, + 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, + 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, + 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, + 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, + 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, + 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, + 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, + 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, + 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, + 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, + 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, + 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, + 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, + 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a, +} + +var s1 = [256]uint32{ + 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, + 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, + 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, + 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, + 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, + 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, + 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, + 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, + 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, + 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, + 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, + 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, + 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, + 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, + 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, + 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, + 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, + 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, + 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, + 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, + 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, + 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, + 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, + 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, + 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, + 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, + 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, + 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, + 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, + 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, + 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, + 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, + 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, + 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, + 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, + 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, + 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, + 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, + 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, + 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, + 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, + 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, + 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7, +} + +var s2 = [256]uint32{ + 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, + 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, + 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, + 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, + 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, + 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, + 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, + 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, + 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, + 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, + 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, + 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, + 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, + 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, + 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, + 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, + 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, + 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, + 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, + 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, + 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, + 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, + 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, + 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, + 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, + 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, + 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, + 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, + 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, + 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, + 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, + 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, + 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, + 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, + 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, + 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, + 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, + 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, + 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, + 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, + 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, + 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, + 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0, +} + +var s3 = [256]uint32{ + 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, + 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, + 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, + 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, + 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, + 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, + 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, + 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, + 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, + 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, + 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, + 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, + 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, + 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, + 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, + 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, + 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, + 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, + 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, + 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, + 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, + 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, + 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, + 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, + 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, + 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, + 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, + 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, + 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, + 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, + 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, + 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, + 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, + 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, + 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, + 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, + 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, + 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, + 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, + 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, + 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, + 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, + 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6, +} + +var p = [18]uint32{ + 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, + 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, + 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b, +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5dfacbb --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f1f6623 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 10 + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R1 + MOVD src+24(FP), R2 + MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3 + MOVD key+48(FP), R4 + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 + + MOVD $·constants(SB), R10 + MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11 + + MOVW (R7), R20 + + AND $~255, R3, R13 + ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end + AND $255, R3, R13 +loop: + MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21 + VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4] + + // load contants + // VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E940 + + // load keys + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE884 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE888 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8EC + + // VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8CD + + // update counter + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + +chacha: + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12) + VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7) + VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4 + // V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + // V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8) + // ... + VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + SUB $1, R21 + CBNZ R21, chacha + + // VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E950 + + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE894 + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE898 + // restore R4 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8FC + // VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8DD + + VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4 + VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4 + VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4 + VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4 + VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4 + VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4 + VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4 + + VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4 + VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4 + VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4 + VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4 + VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4 + VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4 + VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4 + VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4 + VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4 + VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4 + VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4 + VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4 + VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4 + VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4 + VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4 + VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4 + VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2 + VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2 + VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2 + VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16] + + VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2 + VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2 + VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2 + VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16] + VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2 + VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2 + VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2 + VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16] + VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2 + VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2 + VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2 + VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16] + VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16 + VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16 + VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16 + VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16 + VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16 + VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16 + VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16 + VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1) + + ADD $4, R20 + MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter + + CMP R2, R12 + BGT loop + + RET + + +DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 + +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F +GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93eb5ae --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,398 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms +// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "math/bits" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // cipher, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of + // this cipher, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 +) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter + // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce. + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 + nonce [3]uint32 + + // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous + // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are + // computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks. + buf [bufSize]byte + len int + + // overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be + // generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic. + overflow bool + + // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they + // are computed the first time. + precompDone bool + p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32 + p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32 + p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32 +} + +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given +// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided, +// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce +// have any other length. +// +// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows +// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more +// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism. +// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305. +func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + c := &Cipher{} + return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce) +} + +func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size") + } + if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX { + // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a + // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See + // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3. + key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16]) + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + nonce = cNonce + } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size") + } + + key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint + c.key = [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + } + c.nonce = [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]), + } + return c, nil +} + +// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state. +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3 + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k +) + +const blockSize = 64 + +// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words. +// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16 +// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time. +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12) + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will +// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far. +// +// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less +// than the current value. +// +// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the +// counter value. +func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) { + // Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this + // implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled + // back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks + // we have already output. + outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize + if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter { + panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter") + } + + // In the general case, we set the new counter value and reset s.len to 0, + // causing the next call to XORKeyStream to refill the buffer. However, if + // we're advancing within the existing buffer, we can save work by simply + // setting s.len. + if counter < s.counter { + s.len = int(s.counter-counter) * blockSize + } else { + s.counter = counter + s.len = 0 + } +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + dst = dst[:len(src)] + if alias.InexactOverlap(dst, src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream. + if s.len != 0 { + keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(keyStream) { + keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)] + } + _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint + for i, b := range keyStream { + dst[i] = src[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(keyStream) + dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):] + } + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + + // If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output, + // panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember + // not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained. + numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 { + s.overflow = true + } + + // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a + // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a + // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize. + + full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize + if full > 0 { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full]) + } + dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:] + + // If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic + // one that does one block at a time. + const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize + if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:] + copy(buf, src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf) + s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf) + return + } + + // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and + // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation. + if len(src) > 0 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + copy(s.buf[:], src) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:]) + s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:]) + } +} + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length") + } + + // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state + // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling, + // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13) + // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12). + // + // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc + // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk + // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk + // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn + // + // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + var ( + c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3 + c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3] + c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7] + _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2] + ) + + // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can + // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and + // for future XORKeyStream invocations. + if !s.precompDone { + s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13) + s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14) + s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15) + s.precompDone = true + } + + // A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also + // acts as a bounds check elimination hint. + for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 { + // The remainder of the first column round. + fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter) + + // The second diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14) + + // The remaining 18 rounds. + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + // Column round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + // Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result. + addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0) + addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1) + addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2) + addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3) + addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4) + addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5) + addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6) + addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7) + addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8) + addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9) + addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10) + addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11) + addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter) + addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13) + addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14) + addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15) + + s.counter += 1 + + src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:] + } +} + +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes +// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other +// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + out := make([]byte, 32) + return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce) +} + +func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size") + } + if len(nonce) != 16 { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size") + } + + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) + x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16]) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + // Diagonal round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Column round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15) + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02ff3d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!arm64 && !s390x && !ppc64le) || !gc || purego +// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le !gc purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = blockSize + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da420b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c0fed2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,450 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: +// # ==================================================================== +// # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL +// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and +// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further +// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. +// # ==================================================================== + +// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler +// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on +// the original from openssl. + +// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91 + +// The differences in this and the original implementation are +// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define OUT R3 +#define INP R4 +#define LEN R5 +#define KEY R6 +#define CNT R7 +#define TMP R15 + +#define CONSTBASE R16 +#define BLOCKS R17 + +DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001 +DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004 +DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d +DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405 +DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c +DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704 +DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000 +DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002 +GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0 + +//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40 + MOVD out+0(FP), OUT + MOVD inp+8(FP), INP + MOVD len+16(FP), LEN + MOVD key+24(FP), KEY + MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT + + // Addressing for constants + MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE + MOVD $16, R8 + MOVD $32, R9 + MOVD $48, R10 + MOVD $64, R11 + SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS + // V16 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48 + ADD $80,CONSTBASE + + // Load key into V17,V18 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50 + + // Load CNT, NONCE into V19 + LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51 + + // Clear V27 + VXOR V27, V27, V27 + + // V28 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60 + + // splat slot from V19 -> V26 + VSPLTW $0, V19, V26 + + VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19 + VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19 + + VADDUWM V26, V28, V26 + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + +loop_outer_vsx: + // V0, V1, V2, V3 + LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32 + LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33 + LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34 + LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35 + + // splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11 + VSPLTW $0, V17, V4 + VSPLTW $1, V17, V5 + VSPLTW $2, V17, V6 + VSPLTW $3, V17, V7 + VSPLTW $0, V18, V8 + VSPLTW $1, V18, V9 + VSPLTW $2, V18, V10 + VSPLTW $3, V18, V11 + + // VOR + VOR V26, V26, V12 + + // splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15 + VSPLTW $1, V19, V13 + VSPLTW $2, V19, V14 + VSPLTW $3, V19, V15 + + // splat const values + VSPLTISW $-16, V27 + VSPLTISW $12, V28 + VSPLTISW $8, V29 + VSPLTISW $7, V30 + +loop_vsx: + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + BC 16, LT, loop_vsx + + VADDUWM V12, V26, V12 + + WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27 + WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28 + + WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0 + WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2 + + WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29 + WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33 + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34 + + WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4 + WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6 + + WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27 + WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28 + + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37 + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38 + + WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8 + WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10 + + WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29 + WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41 + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42 + + WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12 + WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14 + + VSPLTISW $4, V27 + VADDUWM V26, V27, V26 + + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45 + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46 + + VADDUWM V0, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V4, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V8, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V12, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + // Bottom of loop + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V1, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V5, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V9, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V13, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V2, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V6, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V10, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V14, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V3, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V7, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V11, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V15, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + BNE loop_outer_vsx + +done_vsx: + // Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks + MOVD (CNT), R14 + ADD BLOCKS, R14 + MOVD R14, (CNT) + RET + +tail_vsx: + ADD $32, R1, R11 + MOVD LEN, CTR + + // Save values on stack to copy from + STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10) + ADD $-1, R11, R12 + ADD $-1, INP + ADD $-1, OUT + +looptail_vsx: + // Copying the result to OUT + // in bytes. + MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY + MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP + XOR KEY, TMP, KEY + MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT) + BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx + + // Clear the stack values + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10) + BR done_vsx diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4652247 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package chacha20 + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX + +const bufSize = 256 + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +// +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) + } else { + c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3ef5a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "go_asm.h" +#include "textflag.h" + +// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as +// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute +// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed +// with the bytes in the input slice. + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32 +// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908 +DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c +// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3] +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 + +#define BSWAP V5 +#define J0 V6 +#define KEY0 V7 +#define KEY1 V8 +#define NONCE V9 +#define CTR V10 +#define M0 V11 +#define M1 V12 +#define M2 V13 +#define M3 V14 +#define INC V15 +#define X0 V16 +#define X1 V17 +#define X2 V18 +#define X3 V19 +#define X4 V20 +#define X5 V21 +#define X6 V22 +#define X7 V23 +#define X8 V24 +#define X9 V25 +#define X10 V26 +#define X11 V27 +#define X12 V28 +#define X13 V29 +#define X14 V30 +#define X15 V31 + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 20 + +#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $7, d1, d1 + +#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \ + VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \ + VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \ + VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3 + +#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VAF x, v0, v0 \ + VAF x, v1, v1 \ + VAF x, v2, v2 \ + VAF x, v3, v3 + +#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VLM off(src), M0, M3 \ + PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VX v0, M0, M0 \ + VX v1, M1, M1 \ + VX v2, M2, M2 \ + VX v3, M3, M3 \ + VSTM M0, M3, off(dst) + +#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \ + VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]} + VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]} + VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]} + VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]} + VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]} + VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]} + VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} + VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] + LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src) + MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter + + // load BSWAP and J0 + VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 + + // setup + MOVD $95, R0 + VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 + VLL R0, (R6), NONCE + VZERO M0 + VLEIB $7, $32, M0 + VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE + + // initialize counter values + VLREPF (R7), CTR + VZERO INC + VLEIF $1, $1, INC + VLEIF $2, $2, INC + VLEIF $3, $3, INC + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + VREPIF $4, INC + +chacha: + VREPF $0, J0, X0 + VREPF $1, J0, X1 + VREPF $2, J0, X2 + VREPF $3, J0, X3 + VREPF $0, KEY0, X4 + VREPF $1, KEY0, X5 + VREPF $2, KEY0, X6 + VREPF $3, KEY0, X7 + VREPF $0, KEY1, X8 + VREPF $1, KEY1, X9 + VREPF $2, KEY1, X10 + VREPF $3, KEY1, X11 + VLR CTR, X12 + VREPF $1, NONCE, X13 + VREPF $2, NONCE, X14 + VREPF $3, NONCE, X15 + + MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1 + +loop: + ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11) + ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9) + + ADD $-1, R1 + BNE loop + + // decrement length + ADD $-256, R4 + + // rearrange vectors + SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) + SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7) + SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11) + VAF CTR, X12, X12 + SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15) + + // increment counters + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + + // xor keystream with plaintext + XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12) + XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13) + XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14) + XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15) + + // increment pointers + MOVD $256(R2), R2 + MOVD $256(R3), R3 + + CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha + + VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2d0485 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found src the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20 + +import "runtime" + +// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. +const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || + runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" + +// addXor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with (a + b) and +// places the result in little endian byte order in dst. +func addXor(dst, src []byte, a, b uint32) { + _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // bounds check elimination hint + if unaligned { + // The compiler should optimize this code into + // 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores. + // TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably + // good job with the generic code below. + // See issue #25111 for more details. + v := uint32(src[0]) + v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8 + v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16 + v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24 + v ^= a + b + dst[0] = byte(v) + dst[1] = byte(v >> 8) + dst[2] = byte(v >> 16) + dst[3] = byte(v >> 24) + } else { + a += b + dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(a) + dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(a>>8) + dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(a>>16) + dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(a>>24) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00f963e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which +// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519. +// See RFC 7748. +// +// Starting in Go 1.20, this package is a wrapper for the X25519 implementation +// in the crypto/ecdh package. +package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" + +// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point. +// +// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all +// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which +// will return an error. +func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + scalarMult(dst, scalar, point) +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the +// standard generator. +// +// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as +// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs. +func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar) +} + +const ( + // ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519. + ScalarSize = 32 + // PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519. + PointSize = 32 +) + +// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator. +var Basepoint []byte + +var basePoint = [32]byte{9} + +func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] } + +// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point), +// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are +// slices of 32 bytes. +// +// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should +// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call. +// +// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same +// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance. +func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the + // caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap. + var dst [32]byte + return x25519(&dst, scalar, point) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba647e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !go1.20 + +package curve25519 + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "strconv" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field" +) + +func scalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + var e [32]byte + + copy(e[:], scalar[:]) + e[0] &= 248 + e[31] &= 127 + e[31] |= 64 + + var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 field.Element + x1.SetBytes(point[:]) + x2.One() + x3.Set(&x1) + z3.One() + + swap := 0 + for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- { + b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7) + b &= 1 + swap ^= int(b) + x2.Swap(&x3, swap) + z2.Swap(&z3, swap) + swap = int(b) + + tmp0.Subtract(&x3, &z3) + tmp1.Subtract(&x2, &z2) + x2.Add(&x2, &z2) + z2.Add(&x3, &z3) + z3.Multiply(&tmp0, &x2) + z2.Multiply(&z2, &tmp1) + tmp0.Square(&tmp1) + tmp1.Square(&x2) + x3.Add(&z3, &z2) + z2.Subtract(&z3, &z2) + x2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0) + tmp1.Subtract(&tmp1, &tmp0) + z2.Square(&z2) + + z3.Mult32(&tmp1, 121666) + x3.Square(&x3) + tmp0.Add(&tmp0, &z3) + z3.Multiply(&x1, &z2) + z2.Multiply(&tmp1, &tmp0) + } + + x2.Swap(&x3, swap) + z2.Swap(&z3, swap) + + z2.Invert(&z2) + x2.Multiply(&x2, &z2) + copy(dst[:], x2.Bytes()) +} + +func scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + checkBasepoint() + scalarMult(dst, scalar, &basePoint) +} + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var in [32]byte + if l := len(scalar); l != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("bad scalar length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32") + } + if l := len(point); l != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("bad point length: " + strconv.Itoa(l) + ", expected 32") + } + copy(in[:], scalar) + if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] { + scalarBaseMult(dst, &in) + } else { + var base, zero [32]byte + copy(base[:], point) + scalarMult(dst, &in, &base) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("bad input point: low order point") + } + } + return dst[:], nil +} + +func checkBasepoint() { + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(Basepoint, []byte{ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + }) != 1 { + panic("curve25519: global Basepoint value was modified") + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..627df49 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_go120.go @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +// Copyright 2022 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.20 + +package curve25519 + +import "crypto/ecdh" + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + pub, err := curve.NewPublicKey(point) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + out, err := priv.ECDH(pub) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + copy(dst[:], out) + return dst[:], nil +} + +func scalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + if _, err := x25519(dst, scalar[:], point[:]); err != nil { + // The only error condition for x25519 when the inputs are 32 bytes long + // is if the output would have been the all-zero value. + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = 0 + } + } +} + +func scalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + curve := ecdh.X25519() + priv, err := curve.NewPrivateKey(scalar[:]) + if err != nil { + panic("curve25519: internal error: scalarBaseMult was not 32 bytes") + } + copy(dst[:], priv.PublicKey().Bytes()) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e25bca7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/README @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +This package is kept in sync with crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field in +the standard library. + +If there are any changes in the standard library that need to be synced to this +package, run sync.sh. It will not overwrite any local changes made since the +previous sync, so it's ok to land changes in this package first, and then sync +to the standard library later. diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca841ad --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe.go @@ -0,0 +1,416 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package field implements fast arithmetic modulo 2^255-19. +package field + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "math/bits" +) + +// Element represents an element of the field GF(2^255-19). Note that this +// is not a cryptographically secure group, and should only be used to interact +// with edwards25519.Point coordinates. +// +// This type works similarly to math/big.Int, and all arguments and receivers +// are allowed to alias. +// +// The zero value is a valid zero element. +type Element struct { + // An element t represents the integer + // t.l0 + t.l1*2^51 + t.l2*2^102 + t.l3*2^153 + t.l4*2^204 + // + // Between operations, all limbs are expected to be lower than 2^52. + l0 uint64 + l1 uint64 + l2 uint64 + l3 uint64 + l4 uint64 +} + +const maskLow51Bits uint64 = (1 << 51) - 1 + +var feZero = &Element{0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +// Zero sets v = 0, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Zero() *Element { + *v = *feZero + return v +} + +var feOne = &Element{1, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +// One sets v = 1, and returns v. +func (v *Element) One() *Element { + *v = *feOne + return v +} + +// reduce reduces v modulo 2^255 - 19 and returns it. +func (v *Element) reduce() *Element { + v.carryPropagate() + + // After the light reduction we now have a field element representation + // v < 2^255 + 2^13 * 19, but need v < 2^255 - 19. + + // If v >= 2^255 - 19, then v + 19 >= 2^255, which would overflow 2^255 - 1, + // generating a carry. That is, c will be 0 if v < 2^255 - 19, and 1 otherwise. + c := (v.l0 + 19) >> 51 + c = (v.l1 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l2 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l3 + c) >> 51 + c = (v.l4 + c) >> 51 + + // If v < 2^255 - 19 and c = 0, this will be a no-op. Otherwise, it's + // effectively applying the reduction identity to the carry. + v.l0 += 19 * c + + v.l1 += v.l0 >> 51 + v.l0 = v.l0 & maskLow51Bits + v.l2 += v.l1 >> 51 + v.l1 = v.l1 & maskLow51Bits + v.l3 += v.l2 >> 51 + v.l2 = v.l2 & maskLow51Bits + v.l4 += v.l3 >> 51 + v.l3 = v.l3 & maskLow51Bits + // no additional carry + v.l4 = v.l4 & maskLow51Bits + + return v +} + +// Add sets v = a + b, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Add(a, b *Element) *Element { + v.l0 = a.l0 + b.l0 + v.l1 = a.l1 + b.l1 + v.l2 = a.l2 + b.l2 + v.l3 = a.l3 + b.l3 + v.l4 = a.l4 + b.l4 + // Using the generic implementation here is actually faster than the + // assembly. Probably because the body of this function is so simple that + // the compiler can figure out better optimizations by inlining the carry + // propagation. TODO + return v.carryPropagateGeneric() +} + +// Subtract sets v = a - b, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Subtract(a, b *Element) *Element { + // We first add 2 * p, to guarantee the subtraction won't underflow, and + // then subtract b (which can be up to 2^255 + 2^13 * 19). + v.l0 = (a.l0 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA) - b.l0 + v.l1 = (a.l1 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l1 + v.l2 = (a.l2 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l2 + v.l3 = (a.l3 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l3 + v.l4 = (a.l4 + 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE) - b.l4 + return v.carryPropagate() +} + +// Negate sets v = -a, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Negate(a *Element) *Element { + return v.Subtract(feZero, a) +} + +// Invert sets v = 1/z mod p, and returns v. +// +// If z == 0, Invert returns v = 0. +func (v *Element) Invert(z *Element) *Element { + // Inversion is implemented as exponentiation with exponent p − 2. It uses the + // same sequence of 255 squarings and 11 multiplications as [Curve25519]. + var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t Element + + z2.Square(z) // 2 + t.Square(&z2) // 4 + t.Square(&t) // 8 + z9.Multiply(&t, z) // 9 + z11.Multiply(&z9, &z2) // 11 + t.Square(&z11) // 22 + z2_5_0.Multiply(&t, &z9) // 31 = 2^5 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_5_0) // 2^6 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 4; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^10 - 2^5 + } + z2_10_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_5_0) // 2^10 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_10_0) // 2^11 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^20 - 2^10 + } + z2_20_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^20 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_20_0) // 2^21 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 19; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^40 - 2^20 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_20_0) // 2^40 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^41 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^50 - 2^10 + } + z2_50_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_10_0) // 2^50 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_50_0) // 2^51 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 49; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^100 - 2^50 + } + z2_100_0.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^100 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&z2_100_0) // 2^101 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 99; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^200 - 2^100 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_100_0) // 2^200 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^201 - 2^1 + for i := 0; i < 49; i++ { + t.Square(&t) // 2^250 - 2^50 + } + t.Multiply(&t, &z2_50_0) // 2^250 - 2^0 + + t.Square(&t) // 2^251 - 2^1 + t.Square(&t) // 2^252 - 2^2 + t.Square(&t) // 2^253 - 2^3 + t.Square(&t) // 2^254 - 2^4 + t.Square(&t) // 2^255 - 2^5 + + return v.Multiply(&t, &z11) // 2^255 - 21 +} + +// Set sets v = a, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Set(a *Element) *Element { + *v = *a + return v +} + +// SetBytes sets v to x, which must be a 32-byte little-endian encoding. +// +// Consistent with RFC 7748, the most significant bit (the high bit of the +// last byte) is ignored, and non-canonical values (2^255-19 through 2^255-1) +// are accepted. Note that this is laxer than specified by RFC 8032. +func (v *Element) SetBytes(x []byte) *Element { + if len(x) != 32 { + panic("edwards25519: invalid field element input size") + } + + // Bits 0:51 (bytes 0:8, bits 0:64, shift 0, mask 51). + v.l0 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[0:8]) + v.l0 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 51:102 (bytes 6:14, bits 48:112, shift 3, mask 51). + v.l1 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[6:14]) >> 3 + v.l1 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 102:153 (bytes 12:20, bits 96:160, shift 6, mask 51). + v.l2 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[12:20]) >> 6 + v.l2 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 153:204 (bytes 19:27, bits 152:216, shift 1, mask 51). + v.l3 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[19:27]) >> 1 + v.l3 &= maskLow51Bits + // Bits 204:251 (bytes 24:32, bits 192:256, shift 12, mask 51). + // Note: not bytes 25:33, shift 4, to avoid overread. + v.l4 = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(x[24:32]) >> 12 + v.l4 &= maskLow51Bits + + return v +} + +// Bytes returns the canonical 32-byte little-endian encoding of v. +func (v *Element) Bytes() []byte { + // This function is outlined to make the allocations inline in the caller + // rather than happen on the heap. + var out [32]byte + return v.bytes(&out) +} + +func (v *Element) bytes(out *[32]byte) []byte { + t := *v + t.reduce() + + var buf [8]byte + for i, l := range [5]uint64{t.l0, t.l1, t.l2, t.l3, t.l4} { + bitsOffset := i * 51 + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(buf[:], l<= len(out) { + break + } + out[off] |= bb + } + } + + return out[:] +} + +// Equal returns 1 if v and u are equal, and 0 otherwise. +func (v *Element) Equal(u *Element) int { + sa, sv := u.Bytes(), v.Bytes() + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(sa, sv) +} + +// mask64Bits returns 0xffffffff if cond is 1, and 0 otherwise. +func mask64Bits(cond int) uint64 { return ^(uint64(cond) - 1) } + +// Select sets v to a if cond == 1, and to b if cond == 0. +func (v *Element) Select(a, b *Element, cond int) *Element { + m := mask64Bits(cond) + v.l0 = (m & a.l0) | (^m & b.l0) + v.l1 = (m & a.l1) | (^m & b.l1) + v.l2 = (m & a.l2) | (^m & b.l2) + v.l3 = (m & a.l3) | (^m & b.l3) + v.l4 = (m & a.l4) | (^m & b.l4) + return v +} + +// Swap swaps v and u if cond == 1 or leaves them unchanged if cond == 0, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Swap(u *Element, cond int) { + m := mask64Bits(cond) + t := m & (v.l0 ^ u.l0) + v.l0 ^= t + u.l0 ^= t + t = m & (v.l1 ^ u.l1) + v.l1 ^= t + u.l1 ^= t + t = m & (v.l2 ^ u.l2) + v.l2 ^= t + u.l2 ^= t + t = m & (v.l3 ^ u.l3) + v.l3 ^= t + u.l3 ^= t + t = m & (v.l4 ^ u.l4) + v.l4 ^= t + u.l4 ^= t +} + +// IsNegative returns 1 if v is negative, and 0 otherwise. +func (v *Element) IsNegative() int { + return int(v.Bytes()[0] & 1) +} + +// Absolute sets v to |u|, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Absolute(u *Element) *Element { + return v.Select(new(Element).Negate(u), u, u.IsNegative()) +} + +// Multiply sets v = x * y, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Multiply(x, y *Element) *Element { + feMul(v, x, y) + return v +} + +// Square sets v = x * x, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Square(x *Element) *Element { + feSquare(v, x) + return v +} + +// Mult32 sets v = x * y, and returns v. +func (v *Element) Mult32(x *Element, y uint32) *Element { + x0lo, x0hi := mul51(x.l0, y) + x1lo, x1hi := mul51(x.l1, y) + x2lo, x2hi := mul51(x.l2, y) + x3lo, x3hi := mul51(x.l3, y) + x4lo, x4hi := mul51(x.l4, y) + v.l0 = x0lo + 19*x4hi // carried over per the reduction identity + v.l1 = x1lo + x0hi + v.l2 = x2lo + x1hi + v.l3 = x3lo + x2hi + v.l4 = x4lo + x3hi + // The hi portions are going to be only 32 bits, plus any previous excess, + // so we can skip the carry propagation. + return v +} + +// mul51 returns lo + hi * 2⁵¹ = a * b. +func mul51(a uint64, b uint32) (lo uint64, hi uint64) { + mh, ml := bits.Mul64(a, uint64(b)) + lo = ml & maskLow51Bits + hi = (mh << 13) | (ml >> 51) + return +} + +// Pow22523 set v = x^((p-5)/8), and returns v. (p-5)/8 is 2^252-3. +func (v *Element) Pow22523(x *Element) *Element { + var t0, t1, t2 Element + + t0.Square(x) // x^2 + t1.Square(&t0) // x^4 + t1.Square(&t1) // x^8 + t1.Multiply(x, &t1) // x^9 + t0.Multiply(&t0, &t1) // x^11 + t0.Square(&t0) // x^22 + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^31 + t1.Square(&t0) // x^62 + for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { // x^992 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // x^1023 -> 1023 = 2^10 - 1 + t1.Square(&t0) // 2^11 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^20 - 2^10 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^20 - 1 + t2.Square(&t1) // 2^21 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { // 2^40 - 2^20 + t2.Square(&t2) + } + t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^40 - 1 + t1.Square(&t1) // 2^41 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { // 2^50 - 2^10 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^50 - 1 + t1.Square(&t0) // 2^51 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^100 - 2^50 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t1.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^100 - 1 + t2.Square(&t1) // 2^101 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { // 2^200 - 2^100 + t2.Square(&t2) + } + t1.Multiply(&t2, &t1) // 2^200 - 1 + t1.Square(&t1) // 2^201 - 2 + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { // 2^250 - 2^50 + t1.Square(&t1) + } + t0.Multiply(&t1, &t0) // 2^250 - 1 + t0.Square(&t0) // 2^251 - 2 + t0.Square(&t0) // 2^252 - 4 + return v.Multiply(&t0, x) // 2^252 - 3 -> x^(2^252-3) +} + +// sqrtM1 is 2^((p-1)/4), which squared is equal to -1 by Euler's Criterion. +var sqrtM1 = &Element{1718705420411056, 234908883556509, + 2233514472574048, 2117202627021982, 765476049583133} + +// SqrtRatio sets r to the non-negative square root of the ratio of u and v. +// +// If u/v is square, SqrtRatio returns r and 1. If u/v is not square, SqrtRatio +// sets r according to Section 4.3 of draft-irtf-cfrg-ristretto255-decaf448-00, +// and returns r and 0. +func (r *Element) SqrtRatio(u, v *Element) (rr *Element, wasSquare int) { + var a, b Element + + // r = (u * v3) * (u * v7)^((p-5)/8) + v2 := a.Square(v) + uv3 := b.Multiply(u, b.Multiply(v2, v)) + uv7 := a.Multiply(uv3, a.Square(v2)) + r.Multiply(uv3, r.Pow22523(uv7)) + + check := a.Multiply(v, a.Square(r)) // check = v * r^2 + + uNeg := b.Negate(u) + correctSignSqrt := check.Equal(u) + flippedSignSqrt := check.Equal(uNeg) + flippedSignSqrtI := check.Equal(uNeg.Multiply(uNeg, sqrtM1)) + + rPrime := b.Multiply(r, sqrtM1) // r_prime = SQRT_M1 * r + // r = CT_SELECT(r_prime IF flipped_sign_sqrt | flipped_sign_sqrt_i ELSE r) + r.Select(rPrime, r, flippedSignSqrt|flippedSignSqrtI) + + r.Absolute(r) // Choose the nonnegative square root. + return r, correctSignSqrt | flippedSignSqrt +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..edcf163 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +package field + +// feMul sets out = a * b. It works like feMulGeneric. +// +//go:noescape +func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element) + +// feSquare sets out = a * a. It works like feSquareGeneric. +// +//go:noescape +func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..293f013 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,379 @@ +// Code generated by command: go run fe_amd64_asm.go -out ../fe_amd64.s -stubs ../fe_amd64.go -pkg field. DO NOT EDIT. + +//go:build amd64 && gc && !purego +// +build amd64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func feMul(out *Element, a *Element, b *Element) +TEXT ·feMul(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24 + MOVQ a+8(FP), CX + MOVQ b+16(FP), BX + + // r0 = a0×b0 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + MOVQ AX, DI + MOVQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a1×b4 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a2×b3 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a3×b2 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r0 += 19×a4×b1 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, DI + ADCQ DX, SI + + // r1 = a0×b1 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + MOVQ AX, R9 + MOVQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += a1×b0 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a2×b4 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a3×b3 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r1 += 19×a4×b2 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R9 + ADCQ DX, R8 + + // r2 = a0×b2 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + MOVQ AX, R11 + MOVQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += a1×b1 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += a2×b0 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += 19×a3×b4 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r2 += 19×a4×b3 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R11 + ADCQ DX, R10 + + // r3 = a0×b3 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 24(BX) + MOVQ AX, R13 + MOVQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a1×b2 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a2×b1 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += a3×b0 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r3 += 19×a4×b4 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(BX) + ADDQ AX, R13 + ADCQ DX, R12 + + // r4 = a0×b4 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ 32(BX) + MOVQ AX, R15 + MOVQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a1×b3 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 24(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a2×b2 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 16(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a3×b1 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + MULQ 8(BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // r4 += a4×b0 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + MULQ (BX) + ADDQ AX, R15 + ADCQ DX, R14 + + // First reduction chain + MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX + SHLQ $0x0d, DI, SI + SHLQ $0x0d, R9, R8 + SHLQ $0x0d, R11, R10 + SHLQ $0x0d, R13, R12 + SHLQ $0x0d, R15, R14 + ANDQ AX, DI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14 + ADDQ R14, DI + ANDQ AX, R9 + ADDQ SI, R9 + ANDQ AX, R11 + ADDQ R8, R11 + ANDQ AX, R13 + ADDQ R10, R13 + ANDQ AX, R15 + ADDQ R12, R15 + + // Second reduction chain (carryPropagate) + MOVQ DI, SI + SHRQ $0x33, SI + MOVQ R9, R8 + SHRQ $0x33, R8 + MOVQ R11, R10 + SHRQ $0x33, R10 + MOVQ R13, R12 + SHRQ $0x33, R12 + MOVQ R15, R14 + SHRQ $0x33, R14 + ANDQ AX, DI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R14, R14 + ADDQ R14, DI + ANDQ AX, R9 + ADDQ SI, R9 + ANDQ AX, R11 + ADDQ R8, R11 + ANDQ AX, R13 + ADDQ R10, R13 + ANDQ AX, R15 + ADDQ R12, R15 + + // Store output + MOVQ out+0(FP), AX + MOVQ DI, (AX) + MOVQ R9, 8(AX) + MOVQ R11, 16(AX) + MOVQ R13, 24(AX) + MOVQ R15, 32(AX) + RET + +// func feSquare(out *Element, a *Element) +TEXT ·feSquare(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-16 + MOVQ a+8(FP), CX + + // r0 = l0×l0 + MOVQ (CX), AX + MULQ (CX) + MOVQ AX, SI + MOVQ DX, BX + + // r0 += 38×l1×l4 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, SI + ADCQ DX, BX + + // r0 += 38×l2×l3 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, SI + ADCQ DX, BX + + // r1 = 2×l0×l1 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 8(CX) + MOVQ AX, R8 + MOVQ DX, DI + + // r1 += 38×l2×l4 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R8 + ADCQ DX, DI + + // r1 += 19×l3×l3 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, R8 + ADCQ DX, DI + + // r2 = 2×l0×l2 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX, R10 + MOVQ DX, R9 + + // r2 += l1×l1 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX, R10 + ADCQ DX, R9 + + // r2 += 38×l3×l4 + MOVQ 24(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x26, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R10 + ADCQ DX, R9 + + // r3 = 2×l0×l3 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + MOVQ AX, R12 + MOVQ DX, R11 + + // r3 += 2×l1×l2 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX, R12 + ADCQ DX, R11 + + // r3 += 19×l4×l4 + MOVQ 32(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x13, AX, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX, R12 + ADCQ DX, R11 + + // r4 = 2×l0×l4 + MOVQ (CX), AX + SHLQ $0x01, AX + MULQ 32(CX) + MOVQ AX, R14 + MOVQ DX, R13 + + // r4 += 2×l1×l3 + MOVQ 8(CX), AX + IMUL3Q $0x02, AX, AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX, R14 + ADCQ DX, R13 + + // r4 += l2×l2 + MOVQ 16(CX), AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX, R14 + ADCQ DX, R13 + + // First reduction chain + MOVQ $0x0007ffffffffffff, AX + SHLQ $0x0d, SI, BX + SHLQ $0x0d, R8, DI + SHLQ $0x0d, R10, R9 + SHLQ $0x0d, R12, R11 + SHLQ $0x0d, R14, R13 + ANDQ AX, SI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13 + ADDQ R13, SI + ANDQ AX, R8 + ADDQ BX, R8 + ANDQ AX, R10 + ADDQ DI, R10 + ANDQ AX, R12 + ADDQ R9, R12 + ANDQ AX, R14 + ADDQ R11, R14 + + // Second reduction chain (carryPropagate) + MOVQ SI, BX + SHRQ $0x33, BX + MOVQ R8, DI + SHRQ $0x33, DI + MOVQ R10, R9 + SHRQ $0x33, R9 + MOVQ R12, R11 + SHRQ $0x33, R11 + MOVQ R14, R13 + SHRQ $0x33, R13 + ANDQ AX, SI + IMUL3Q $0x13, R13, R13 + ADDQ R13, SI + ANDQ AX, R8 + ADDQ BX, R8 + ANDQ AX, R10 + ADDQ DI, R10 + ANDQ AX, R12 + ADDQ R9, R12 + ANDQ AX, R14 + ADDQ R11, R14 + + // Store output + MOVQ out+0(FP), AX + MOVQ SI, (AX) + MOVQ R8, 8(AX) + MOVQ R10, 16(AX) + MOVQ R12, 24(AX) + MOVQ R14, 32(AX) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ddb6c9b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_amd64_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !amd64 || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64 !gc purego + +package field + +func feMul(v, x, y *Element) { feMulGeneric(v, x, y) } + +func feSquare(v, x *Element) { feSquareGeneric(v, x) } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af459ef --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego +// +build arm64,gc,!purego + +package field + +//go:noescape +func carryPropagate(v *Element) + +func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element { + carryPropagate(v) + return v +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c91e45 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2020 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build arm64 && gc && !purego +// +build arm64,gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// carryPropagate works exactly like carryPropagateGeneric and uses the +// same AND, ADD, and LSR+MADD instructions emitted by the compiler, but +// avoids loading R0-R4 twice and uses LDP and STP. +// +// See https://golang.org/issues/43145 for the main compiler issue. +// +// func carryPropagate(v *Element) +TEXT ·carryPropagate(SB),NOFRAME|NOSPLIT,$0-8 + MOVD v+0(FP), R20 + + LDP 0(R20), (R0, R1) + LDP 16(R20), (R2, R3) + MOVD 32(R20), R4 + + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R0, R10 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R1, R11 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R2, R12 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R3, R13 + AND $0x7ffffffffffff, R4, R14 + + ADD R0>>51, R11, R11 + ADD R1>>51, R12, R12 + ADD R2>>51, R13, R13 + ADD R3>>51, R14, R14 + // R4>>51 * 19 + R10 -> R10 + LSR $51, R4, R21 + MOVD $19, R22 + MADD R22, R10, R21, R10 + + STP (R10, R11), 0(R20) + STP (R12, R13), 16(R20) + MOVD R14, 32(R20) + + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..234a5b2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_arm64_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2021 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !arm64 || !gc || purego +// +build !arm64 !gc purego + +package field + +func (v *Element) carryPropagate() *Element { + return v.carryPropagateGeneric() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2671217 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/fe_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +// Copyright (c) 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package field + +import "math/bits" + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +// mul64 returns a * b. +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +// addMul64 returns v + a * b. +func addMul64(v uint128, a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bits.Mul64(a, b) + lo, c := bits.Add64(lo, v.lo, 0) + hi, _ = bits.Add64(hi, v.hi, c) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +// shiftRightBy51 returns a >> 51. a is assumed to be at most 115 bits. +func shiftRightBy51(a uint128) uint64 { + return (a.hi << (64 - 51)) | (a.lo >> 51) +} + +func feMulGeneric(v, a, b *Element) { + a0 := a.l0 + a1 := a.l1 + a2 := a.l2 + a3 := a.l3 + a4 := a.l4 + + b0 := b.l0 + b1 := b.l1 + b2 := b.l2 + b3 := b.l3 + b4 := b.l4 + + // Limb multiplication works like pen-and-paper columnar multiplication, but + // with 51-bit limbs instead of digits. + // + // a4 a3 a2 a1 a0 x + // b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 = + // ------------------------ + // a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 + + // a4b1 a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 + + // a4b2 a3b2 a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 + + // a4b3 a3b3 a2b3 a1b3 a0b3 + + // a4b4 a3b4 a2b4 a1b4 a0b4 = + // ---------------------------------------------- + // r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // We can then use the reduction identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to + // reduce the limbs that would overflow 255 bits. r5 * 2²⁵⁵ becomes 19 * r5, + // r6 * 2³⁰⁶ becomes 19 * r6 * 2⁵¹, etc. + // + // Reduction can be carried out simultaneously to multiplication. For + // example, we do not compute r5: whenever the result of a multiplication + // belongs to r5, like a1b4, we multiply it by 19 and add the result to r0. + // + // a4b0 a3b0 a2b0 a1b0 a0b0 + + // a3b1 a2b1 a1b1 a0b1 19×a4b1 + + // a2b2 a1b2 a0b2 19×a4b2 19×a3b2 + + // a1b3 a0b3 19×a4b3 19×a3b3 19×a2b3 + + // a0b4 19×a4b4 19×a3b4 19×a2b4 19×a1b4 = + // -------------------------------------- + // r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // Finally we add up the columns into wide, overlapping limbs. + + a1_19 := a1 * 19 + a2_19 := a2 * 19 + a3_19 := a3 * 19 + a4_19 := a4 * 19 + + // r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1) + r0 := mul64(a0, b0) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a1_19, b4) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a2_19, b3) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a3_19, b2) + r0 = addMul64(r0, a4_19, b1) + + // r1 = a0×b1 + a1×b0 + 19×(a2×b4 + a3×b3 + a4×b2) + r1 := mul64(a0, b1) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a1, b0) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a2_19, b4) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a3_19, b3) + r1 = addMul64(r1, a4_19, b2) + + // r2 = a0×b2 + a1×b1 + a2×b0 + 19×(a3×b4 + a4×b3) + r2 := mul64(a0, b2) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a1, b1) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a2, b0) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a3_19, b4) + r2 = addMul64(r2, a4_19, b3) + + // r3 = a0×b3 + a1×b2 + a2×b1 + a3×b0 + 19×a4×b4 + r3 := mul64(a0, b3) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a1, b2) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a2, b1) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a3, b0) + r3 = addMul64(r3, a4_19, b4) + + // r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0 + r4 := mul64(a0, b4) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a1, b3) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a2, b2) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a3, b1) + r4 = addMul64(r4, a4, b0) + + // After the multiplication, we need to reduce (carry) the five coefficients + // to obtain a result with limbs that are at most slightly larger than 2⁵¹, + // to respect the Element invariant. + // + // Overall, the reduction works the same as carryPropagate, except with + // wider inputs: we take the carry for each coefficient by shifting it right + // by 51, and add it to the limb above it. The top carry is multiplied by 19 + // according to the reduction identity and added to the lowest limb. + // + // The largest coefficient (r0) will be at most 111 bits, which guarantees + // that all carries are at most 111 - 51 = 60 bits, which fits in a uint64. + // + // r0 = a0×b0 + 19×(a1×b4 + a2×b3 + a3×b2 + a4×b1) + // r0 < 2⁵²×2⁵² + 19×(2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵² + 2⁵²×2⁵²) + // r0 < (1 + 19 × 4) × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r0 < 2⁷ × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r0 < 2¹¹¹ + // + // Moreover, the top coefficient (r4) is at most 107 bits, so c4 is at most + // 56 bits, and c4 * 19 is at most 61 bits, which again fits in a uint64 and + // allows us to easily apply the reduction identity. + // + // r4 = a0×b4 + a1×b3 + a2×b2 + a3×b1 + a4×b0 + // r4 < 5 × 2⁵² × 2⁵² + // r4 < 2¹⁰⁷ + // + + c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0) + c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1) + c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2) + c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3) + c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4) + + rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0 + rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1 + rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2 + rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + // Now all coefficients fit into 64-bit registers but are still too large to + // be passed around as a Element. We therefore do one last carry chain, + // where the carries will be small enough to fit in the wiggle room above 2⁵¹. + *v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4} + v.carryPropagate() +} + +func feSquareGeneric(v, a *Element) { + l0 := a.l0 + l1 := a.l1 + l2 := a.l2 + l3 := a.l3 + l4 := a.l4 + + // Squaring works precisely like multiplication above, but thanks to its + // symmetry we get to group a few terms together. + // + // l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 x + // l4 l3 l2 l1 l0 = + // ------------------------ + // l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 + + // l4l1 l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 + + // l4l2 l3l2 l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 + + // l4l3 l3l3 l2l3 l1l3 l0l3 + + // l4l4 l3l4 l2l4 l1l4 l0l4 = + // ---------------------------------------------- + // r8 r7 r6 r5 r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // l4l0 l3l0 l2l0 l1l0 l0l0 + + // l3l1 l2l1 l1l1 l0l1 19×l4l1 + + // l2l2 l1l2 l0l2 19×l4l2 19×l3l2 + + // l1l3 l0l3 19×l4l3 19×l3l3 19×l2l3 + + // l0l4 19×l4l4 19×l3l4 19×l2l4 19×l1l4 = + // -------------------------------------- + // r4 r3 r2 r1 r0 + // + // With precomputed 2×, 19×, and 2×19× terms, we can compute each limb with + // only three Mul64 and four Add64, instead of five and eight. + + l0_2 := l0 * 2 + l1_2 := l1 * 2 + + l1_38 := l1 * 38 + l2_38 := l2 * 38 + l3_38 := l3 * 38 + + l3_19 := l3 * 19 + l4_19 := l4 * 19 + + // r0 = l0×l0 + 19×(l1×l4 + l2×l3 + l3×l2 + l4×l1) = l0×l0 + 19×2×(l1×l4 + l2×l3) + r0 := mul64(l0, l0) + r0 = addMul64(r0, l1_38, l4) + r0 = addMul64(r0, l2_38, l3) + + // r1 = l0×l1 + l1×l0 + 19×(l2×l4 + l3×l3 + l4×l2) = 2×l0×l1 + 19×2×l2×l4 + 19×l3×l3 + r1 := mul64(l0_2, l1) + r1 = addMul64(r1, l2_38, l4) + r1 = addMul64(r1, l3_19, l3) + + // r2 = l0×l2 + l1×l1 + l2×l0 + 19×(l3×l4 + l4×l3) = 2×l0×l2 + l1×l1 + 19×2×l3×l4 + r2 := mul64(l0_2, l2) + r2 = addMul64(r2, l1, l1) + r2 = addMul64(r2, l3_38, l4) + + // r3 = l0×l3 + l1×l2 + l2×l1 + l3×l0 + 19×l4×l4 = 2×l0×l3 + 2×l1×l2 + 19×l4×l4 + r3 := mul64(l0_2, l3) + r3 = addMul64(r3, l1_2, l2) + r3 = addMul64(r3, l4_19, l4) + + // r4 = l0×l4 + l1×l3 + l2×l2 + l3×l1 + l4×l0 = 2×l0×l4 + 2×l1×l3 + l2×l2 + r4 := mul64(l0_2, l4) + r4 = addMul64(r4, l1_2, l3) + r4 = addMul64(r4, l2, l2) + + c0 := shiftRightBy51(r0) + c1 := shiftRightBy51(r1) + c2 := shiftRightBy51(r2) + c3 := shiftRightBy51(r3) + c4 := shiftRightBy51(r4) + + rr0 := r0.lo&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + rr1 := r1.lo&maskLow51Bits + c0 + rr2 := r2.lo&maskLow51Bits + c1 + rr3 := r3.lo&maskLow51Bits + c2 + rr4 := r4.lo&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + *v = Element{rr0, rr1, rr2, rr3, rr4} + v.carryPropagate() +} + +// carryPropagateGeneric brings the limbs below 52 bits by applying the reduction +// identity (a * 2²⁵⁵ + b = a * 19 + b) to the l4 carry. TODO inline +func (v *Element) carryPropagateGeneric() *Element { + c0 := v.l0 >> 51 + c1 := v.l1 >> 51 + c2 := v.l2 >> 51 + c3 := v.l3 >> 51 + c4 := v.l4 >> 51 + + v.l0 = v.l0&maskLow51Bits + c4*19 + v.l1 = v.l1&maskLow51Bits + c0 + v.l2 = v.l2&maskLow51Bits + c1 + v.l3 = v.l3&maskLow51Bits + c2 + v.l4 = v.l4&maskLow51Bits + c3 + + return v +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e3685f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.checkpoint @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +b0c49ae9f59d233526f8934262c5bbbe14d4358d diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ba22a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field/sync.sh @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +#! /bin/bash +set -euo pipefail + +cd "$(git rev-parse --show-toplevel)" + +STD_PATH=src/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519/field +LOCAL_PATH=curve25519/internal/field +LAST_SYNC_REF=$(cat $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint) + +git fetch https://go.googlesource.com/go master + +if git diff --quiet $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH; then + echo "No changes." +else + NEW_REF=$(git rev-parse FETCH_HEAD | tee $LOCAL_PATH/sync.checkpoint) + echo "Applying changes from $LAST_SYNC_REF to $NEW_REF..." + git diff $LAST_SYNC_REF:$STD_PATH FETCH_HEAD:$STD_PATH | \ + git apply -3 --directory=$LOCAL_PATH +fi diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a782834 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/ed25519.go @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package ed25519 implements the Ed25519 signature algorithm. See +// https://ed25519.cr.yp.to/. +// +// These functions are also compatible with the “Ed25519” function defined in +// RFC 8032. However, unlike RFC 8032's formulation, this package's private key +// representation includes a public key suffix to make multiple signing +// operations with the same key more efficient. This package refers to the RFC +// 8032 private key as the “seed”. +// +// Beginning with Go 1.13, the functionality of this package was moved to the +// standard library as crypto/ed25519. This package only acts as a compatibility +// wrapper. +package ed25519 + +import ( + "crypto/ed25519" + "io" +) + +const ( + // PublicKeySize is the size, in bytes, of public keys as used in this package. + PublicKeySize = 32 + // PrivateKeySize is the size, in bytes, of private keys as used in this package. + PrivateKeySize = 64 + // SignatureSize is the size, in bytes, of signatures generated and verified by this package. + SignatureSize = 64 + // SeedSize is the size, in bytes, of private key seeds. These are the private key representations used by RFC 8032. + SeedSize = 32 +) + +// PublicKey is the type of Ed25519 public keys. +// +// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PublicKey type. +// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type. +type PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey + +// PrivateKey is the type of Ed25519 private keys. It implements crypto.Signer. +// +// This type is an alias for crypto/ed25519's PrivateKey type. +// See the crypto/ed25519 package for the methods on this type. +type PrivateKey = ed25519.PrivateKey + +// GenerateKey generates a public/private key pair using entropy from rand. +// If rand is nil, crypto/rand.Reader will be used. +func GenerateKey(rand io.Reader) (PublicKey, PrivateKey, error) { + return ed25519.GenerateKey(rand) +} + +// NewKeyFromSeed calculates a private key from a seed. It will panic if +// len(seed) is not SeedSize. This function is provided for interoperability +// with RFC 8032. RFC 8032's private keys correspond to seeds in this +// package. +func NewKeyFromSeed(seed []byte) PrivateKey { + return ed25519.NewKeyFromSeed(seed) +} + +// Sign signs the message with privateKey and returns a signature. It will +// panic if len(privateKey) is not PrivateKeySize. +func Sign(privateKey PrivateKey, message []byte) []byte { + return ed25519.Sign(privateKey, message) +} + +// Verify reports whether sig is a valid signature of message by publicKey. It +// will panic if len(publicKey) is not PublicKeySize. +func Verify(publicKey PublicKey, message, sig []byte) bool { + return ed25519.Verify(publicKey, message, sig) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69c17f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !purego +// +build !purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +import "unsafe" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1])) +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4775b0a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias/alias_purego.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build purego +// +build purego + +// Package alias implements memory aliasing tests. +package alias + +// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect +// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed. + +import "reflect" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() && + reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer() +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..45b5c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build !go1.13 +// +build !go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +// Generic fallbacks for the math/bits intrinsics, copied from +// src/math/bits/bits.go. They were added in Go 1.12, but Add64 and Sum64 had +// variable time fallbacks until Go 1.13. + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + sum = x + y + carry + carryOut = ((x & y) | ((x | y) &^ sum)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + diff = x - y - borrow + borrowOut = ((^x & y) | (^(x ^ y) & diff)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + const mask32 = 1<<32 - 1 + x0 := x & mask32 + x1 := x >> 32 + y0 := y & mask32 + y1 := y >> 32 + w0 := x0 * y0 + t := x1*y0 + w0>>32 + w1 := t & mask32 + w2 := t >> 32 + w1 += x0 * y1 + hi = x1*y1 + w2 + w1>>32 + lo = x * y + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed52b34 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build go1.13 +// +build go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +import "math/bits" + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + return bits.Add64(x, y, carry) +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + return bits.Sub64(x, y, borrow) +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + return bits.Mul64(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f184b67 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/mac_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build (!amd64 && !ppc64le && !s390x) || !gc || purego +// +build !amd64,!ppc64le,!s390x !gc purego + +package poly1305 + +type mac struct{ macGeneric } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4aaea81 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as +// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. +// +// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an +// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a +// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different +// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other +// messages with the same key. +// +// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was +// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. +// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified +// directly. +package poly1305 + +import "crypto/subtle" + +// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. +const TagSize = 16 + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := New(key) + h.Write(m) + h.Sum(out[:0]) +} + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. +func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { + var tmp [16]byte + Sum(&tmp, m, key) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 +} + +// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication +// tag of all data written to it with the given key. +// This allows writing the message progressively instead +// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use +// the Sum function instead. +// +// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating +// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker +// to forge messages at will. +func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC { + m := &MAC{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag +// of the data written to it. +// +// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations, +// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security. +// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling +// Sum or Verify causes it to panic. +type MAC struct { + mac // platform-dependent implementation + + finalized bool +} + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize } + +// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code. +// It never returns an error. +// +// It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify. +func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if h.finalized { + panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify") + } + return h.mac.Write(p) +} + +// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the +// message authentication code. +func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return append(b, mac[:]...) +} + +// Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to +// the message authentication code matches the expected value. +func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6d52233 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d74f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \ + ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \ + ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \ + ADCQ $1, h2; \ + LEAQ 16(msg), msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + MOVQ AX, t0; \ + MOVQ DX, t1; \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ r0, t2; \ + IMULQ h2, t2; \ + ADDQ DX, t2; \ + \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ DX, h0; \ + MOVQ r1, t3; \ + IMULQ h2, t3; \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t2; \ + ADCQ DX, t3; \ + ADDQ h0, t2; \ + ADCQ $0, t3; \ + \ + MOVQ t0, h0; \ + MOVQ t1, h1; \ + MOVQ t2, h2; \ + ANDQ $3, h2; \ + MOVQ t2, t0; \ + ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \ + ADDQ t0, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3; \ + ADDQ t2, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVQ state+0(FP), DI + MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI + MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15 + + MOVQ 0(DI), R8 // h0 + MOVQ 8(DI), R9 // h1 + MOVQ 16(DI), R10 // h2 + MOVQ 24(DI), R11 // r0 + MOVQ 32(DI), R12 // r1 + + CMPQ R15, $16 + JB bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14) + SUBQ $16, R15 + CMPQ R15, $16 + JAE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + TESTQ R15, R15 + JZ done + MOVQ $1, BX + XORQ CX, CX + XORQ R13, R13 + ADDQ R15, SI + +flush_buffer: + SHLQ $8, BX, CX + SHLQ $8, BX + MOVB -1(SI), R13 + XORQ R13, BX + DECQ SI + DECQ R15 + JNZ flush_buffer + + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ CX, R9 + ADCQ $0, R10 + MOVQ $16, R15 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVQ R8, 0(DI) + MOVQ R9, 8(DI) + MOVQ R10, 16(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e041da5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,309 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files +// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code. + +package poly1305 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag +// for a 64 bytes message is approximately +// +// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like +// +// for len(msg) > 0: +// h += read(msg, 16) +// h *= r +// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// return h + s +// +// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers +// larger than any available numeric type. + +func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMACGeneric(key) + h.Write(msg) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) macGeneric { + m := macGeneric{} + initialize(key, &m.macState) + return m +} + +// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is, +// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸. +type macState struct { + // h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but + // can grow larger during and after rounds. It must, however, remain below + // 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). + h [3]uint64 + // r and s are the private key components. + r [2]uint64 + s [2]uint64 +} + +type macGeneric struct { + macState + + buffer [TagSize]byte + offset int +} + +// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to +// update. It buffers incomplete chunks. +func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates +// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple +// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum. +func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} + +// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It +// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement +// multiplication more efficiently. +const ( + rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF + rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +) + +// initialize loads the 256-bit key into the two 128-bit secret values r and s. +func initialize(key *[32]byte, m *macState) { + m.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0 + m.r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1 + m.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24]) + m.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32]) +} + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 { + lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0) + hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c) + if c != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 { + a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62 + a.hi = a.hi >> 2 + return a +} + +// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of +// 128 bits of message, it computes +// +// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last +// incomplete chunk is the final one. +func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) { + h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] + r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1] + + for len(msg) > 0 { + var c uint64 + + // For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics. + // The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially + // reduced at the end of the multiplication below. + // + // The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to + // hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just + // add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2. + if len(msg) >= TagSize { + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + 1 + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } else { + var buf [TagSize]byte + copy(buf[:], msg) + buf[len(msg)] = 1 + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + + msg = nil + } + + // Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school + // columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs. + // + // We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r. + // + // h2 h1 h0 x + // r1 r0 = + // ---------------- + // h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products + // + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1 + // ------------------------ + // m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs + // ------------------------ + // m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation + // + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo + // ------------------------------- + // t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs + // + // The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do + // carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums + // at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once. + + h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0) + h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0) + h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0) + h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1) + h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1) + h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1) + + // Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their + // top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going + // to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products. + // + // This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4). + if h2r0.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + if h2r1.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + + m0 := h0r0 + m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again + m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1. + m3 := h2r1 + + t0 := m0.lo + t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0) + t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c) + t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c) + + // Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it + // modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do + // a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity + // + // c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 + // + // because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is + // likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the + // assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code. + // + // See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23 + + // We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry. + // Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other + // words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity. + h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits + cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3} + + // To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c. + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + cc = shiftRightBy2(cc) + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + // h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most + // + // 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1 + } + + state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2 +} + +const ( + maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003 + maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits +) + +// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time. +func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y } + +// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order. +const ( + p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB + p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + p2 = 0x0000000000000003 +) + +// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes +// +// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ +func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) { + h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2] + + // After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than + // 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction + // in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the + // result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise. + + hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0) + hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b) + _, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b) + + // h = h if h < p else h - p + h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0) + h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1) + + // Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step + // + // tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ + // + // by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding + // the overflow. + h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0) + h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a06994 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..58422aa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This was ported from the amd64 implementation. + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \ + MOVD (msg), t0; \ + MOVD 8(msg), t1; \ + MOVD $1, t2; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t1, h1, h1; \ + ADDE t2, h2; \ + ADD $16, msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \ + MULLD r0, h0, t0; \ + MULLD r0, h1, t4; \ + MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \ + MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \ + ADDC t4, t1, t1; \ + MULLD r0, h2, t2; \ + ADDZE t5; \ + MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \ + MULLD r1, h0, h0; \ + ADD t5, t2, t2; \ + ADDC h0, t1, t1; \ + MULLD h2, r1, t3; \ + ADDZE t4, h0; \ + MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \ + MULLD r1, h1, t4; \ + ADDC t4, t2, t2; \ + ADDE t5, t3, t3; \ + ADDC h0, t2, t2; \ + MOVD $-4, t4; \ + MOVD t0, h0; \ + MOVD t1, h1; \ + ADDZE t3; \ + ANDCC $3, t2, h2; \ + AND t2, t4, t0; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + SLD $62, t3, t4; \ + SRD $2, t2; \ + ADDZE h2; \ + OR t4, t2, t2; \ + SRD $2, t3; \ + ADDC t2, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + ADDZE h2 + +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVD state+0(FP), R3 + MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4 + MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5 + + MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0 + MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1 + MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2 + MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0 + MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1 + + CMP R5, $16 + BLT bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21) + ADD $-16, R5 + CMP R5, $16 + BGE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ done + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R17 // h1 + +flush_buffer: + CMP R5, $8 + BLE just1 + + MOVD $8, R21 + SUB R21, R5, R21 + + // Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg + // and put into R17 (h1) + MOVD (R4)(R21), R17 + MOVD $16, R22 + + // Find the offset to those bytes + SUB R5, R22, R22 + SLD $3, R22 + + // Shift to get only the bytes in msg + SRD R22, R17, R17 + + // Put 1 at high end + MOVD $1, R23 + SLD $3, R21 + SLD R21, R23, R23 + OR R23, R17, R17 + + // Remainder is 8 + MOVD $8, R5 + +just1: + CMP R5, $8 + BLT less8 + + // Exactly 8 + MOVD (R4), R16 + + CMP R17, $0 + + // Check if we've already set R17; if not + // set 1 to indicate end of msg. + BNE carry + MOVD $1, R17 + BR carry + +less8: + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R22 // shift count + CMP R5, $4 + BLT less4 + MOVWZ (R4), R16 + ADD $4, R4 + ADD $-4, R5 + MOVD $32, R22 + +less4: + CMP R5, $2 + BLT less2 + MOVHZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $16, R22 + ADD $-2, R5 + ADD $2, R4 + +less2: + CMP R5, $0 + BEQ insert1 + MOVBZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $8, R22 + +insert1: + // Insert 1 at end of msg + MOVD $1, R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + +carry: + // Add new values to h0, h1, h2 + ADDC R16, R8 + ADDE R17, R9 + ADDZE R10, R10 + MOVD $16, R5 + ADD R5, R4 + BR multiply + +done: + // Save h0, h1, h2 in state + MOVD R8, 0(R3) + MOVD R9, 8(R3) + MOVD R10, 16(R3) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ec95966 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +package poly1305 + +import ( + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +// updateVX is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available. +// +//go:noescape +func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) + +// mac is a replacement for macGeneric that uses a larger buffer and redirects +// calls that would have gone to updateGeneric to updateVX if the vector +// facility is installed. +// +// A larger buffer is required for good performance because the vector +// implementation has a higher fixed cost per call than the generic +// implementation. +type mac struct { + macState + + buffer [16 * TagSize]byte // size must be a multiple of block size (16) + offset int +} + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < len(h.buffer) { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + } + + tail := len(p) % len(h.buffer) // number of bytes to copy into buffer + body := len(p) - tail // number of bytes to process now + if body > 0 { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + updateVX(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } else { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:body]) + } + } + h.offset = copy(h.buffer[:], p[body:]) // copy tail bytes - can be 0 + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + remainder := h.buffer[:h.offset] + + // Use the generic implementation if we have 2 or fewer blocks left + // to sum. The vector implementation has a higher startup time. + if cpu.S390X.HasVX && len(remainder) > 2*TagSize { + updateVX(&state, remainder) + } else if len(remainder) > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, remainder) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa9e049 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305/sum_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +//go:build gc && !purego +// +build gc,!purego + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This implementation of Poly1305 uses the vector facility (vx) +// to process up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration using an +// algorithm based on the one described in: +// +// NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe +// https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf +// +// This algorithm uses 5 26-bit limbs to represent a 130-bit +// value. These limbs are, for the most part, zero extended and +// placed into 64-bit vector register elements. Each vector +// register is 128-bits wide and so holds 2 of these elements. +// Using 26-bit limbs allows us plenty of headroom to accommodate +// accumulations before and after multiplication without +// overflowing either 32-bits (before multiplication) or 64-bits +// (after multiplication). +// +// In order to parallelise the operations required to calculate +// the sum we use two separate accumulators and then sum those +// in an extra final step. For compatibility with the generic +// implementation we perform this summation at the end of every +// updateVX call. +// +// To use two accumulators we must multiply the message blocks +// by r² rather than r. Only the final message block should be +// multiplied by r. +// +// Example: +// +// We want to calculate the sum (h) for a 64 byte message (m): +// +// h = m[0:16]r⁴ + m[16:32]r³ + m[32:48]r² + m[48:64]r +// +// To do this we split the calculation into the even indices +// and odd indices of the message. These form our SIMD 'lanes': +// +// h = m[ 0:16]r⁴ + m[32:48]r² + <- lane 0 +// m[16:32]r³ + m[48:64]r <- lane 1 +// +// To calculate this iteratively we refactor so that both lanes +// are written in terms of r² and r: +// +// h = (m[ 0:16]r² + m[32:48])r² + <- lane 0 +// (m[16:32]r² + m[48:64])r <- lane 1 +// ^ ^ +// | coefficients for second iteration +// coefficients for first iteration +// +// So in this case we would have two iterations. In the first +// both lanes are multiplied by r². In the second only the +// first lane is multiplied by r² and the second lane is +// instead multiplied by r. This gives use the odd and even +// powers of r that we need from the original equation. +// +// Notation: +// +// h - accumulator +// r - key +// m - message +// +// [a, b] - SIMD register holding two 64-bit values +// [a, b, c, d] - SIMD register holding four 32-bit values +// xᵢ[n] - limb n of variable x with bit width i +// +// Limbs are expressed in little endian order, so for 26-bit +// limbs x₂₆[4] will be the most significant limb and x₂₆[0] +// will be the least significant limb. + +// masking constants +#define MOD24 V0 // [0x0000000000ffffff, 0x0000000000ffffff] - mask low 24-bits +#define MOD26 V1 // [0x0000000003ffffff, 0x0000000003ffffff] - mask low 26-bits + +// expansion constants (see EXPAND macro) +#define EX0 V2 +#define EX1 V3 +#define EX2 V4 + +// key (r², r or 1 depending on context) +#define R_0 V5 +#define R_1 V6 +#define R_2 V7 +#define R_3 V8 +#define R_4 V9 + +// precalculated coefficients (5r², 5r or 0 depending on context) +#define R5_1 V10 +#define R5_2 V11 +#define R5_3 V12 +#define R5_4 V13 + +// message block (m) +#define M_0 V14 +#define M_1 V15 +#define M_2 V16 +#define M_3 V17 +#define M_4 V18 + +// accumulator (h) +#define H_0 V19 +#define H_1 V20 +#define H_2 V21 +#define H_3 V22 +#define H_4 V23 + +// temporary registers (for short-lived values) +#define T_0 V24 +#define T_1 V25 +#define T_2 V26 +#define T_3 V27 +#define T_4 V28 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $0x30 +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706 +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d +DATA ·constants<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d + +// MULTIPLY multiplies each lane of f and g, partially reduced +// modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The result, h, consists of partial products +// in each lane that need to be reduced further to produce the +// final result. +// +// h₁₃₀ = (f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) % 2¹³⁰ + (5f₁₃₀g₁₃₀) / 2¹³⁰ +// +// Note that the multiplication by 5 of the high bits is +// achieved by precalculating the multiplication of four of the +// g coefficients by 5. These are g51-g54. +#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \ + VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \ + VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \ + VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \ + VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \ + VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \ + VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \ + VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \ + VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \ + VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \ + VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \ + VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \ + VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \ + VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \ + VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \ + VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_0, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_3, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_4, h4, h4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 + +// REDUCE performs the following carry operations in four +// stages, as specified in Bernstein & Schwabe: +// +// 1: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// 2: h₂₆[1]->h₂₆[2] h₂₆[4]->h₂₆[0] +// 3: h₂₆[0]->h₂₆[1] h₂₆[2]->h₂₆[3] +// 4: h₂₆[3]->h₂₆[4] +// +// The result is that all of the limbs are limited to 26-bits +// except for h₂₆[1] and h₂₆[4] which are limited to 27-bits. +// +// Note that although each limb is aligned at 26-bit intervals +// they may contain values that exceed 2²⁶ - 1, hence the need +// to carry the excess bits in each limb. +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_0, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_1, h4, h4 \ + VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \ + VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \ + VN MOD26, h1, h1 \ + VN MOD26, h4, h4 \ + VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \ + VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_4, h0, h0 \ + VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h2, h2 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_0, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_2, h4, h4 + +// EXPAND splits the 128-bit little-endian values in0 and in1 +// into 26-bit big-endian limbs and places the results into +// the first and second lane of d₂₆[0:4] respectively. +// +// The EX0, EX1 and EX2 constants are arrays of byte indices +// for permutation. The permutation both reverses the bytes +// in the input and ensures the bytes are copied into the +// destination limb ready to be shifted into their final +// position. +#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \ + VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \ + VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d0, d0 \ // [in0₂₆[0], in1₂₆[0]] + VN MOD26, d3, d3 \ // [in0₂₆[3], in1₂₆[3]] + VN MOD26, d1, d1 \ // [in0₂₆[1], in1₂₆[1]] + VN MOD24, d4, d4 \ // [in0₂₆[4], in1₂₆[4]] + VN MOD26, d2, d2 // [in0₂₆[2], in1₂₆[2]] + +// func updateVX(state *macState, msg []byte) +TEXT ·updateVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD state+0(FP), R1 + LMG msg+8(FP), R2, R3 // R2=msg_base, R3=msg_len + + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + // generate masks + VGMG $(64-24), $63, MOD24 // [0x00ffffff, 0x00ffffff] + VGMG $(64-26), $63, MOD26 // [0x03ffffff, 0x03ffffff] + + // load h (accumulator) and r (key) from state + VZERO T_1 // [0, 0] + VL 0(R1), T_0 // [h₆₄[0], h₆₄[1]] + VLEG $0, 16(R1), T_1 // [h₆₄[2], 0] + VL 24(R1), T_2 // [r₆₄[0], r₆₄[1]] + VPDI $0, T_0, T_2, T_3 // [h₆₄[0], r₆₄[0]] + VPDI $5, T_0, T_2, T_4 // [h₆₄[1], r₆₄[1]] + + // unpack h and r into 26-bit limbs + // note: h₆₄[2] may have the low 3 bits set, so h₂₆[4] is a 27-bit value + VN MOD26, T_3, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VZERO H_1 // [0, 0] + VZERO H_3 // [0, 0] + VGMG $(64-12-14), $(63-12), T_0 // [0x03fff000, 0x03fff000] - 26-bit mask with low 12 bits masked out + VESLG $24, T_1, T_1 // [h₆₄[2]<<24, 0] + VERIMG $-26&63, T_3, MOD26, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $+52&63, T_3, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - low 12 bits only + VERIMG $-14&63, T_4, MOD26, H_3 // [h₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VESRLG $40, T_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - low 24 bits only + VERIMG $+12&63, T_4, T_0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] - complete + VO T_1, H_4, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] - complete + + // replicate r across all 4 vector elements + VREPF $3, H_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r₂₆[0]] + VREPF $3, H_1, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r₂₆[1]] + VREPF $3, H_2, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r₂₆[2]] + VREPF $3, H_3, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r₂₆[3]] + VREPF $3, H_4, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r₂₆[4]] + + // zero out lane 1 of h + VLEIG $1, $0, H_0 // [h₂₆[0], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_1 // [h₂₆[1], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_2 // [h₂₆[2], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_3 // [h₂₆[3], 0] + VLEIG $1, $0, H_4 // [h₂₆[4], 0] + + // calculate 5r (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4]] + + // skip r² calculation if we are only calculating one block + CMPBLE R3, $16, skip + + // calculate r² + MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + REDUCE(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + VGBM $0x0f0f, T_0 + VERIMG $0, M_0, T_0, R_0 // [r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0], r₂₆[0], r²₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $0, M_1, T_0, R_1 // [r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1], r₂₆[1], r²₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $0, M_2, T_0, R_2 // [r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2], r₂₆[2], r²₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $0, M_3, T_0, R_3 // [r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3], r₂₆[3], r²₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $0, M_4, T_0, R_4 // [r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4], r₂₆[4], r²₂₆[4]] + + // calculate 5r² (ignore least significant limb) + VREPIF $5, T_0 + VMLF T_0, R_1, R5_1 // [5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1], 5r₂₆[1], 5r²₂₆[1]] + VMLF T_0, R_2, R5_2 // [5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2], 5r₂₆[2], 5r²₂₆[2]] + VMLF T_0, R_3, R5_3 // [5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3], 5r₂₆[3], 5r²₂₆[3]] + VMLF T_0, R_4, R5_4 // [5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4], 5r₂₆[4], 5r²₂₆[4]] + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 // 2 or fewer blocks remaining, need to change key coefficients + + // load next 2 blocks from message + VLM (R2), T_0, T_1 + + // update message slice + SUB $32, R3 + MOVD $32(R2), R2 + + // unpack message blocks into 26-bit big-endian limbs + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // add 2¹²⁸ to each message block value + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + +multiply: + // accumulate the incoming message + VAG H_0, M_0, M_0 + VAG H_3, M_3, M_3 + VAG H_1, M_1, M_1 + VAG H_4, M_4, M_4 + VAG H_2, M_2, M_2 + + // multiply the accumulator by the key coefficient + MULTIPLY(M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry and partially reduce the partial products + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + +finish: + // sum lane 0 and lane 1 and put the result in lane 1 + VZERO T_0 + VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0 + VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3 + VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1 + VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4 + VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2 + + // reduce again after summation + // TODO(mundaym): there might be a more efficient way to do this + // now that we only have 1 active lane. For example, we could + // simultaneously pack the values as we reduce them. + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry h[1] through to h[4] so that only h[4] can exceed 2²⁶ - 1 + // TODO(mundaym): in testing this final carry was unnecessary. + // Needs a proof before it can be removed though. + VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1 + VN MOD26, H_1, H_1 + VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2 + VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2 + VN MOD26, H_2, H_2 + VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3 + VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3 + VN MOD26, H_3, H_3 + VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4 + + // h is now < 2(2¹³⁰ - 5) + // Pack each lane in h₂₆[0:4] into h₁₂₈[0:1]. + VESLG $26, H_1, H_1 + VESLG $26, H_3, H_3 + VO H_0, H_1, H_0 + VO H_2, H_3, H_2 + VESLG $4, H_2, H_2 + VLEIB $7, $48, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_2, H_2 + VO H_0, H_2, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $104, H_1 + VSLB H_1, H_4, H_3 + VO H_3, H_0, H_0 + VLEIB $7, $24, H_1 + VSRLB H_1, H_4, H_1 + + // update state + VSTEG $1, H_0, 0(R1) + VSTEG $0, H_0, 8(R1) + VSTEG $1, H_1, 16(R1) + RET + +b2: // 2 or fewer blocks remaining + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // Load the 2 remaining blocks (17-32 bytes remaining). + MOVD $-17(R3), R0 // index of final byte to load modulo 16 + VL (R2), T_0 // load full 16 byte block + VLL R0, 16(R2), T_1 // load final (possibly partial) block and pad with zeros to 16 bytes + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + MOVD $-16(R3), R3 // index of byte in last block to insert 1 at (could be 16) + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) // skip the insertion if the final block is 16 bytes long + VLVGB R3, R0, T_1 // insert 1 into the byte at index R3 + + // Split both blocks into 26-bit limbs in the appropriate lanes. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the second to last block. + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $12, $1, M_4 + + // Finally, set up the coefficients for the final multiplication. + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r² so that can be kept the + // same. We want lane 1 to be multiplied by r so we need to move + // the saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 1 by + // rotating the 64-bit lane by 32. + VGBM $0x00ff, T_0 // [0, 0xffffffffffffffff] - mask lane 1 only + VERIMG $32, R_0, T_0, R_0 // [_, r²₂₆[0], _, r₂₆[0]] + VERIMG $32, R_1, T_0, R_1 // [_, r²₂₆[1], _, r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R_2, T_0, R_2 // [_, r²₂₆[2], _, r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R_3, T_0, R_3 // [_, r²₂₆[3], _, r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R_4, T_0, R_4 // [_, r²₂₆[4], _, r₂₆[4]] + VERIMG $32, R5_1, T_0, R5_1 // [_, 5r²₂₆[1], _, 5r₂₆[1]] + VERIMG $32, R5_2, T_0, R5_2 // [_, 5r²₂₆[2], _, 5r₂₆[2]] + VERIMG $32, R5_3, T_0, R5_3 // [_, 5r²₂₆[3], _, 5r₂₆[3]] + VERIMG $32, R5_4, T_0, R5_4 // [_, 5r²₂₆[4], _, 5r₂₆[4]] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +skip: + CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish + +b1: // 1 block remaining + + // Load the final block (1-16 bytes). This will be placed into + // lane 0. + MOVD $-1(R3), R0 + VLL R0, (R2), T_0 // pad to 16 bytes with zeros + + // The Poly1305 algorithm requires that a 1 bit be appended to + // each message block. If the final block is less than 16 bytes + // long then it is easiest to insert the 1 before the message + // block is split into 26-bit limbs. If, on the other hand, the + // final message block is 16 bytes long then we append the 1 bit + // after expansion as normal. + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_0 + + // Set the message block in lane 1 to the value 0 so that it + // can be accumulated without affecting the final result. + VZERO T_1 + + // Split the final message block into 26-bit limbs in lane 0. + // Lane 1 will be contain 0. + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, M_0, M_1, M_2, M_3, M_4) + + // Append a 1 byte to the end of the last block only if it is a + // full 16 byte block. + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $4, $1, M_4 + + // We have previously saved r and 5r in the 32-bit even indexes + // of the R_[0-4] and R5_[1-4] coefficient registers. + // + // We want lane 0 to be multiplied by r so we need to move the + // saved r value into the 32-bit odd index in lane 0. We want + // lane 1 to be set to the value 1. This makes multiplication + // a no-op. We do this by setting lane 1 in every register to 0 + // and then just setting the 32-bit index 3 in R_0 to 1. + VZERO T_0 + MOVD $0, R0 + MOVD $0x10111213, R12 + VLVGP R12, R0, T_1 // [_, 0x10111213, _, 0x00000000] + VPERM T_0, R_0, T_1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_1, T_1, R_1 // [_, r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_2, T_1, R_2 // [_, r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_3, T_1, R_3 // [_, r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R_4, T_1, R_4 // [_, r₂₆[4], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_1, T_1, R5_1 // [_, 5r₂₆[1], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_2, T_1, R5_2 // [_, 5r₂₆[2], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_3, T_1, R5_3 // [_, 5r₂₆[3], _, 0] + VPERM T_0, R5_4, T_1, R5_4 // [_, 5r₂₆[4], _, 0] + + // Set the value of lane 1 to be 1. + VLEIF $3, $1, R_0 // [_, r₂₆[0], _, 1] + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf3eeb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160.go @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package ripemd160 implements the RIPEMD-160 hash algorithm. +// +// Deprecated: RIPEMD-160 is a legacy hash and should not be used for new +// applications. Also, this package does not and will not provide an optimized +// implementation. Instead, use a modern hash like SHA-256 (from crypto/sha256). +package ripemd160 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160" + +// RIPEMD-160 is designed by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, and Bart +// Preneel with specifications available at: +// http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~cosicart/pdf/AB-9601/AB-9601.pdf. + +import ( + "crypto" + "hash" +) + +func init() { + crypto.RegisterHash(crypto.RIPEMD160, New) +} + +// The size of the checksum in bytes. +const Size = 20 + +// The block size of the hash algorithm in bytes. +const BlockSize = 64 + +const ( + _s0 = 0x67452301 + _s1 = 0xefcdab89 + _s2 = 0x98badcfe + _s3 = 0x10325476 + _s4 = 0xc3d2e1f0 +) + +// digest represents the partial evaluation of a checksum. +type digest struct { + s [5]uint32 // running context + x [BlockSize]byte // temporary buffer + nx int // index into x + tc uint64 // total count of bytes processed +} + +func (d *digest) Reset() { + d.s[0], d.s[1], d.s[2], d.s[3], d.s[4] = _s0, _s1, _s2, _s3, _s4 + d.nx = 0 + d.tc = 0 +} + +// New returns a new hash.Hash computing the checksum. +func New() hash.Hash { + result := new(digest) + result.Reset() + return result +} + +func (d *digest) Size() int { return Size } + +func (d *digest) BlockSize() int { return BlockSize } + +func (d *digest) Write(p []byte) (nn int, err error) { + nn = len(p) + d.tc += uint64(nn) + if d.nx > 0 { + n := len(p) + if n > BlockSize-d.nx { + n = BlockSize - d.nx + } + for i := 0; i < n; i++ { + d.x[d.nx+i] = p[i] + } + d.nx += n + if d.nx == BlockSize { + _Block(d, d.x[0:]) + d.nx = 0 + } + p = p[n:] + } + n := _Block(d, p) + p = p[n:] + if len(p) > 0 { + d.nx = copy(d.x[:], p) + } + return +} + +func (d0 *digest) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + // Make a copy of d0 so that caller can keep writing and summing. + d := *d0 + + // Padding. Add a 1 bit and 0 bits until 56 bytes mod 64. + tc := d.tc + var tmp [64]byte + tmp[0] = 0x80 + if tc%64 < 56 { + d.Write(tmp[0 : 56-tc%64]) + } else { + d.Write(tmp[0 : 64+56-tc%64]) + } + + // Length in bits. + tc <<= 3 + for i := uint(0); i < 8; i++ { + tmp[i] = byte(tc >> (8 * i)) + } + d.Write(tmp[0:8]) + + if d.nx != 0 { + panic("d.nx != 0") + } + + var digest [Size]byte + for i, s := range d.s { + digest[i*4] = byte(s) + digest[i*4+1] = byte(s >> 8) + digest[i*4+2] = byte(s >> 16) + digest[i*4+3] = byte(s >> 24) + } + + return append(in, digest[:]...) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e0edc02 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160/ripemd160block.go @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +// Copyright 2010 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// RIPEMD-160 block step. +// In its own file so that a faster assembly or C version +// can be substituted easily. + +package ripemd160 + +import ( + "math/bits" +) + +// work buffer indices and roll amounts for one line +var _n = [80]uint{ + 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, + 7, 4, 13, 1, 10, 6, 15, 3, 12, 0, 9, 5, 2, 14, 11, 8, + 3, 10, 14, 4, 9, 15, 8, 1, 2, 7, 0, 6, 13, 11, 5, 12, + 1, 9, 11, 10, 0, 8, 12, 4, 13, 3, 7, 15, 14, 5, 6, 2, + 4, 0, 5, 9, 7, 12, 2, 10, 14, 1, 3, 8, 11, 6, 15, 13, +} + +var _r = [80]uint{ + 11, 14, 15, 12, 5, 8, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 6, 7, 9, 8, + 7, 6, 8, 13, 11, 9, 7, 15, 7, 12, 15, 9, 11, 7, 13, 12, + 11, 13, 6, 7, 14, 9, 13, 15, 14, 8, 13, 6, 5, 12, 7, 5, + 11, 12, 14, 15, 14, 15, 9, 8, 9, 14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5, 12, + 9, 15, 5, 11, 6, 8, 13, 12, 5, 12, 13, 14, 11, 8, 5, 6, +} + +// same for the other parallel one +var n_ = [80]uint{ + 5, 14, 7, 0, 9, 2, 11, 4, 13, 6, 15, 8, 1, 10, 3, 12, + 6, 11, 3, 7, 0, 13, 5, 10, 14, 15, 8, 12, 4, 9, 1, 2, + 15, 5, 1, 3, 7, 14, 6, 9, 11, 8, 12, 2, 10, 0, 4, 13, + 8, 6, 4, 1, 3, 11, 15, 0, 5, 12, 2, 13, 9, 7, 10, 14, + 12, 15, 10, 4, 1, 5, 8, 7, 6, 2, 13, 14, 0, 3, 9, 11, +} + +var r_ = [80]uint{ + 8, 9, 9, 11, 13, 15, 15, 5, 7, 7, 8, 11, 14, 14, 12, 6, + 9, 13, 15, 7, 12, 8, 9, 11, 7, 7, 12, 7, 6, 15, 13, 11, + 9, 7, 15, 11, 8, 6, 6, 14, 12, 13, 5, 14, 13, 13, 7, 5, + 15, 5, 8, 11, 14, 14, 6, 14, 6, 9, 12, 9, 12, 5, 15, 8, + 8, 5, 12, 9, 12, 5, 14, 6, 8, 13, 6, 5, 15, 13, 11, 11, +} + +func _Block(md *digest, p []byte) int { + n := 0 + var x [16]uint32 + var alpha, beta uint32 + for len(p) >= BlockSize { + a, b, c, d, e := md.s[0], md.s[1], md.s[2], md.s[3], md.s[4] + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee := a, b, c, d, e + j := 0 + for i := 0; i < 16; i++ { + x[i] = uint32(p[j]) | uint32(p[j+1])<<8 | uint32(p[j+2])<<16 | uint32(p[j+3])<<24 + j += 4 + } + + // round 1 + i := 0 + for i < 16 { + alpha = a + (b ^ c ^ d) + x[_n[i]] + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb ^ (cc | ^dd)) + x[n_[i]] + 0x50a28be6 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 2 + for i < 32 { + alpha = a + (b&c | ^b&d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x5a827999 + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb&dd | cc&^dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x5c4dd124 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 3 + for i < 48 { + alpha = a + (b | ^c ^ d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x6ed9eba1 + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb | ^cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x6d703ef3 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 4 + for i < 64 { + alpha = a + (b&d | c&^d) + x[_n[i]] + 0x8f1bbcdc + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb&cc | ^bb&dd) + x[n_[i]] + 0x7a6d76e9 + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // round 5 + for i < 80 { + alpha = a + (b ^ (c | ^d)) + x[_n[i]] + 0xa953fd4e + s := int(_r[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + e + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(c, 10) + a, b, c, d, e = e, alpha, b, beta, d + + // parallel line + alpha = aa + (bb ^ cc ^ dd) + x[n_[i]] + s = int(r_[i]) + alpha = bits.RotateLeft32(alpha, s) + ee + beta = bits.RotateLeft32(cc, 10) + aa, bb, cc, dd, ee = ee, alpha, bb, beta, dd + + i++ + } + + // combine results + dd += c + md.s[1] + md.s[1] = md.s[2] + d + ee + md.s[2] = md.s[3] + e + aa + md.s[3] = md.s[4] + a + bb + md.s[4] = md.s[0] + b + cc + md.s[0] = dd + + p = p[BlockSize:] + n += BlockSize + } + return n +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f09aae --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,849 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package agent implements the ssh-agent protocol, and provides both +// a client and a server. The client can talk to a standard ssh-agent +// that uses UNIX sockets, and one could implement an alternative +// ssh-agent process using the sample server. +// +// References: +// +// [PROTOCOL.agent]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-00 +package agent // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent" + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "sync" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// SignatureFlags represent additional flags that can be passed to the signature +// requests an defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1. +type SignatureFlags uint32 + +// SignatureFlag values as defined in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 5.3. +const ( + SignatureFlagReserved SignatureFlags = 1 << iota + SignatureFlagRsaSha256 + SignatureFlagRsaSha512 +) + +// Agent represents the capabilities of an ssh-agent. +type Agent interface { + // List returns the identities known to the agent. + List() ([]*Key, error) + + // Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined + // in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.6.2. + Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) + + // Add adds a private key to the agent. + Add(key AddedKey) error + + // Remove removes all identities with the given public key. + Remove(key ssh.PublicKey) error + + // RemoveAll removes all identities. + RemoveAll() error + + // Lock locks the agent. Sign and Remove will fail, and List will empty an empty list. + Lock(passphrase []byte) error + + // Unlock undoes the effect of Lock + Unlock(passphrase []byte) error + + // Signers returns signers for all the known keys. + Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error) +} + +type ExtendedAgent interface { + Agent + + // SignWithFlags signs like Sign, but allows for additional flags to be sent/received + SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) + + // Extension processes a custom extension request. Standard-compliant agents are not + // required to support any extensions, but this method allows agents to implement + // vendor-specific methods or add experimental features. See [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7. + // If agent extensions are unsupported entirely this method MUST return an + // ErrExtensionUnsupported error. Similarly, if just the specific extensionType in + // the request is unsupported by the agent then ErrExtensionUnsupported MUST be + // returned. + // + // In the case of success, since [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 specifies that the contents + // of the response are unspecified (including the type of the message), the complete + // response will be returned as a []byte slice, including the "type" byte of the message. + Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) +} + +// ConstraintExtension describes an optional constraint defined by users. +type ConstraintExtension struct { + // ExtensionName consist of a UTF-8 string suffixed by the + // implementation domain following the naming scheme defined + // in Section 4.2 of RFC 4251, e.g. "foo@example.com". + ExtensionName string + // ExtensionDetails contains the actual content of the extended + // constraint. + ExtensionDetails []byte +} + +// AddedKey describes an SSH key to be added to an Agent. +type AddedKey struct { + // PrivateKey must be a *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey, + // ed25519.PrivateKey or *ecdsa.PrivateKey, which will be inserted into the + // agent. + PrivateKey interface{} + // Certificate, if not nil, is communicated to the agent and will be + // stored with the key. + Certificate *ssh.Certificate + // Comment is an optional, free-form string. + Comment string + // LifetimeSecs, if not zero, is the number of seconds that the + // agent will store the key for. + LifetimeSecs uint32 + // ConfirmBeforeUse, if true, requests that the agent confirm with the + // user before each use of this key. + ConfirmBeforeUse bool + // ConstraintExtensions are the experimental or private-use constraints + // defined by users. + ConstraintExtensions []ConstraintExtension +} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 3. +const ( + agentRequestV1Identities = 1 + agentRemoveAllV1Identities = 9 + + // 3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations + agentAddIdentity = 17 + agentRemoveIdentity = 18 + agentRemoveAllIdentities = 19 + agentAddIDConstrained = 25 + + // 3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent + agentAddSmartcardKey = 20 + agentRemoveSmartcardKey = 21 + agentLock = 22 + agentUnlock = 23 + agentAddSmartcardKeyConstrained = 26 + + // 3.7 Key constraint identifiers + agentConstrainLifetime = 1 + agentConstrainConfirm = 2 + agentConstrainExtension = 3 +) + +// maxAgentResponseBytes is the maximum agent reply size that is accepted. This +// is a sanity check, not a limit in the spec. +const maxAgentResponseBytes = 16 << 20 + +// Agent messages: +// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding ssh agent +// messages found in [PROTOCOL.agent]. + +// 3.4 Generic replies from agent to client +const agentFailure = 5 + +type failureAgentMsg struct{} + +const agentSuccess = 6 + +type successAgentMsg struct{} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2. +const agentRequestIdentities = 11 + +type requestIdentitiesAgentMsg struct{} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2. +const agentIdentitiesAnswer = 12 + +type identitiesAnswerAgentMsg struct { + NumKeys uint32 `sshtype:"12"` + Keys []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.6.2. +const agentSignRequest = 13 + +type signRequestAgentMsg struct { + KeyBlob []byte `sshtype:"13"` + Data []byte + Flags uint32 +} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.6.2. + +// 3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations +const agentSignResponse = 14 + +type signResponseAgentMsg struct { + SigBlob []byte `sshtype:"14"` +} + +type publicKey struct { + Format string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// 3.7 Key constraint identifiers +type constrainLifetimeAgentMsg struct { + LifetimeSecs uint32 `sshtype:"1"` +} + +type constrainExtensionAgentMsg struct { + ExtensionName string `sshtype:"3"` + ExtensionDetails []byte + + // Rest is a field used for parsing, not part of message + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 4.7 +const agentExtension = 27 +const agentExtensionFailure = 28 + +// ErrExtensionUnsupported indicates that an extension defined in +// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 is unsupported by the agent. Specifically this +// error indicates that the agent returned a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message +// as the result of a SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION request. Note that the protocol +// specification (and therefore this error) does not distinguish between a +// specific extension being unsupported and extensions being unsupported entirely. +var ErrExtensionUnsupported = errors.New("agent: extension unsupported") + +type extensionAgentMsg struct { + ExtensionType string `sshtype:"27"` + // NOTE: this matches OpenSSH's PROTOCOL.agent, not the IETF draft [PROTOCOL.agent], + // so that it matches what OpenSSH actually implements in the wild. + Contents []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Key represents a protocol 2 public key as defined in +// [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.2. +type Key struct { + Format string + Blob []byte + Comment string +} + +func clientErr(err error) error { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: client error: %v", err) +} + +// String returns the storage form of an agent key with the format, base64 +// encoded serialized key, and the comment if it is not empty. +func (k *Key) String() string { + s := string(k.Format) + " " + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k.Blob) + + if k.Comment != "" { + s += " " + k.Comment + } + + return s +} + +// Type returns the public key type. +func (k *Key) Type() string { + return k.Format +} + +// Marshal returns key blob to satisfy the ssh.PublicKey interface. +func (k *Key) Marshal() []byte { + return k.Blob +} + +// Verify satisfies the ssh.PublicKey interface. +func (k *Key) Verify(data []byte, sig *ssh.Signature) error { + pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.Blob) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: bad public key: %v", err) + } + return pubKey.Verify(data, sig) +} + +type wireKey struct { + Format string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +func parseKey(in []byte) (out *Key, rest []byte, err error) { + var record struct { + Blob []byte + Comment string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(in, &record); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + var wk wireKey + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(record.Blob, &wk); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return &Key{ + Format: wk.Format, + Blob: record.Blob, + Comment: record.Comment, + }, record.Rest, nil +} + +// client is a client for an ssh-agent process. +type client struct { + // conn is typically a *net.UnixConn + conn io.ReadWriter + // mu is used to prevent concurrent access to the agent + mu sync.Mutex +} + +// NewClient returns an Agent that talks to an ssh-agent process over +// the given connection. +func NewClient(rw io.ReadWriter) ExtendedAgent { + return &client{conn: rw} +} + +// call sends an RPC to the agent. On success, the reply is +// unmarshaled into reply and replyType is set to the first byte of +// the reply, which contains the type of the message. +func (c *client) call(req []byte) (reply interface{}, err error) { + buf, err := c.callRaw(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + reply, err = unmarshal(buf) + if err != nil { + return nil, clientErr(err) + } + return reply, nil +} + +// callRaw sends an RPC to the agent. On success, the raw +// bytes of the response are returned; no unmarshalling is +// performed on the response. +func (c *client) callRaw(req []byte) (reply []byte, err error) { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + + msg := make([]byte, 4+len(req)) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(msg, uint32(len(req))) + copy(msg[4:], req) + if _, err = c.conn.Write(msg); err != nil { + return nil, clientErr(err) + } + + var respSizeBuf [4]byte + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.conn, respSizeBuf[:]); err != nil { + return nil, clientErr(err) + } + respSize := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(respSizeBuf[:]) + if respSize > maxAgentResponseBytes { + return nil, clientErr(errors.New("response too large")) + } + + buf := make([]byte, respSize) + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.conn, buf); err != nil { + return nil, clientErr(err) + } + return buf, nil +} + +func (c *client) simpleCall(req []byte) error { + resp, err := c.call(req) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok { + return nil + } + return errors.New("agent: failure") +} + +func (c *client) RemoveAll() error { + return c.simpleCall([]byte{agentRemoveAllIdentities}) +} + +func (c *client) Remove(key ssh.PublicKey) error { + req := ssh.Marshal(&agentRemoveIdentityMsg{ + KeyBlob: key.Marshal(), + }) + return c.simpleCall(req) +} + +func (c *client) Lock(passphrase []byte) error { + req := ssh.Marshal(&agentLockMsg{ + Passphrase: passphrase, + }) + return c.simpleCall(req) +} + +func (c *client) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error { + req := ssh.Marshal(&agentUnlockMsg{ + Passphrase: passphrase, + }) + return c.simpleCall(req) +} + +// List returns the identities known to the agent. +func (c *client) List() ([]*Key, error) { + // see [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.5.2. + req := []byte{agentRequestIdentities} + + msg, err := c.call(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *identitiesAnswerAgentMsg: + if msg.NumKeys > maxAgentResponseBytes/8 { + return nil, errors.New("agent: too many keys in agent reply") + } + keys := make([]*Key, msg.NumKeys) + data := msg.Keys + for i := uint32(0); i < msg.NumKeys; i++ { + var key *Key + var err error + if key, data, err = parseKey(data); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + keys[i] = key + } + return keys, nil + case *failureAgentMsg: + return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to list keys") + } + panic("unreachable") +} + +// Sign has the agent sign the data using a protocol 2 key as defined +// in [PROTOCOL.agent] section 2.6.2. +func (c *client) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + return c.SignWithFlags(key, data, 0) +} + +func (c *client) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + req := ssh.Marshal(signRequestAgentMsg{ + KeyBlob: key.Marshal(), + Data: data, + Flags: uint32(flags), + }) + + msg, err := c.call(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *signResponseAgentMsg: + var sig ssh.Signature + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(msg.SigBlob, &sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &sig, nil + case *failureAgentMsg: + return nil, errors.New("agent: failed to sign challenge") + } + panic("unreachable") +} + +// unmarshal parses an agent message in packet, returning the parsed +// form and the message type of packet. +func unmarshal(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) { + if len(packet) < 1 { + return nil, errors.New("agent: empty packet") + } + var msg interface{} + switch packet[0] { + case agentFailure: + return new(failureAgentMsg), nil + case agentSuccess: + return new(successAgentMsg), nil + case agentIdentitiesAnswer: + msg = new(identitiesAnswerAgentMsg) + case agentSignResponse: + msg = new(signResponseAgentMsg) + case agentV1IdentitiesAnswer: + msg = new(agentV1IdentityMsg) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unknown type tag %d", packet[0]) + } + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return msg, nil +} + +type rsaKeyMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + N *big.Int + E *big.Int + D *big.Int + Iqmp *big.Int // IQMP = Inverse Q Mod P + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type dsaKeyMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + G *big.Int + Y *big.Int + X *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type ecdsaKeyMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + D *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type ed25519KeyMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + Pub []byte + Priv []byte + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Insert adds a private key to the agent. +func (c *client) insertKey(s interface{}, comment string, constraints []byte) error { + var req []byte + switch k := s.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + if len(k.Primes) != 2 { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported RSA key with %d primes", len(k.Primes)) + } + k.Precompute() + req = ssh.Marshal(rsaKeyMsg{ + Type: ssh.KeyAlgoRSA, + N: k.N, + E: big.NewInt(int64(k.E)), + D: k.D, + Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv, + P: k.Primes[0], + Q: k.Primes[1], + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case *dsa.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(dsaKeyMsg{ + Type: ssh.KeyAlgoDSA, + P: k.P, + Q: k.Q, + G: k.G, + Y: k.Y, + X: k.X, + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + nistID := fmt.Sprintf("nistp%d", k.Params().BitSize) + req = ssh.Marshal(ecdsaKeyMsg{ + Type: "ecdsa-sha2-" + nistID, + Curve: nistID, + KeyBytes: elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y), + D: k.D, + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case ed25519.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{ + Type: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519, + Pub: []byte(k)[32:], + Priv: []byte(k), + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + // This function originally supported only *ed25519.PrivateKey, however the + // general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer. + // We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility. + case *ed25519.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519KeyMsg{ + Type: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519, + Pub: []byte(*k)[32:], + Priv: []byte(*k), + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported key type %T", s) + } + + // if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed. + if len(constraints) != 0 { + req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained + } + + resp, err := c.call(req) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok { + return nil + } + return errors.New("agent: failure") +} + +type rsaCertMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + CertBytes []byte + D *big.Int + Iqmp *big.Int // IQMP = Inverse Q Mod P + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type dsaCertMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + CertBytes []byte + X *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type ecdsaCertMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + CertBytes []byte + D *big.Int + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type ed25519CertMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + CertBytes []byte + Pub []byte + Priv []byte + Comments string + Constraints []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Add adds a private key to the agent. If a certificate is given, +// that certificate is added instead as public key. +func (c *client) Add(key AddedKey) error { + var constraints []byte + + if secs := key.LifetimeSecs; secs != 0 { + constraints = append(constraints, ssh.Marshal(constrainLifetimeAgentMsg{secs})...) + } + + if key.ConfirmBeforeUse { + constraints = append(constraints, agentConstrainConfirm) + } + + cert := key.Certificate + if cert == nil { + return c.insertKey(key.PrivateKey, key.Comment, constraints) + } + return c.insertCert(key.PrivateKey, cert, key.Comment, constraints) +} + +func (c *client) insertCert(s interface{}, cert *ssh.Certificate, comment string, constraints []byte) error { + var req []byte + switch k := s.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + if len(k.Primes) != 2 { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported RSA key with %d primes", len(k.Primes)) + } + k.Precompute() + req = ssh.Marshal(rsaCertMsg{ + Type: cert.Type(), + CertBytes: cert.Marshal(), + D: k.D, + Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv, + P: k.Primes[0], + Q: k.Primes[1], + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case *dsa.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(dsaCertMsg{ + Type: cert.Type(), + CertBytes: cert.Marshal(), + X: k.X, + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(ecdsaCertMsg{ + Type: cert.Type(), + CertBytes: cert.Marshal(), + D: k.D, + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + case ed25519.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{ + Type: cert.Type(), + CertBytes: cert.Marshal(), + Pub: []byte(k)[32:], + Priv: []byte(k), + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + // This function originally supported only *ed25519.PrivateKey, however the + // general idiom is to pass ed25519.PrivateKey by value, not by pointer. + // We still support the pointer variant for backwards compatibility. + case *ed25519.PrivateKey: + req = ssh.Marshal(ed25519CertMsg{ + Type: cert.Type(), + CertBytes: cert.Marshal(), + Pub: []byte(*k)[32:], + Priv: []byte(*k), + Comments: comment, + Constraints: constraints, + }) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported key type %T", s) + } + + // if constraints are present then the message type needs to be changed. + if len(constraints) != 0 { + req[0] = agentAddIDConstrained + } + + signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(s) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !bytes.Equal(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) { + return errors.New("agent: signer and cert have different public key") + } + + resp, err := c.call(req) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if _, ok := resp.(*successAgentMsg); ok { + return nil + } + return errors.New("agent: failure") +} + +// Signers provides a callback for client authentication. +func (c *client) Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error) { + keys, err := c.List() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var result []ssh.Signer + for _, k := range keys { + result = append(result, &agentKeyringSigner{c, k}) + } + return result, nil +} + +type agentKeyringSigner struct { + agent *client + pub ssh.PublicKey +} + +func (s *agentKeyringSigner) PublicKey() ssh.PublicKey { + return s.pub +} + +func (s *agentKeyringSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + // The agent has its own entropy source, so the rand argument is ignored. + return s.agent.Sign(s.pub, data) +} + +func (s *agentKeyringSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + if algorithm == "" || algorithm == underlyingAlgo(s.pub.Type()) { + return s.Sign(rand, data) + } + + var flags SignatureFlags + switch algorithm { + case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256: + flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha256 + case ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512: + flags = SignatureFlagRsaSha512 + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported algorithm %q", algorithm) + } + + return s.agent.SignWithFlags(s.pub, data, flags) +} + +var _ ssh.AlgorithmSigner = &agentKeyringSigner{} + +// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the +// corresponding public key signature algorithm. +// +// This map must be kept in sync with the one in certs.go. +var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{ + ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSA, + ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + ssh.CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + ssh.CertAlgoDSAv01: ssh.KeyAlgoDSA, + ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256, + ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384, + ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01: ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521, + ssh.CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: ssh.KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + ssh.CertAlgoED25519v01: ssh.KeyAlgoED25519, + ssh.CertAlgoSKED25519v01: ssh.KeyAlgoSKED25519, +} + +// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is +// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are +// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms. +func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string { + if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok { + return a + } + return algo +} + +// Calls an extension method. It is up to the agent implementation as to whether or not +// any particular extension is supported and may always return an error. Because the +// type of the response is up to the implementation, this returns the bytes of the +// response and does not attempt any type of unmarshalling. +func (c *client) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) { + req := ssh.Marshal(extensionAgentMsg{ + ExtensionType: extensionType, + Contents: contents, + }) + buf, err := c.callRaw(req) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(buf) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("agent: failure; empty response") + } + // [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 indicates that an SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message + // represents an agent that does not support the extension + if buf[0] == agentFailure { + return nil, ErrExtensionUnsupported + } + if buf[0] == agentExtensionFailure { + return nil, errors.New("agent: generic extension failure") + } + + return buf, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/forward.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/forward.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fd24ba9 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/forward.go @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package agent + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "net" + "sync" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// RequestAgentForwarding sets up agent forwarding for the session. +// ForwardToAgent or ForwardToRemote should be called to route +// the authentication requests. +func RequestAgentForwarding(session *ssh.Session) error { + ok, err := session.SendRequest("auth-agent-req@openssh.com", true, nil) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if !ok { + return errors.New("forwarding request denied") + } + return nil +} + +// ForwardToAgent routes authentication requests to the given keyring. +func ForwardToAgent(client *ssh.Client, keyring Agent) error { + channels := client.HandleChannelOpen(channelType) + if channels == nil { + return errors.New("agent: already have handler for " + channelType) + } + + go func() { + for ch := range channels { + channel, reqs, err := ch.Accept() + if err != nil { + continue + } + go ssh.DiscardRequests(reqs) + go func() { + ServeAgent(keyring, channel) + channel.Close() + }() + } + }() + return nil +} + +const channelType = "auth-agent@openssh.com" + +// ForwardToRemote routes authentication requests to the ssh-agent +// process serving on the given unix socket. +func ForwardToRemote(client *ssh.Client, addr string) error { + channels := client.HandleChannelOpen(channelType) + if channels == nil { + return errors.New("agent: already have handler for " + channelType) + } + conn, err := net.Dial("unix", addr) + if err != nil { + return err + } + conn.Close() + + go func() { + for ch := range channels { + channel, reqs, err := ch.Accept() + if err != nil { + continue + } + go ssh.DiscardRequests(reqs) + go forwardUnixSocket(channel, addr) + } + }() + return nil +} + +func forwardUnixSocket(channel ssh.Channel, addr string) { + conn, err := net.Dial("unix", addr) + if err != nil { + return + } + + var wg sync.WaitGroup + wg.Add(2) + go func() { + io.Copy(conn, channel) + conn.(*net.UnixConn).CloseWrite() + wg.Done() + }() + go func() { + io.Copy(channel, conn) + channel.CloseWrite() + wg.Done() + }() + + wg.Wait() + conn.Close() + channel.Close() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21bfa87 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/keyring.go @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package agent + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/subtle" + "errors" + "fmt" + "sync" + "time" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +type privKey struct { + signer ssh.Signer + comment string + expire *time.Time +} + +type keyring struct { + mu sync.Mutex + keys []privKey + + locked bool + passphrase []byte +} + +var errLocked = errors.New("agent: locked") + +// NewKeyring returns an Agent that holds keys in memory. It is safe +// for concurrent use by multiple goroutines. +func NewKeyring() Agent { + return &keyring{} +} + +// RemoveAll removes all identities. +func (r *keyring) RemoveAll() error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return errLocked + } + + r.keys = nil + return nil +} + +// removeLocked does the actual key removal. The caller must already be holding the +// keyring mutex. +func (r *keyring) removeLocked(want []byte) error { + found := false + for i := 0; i < len(r.keys); { + if bytes.Equal(r.keys[i].signer.PublicKey().Marshal(), want) { + found = true + r.keys[i] = r.keys[len(r.keys)-1] + r.keys = r.keys[:len(r.keys)-1] + continue + } else { + i++ + } + } + + if !found { + return errors.New("agent: key not found") + } + return nil +} + +// Remove removes all identities with the given public key. +func (r *keyring) Remove(key ssh.PublicKey) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return errLocked + } + + return r.removeLocked(key.Marshal()) +} + +// Lock locks the agent. Sign and Remove will fail, and List will return an empty list. +func (r *keyring) Lock(passphrase []byte) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return errLocked + } + + r.locked = true + r.passphrase = passphrase + return nil +} + +// Unlock undoes the effect of Lock +func (r *keyring) Unlock(passphrase []byte) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if !r.locked { + return errors.New("agent: not locked") + } + if 1 != subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(passphrase, r.passphrase) { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: incorrect passphrase") + } + + r.locked = false + r.passphrase = nil + return nil +} + +// expireKeysLocked removes expired keys from the keyring. If a key was added +// with a lifetimesecs contraint and seconds >= lifetimesecs seconds have +// elapsed, it is removed. The caller *must* be holding the keyring mutex. +func (r *keyring) expireKeysLocked() { + for _, k := range r.keys { + if k.expire != nil && time.Now().After(*k.expire) { + r.removeLocked(k.signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) + } + } +} + +// List returns the identities known to the agent. +func (r *keyring) List() ([]*Key, error) { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + // section 2.7: locked agents return empty. + return nil, nil + } + + r.expireKeysLocked() + var ids []*Key + for _, k := range r.keys { + pub := k.signer.PublicKey() + ids = append(ids, &Key{ + Format: pub.Type(), + Blob: pub.Marshal(), + Comment: k.comment}) + } + return ids, nil +} + +// Insert adds a private key to the keyring. If a certificate +// is given, that certificate is added as public key. Note that +// any constraints given are ignored. +func (r *keyring) Add(key AddedKey) error { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return errLocked + } + signer, err := ssh.NewSignerFromKey(key.PrivateKey) + + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if cert := key.Certificate; cert != nil { + signer, err = ssh.NewCertSigner(cert, signer) + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + + p := privKey{ + signer: signer, + comment: key.Comment, + } + + if key.LifetimeSecs > 0 { + t := time.Now().Add(time.Duration(key.LifetimeSecs) * time.Second) + p.expire = &t + } + + r.keys = append(r.keys, p) + + return nil +} + +// Sign returns a signature for the data. +func (r *keyring) Sign(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + return r.SignWithFlags(key, data, 0) +} + +func (r *keyring) SignWithFlags(key ssh.PublicKey, data []byte, flags SignatureFlags) (*ssh.Signature, error) { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return nil, errLocked + } + + r.expireKeysLocked() + wanted := key.Marshal() + for _, k := range r.keys { + if bytes.Equal(k.signer.PublicKey().Marshal(), wanted) { + if flags == 0 { + return k.signer.Sign(rand.Reader, data) + } else { + if algorithmSigner, ok := k.signer.(ssh.AlgorithmSigner); !ok { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: signature does not support non-default signature algorithm: %T", k.signer) + } else { + var algorithm string + switch flags { + case SignatureFlagRsaSha256: + algorithm = ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA256 + case SignatureFlagRsaSha512: + algorithm = ssh.KeyAlgoRSASHA512 + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unsupported signature flags: %d", flags) + } + return algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand.Reader, data, algorithm) + } + } + } + } + return nil, errors.New("not found") +} + +// Signers returns signers for all the known keys. +func (r *keyring) Signers() ([]ssh.Signer, error) { + r.mu.Lock() + defer r.mu.Unlock() + if r.locked { + return nil, errLocked + } + + r.expireKeysLocked() + s := make([]ssh.Signer, 0, len(r.keys)) + for _, k := range r.keys { + s = append(s, k.signer) + } + return s, nil +} + +// The keyring does not support any extensions +func (r *keyring) Extension(extensionType string, contents []byte) ([]byte, error) { + return nil, ErrExtensionUnsupported +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd2e0a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent/server.go @@ -0,0 +1,570 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package agent + +import ( + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rsa" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "math/big" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" +) + +// server wraps an Agent and uses it to implement the agent side of +// the SSH-agent, wire protocol. +type server struct { + agent Agent +} + +func (s *server) processRequestBytes(reqData []byte) []byte { + rep, err := s.processRequest(reqData) + if err != nil { + if err != errLocked { + // TODO(hanwen): provide better logging interface? + log.Printf("agent %d: %v", reqData[0], err) + } + return []byte{agentFailure} + } + + if err == nil && rep == nil { + return []byte{agentSuccess} + } + + return ssh.Marshal(rep) +} + +func marshalKey(k *Key) []byte { + var record struct { + Blob []byte + Comment string + } + record.Blob = k.Marshal() + record.Comment = k.Comment + + return ssh.Marshal(&record) +} + +// See [PROTOCOL.agent], section 2.5.1. +const agentV1IdentitiesAnswer = 2 + +type agentV1IdentityMsg struct { + Numkeys uint32 `sshtype:"2"` +} + +type agentRemoveIdentityMsg struct { + KeyBlob []byte `sshtype:"18"` +} + +type agentLockMsg struct { + Passphrase []byte `sshtype:"22"` +} + +type agentUnlockMsg struct { + Passphrase []byte `sshtype:"23"` +} + +func (s *server) processRequest(data []byte) (interface{}, error) { + switch data[0] { + case agentRequestV1Identities: + return &agentV1IdentityMsg{0}, nil + + case agentRemoveAllV1Identities: + return nil, nil + + case agentRemoveIdentity: + var req agentRemoveIdentityMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var wk wireKey + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req.KeyBlob, &wk); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nil, s.agent.Remove(&Key{Format: wk.Format, Blob: req.KeyBlob}) + + case agentRemoveAllIdentities: + return nil, s.agent.RemoveAll() + + case agentLock: + var req agentLockMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nil, s.agent.Lock(req.Passphrase) + + case agentUnlock: + var req agentUnlockMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return nil, s.agent.Unlock(req.Passphrase) + + case agentSignRequest: + var req signRequestAgentMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var wk wireKey + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req.KeyBlob, &wk); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + k := &Key{ + Format: wk.Format, + Blob: req.KeyBlob, + } + + var sig *ssh.Signature + var err error + if extendedAgent, ok := s.agent.(ExtendedAgent); ok { + sig, err = extendedAgent.SignWithFlags(k, req.Data, SignatureFlags(req.Flags)) + } else { + sig, err = s.agent.Sign(k, req.Data) + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &signResponseAgentMsg{SigBlob: ssh.Marshal(sig)}, nil + + case agentRequestIdentities: + keys, err := s.agent.List() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + rep := identitiesAnswerAgentMsg{ + NumKeys: uint32(len(keys)), + } + for _, k := range keys { + rep.Keys = append(rep.Keys, marshalKey(k)...) + } + return rep, nil + + case agentAddIDConstrained, agentAddIdentity: + return nil, s.insertIdentity(data) + + case agentExtension: + // Return a stub object where the whole contents of the response gets marshaled. + var responseStub struct { + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if extendedAgent, ok := s.agent.(ExtendedAgent); !ok { + // If this agent doesn't implement extensions, [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 + // requires that we return a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE message. + responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentFailure} + } else { + var req extensionAgentMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(data, &req); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + res, err := extendedAgent.Extension(req.ExtensionType, req.Contents) + if err != nil { + // If agent extensions are unsupported, return a standard SSH_AGENT_FAILURE + // message as required by [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7. + if err == ErrExtensionUnsupported { + responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentFailure} + } else { + // As the result of any other error processing an extension request, + // [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.7 requires that we return a + // SSH_AGENT_EXTENSION_FAILURE code. + responseStub.Rest = []byte{agentExtensionFailure} + } + } else { + if len(res) == 0 { + return nil, nil + } + responseStub.Rest = res + } + } + + return responseStub, nil + } + + return nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown opcode %d", data[0]) +} + +func parseConstraints(constraints []byte) (lifetimeSecs uint32, confirmBeforeUse bool, extensions []ConstraintExtension, err error) { + for len(constraints) != 0 { + switch constraints[0] { + case agentConstrainLifetime: + lifetimeSecs = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(constraints[1:5]) + constraints = constraints[5:] + case agentConstrainConfirm: + confirmBeforeUse = true + constraints = constraints[1:] + case agentConstrainExtension: + var msg constrainExtensionAgentMsg + if err = ssh.Unmarshal(constraints, &msg); err != nil { + return 0, false, nil, err + } + extensions = append(extensions, ConstraintExtension{ + ExtensionName: msg.ExtensionName, + ExtensionDetails: msg.ExtensionDetails, + }) + constraints = msg.Rest + default: + return 0, false, nil, fmt.Errorf("unknown constraint type: %d", constraints[0]) + } + } + return +} + +func setConstraints(key *AddedKey, constraintBytes []byte) error { + lifetimeSecs, confirmBeforeUse, constraintExtensions, err := parseConstraints(constraintBytes) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + key.LifetimeSecs = lifetimeSecs + key.ConfirmBeforeUse = confirmBeforeUse + key.ConstraintExtensions = constraintExtensions + return nil +} + +func parseRSAKey(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k rsaKeyMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if k.E.BitLen() > 30 { + return nil, errors.New("agent: RSA public exponent too large") + } + priv := &rsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ + E: int(k.E.Int64()), + N: k.N, + }, + D: k.D, + Primes: []*big.Int{k.P, k.Q}, + } + priv.Precompute() + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: priv, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseEd25519Key(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k ed25519KeyMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv := ed25519.PrivateKey(k.Priv) + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: &priv, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseDSAKey(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k dsaKeyMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv := &dsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: k.P, + Q: k.Q, + G: k.G, + }, + Y: k.Y, + }, + X: k.X, + } + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: priv, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func unmarshalECDSA(curveName string, keyBytes []byte, privScalar *big.Int) (priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey, err error) { + priv = &ecdsa.PrivateKey{ + D: privScalar, + } + + switch curveName { + case "nistp256": + priv.Curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + priv.Curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + priv.Curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: unknown curve %q", curveName) + } + + priv.X, priv.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(priv.Curve, keyBytes) + if priv.X == nil || priv.Y == nil { + return nil, errors.New("agent: point not on curve") + } + + return priv, nil +} + +func parseEd25519Cert(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k ed25519CertMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.CertBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + priv := ed25519.PrivateKey(k.Priv) + cert, ok := pubKey.(*ssh.Certificate) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("agent: bad ED25519 certificate") + } + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: &priv, Certificate: cert, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseECDSAKey(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k ecdsaKeyMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + priv, err := unmarshalECDSA(k.Curve, k.KeyBytes, k.D) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: priv, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseRSACert(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k rsaCertMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.CertBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cert, ok := pubKey.(*ssh.Certificate) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("agent: bad RSA certificate") + } + + // An RSA publickey as marshaled by rsaPublicKey.Marshal() in keys.go + var rsaPub struct { + Name string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + } + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(cert.Key.Marshal(), &rsaPub); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: Unmarshal failed to parse public key: %v", err) + } + + if rsaPub.E.BitLen() > 30 { + return nil, errors.New("agent: RSA public exponent too large") + } + + priv := rsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ + E: int(rsaPub.E.Int64()), + N: rsaPub.N, + }, + D: k.D, + Primes: []*big.Int{k.Q, k.P}, + } + priv.Precompute() + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: &priv, Certificate: cert, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseDSACert(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k dsaCertMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.CertBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cert, ok := pubKey.(*ssh.Certificate) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("agent: bad DSA certificate") + } + + // A DSA publickey as marshaled by dsaPublicKey.Marshal() in keys.go + var w struct { + Name string + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + } + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(cert.Key.Marshal(), &w); err != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("agent: Unmarshal failed to parse public key: %v", err) + } + + priv := &dsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: w.P, + Q: w.Q, + G: w.G, + }, + Y: w.Y, + }, + X: k.X, + } + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: priv, Certificate: cert, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func parseECDSACert(req []byte) (*AddedKey, error) { + var k ecdsaCertMsg + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &k); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pubKey, err := ssh.ParsePublicKey(k.CertBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + cert, ok := pubKey.(*ssh.Certificate) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("agent: bad ECDSA certificate") + } + + // An ECDSA publickey as marshaled by ecdsaPublicKey.Marshal() in keys.go + var ecdsaPub struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + } + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(cert.Key.Marshal(), &ecdsaPub); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + priv, err := unmarshalECDSA(ecdsaPub.ID, ecdsaPub.Key, k.D) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + addedKey := &AddedKey{PrivateKey: priv, Certificate: cert, Comment: k.Comments} + if err := setConstraints(addedKey, k.Constraints); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return addedKey, nil +} + +func (s *server) insertIdentity(req []byte) error { + var record struct { + Type string `sshtype:"17|25"` + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := ssh.Unmarshal(req, &record); err != nil { + return err + } + + var addedKey *AddedKey + var err error + + switch record.Type { + case ssh.KeyAlgoRSA: + addedKey, err = parseRSAKey(req) + case ssh.KeyAlgoDSA: + addedKey, err = parseDSAKey(req) + case ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA256, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA384, ssh.KeyAlgoECDSA521: + addedKey, err = parseECDSAKey(req) + case ssh.KeyAlgoED25519: + addedKey, err = parseEd25519Key(req) + case ssh.CertAlgoRSAv01: + addedKey, err = parseRSACert(req) + case ssh.CertAlgoDSAv01: + addedKey, err = parseDSACert(req) + case ssh.CertAlgoECDSA256v01, ssh.CertAlgoECDSA384v01, ssh.CertAlgoECDSA521v01: + addedKey, err = parseECDSACert(req) + case ssh.CertAlgoED25519v01: + addedKey, err = parseEd25519Cert(req) + default: + return fmt.Errorf("agent: not implemented: %q", record.Type) + } + + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.agent.Add(*addedKey) +} + +// ServeAgent serves the agent protocol on the given connection. It +// returns when an I/O error occurs. +func ServeAgent(agent Agent, c io.ReadWriter) error { + s := &server{agent} + + var length [4]byte + for { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, length[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + l := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(length[:]) + if l == 0 { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: request size is 0") + } + if l > maxAgentResponseBytes { + // We also cap requests. + return fmt.Errorf("agent: request too large: %d", l) + } + + req := make([]byte, l) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c, req); err != nil { + return err + } + + repData := s.processRequestBytes(req) + if len(repData) > maxAgentResponseBytes { + return fmt.Errorf("agent: reply too large: %d bytes", len(repData)) + } + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(length[:], uint32(len(repData))) + if _, err := c.Write(length[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := c.Write(repData); err != nil { + return err + } + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ab07d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "io" + "sync" +) + +// buffer provides a linked list buffer for data exchange +// between producer and consumer. Theoretically the buffer is +// of unlimited capacity as it does no allocation of its own. +type buffer struct { + // protects concurrent access to head, tail and closed + *sync.Cond + + head *element // the buffer that will be read first + tail *element // the buffer that will be read last + + closed bool +} + +// An element represents a single link in a linked list. +type element struct { + buf []byte + next *element +} + +// newBuffer returns an empty buffer that is not closed. +func newBuffer() *buffer { + e := new(element) + b := &buffer{ + Cond: newCond(), + head: e, + tail: e, + } + return b +} + +// write makes buf available for Read to receive. +// buf must not be modified after the call to write. +func (b *buffer) write(buf []byte) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + e := &element{buf: buf} + b.tail.next = e + b.tail = e + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// eof closes the buffer. Reads from the buffer once all +// the data has been consumed will receive io.EOF. +func (b *buffer) eof() { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + b.closed = true + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// Read reads data from the internal buffer in buf. Reads will block +// if no data is available, or until the buffer is closed. +func (b *buffer) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + defer b.Cond.L.Unlock() + + for len(buf) > 0 { + // if there is data in b.head, copy it + if len(b.head.buf) > 0 { + r := copy(buf, b.head.buf) + buf, b.head.buf = buf[r:], b.head.buf[r:] + n += r + continue + } + // if there is a next buffer, make it the head + if len(b.head.buf) == 0 && b.head != b.tail { + b.head = b.head.next + continue + } + + // if at least one byte has been copied, return + if n > 0 { + break + } + + // if nothing was read, and there is nothing outstanding + // check to see if the buffer is closed. + if b.closed { + err = io.EOF + break + } + // out of buffers, wait for producer + b.Cond.Wait() + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27d0e14 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -0,0 +1,611 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "sort" + "time" +) + +// Certificate algorithm names from [PROTOCOL.certkeys]. These values can appear +// in Certificate.Type, PublicKey.Type, and ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. +// Unlike key algorithm names, these are not passed to AlgorithmSigner nor +// returned by MultiAlgorithmSigner and don't appear in the Signature.Format +// field. +const ( + CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoSKED25519v01 = "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" + + // CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 and CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 can't appear as a + // Certificate.Type (or PublicKey.Type), but only in + // ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms. + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 = "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 = "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" +) + +const ( + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSAv01. + CertSigAlgoRSAv01 = CertAlgoRSAv01 + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA256v01. + CertSigAlgoRSASHA2256v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA256v01 + // Deprecated: use CertAlgoRSASHA512v01. + CertSigAlgoRSASHA2512v01 = CertAlgoRSASHA512v01 +) + +// Certificate types distinguish between host and user +// certificates. The values can be set in the CertType field of +// Certificate. +const ( + UserCert = 1 + HostCert = 2 +) + +// Signature represents a cryptographic signature. +type Signature struct { + Format string + Blob []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that +// a certificate does not expire. +const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1 + +// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in +// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the +// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using +// ParsePublicKey. +type Certificate struct { + Nonce []byte + Key PublicKey + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []string + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + Permissions + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey PublicKey + Signature *Signature +} + +// genericCertData holds the key-independent part of the certificate data. +// Overall, certificates contain an nonce, public key fields and +// key-independent fields. +type genericCertData struct { + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []byte + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + CriticalOptions []byte + Extensions []byte + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +func marshalStringList(namelist []string) []byte { + var to []byte + for _, name := range namelist { + s := struct{ N string }{name} + to = append(to, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return to +} + +type optionsTuple struct { + Key string + Value []byte +} + +type optionsTupleValue struct { + Value string +} + +// serialize a map of critical options or extensions +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty string value +func marshalTuples(tups map[string]string) []byte { + keys := make([]string, 0, len(tups)) + for key := range tups { + keys = append(keys, key) + } + sort.Strings(keys) + + var ret []byte + for _, key := range keys { + s := optionsTuple{Key: key} + if value := tups[key]; len(value) > 0 { + s.Value = Marshal(&optionsTupleValue{value}) + } + ret = append(ret, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return ret +} + +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty option value +func parseTuples(in []byte) (map[string]string, error) { + tups := map[string]string{} + var lastKey string + var haveLastKey bool + + for len(in) > 0 { + var key, val, extra []byte + var ok bool + + if key, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + keyStr := string(key) + // according to [PROTOCOL.certkeys], the names must be in + // lexical order. + if haveLastKey && keyStr <= lastKey { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate options are not in lexical order") + } + lastKey, haveLastKey = keyStr, true + // the next field is a data field, which if non-empty has a string embedded + if val, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(val) > 0 { + val, extra, ok = parseString(val) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(extra) > 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected trailing data after certificate option value") + } + tups[keyStr] = string(val) + } else { + tups[keyStr] = "" + } + } + return tups, nil +} + +func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) { + nonce, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + + key, rest, err := parsePubKey(rest, privAlgo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var g genericCertData + if err := Unmarshal(rest, &g); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c := &Certificate{ + Nonce: nonce, + Key: key, + Serial: g.Serial, + CertType: g.CertType, + KeyId: g.KeyId, + ValidAfter: g.ValidAfter, + ValidBefore: g.ValidBefore, + } + + for principals := g.ValidPrincipals; len(principals) > 0; { + principal, rest, ok := parseString(principals) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + c.ValidPrincipals = append(c.ValidPrincipals, string(principal)) + principals = rest + } + + c.CriticalOptions, err = parseTuples(g.CriticalOptions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Extensions, err = parseTuples(g.Extensions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Reserved = g.Reserved + k, err := ParsePublicKey(g.SignatureKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.SignatureKey = k + c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature) + if !ok || len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + return c, nil +} + +type openSSHCertSigner struct { + pub *Certificate + signer Signer +} + +type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct { + *openSSHCertSigner + algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner +} + +// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose +// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert +// doesn't match the key used by signer. +func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) { + if !bytes.Equal(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key") + } + + switch s := signer.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, + supportedAlgorithms: s.Algorithms(), + }, nil + case AlgorithmSigner: + return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, s}, nil + default: + return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil + } +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.signer.Sign(rand, data) +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pub +} + +func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + +const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address" + +// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods +// can be plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback and +// ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. For the CertChecker to work, +// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set. +type CertChecker struct { + // SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the + // server application layer understands. These are only used + // for user certificates. + SupportedCriticalOptions []string + + // IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an + // authority for the given user certificate. This allows for + // certificates to be signed by other certificates. This must be set + // if this CertChecker will be checking user certificates. + IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool + + // IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as + // an authority for this host. This allows for certificates to be + // signed by other keys, and for those other keys to only be valid + // signers for particular hostnames. This must be set if this + // CertChecker will be checking host certificates. + IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool + + // Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now + // is used. + Clock func() time.Time + + // UserKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.Authenticate encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement validation + // of user keys or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + UserKeyFallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // HostKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.CheckHostKey encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement host key + // validation or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + HostKeyFallback HostKeyCallback + + // IsRevoked is called for each certificate so that revocation checking + // can be implemented. It should return true if the given certificate + // is revoked and false otherwise. If nil, no certificates are + // considered to have been revoked. + IsRevoked func(cert *Certificate) bool +} + +// CheckHostKey checks a host key certificate. This method can be +// plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + cert, ok := key.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.HostKeyFallback != nil { + return c.HostKeyFallback(addr, remote, key) + } + return errors.New("ssh: non-certificate host key") + } + if cert.CertType != HostCert { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr) + } + + hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // Pass hostname only as principal for host certificates (consistent with OpenSSH) + return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert) +} + +// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as +// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) { + cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.UserKeyFallback != nil { + return c.UserKeyFallback(conn, pubKey) + } + return nil, errors.New("ssh: normal key pairs not accepted") + } + + if cert.CertType != UserCert { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority") + } + + if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &cert.Permissions, nil +} + +// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and +// the signature of the certificate. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { + if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) + } + + for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions { + // sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by + // serverAuthenticate + if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption { + continue + } + + found := false + for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions { + if supp == opt { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt) + } + } + + if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) > 0 { + // By default, certs are valid for all users/hosts. + found := false + for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals { + if p == principal { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: principal %q not in the set of valid principals for given certificate: %q", principal, cert.ValidPrincipals) + } + } + + clock := c.Clock + if clock == nil { + clock = time.Now + } + + unixNow := clock().Unix() + if after := int64(cert.ValidAfter); after < 0 || unixNow < int64(cert.ValidAfter) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert is not yet valid") + } + if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired") + } + if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +// SignCert signs the certificate with an authority, setting the Nonce, +// SignatureKey, and Signature fields. If the authority implements the +// MultiAlgorithmSigner interface the first algorithm in the list is used. This +// is useful if you want to sign with a specific algorithm. +func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error { + c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil { + return err + } + c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey() + + if v, ok := authority.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + if len(v.Algorithms()) == 0 { + return errors.New("the provided authority has no signature algorithm") + } + // Use the first algorithm in the list. + sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), v.Algorithms()[0]) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil + } else if v, ok := authority.(AlgorithmSigner); ok && v.PublicKey().Type() == KeyAlgoRSA { + // Default to KeyAlgoRSASHA512 for ssh-rsa signers. + // TODO: consider using KeyAlgoRSASHA256 as default. + sig, err := v.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, c.bytesForSigning(), KeyAlgoRSASHA512) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil + } + + sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil +} + +// certKeyAlgoNames is a mapping from known certificate algorithm names to the +// corresponding public key signature algorithm. +// +// This map must be kept in sync with the one in agent/client.go. +var certKeyAlgoNames = map[string]string{ + CertAlgoRSAv01: KeyAlgoRSA, + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA256, + CertAlgoRSASHA512v01: KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + CertAlgoDSAv01: KeyAlgoDSA, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoECDSA256, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01: KeyAlgoECDSA384, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01: KeyAlgoECDSA521, + CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01: KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + CertAlgoED25519v01: KeyAlgoED25519, + CertAlgoSKED25519v01: KeyAlgoSKED25519, +} + +// underlyingAlgo returns the signature algorithm associated with algo (which is +// an advertised or negotiated public key or host key algorithm). These are +// usually the same, except for certificate algorithms. +func underlyingAlgo(algo string) string { + if a, ok := certKeyAlgoNames[algo]; ok { + return a + } + return algo +} + +// certificateAlgo returns the certificate algorithms that uses the provided +// underlying signature algorithm. +func certificateAlgo(algo string) (certAlgo string, ok bool) { + for certName, algoName := range certKeyAlgoNames { + if algoName == algo { + return certName, true + } + } + return "", false +} + +func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte { + c2 := *cert + c2.Signature = nil + out := c2.Marshal() + // Drop trailing signature length. + return out[:len(out)-4] +} + +// Marshal serializes c into OpenSSH's wire format. It is part of the +// PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte { + generic := genericCertData{ + Serial: c.Serial, + CertType: c.CertType, + KeyId: c.KeyId, + ValidPrincipals: marshalStringList(c.ValidPrincipals), + ValidAfter: uint64(c.ValidAfter), + ValidBefore: uint64(c.ValidBefore), + CriticalOptions: marshalTuples(c.CriticalOptions), + Extensions: marshalTuples(c.Extensions), + Reserved: c.Reserved, + SignatureKey: c.SignatureKey.Marshal(), + } + if c.Signature != nil { + generic.Signature = Marshal(c.Signature) + } + genericBytes := Marshal(&generic) + keyBytes := c.Key.Marshal() + _, keyBytes, _ = parseString(keyBytes) + prefix := Marshal(&struct { + Name string + Nonce []byte + Key []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{c.Type(), c.Nonce, keyBytes}) + + result := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(genericBytes)) + result = append(result, prefix...) + result = append(result, genericBytes...) + return result +} + +// Type returns the certificate algorithm name. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Type() string { + certName, ok := certificateAlgo(c.Key.Type()) + if !ok { + panic("unknown certificate type for key type " + c.Key.Type()) + } + return certName +} + +// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public +// key. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + return c.Key.Verify(data, sig) +} + +func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + format, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out = &Signature{ + Format: string(format), + } + + if out.Blob, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return + } + + switch out.Format { + case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, KeyAlgoSKED25519, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: + out.Rest = in + return out, nil, ok + } + + return out, in, ok +} + +func parseSignature(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + sigBytes, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out, trailing, ok := parseSignatureBody(sigBytes) + if !ok || len(trailing) > 0 { + return nil, nil, false + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0834c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" +) + +const ( + minPacketLength = 9 + // channelMaxPacket contains the maximum number of bytes that will be + // sent in a single packet. As per RFC 4253, section 6.1, 32k is also + // the minimum. + channelMaxPacket = 1 << 15 + // We follow OpenSSH here. + channelWindowSize = 64 * channelMaxPacket +) + +// NewChannel represents an incoming request to a channel. It must either be +// accepted for use by calling Accept, or rejected by calling Reject. +type NewChannel interface { + // Accept accepts the channel creation request. It returns the Channel + // and a Go channel containing SSH requests. The Go channel must be + // serviced otherwise the Channel will hang. + Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Reject rejects the channel creation request. After calling + // this, no other methods on the Channel may be called. + Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error + + // ChannelType returns the type of the channel, as supplied by the + // client. + ChannelType() string + + // ExtraData returns the arbitrary payload for this channel, as supplied + // by the client. This data is specific to the channel type. + ExtraData() []byte +} + +// A Channel is an ordered, reliable, flow-controlled, duplex stream +// that is multiplexed over an SSH connection. +type Channel interface { + // Read reads up to len(data) bytes from the channel. + Read(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Write writes len(data) bytes to the channel. + Write(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Close signals end of channel use. No data may be sent after this + // call. + Close() error + + // CloseWrite signals the end of sending in-band + // data. Requests may still be sent, and the other side may + // still send data + CloseWrite() error + + // SendRequest sends a channel request. If wantReply is true, + // it will wait for a reply and return the result as a + // boolean, otherwise the return value will be false. Channel + // requests are out-of-band messages so they may be sent even + // if the data stream is closed or blocked by flow control. + // If the channel is closed before a reply is returned, io.EOF + // is returned. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) + + // Stderr returns an io.ReadWriter that writes to this channel + // with the extended data type set to stderr. Stderr may + // safely be read and written from a different goroutine than + // Read and Write respectively. + Stderr() io.ReadWriter +} + +// Request is a request sent outside of the normal stream of +// data. Requests can either be specific to an SSH channel, or they +// can be global. +type Request struct { + Type string + WantReply bool + Payload []byte + + ch *channel + mux *mux +} + +// Reply sends a response to a request. It must be called for all requests +// where WantReply is true and is a no-op otherwise. The payload argument is +// ignored for replies to channel-specific requests. +func (r *Request) Reply(ok bool, payload []byte) error { + if !r.WantReply { + return nil + } + + if r.ch == nil { + return r.mux.ackRequest(ok, payload) + } + + return r.ch.ackRequest(ok) +} + +// RejectionReason is an enumeration used when rejecting channel creation +// requests. See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +type RejectionReason uint32 + +const ( + Prohibited RejectionReason = iota + 1 + ConnectionFailed + UnknownChannelType + ResourceShortage +) + +// String converts the rejection reason to human readable form. +func (r RejectionReason) String() string { + switch r { + case Prohibited: + return "administratively prohibited" + case ConnectionFailed: + return "connect failed" + case UnknownChannelType: + return "unknown channel type" + case ResourceShortage: + return "resource shortage" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r)) +} + +func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 { + if a < uint32(b) { + return a + } + return uint32(b) +} + +type channelDirection uint8 + +const ( + channelInbound channelDirection = iota + channelOutbound +) + +// channel is an implementation of the Channel interface that works +// with the mux class. +type channel struct { + // R/O after creation + chanType string + extraData []byte + localId, remoteId uint32 + + // maxIncomingPayload and maxRemotePayload are the maximum + // payload sizes of normal and extended data packets for + // receiving and sending, respectively. The wire packet will + // be 9 or 13 bytes larger (excluding encryption overhead). + maxIncomingPayload uint32 + maxRemotePayload uint32 + + mux *mux + + // decided is set to true if an accept or reject message has been sent + // (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels). + decided bool + + // direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created + // locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer. + direction channelDirection + + // Pending internal channel messages. + msg chan interface{} + + // Since requests have no ID, there can be only one request + // with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a + // goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending. + sentRequestMu sync.Mutex + + incomingRequests chan *Request + + sentEOF bool + + // thread-safe data + remoteWin window + pending *buffer + extPending *buffer + + // windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window. + windowMu sync.Mutex + myWindow uint32 + + // writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and + // protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be + // different from windowMu, as writePacket can block if there + // is a key exchange pending. + writeMu sync.Mutex + sentClose bool + + // packetPool has a buffer for each extended channel ID to + // save allocations during writes. + packetPool map[uint32][]byte +} + +// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates +// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu. +func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + ch.writeMu.Lock() + if ch.sentClose { + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return io.EOF + } + ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose) + err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet) + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return err +} + +func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg) + } + + p := Marshal(msg) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId) + return ch.writePacket(p) +} + +// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are +// used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) { + if ch.sentEOF { + return 0, io.EOF + } + // 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length + opCode := byte(msgChannelData) + headerLength := uint32(9) + if extendedCode > 0 { + headerLength += 4 + opCode = msgChannelExtendedData + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode] + // We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so + // WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be + // flagged as errors by the race detector. + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + for len(data) > 0 { + space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) + if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil { + return n, err + } + if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want { + packet = make([]byte, want) + } else { + packet = packet[:want] + } + + todo := data[:space] + + packet[0] = opCode + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId) + if extendedCode > 0 { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode)) + } + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo))) + copy(packet[headerLength:], todo) + if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil { + return n, err + } + + n += len(todo) + data = data[len(todo):] + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + return n, err +} + +func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error { + headerLen := 9 + isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData + if isExtendedData { + headerLen = 13 + } + if len(packet) < headerLen { + // malformed data packet + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + + var extended uint32 + if isExtendedData { + extended = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[5:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[headerLen-4 : headerLen]) + if length == 0 { + return nil + } + if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload { + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect? + return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size") + } + + data := packet[headerLen:] + if length != uint32(len(data)) { + return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length") + } + + ch.windowMu.Lock() + if ch.myWindow < length { + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason? + return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much") + } + ch.myWindow -= length + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + + if extended == 1 { + ch.extPending.write(data) + } else if extended > 0 { + // discard other extended data. + } else { + ch.pending.write(data) + } + return nil +} + +func (c *channel) adjustWindow(n uint32) error { + c.windowMu.Lock() + // Since myWindow is managed on our side, and can never exceed + // the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow. + c.myWindow += uint32(n) + c.windowMu.Unlock() + return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{ + AdditionalBytes: uint32(n), + }) +} + +func (c *channel) ReadExtended(data []byte, extended uint32) (n int, err error) { + switch extended { + case 1: + n, err = c.extPending.Read(data) + case 0: + n, err = c.pending.Read(data) + default: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: extended code %d unimplemented", extended) + } + + if n > 0 { + err = c.adjustWindow(uint32(n)) + // sendWindowAdjust can return io.EOF if the remote + // peer has closed the connection, however we want to + // defer forwarding io.EOF to the caller of Read until + // the buffer has been drained. + if n > 0 && err == io.EOF { + err = nil + } + } + + return n, err +} + +func (c *channel) close() { + c.pending.eof() + c.extPending.eof() + close(c.msg) + close(c.incomingRequests) + c.writeMu.Lock() + // This is not necessary for a normal channel teardown, but if + // there was another error, it is. + c.sentClose = true + c.writeMu.Unlock() + // Unblock writers. + c.remoteWin.close() +} + +// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is +// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the +// given channel. +func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error { + if ch.direction == channelInbound { + return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel") + } + if ch.decided { + return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel") + } + ch.decided = true + return nil +} + +func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error { + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData: + return ch.handleData(packet) + case msgChannelClose: + ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId}) + ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId) + ch.close() + return nil + case msgChannelEOF: + // RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but + // it is logical to signal EOF at the same time. + ch.extPending.eof() + ch.pending.eof() + return nil + } + + decoded, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := decoded.(type) { + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID) + ch.msg <- msg + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize) + } + ch.remoteId = msg.MyID + ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow) + ch.msg <- msg + case *windowAdjustMsg: + if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes) + } + case *channelRequestMsg: + req := Request{ + Type: msg.Request, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData, + ch: ch, + } + + ch.incomingRequests <- &req + default: + ch.msg <- msg + } + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData []byte) *channel { + ch := &channel{ + remoteWin: window{Cond: newCond()}, + myWindow: channelWindowSize, + pending: newBuffer(), + extPending: newBuffer(), + direction: direction, + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize), + chanType: chanType, + extraData: extraData, + mux: m, + packetPool: make(map[uint32][]byte), + } + ch.localId = m.chanList.add(ch) + return ch +} + +var errUndecided = errors.New("ssh: must Accept or Reject channel") +var errDecidedAlready = errors.New("ssh: can call Accept or Reject only once") + +type extChannel struct { + code uint32 + ch *channel +} + +func (e *extChannel) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.WriteExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + if ch.decided { + return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready + } + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + MyID: ch.localId, + MyWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + } + ch.decided = true + if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error { + if ch.decided { + return errDecidedAlready + } + reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Reason: reason, + Message: message, + Language: "en", + } + ch.decided = true + return ch.sendMessage(reject) +} + +func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.ReadExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.WriteExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + ch.sentEOF = true + return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +func (ch *channel) Close() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given, +// SSH extended stream. Such streams are used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) Extended(code uint32) io.ReadWriter { + if !ch.decided { + return nil + } + return &extChannel{code, ch} +} + +func (ch *channel) Stderr() io.ReadWriter { + return ch.Extended(1) +} + +func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return false, errUndecided + } + + if wantReply { + ch.sentRequestMu.Lock() + defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock() + } + + msg := channelRequestMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Request: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + RequestSpecificData: payload, + } + + if err := ch.sendMessage(msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + if wantReply { + m, ok := (<-ch.msg) + if !ok { + return false, io.EOF + } + switch m.(type) { + case *channelRequestFailureMsg: + return false, nil + case *channelRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, nil + default: + return false, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to channel request: %#v", m) + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// ackRequest either sends an ack or nack to the channel request. +func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + var msg interface{} + if !ok { + msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } else { + msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } + return ch.sendMessage(msg) +} + +func (ch *channel) ChannelType() string { + return ch.chanType +} + +func (ch *channel) ExtraData() []byte { + return ch.extraData +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..741e984 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -0,0 +1,789 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/rc4" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "io" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305" +) + +const ( + packetSizeMultiple = 16 // TODO(huin) this should be determined by the cipher. + + // RFC 4253 section 6.1 defines a minimum packet size of 32768 that implementations + // MUST be able to process (plus a few more kilobytes for padding and mac). The RFC + // indicates implementations SHOULD be able to handle larger packet sizes, but then + // waffles on about reasonable limits. + // + // OpenSSH caps their maxPacket at 256kB so we choose to do + // the same. maxPacket is also used to ensure that uint32 + // length fields do not overflow, so it should remain well + // below 4G. + maxPacket = 256 * 1024 +) + +// noneCipher implements cipher.Stream and provides no encryption. It is used +// by the transport before the first key-exchange. +type noneCipher struct{} + +func (c noneCipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + copy(dst, src) +} + +func newAESCTR(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return cipher.NewCTR(c, iv), nil +} + +func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + return rc4.NewCipher(key) +} + +type cipherMode struct { + keySize int + ivSize int + create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) +} + +func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + stream, err := createFunc(key, iv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var streamDump []byte + if skip > 0 { + streamDump = make([]byte, 512) + } + + for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; { + dumpThisTime := remainingToDump + if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { + dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) + } + stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) + remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime + } + + mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey) + return &streamPacketCipher{ + mac: mac, + etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, + macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()), + cipher: stream, + }, nil + } +} + +// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included +// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in +// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers. +var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{ + // Ciphers from RFC 4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms + // are defined in the order specified in the RFC. + "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + + // Ciphers from RFC 4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers. + // They are defined in the order specified in the RFC. + "arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, + "arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, + + // Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol. + // Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and + // RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution." + // RFC 4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour. + "arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)}, + + // AEAD ciphers + gcm128CipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher}, + gcm256CipherID: {32, 12, newGCMCipher}, + chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher}, + + // CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config. + // (See https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a526.pdf). If absolutely + // needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it. + // You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if + // you do. + aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}, + + // 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default + // config. + tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}, +} + +// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length +// and number of padding bytes. +const prefixLen = 5 + +// streamPacketCipher is a packetCipher using a stream cipher. +type streamPacketCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + cipher cipher.Stream + etm bool + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + prefix [prefixLen]byte + seqNumBytes [4]byte + padding [2 * packetSizeMultiple]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte +} + +// readCipherPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument. +func (s *streamPacketCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5]) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } else { + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4]) + paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4]) + + var macSize uint32 + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + if s.etm { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4]) + s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:]) + } else { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + } + macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size()) + } + + if length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too small") + } + + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + // the maxPacket check above ensures that length-1+macSize + // does not overflow. + if uint32(cap(s.packetData)) < length-1+macSize { + s.packetData = make([]byte, length-1+macSize) + } else { + s.packetData = s.packetData[:length-1+macSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.packetData); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mac := s.packetData[length-1:] + data := s.packetData[:length-1] + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data) + + if s.mac != nil { + if !s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil +} + +// writeCipherPacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument +func (s *streamPacketCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + if len(packet) > maxPacket { + return errors.New("ssh: packet too large") + } + + aadlen := 0 + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes + aadlen = 4 + } + + paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple + if paddingLength < 4 { + paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := len(packet) + 1 + paddingLength + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.prefix[:], uint32(length)) + s.prefix[4] = byte(paddingLength) + padding := s.padding[:paddingLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + + if s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted, + // but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } + + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + + if !s.etm { + // For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + } + + if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) { + // For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted + // and the packet length must remain unencrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding) + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + + if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(packet); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if _, err := w.Write(s.macResult); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + return nil +} + +type gcmCipher struct { + aead cipher.AEAD + prefix [4]byte + iv []byte + buf []byte +} + +func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(c) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &gcmCipher{ + aead: aead, + iv: iv, + }, nil +} + +const gcmTagSize = 16 + +func (c *gcmCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + // Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the + // stream cipher because that encrypts the length too. + padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple) + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := uint32(len(packet) + int(padding) + 1) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.prefix[:], length) + if _, err := w.Write(c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length] + } + + c.buf[0] = padding + copy(c.buf[1:], packet) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[1+len(packet):]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.buf = c.aead.Seal(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + c.incIV() + + return nil +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() { + for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- { + c.iv[i]++ + if c.iv[i] != 0 { + break + } + } +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded") + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length+gcmTagSize) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length+gcmTagSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + plain, err := c.aead.Open(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.incIV() + + if len(plain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") + } + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)] + return plain, nil +} + +// cbcCipher implements aes128-cbc cipher defined in RFC 4253 section 6.1 +type cbcCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + macSize uint32 + decrypter cipher.BlockMode + encrypter cipher.BlockMode + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + seqNumBytes [4]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte + + // Amount of data we should still read to hide which + // verification error triggered. + oracleCamouflage uint32 +} + +func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + cbc := &cbcCipher{ + mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), + decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv), + encrypter: cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, iv), + packetData: make([]byte, 1024), + } + if cbc.mac != nil { + cbc.macSize = uint32(cbc.mac.Size()) + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func maxUInt32(a, b int) uint32 { + if a > b { + return uint32(a) + } + return uint32(b) +} + +const ( + cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple = 8 + cbcMinPacketSize = 16 + cbcMinPaddingSize = 4 +) + +// cbcError represents a verification error that may leak information. +type cbcError string + +func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) } + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := c.readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum, r) + if err != nil { + if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok { + // Verification error: read a fixed amount of + // data, to make distinguishing between + // failing MAC and failing length check more + // difficult. + io.CopyN(io.Discard, r, int64(c.oracleCamouflage)) + } + } + return p, err +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize() + + // Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the + // case of block ciphers - this is copied back to the payload later. + // How many bytes of payload/padding will be read with this first read. + firstBlockLength := uint32((prefixLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize * blockSize) + firstBlock := c.packetData[:firstBlockLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, firstBlock); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.oracleCamouflage = maxPacket + 4 + c.macSize - firstBlockLength + + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(firstBlock, firstBlock) + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(firstBlock[:4]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too large") + } + if length+4 < maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSize, blockSize) { + // The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size, whichever + // is larger) bytes. + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too small") + } + // The length of the packet (including the length field but not the MAC) must + // be a multiple of the block size or 8, whichever is larger. + if (length+4)%maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, blockSize) != 0 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length multiple") + } + + paddingLength := uint32(firstBlock[4]) + if paddingLength < cbcMinPaddingSize || length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length") + } + + // Positions within the c.packetData buffer: + macStart := 4 + length + paddingStart := macStart - paddingLength + + // Entire packet size, starting before length, ending at end of mac. + entirePacketSize := macStart + c.macSize + + // Ensure c.packetData is large enough for the entire packet data. + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < entirePacketSize { + // Still need to upsize and copy, but this should be rare at runtime, only + // on upsizing the packetData buffer. + c.packetData = make([]byte, entirePacketSize) + copy(c.packetData, firstBlock) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize] + } + + n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n) + + remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart] + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted) + + mac := c.packetData[macStart:] + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData[:macStart]) + c.macResult = c.mac.Sum(c.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize()) + + // Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding). + // Enforce minimum padding and packet size. + encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize) + // Enforce block size. + encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize + + length := encLength - 4 + paddingLength := int(length) - (1 + len(packet)) + + // Overall buffer contains: header, payload, padding, mac. + // Space for the MAC is reserved in the capacity but not the slice length. + bufferSize := encLength + c.macSize + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < bufferSize { + c.packetData = make([]byte, encLength, bufferSize) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:encLength] + } + + p := c.packetData + + // Packet header. + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, length) + p = p[4:] + p[0] = byte(paddingLength) + + // Payload. + p = p[1:] + copy(p, packet) + + // Padding. + p = p[len(packet):] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, p); err != nil { + return err + } + + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData) + // The MAC is now appended into the capacity reserved for it earlier. + c.packetData = c.mac.Sum(c.packetData) + } + + c.encrypter.CryptBlocks(c.packetData[:encLength], c.packetData[:encLength]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.packetData); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + +// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +// AEAD, which is described here: +// +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00 +// +// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC 4253 Section 6 +// also requires of stream ciphers. +type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { + lengthKey [32]byte + contentKey [32]byte + buf []byte +} + +func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + if len(key) != 64 { + panic(len(key)) + } + + c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{ + buf: make([]byte, 256), + } + + copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) + copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) + return c, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var lenBytes [4]byte + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + contentEnd := 4 + length + packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize + if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd { + c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd) + copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd]) + if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + + plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] + s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain) + + if len(plain) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: empty packet") + } + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + + plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)] + + return plain, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte + // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. + const packetSizeMultiple = 8 + + padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag. + totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize + if cap(c.buf) < totalLength { + c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength] + } + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) + c.buf[4] = byte(padding) + copy(c.buf[5:], payload) + packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil { + return err + } + + s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd]) + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) + + copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdc356c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,282 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Client implements a traditional SSH client that supports shells, +// subprocesses, TCP port/streamlocal forwarding and tunneled dialing. +type Client struct { + Conn + + handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards + + forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side + mu sync.Mutex + channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel +} + +// HandleChannelOpen returns a channel on which NewChannel requests +// for the given type are sent. If the type already is being handled, +// nil is returned. The channel is closed when the connection is closed. +func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + if c.channelHandlers == nil { + // The SSH channel has been closed. + c := make(chan NewChannel) + close(c) + return c + } + + ch := c.channelHandlers[channelType] + if ch != nil { + return nil + } + + ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize) + c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch + return ch +} + +// NewClient creates a Client on top of the given connection. +func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client { + conn := &Client{ + Conn: c, + channelHandlers: make(map[string]chan NewChannel, 1), + } + + go conn.handleGlobalRequests(reqs) + go conn.handleChannelOpens(chans) + go func() { + conn.Wait() + conn.forwards.closeAll() + }() + return conn +} + +// NewClientConn establishes an authenticated SSH connection using c +// as the underlying transport. The Request and NewChannel channels +// must be serviced or the connection will hang. +func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.HostKeyCallback == nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: must specify HostKeyCallback") + } + + conn := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c, user: fullConf.User}, + } + + if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %v", err) + } + conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport) + return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section +// 7. +func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error { + if config.ClientVersion != "" { + c.clientVersion = []byte(config.ClientVersion) + } else { + c.clientVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + c.transport = newClientTransport( + newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */), + c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr()) + if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID() + return c.clientAuthenticate(config) +} + +// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key exchange. +// algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may be a certificate type. +func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, algo string, result *kexResult) error { + sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature) + if len(rest) > 0 || !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + if a := underlyingAlgo(algo); sig.Format != a { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid signature algorithm %q, expected %q", sig.Format, a) + } + + return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig) +} + +// NewSession opens a new Session for this client. (A session is a remote +// execution of a program.) +func (c *Client) NewSession() (*Session, error) { + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("session", nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return newSession(ch, in) +} + +func (c *Client) handleGlobalRequests(incoming <-chan *Request) { + for r := range incoming { + // This handles keepalive messages and matches + // the behaviour of OpenSSH. + r.Reply(false, nil) + } +} + +// handleChannelOpens channel open messages from the remote side. +func (c *Client) handleChannelOpens(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + c.mu.Lock() + handler := c.channelHandlers[ch.ChannelType()] + c.mu.Unlock() + + if handler != nil { + handler <- ch + } else { + ch.Reject(UnknownChannelType, fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel type: %v", ch.ChannelType())) + } + } + + c.mu.Lock() + for _, ch := range c.channelHandlers { + close(ch) + } + c.channelHandlers = nil + c.mu.Unlock() +} + +// Dial starts a client connection to the given SSH server. It is a +// convenience function that connects to the given network address, +// initiates the SSH handshake, and then sets up a Client. For access +// to incoming channels and requests, use net.Dial with NewClientConn +// instead. +func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) { + conn, err := net.DialTimeout(network, addr, config.Timeout) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c, chans, reqs, err := NewClientConn(conn, addr, config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return NewClient(c, chans, reqs), nil +} + +// HostKeyCallback is the function type used for verifying server +// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or +// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial +// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the +// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection. +type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error + +// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by +// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server. +type BannerCallback func(message string) error + +// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be +// modified after having been passed to an SSH function. +type ClientConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration that is shared between clients and + // servers. + Config + + // User contains the username to authenticate as. + User string + + // Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the + // server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will + // be used during authentication. + Auth []AuthMethod + + // HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic + // handshake to validate the server's host key. The client + // configuration must supply this callback for the connection + // to succeed. The functions InsecureIgnoreHostKey or + // FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks. + HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + + // BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom + // server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to + // handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for + // simplistic display on Stderr. + BannerCallback BannerCallback + + // ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will + // be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used. + ClientVersion string + + // HostKeyAlgorithms lists the public key algorithms that the client will + // accept from the server for host key authentication, in order of + // preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any + // string returned from a PublicKey.Type method may be used, or + // any of the CertAlgo and KeyAlgo constants. + HostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish. + // + // A Timeout of zero means no timeout. + Timeout time.Duration +} + +// InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept any host key. It should +// not be used for production code. +func InsecureIgnoreHostKey() HostKeyCallback { + return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + return nil + } +} + +type fixedHostKey struct { + key PublicKey +} + +func (f *fixedHostKey) check(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + if f.key == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: required host key was nil") + } + if !bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), f.key.Marshal()) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: host key mismatch") + } + return nil +} + +// FixedHostKey returns a function for use in +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept only a specific host key. +func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback { + hk := &fixedHostKey{key} + return hk.check +} + +// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr. +func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback { + return func(banner string) error { + _, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner) + + return err + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c3bc25 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,761 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "strings" +) + +type authResult int + +const ( + authFailure authResult = iota + authPartialSuccess + authSuccess +) + +// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. +func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { + // initiate user auth session + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil { + return err + } + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + // The server may choose to send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO at this point (if we + // advertised willingness to receive one, which we always do) or not. See + // RFC 8308, Section 2.4. + extensions := make(map[string][]byte) + if len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgExtInfo { + var extInfo extInfoMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &extInfo); err != nil { + return err + } + payload := extInfo.Payload + for i := uint32(0); i < extInfo.NumExtensions; i++ { + name, rest, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return parseError(msgExtInfo) + } + value, rest, ok := parseString(rest) + if !ok { + return parseError(msgExtInfo) + } + extensions[string(name)] = value + payload = rest + } + packet, err = c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + } + var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil { + return err + } + + // during the authentication phase the client first attempts the "none" method + // then any untried methods suggested by the server. + var tried []string + var lastMethods []string + + sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID() + for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; { + ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand, extensions) + if err != nil { + // We return the error later if there is no other method left to + // try. + ok = authFailure + } + if ok == authSuccess { + // success + return nil + } else if ok == authFailure { + if m := auth.method(); !contains(tried, m) { + tried = append(tried, m) + } + } + if methods == nil { + methods = lastMethods + } + lastMethods = methods + + auth = nil + + findNext: + for _, a := range config.Auth { + candidateMethod := a.method() + if contains(tried, candidateMethod) { + continue + } + for _, meth := range methods { + if meth == candidateMethod { + auth = a + break findNext + } + } + } + + if auth == nil && err != nil { + // We have an error and there are no other authentication methods to + // try, so we return it. + return err + } + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", tried) +} + +func contains(list []string, e string) bool { + for _, s := range list { + if s == e { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method. +type AuthMethod interface { + // auth authenticates user over transport t. + // Returns true if authentication is successful. + // If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative + // method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored + // and the previous set of possible methods will be reused. + auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) + + // method returns the RFC 4252 method name. + method() string +} + +// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2. +type noneAuth int + +func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "none", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (n *noneAuth) method() string { + return "none" +} + +// passwordCallback is an AuthMethod that fetches the password through +// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user. +type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error) + +func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + type passwordAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Reply bool + Password string + } + + pw, err := cb() + // REVIEW NOTE: is there a need to support skipping a password attempt? + // The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password + // when prompting. + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + Reply: false, + Password: pw, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (cb passwordCallback) method() string { + return "password" +} + +// Password returns an AuthMethod using the given password. +func Password(secret string) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(func() (string, error) { return secret, nil }) +} + +// PasswordCallback returns an AuthMethod that uses a callback for +// fetching a password. +func PasswordCallback(prompt func() (secret string, err error)) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(prompt) +} + +type publickeyAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + // HasSig indicates to the receiver packet that the auth request is signed and + // should be used for authentication of the request. + HasSig bool + Algoname string + PubKey []byte + // Sig is tagged with "rest" so Marshal will exclude it during + // validateKey + Sig []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// publicKeyCallback is an AuthMethod that uses a set of key +// pairs for authentication. +type publicKeyCallback func() ([]Signer, error) + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string { + return "publickey" +} + +func pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer Signer, extensions map[string][]byte) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, string, error) { + var as MultiAlgorithmSigner + keyFormat := signer.PublicKey().Type() + + // If the signer implements MultiAlgorithmSigner we use the algorithms it + // support, if it implements AlgorithmSigner we assume it supports all + // algorithms, otherwise only the key format one. + switch s := signer.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + as = s + case AlgorithmSigner: + as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: s, + supportedAlgorithms: algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)), + } + default: + as = &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: algorithmSignerWrapper{signer}, + supportedAlgorithms: []string{underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)}, + } + } + + getFallbackAlgo := func() (string, error) { + // Fallback to use if there is no "server-sig-algs" extension or a + // common algorithm cannot be found. We use the public key format if the + // MultiAlgorithmSigner supports it, otherwise we return an error. + if !contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(keyFormat)) { + return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common public key signature algorithm, server only supports %q for key type %q, signer only supports %v", + underlyingAlgo(keyFormat), keyFormat, as.Algorithms()) + } + return keyFormat, nil + } + + extPayload, ok := extensions["server-sig-algs"] + if !ok { + // If there is no "server-sig-algs" extension use the fallback + // algorithm. + algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() + return as, algo, err + } + + // The server-sig-algs extension only carries underlying signature + // algorithm, but we are trying to select a protocol-level public key + // algorithm, which might be a certificate type. Extend the list of server + // supported algorithms to include the corresponding certificate algorithms. + serverAlgos := strings.Split(string(extPayload), ",") + for _, algo := range serverAlgos { + if certAlgo, ok := certificateAlgo(algo); ok { + serverAlgos = append(serverAlgos, certAlgo) + } + } + + // Filter algorithms based on those supported by MultiAlgorithmSigner. + var keyAlgos []string + for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { + if contains(as.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + keyAlgos = append(keyAlgos, algo) + } + } + + algo, err := findCommon("public key signature algorithm", keyAlgos, serverAlgos) + if err != nil { + // If there is no overlap, return the fallback algorithm to support + // servers that fail to list all supported algorithms. + algo, err := getFallbackAlgo() + return as, algo, err + } + return as, algo, nil +} + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + // Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is + // acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will + // attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat + // the process with the remaining keys. + + signers, err := cb() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var methods []string + var errSigAlgo error + for _, signer := range signers { + pub := signer.PublicKey() + as, algo, err := pickSignatureAlgorithm(signer, extensions) + if err != nil && errSigAlgo == nil { + // If we cannot negotiate a signature algorithm store the first + // error so we can return it to provide a more meaningful message if + // no other signers work. + errSigAlgo = err + continue + } + ok, err := validateKey(pub, algo, user, c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if !ok { + continue + } + + pubKey := pub.Marshal() + data := buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + }, algo, pubKey) + sign, err := as.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // manually wrap the serialized signature in a string + s := Marshal(sign) + sig := make([]byte, stringLength(len(s))) + marshalString(sig, s) + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + HasSig: true, + Algoname: algo, + PubKey: pubKey, + Sig: sig, + } + p := Marshal(&msg) + if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var success authResult + success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not + // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any + // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when + // additional authentication methods are required. + if success == authSuccess || !contains(methods, cb.method()) { + return success, methods, err + } + } + + return authFailure, methods, errSigAlgo +} + +// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server. +func validateKey(key PublicKey, algo string, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "publickey", + HasSig: false, + Algoname: algo, + PubKey: pubKey, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + return confirmKeyAck(key, algo, c) +} + +func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, algo string, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return false, err + } + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + if msg.Algo != algo || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) { + return false, nil + } + return true, nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + return false, nil + default: + return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthPubKeyOk, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +// PublicKeys returns an AuthMethod that uses the given key +// pairs. +func PublicKeys(signers ...Signer) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(func() ([]Signer, error) { return signers, nil }) +} + +// PublicKeysCallback returns an AuthMethod that runs the given +// function to obtain a list of key pairs. +func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(getSigners) +} + +// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded +// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and +// an error if an unexpected response was received. +func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) { + gotMsgExtInfo := false + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + case msgExtInfo: + // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. + if gotMsgExtInfo { + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + gotMsgExtInfo = true + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error { + var msg userAuthBannerMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport) + if !ok { + return nil + } + + if transport.bannerCallback != nil { + return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message) + } + + return nil +} + +// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally +// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers. +// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After +// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no +// questions, for which the name and instruction messages should be +// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for +// both CLI and GUI environments. +type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) + +// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response +// sequence controlled by the server. +func KeyboardInteractive(challenge KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) AuthMethod { + return challenge +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string { + return "keyboard-interactive" +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + type initiateMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Language string + Submethods string + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&initiateMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "keyboard-interactive", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + gotMsgExtInfo := false + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // like handleAuthResponse, but with less options. + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + continue + case msgExtInfo: + // Ignore post-authentication RFC 8308 extensions, once. + if gotMsgExtInfo { + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + gotMsgExtInfo = true + continue + case msgUserAuthInfoRequest: + // OK + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + + var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs. + rest := msg.Prompts + var prompts []string + var echos []bool + for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ { + prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest) + if !ok || len(r) == 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") + } + prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt)) + echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0) + rest = r[1:] + } + + if len(rest) != 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") + } + + answers, err := cb(msg.Name, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if len(answers) != len(prompts) { + return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: incorrect number of answers from keyboard-interactive callback %d (expected %d)", len(answers), len(prompts)) + } + responseLength := 1 + 4 + for _, a := range answers { + responseLength += stringLength(len(a)) + } + serialized := make([]byte, responseLength) + p := serialized + p[0] = msgUserAuthInfoResponse + p = p[1:] + p = marshalUint32(p, uint32(len(answers))) + for _, a := range answers { + p = marshalString(p, []byte(a)) + } + + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } +} + +type retryableAuthMethod struct { + authMethod AuthMethod + maxTries int +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, extensions map[string][]byte) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) { + for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ { + ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand, extensions) + if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate + return ok, methods, err + } + } + return ok, methods, err +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string { + return r.authMethod.method() +} + +// RetryableAuthMethod is a decorator for other auth methods enabling them to +// be retried up to maxTries before considering that AuthMethod itself failed. +// If maxTries is <= 0, will retry indefinitely +// +// This is useful for interactive clients using challenge/response type +// authentication (e.g. Keyboard-Interactive, Password, etc) where the user +// could mistype their response resulting in the server issuing a +// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (rfc4252 #8 [password] and rfc4256 #3.4 +// [keyboard-interactive]); Without this decorator, the non-retryable +// AuthMethod would be removed from future consideration, and never tried again +// (and so the user would never be able to retry their entry). +func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod { + return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries} +} + +// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication. +// See RFC 4462 section 3 +// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details. +// target is the server host you want to log in to. +func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod { + if gssAPIClient == nil { + panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic") + } + return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target} +} + +type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct { + gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient + target string +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader, _ map[string][]byte) (authResult, []string, error) { + m := &userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: g.method(), + } + // The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.2. + m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1) + m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID)) + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an + // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or + // with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.3. + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check + // selected mech if it is valid. + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // Start the loop into the exchange token. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.4. + var token []byte + defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext() + for { + // Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer. + nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if len(nextToken) > 0 { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: nextToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+ + "Major Status: %d\n"+ + "Minor Status: %d\n"+ + "Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus, + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token + } + } + // Binding Encryption Keys. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.5. + micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic") + micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{ + MIC: micToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string { + return "gssapi-with-mic" +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b419c76 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go @@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "io" + "math" + "strings" + "sync" + + _ "crypto/sha1" + _ "crypto/sha256" + _ "crypto/sha512" +) + +// These are string constants in the SSH protocol. +const ( + compressionNone = "none" + serviceUserAuth = "ssh-userauth" + serviceSSH = "ssh-connection" +) + +// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend. +var supportedCiphers = []string{ + "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID, + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour", + aes128cbcID, + tripledescbcID, +} + +// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers. +var preferredCiphers = []string{ + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", gcm256CipherID, + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", +} + +// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in +// preference order. +var supportedKexAlgos = []string{ + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH, + // P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't + // reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK. + kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, + kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH16SHA512, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, + kexAlgoDH1SHA1, +} + +// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden +// for the server half. +var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{ + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests +} + +// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange +// algorithms in preference order. The diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 algorithm +// is disabled by default because it is a bit slower than the others. +var preferredKexAlgos = []string{ + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH, + kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, + kexAlgoDH14SHA256, kexAlgoDH14SHA1, +} + +// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods +// of authenticating servers) in preference order. +var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{ + CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, + CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, + + KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, + KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, + + KeyAlgoED25519, +} + +// supportedMACs specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order. +// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed +// because they have reached the end of their useful life. +var supportedMACs = []string{ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha2-512", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96", +} + +var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone} + +// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported signature algorithms to their +// respective hashes needed for signing and verification. +var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{ + KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256: crypto.SHA256, + KeyAlgoRSASHA512: crypto.SHA512, + KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1, + KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512, + // KeyAlgoED25519 doesn't pre-hash. + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: crypto.SHA256, + KeyAlgoSKED25519: crypto.SHA256, +} + +// algorithmsForKeyFormat returns the supported signature algorithms for a given +// public key format (PublicKey.Type), in order of preference. See RFC 8332, +// Section 2. See also the note in sendKexInit on backwards compatibility. +func algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat string) []string { + switch keyFormat { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + return []string{KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA} + case CertAlgoRSAv01: + return []string{CertAlgoRSASHA256v01, CertAlgoRSASHA512v01, CertAlgoRSAv01} + default: + return []string{keyFormat} + } +} + +// isRSA returns whether algo is a supported RSA algorithm, including certificate +// algorithms. +func isRSA(algo string) bool { + algos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(KeyAlgoRSA) + return contains(algos, underlyingAlgo(algo)) +} + +// supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos specifies the supported client public key +// authentication algorithms. Note that this doesn't include certificate types +// since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the client if +// it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant. +var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos = []string{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + KeyAlgoSKED25519, KeyAlgoSKECDSA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSASHA256, KeyAlgoRSASHA512, KeyAlgoRSA, + KeyAlgoDSA, +} + +var supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList = strings.Join(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, ",") + +// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't +// match what we wanted. +func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected %d)", got, expected) +} + +// parseError results from a malformed SSH message. +func parseError(tag uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag) +} + +func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, err error) { + for _, c := range client { + for _, s := range server { + if c == s { + return c, nil + } + } + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server) +} + +// directionAlgorithms records algorithm choices in one direction (either read or write) +type directionAlgorithms struct { + Cipher string + MAC string + Compression string +} + +// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes. +func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 { + // According to RFC 4344 block ciphers should rekey after + // 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is + // 128. + switch a.Cipher { + case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcm128CipherID, gcm256CipherID, aes128cbcID: + return 16 * (1 << 32) + + } + + // For others, stick with RFC 4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data. + return 1 << 30 +} + +var aeadCiphers = map[string]bool{ + gcm128CipherID: true, + gcm256CipherID: true, + chacha20Poly1305ID: true, +} + +type algorithms struct { + kex string + hostKey string + w directionAlgorithms + r directionAlgorithms +} + +func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) { + result := &algorithms{} + + result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos) + if err != nil { + return + } + + result.hostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc, ctos := &result.w, &result.r + if isClient { + ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos + } + + ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + if !aeadCiphers[ctos.Cipher] { + ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + if !aeadCiphers[stoc.Cipher] { + stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + } + + ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + return result, nil +} + +// If rekeythreshold is too small, we can't make any progress sending +// stuff. +const minRekeyThreshold uint64 = 256 + +// Config contains configuration data common to both ServerConfig and +// ClientConfig. +type Config struct { + // Rand provides the source of entropy for cryptographic + // primitives. If Rand is nil, the cryptographic random reader + // in package crypto/rand will be used. + Rand io.Reader + + // The maximum number of bytes sent or received after which a + // new key is negotiated. It must be at least 256. If + // unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used. + RekeyThreshold uint64 + + // The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a default set + // of algorithms is used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + KeyExchanges []string + + // The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is + // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + Ciphers []string + + // The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default is + // used. Unsupported values are silently ignored. + MACs []string +} + +// SetDefaults sets sensible values for unset fields in config. This is +// exported for testing: Configs passed to SSH functions are copied and have +// default values set automatically. +func (c *Config) SetDefaults() { + if c.Rand == nil { + c.Rand = rand.Reader + } + if c.Ciphers == nil { + c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers + } + var ciphers []string + for _, c := range c.Ciphers { + if cipherModes[c] != nil { + // Ignore the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition. + ciphers = append(ciphers, c) + } + } + c.Ciphers = ciphers + + if c.KeyExchanges == nil { + c.KeyExchanges = preferredKexAlgos + } + var kexs []string + for _, k := range c.KeyExchanges { + if kexAlgoMap[k] != nil { + // Ignore the KEX if we have no kexAlgoMap definition. + kexs = append(kexs, k) + } + } + c.KeyExchanges = kexs + + if c.MACs == nil { + c.MACs = supportedMACs + } + var macs []string + for _, m := range c.MACs { + if macModes[m] != nil { + // Ignore the MAC if we have no macModes definition. + macs = append(macs, m) + } + } + c.MACs = macs + + if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 { + // cipher specific default + } else if c.RekeyThreshold < minRekeyThreshold { + c.RekeyThreshold = minRekeyThreshold + } else if c.RekeyThreshold >= math.MaxInt64 { + // Avoid weirdness if somebody uses -1 as a threshold. + c.RekeyThreshold = math.MaxInt64 + } +} + +// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove +// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7. algo is the advertised +// algorithm, and may be a certificate type. +func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo string, pubKey []byte) []byte { + data := struct { + Session []byte + Type byte + User string + Service string + Method string + Sign bool + Algo string + PubKey []byte + }{ + sessionID, + msgUserAuthRequest, + req.User, + req.Service, + req.Method, + true, + algo, + pubKey, + } + return Marshal(data) +} + +func appendU16(buf []byte, n uint16) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte { + return append(buf, + byte(n>>56), byte(n>>48), byte(n>>40), byte(n>>32), + byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendInt(buf []byte, n int) []byte { + return appendU32(buf, uint32(n)) +} + +func appendString(buf []byte, s string) []byte { + buf = appendU32(buf, uint32(len(s))) + buf = append(buf, s...) + return buf +} + +func appendBool(buf []byte, b bool) []byte { + if b { + return append(buf, 1) + } + return append(buf, 0) +} + +// newCond is a helper to hide the fact that there is no usable zero +// value for sync.Cond. +func newCond() *sync.Cond { return sync.NewCond(new(sync.Mutex)) } + +// window represents the buffer available to clients +// wishing to write to a channel. +type window struct { + *sync.Cond + win uint32 // RFC 4254 5.2 says the window size can grow to 2^32-1 + writeWaiters int + closed bool +} + +// add adds win to the amount of window available +// for consumers. +func (w *window) add(win uint32) bool { + // a zero sized window adjust is a noop. + if win == 0 { + return true + } + w.L.Lock() + if w.win+win < win { + w.L.Unlock() + return false + } + w.win += win + // It is unusual that multiple goroutines would be attempting to reserve + // window space, but not guaranteed. Use broadcast to notify all waiters + // that additional window is available. + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() + return true +} + +// close sets the window to closed, so all reservations fail +// immediately. +func (w *window) close() { + w.L.Lock() + w.closed = true + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() +} + +// reserve reserves win from the available window capacity. +// If no capacity remains, reserve will block. reserve may +// return less than requested. +func (w *window) reserve(win uint32) (uint32, error) { + var err error + w.L.Lock() + w.writeWaiters++ + w.Broadcast() + for w.win == 0 && !w.closed { + w.Wait() + } + w.writeWaiters-- + if w.win < win { + win = w.win + } + w.win -= win + if w.closed { + err = io.EOF + } + w.L.Unlock() + return win, err +} + +// waitWriterBlocked waits until some goroutine is blocked for further +// writes. It is used in tests only. +func (w *window) waitWriterBlocked() { + w.Cond.L.Lock() + for w.writeWaiters == 0 { + w.Cond.Wait() + } + w.Cond.L.Unlock() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8f345ee --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" +) + +// OpenChannelError is returned if the other side rejects an +// OpenChannel request. +type OpenChannelError struct { + Reason RejectionReason + Message string +} + +func (e *OpenChannelError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: rejected: %s (%s)", e.Reason, e.Message) +} + +// ConnMetadata holds metadata for the connection. +type ConnMetadata interface { + // User returns the user ID for this connection. + User() string + + // SessionID returns the session hash, also denoted by H. + SessionID() []byte + + // ClientVersion returns the client's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ClientVersion() []byte + + // ServerVersion returns the server's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ServerVersion() []byte + + // RemoteAddr returns the remote address for this connection. + RemoteAddr() net.Addr + + // LocalAddr returns the local address for this connection. + LocalAddr() net.Addr +} + +// Conn represents an SSH connection for both server and client roles. +// Conn is the basis for implementing an application layer, such +// as ClientConn, which implements the traditional shell access for +// clients. +type Conn interface { + ConnMetadata + + // SendRequest sends a global request, and returns the + // reply. If wantReply is true, it returns the response status + // and payload. See also RFC 4254, section 4. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) + + // OpenChannel tries to open an channel. If the request is + // rejected, it returns *OpenChannelError. On success it returns + // the SSH Channel and a Go channel for incoming, out-of-band + // requests. The Go channel must be serviced, or the + // connection will hang. + OpenChannel(name string, data []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Close closes the underlying network connection + Close() error + + // Wait blocks until the connection has shut down, and returns the + // error causing the shutdown. + Wait() error + + // TODO(hanwen): consider exposing: + // RequestKeyChange + // Disconnect +} + +// DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the +// passed-in channel. +func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) { + for req := range in { + if req.WantReply { + req.Reply(false, nil) + } + } +} + +// A connection represents an incoming connection. +type connection struct { + transport *handshakeTransport + sshConn + + // The connection protocol. + *mux +} + +func (c *connection) Close() error { + return c.sshConn.conn.Close() +} + +// sshConn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and +// writes. +type sshConn struct { + conn net.Conn + + user string + sessionID []byte + clientVersion []byte + serverVersion []byte +} + +func dup(src []byte) []byte { + dst := make([]byte, len(src)) + copy(dst, src) + return dst +} + +func (c *sshConn) User() string { + return c.user +} + +func (c *sshConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) Close() error { + return c.conn.Close() +} + +func (c *sshConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.LocalAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) SessionID() []byte { + return dup(c.sessionID) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.clientVersion) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.serverVersion) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..edbe633 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +/* +Package ssh implements an SSH client and server. + +SSH is a transport security protocol, an authentication protocol and a +family of application protocols. The most typical application level +protocol is a remote shell and this is specifically implemented. However, +the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support +others. + +References: + + [PROTOCOL]: https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL?rev=HEAD + [PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD + [SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1 + +This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself, +so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise. +*/ +package ssh // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..70a7369 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go @@ -0,0 +1,751 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "net" + "sync" +) + +// debugHandshake, if set, prints messages sent and received. Key +// exchange messages are printed as if DH were used, so the debug +// messages are wrong when using ECDH. +const debugHandshake = false + +// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is +// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more +// quickly. +const chanSize = 16 + +// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key +// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through +// msgNewKeys in both directions. +type keyingTransport interface { + packetConn + + // prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a + // direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent + // or received. + prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error +} + +// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport +// and offers a thread-safe writePacket() interface. +type handshakeTransport struct { + conn keyingTransport + config *Config + + serverVersion []byte + clientVersion []byte + + // hostKeys is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, + // it contains all host keys that can be used to sign the + // connection. + hostKeys []Signer + + // hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case, + // we accept these key types from the server as host key. + hostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // On read error, incoming is closed, and readError is set. + incoming chan []byte + readError error + + mu sync.Mutex + writeError error + sentInitPacket []byte + sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg + pendingPackets [][]byte // Used when a key exchange is in progress. + writePacketsLeft uint32 + writeBytesLeft int64 + + // If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this + // channel, and the write loop will send out a kex + // message. + requestKex chan struct{} + + // If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit + // packet is sent here for the write loop to find it. + startKex chan *pendingKex + kexLoopDone chan struct{} // closed (with writeError non-nil) when kexLoop exits + + // data for host key checking + hostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + dialAddress string + remoteAddr net.Addr + + // bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in + // ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication + // dance to handle a custom server's message. + bannerCallback BannerCallback + + // Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange. + algorithms *algorithms + + // Counters exclusively owned by readLoop. + readPacketsLeft uint32 + readBytesLeft int64 + + // The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet. + sessionID []byte +} + +type pendingKex struct { + otherInit []byte + done chan error +} + +func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport { + t := &handshakeTransport{ + conn: conn, + serverVersion: serverVersion, + clientVersion: clientVersion, + incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize), + requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1), + startKex: make(chan *pendingKex), + kexLoopDone: make(chan struct{}), + + config: config, + } + t.resetReadThresholds() + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // We always start with a mandatory key exchange. + t.requestKex <- struct{}{} + return t +} + +func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ClientConfig, dialAddr string, addr net.Addr) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.dialAddress = dialAddr + t.remoteAddr = addr + t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback + t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback + if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms + } else { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos + } + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte { + return t.sessionID +} + +// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be +// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport. +func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error { + p, err := t.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if p[0] != msgNewKeys { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys") + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string { + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + return "server" + } + return "client" +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + action := "got" + if write { + action = "sent" + } + + if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p)) + } else { + msg, err := decode(p) + log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err) + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) { + p, ok := <-t.incoming + if !ok { + return nil, t.readError + } + return p, nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() { + first := true + for { + p, err := t.readOnePacket(first) + first = false + if err != nil { + t.readError = err + close(t.incoming) + break + } + if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug { + continue + } + t.incoming <- p + } + + // Stop writers too. + t.recordWriteError(t.readError) + + // Unblock the writer should it wait for this. + close(t.startKex) + + // Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket. +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, true) + } + return t.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + return t.writeError +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.writeError == nil && err != nil { + t.writeError = err + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() { + select { + case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}: + default: + // something already requested a kex, so do nothing. + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() { + t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() { + +write: + for t.getWriteError() == nil { + var request *pendingKex + var sent bool + + for request == nil || !sent { + var ok bool + select { + case request, ok = <-t.startKex: + if !ok { + break write + } + case <-t.requestKex: + break + } + + if !sent { + if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil { + t.recordWriteError(err) + break + } + sent = true + } + } + + if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil { + if request != nil { + request.done <- err + } + break + } + + // We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK: + // we never block on sending to t.requestKex. + + // We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end + // has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send + // another key change request, until we close the done + // channel on the pendingKex request. + + err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit) + + t.mu.Lock() + t.writeError = err + t.sentInitPacket = nil + t.sentInitMsg = nil + + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // we have completed the key exchange. Since the + // reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out + // the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation + // where: 1) we consumed our own request for the + // initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side + // caused another send on the requestKex channel, + clear: + for { + select { + case <-t.requestKex: + // + default: + break clear + } + } + + request.done <- t.writeError + + // kex finished. Push packets that we received while + // the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex + // and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger + // another kex while we are still busy with the last + // one, things will become very confusing. + for _, p := range t.pendingPackets { + t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p) + if t.writeError != nil { + break + } + } + t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0] + t.mu.Unlock() + } + + // Unblock reader. + t.conn.Close() + + // drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex + // because nobody does blocking sends there. + for request := range t.startKex { + request.done <- t.getWriteError() + } + + // Mark that the loop is done so that Close can return. + close(t.kexLoopDone) +} + +// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them +// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than +// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we +// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the +// key exchange itself. +const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31) + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() { + t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := t.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 { + t.readPacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.readBytesLeft > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + if first && p[0] != msgKexInit { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit") + } + + if p[0] != msgKexInit { + return p, nil + } + + firstKex := t.sessionID == nil + + kex := pendingKex{ + done: make(chan error, 1), + otherInit: p, + } + t.startKex <- &kex + err = <-kex.done + + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err) + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + t.resetReadThresholds() + + // By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by + // translating it into msgIgnore. + successPacket := []byte{msgIgnore} + if firstKex { + // sendKexInit() for the first kex waits for + // msgNewKeys so the authentication process is + // guaranteed to happen over an encrypted transport. + successPacket = []byte{msgNewKeys} + } + + return successPacket, nil +} + +// sendKexInit sends a key change message. +func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side, + // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we + // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a + // second kexInit. + return nil + } + + msg := &kexInitMsg{ + KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges, + CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers, + CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers, + MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs, + MACsServerClient: t.config.MACs, + CompressionClientServer: supportedCompressions, + CompressionServerClient: supportedCompressions, + } + io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:]) + + isServer := len(t.hostKeys) > 0 + if isServer { + for _, k := range t.hostKeys { + // If k is a MultiAlgorithmSigner, we restrict the signature + // algorithms. If k is a AlgorithmSigner, presume it supports all + // signature algorithms associated with the key format. If k is not + // an AlgorithmSigner, we can only assume it only supports the + // algorithms that matches the key format. (This means that Sign + // can't pick a different default). + keyFormat := k.PublicKey().Type() + + switch s := k.(type) { + case MultiAlgorithmSigner: + for _, algo := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat) { + if contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algo) + } + } + case AlgorithmSigner: + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, algorithmsForKeyFormat(keyFormat)...) + default: + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append(msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, keyFormat) + } + } + } else { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms + + // As a client we opt in to receiving SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO so we know what + // algorithms the server supports for public key authentication. See RFC + // 8308, Section 2.1. + if firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil; firstKeyExchange { + msg.KexAlgos = make([]string, 0, len(t.config.KeyExchanges)+1) + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, t.config.KeyExchanges...) + msg.KexAlgos = append(msg.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") + } + } + + packet := Marshal(msg) + + // writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy. + packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(packetCopy, packet) + + if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil { + return err + } + + t.sentInitMsg = msg + t.sentInitPacket = packet + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error { + switch p[0] { + case msgKexInit: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit") + case msgNewKeys: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys") + } + + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.writeError != nil { + return t.writeError + } + + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer. + cp := make([]byte, len(p)) + copy(cp, p) + t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp) + return nil + } + + if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 { + t.writePacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil { + t.writeError = err + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error { + // Close the connection. This should cause the readLoop goroutine to wake up + // and close t.startKex, which will shut down kexLoop if running. + err := t.conn.Close() + + // Wait for the kexLoop goroutine to complete. + // At that point we know that the readLoop goroutine is complete too, + // because kexLoop itself waits for readLoop to close the startKex channel. + <-t.kexLoopDone + + return err +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id()) + } + + otherInit := &kexInitMsg{} + if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil { + return err + } + + magics := handshakeMagics{ + clientVersion: t.clientVersion, + serverVersion: t.serverVersion, + clientKexInit: otherInitPacket, + serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket, + } + + clientInit := otherInit + serverInit := t.sentInitMsg + isClient := len(t.hostKeys) == 0 + if isClient { + clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit + + magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket + magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket + } + + var err error + t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient, clientInit, serverInit) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it. + // + // RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for + // first_kex_packet_follows. It states that the guessed packet + // should be ignored if the "kex algorithm and/or the host + // key algorithm is guessed wrong (server and client have + // different preferred algorithm), or if any of the other + // algorithms cannot be agreed upon". The other algorithms have + // already been checked above so the kex algorithm and host key + // algorithm are checked here. + if otherInit.FirstKexFollows && (clientInit.KexAlgos[0] != serverInit.KexAlgos[0] || clientInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0] != serverInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0]) { + // other side sent a kex message for the wrong algorithm, + // which we have to ignore. + if _, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex] + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex) + } + + var result *kexResult + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + result, err = t.server(kex, &magics) + } else { + result, err = t.client(kex, &magics) + } + + if err != nil { + return err + } + + firstKeyExchange := t.sessionID == nil + if firstKeyExchange { + t.sessionID = result.H + } + result.SessionID = t.sessionID + + if err := t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil { + return err + } + + // On the server side, after the first SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS, send a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO + // message with the server-sig-algs extension if the client supports it. See + // RFC 8308, Sections 2.4 and 3.1, and [PROTOCOL], Section 1.9. + if !isClient && firstKeyExchange && contains(clientInit.KexAlgos, "ext-info-c") { + extInfo := &extInfoMsg{ + NumExtensions: 2, + Payload: make([]byte, 0, 4+15+4+len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)+4+16+4+1), + } + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("server-sig-algs")) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "server-sig-algs"...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList)) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, supportedPubKeyAuthAlgosList...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, len("ping@openssh.com")) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "ping@openssh.com"...) + extInfo.Payload = appendInt(extInfo.Payload, 1) + extInfo.Payload = append(extInfo.Payload, "0"...) + if err := t.conn.writePacket(Marshal(extInfo)); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + if packet, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys { + return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0]) + } + + return nil +} + +// algorithmSignerWrapper is an AlgorithmSigner that only supports the default +// key format algorithm. +// +// This is technically a violation of the AlgorithmSigner interface, but it +// should be unreachable given where we use this. Anyway, at least it returns an +// error instead of panicing or producing an incorrect signature. +type algorithmSignerWrapper struct { + Signer +} + +func (a algorithmSignerWrapper) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != underlyingAlgo(a.PublicKey().Type()) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: algorithmSignerWrapper invoked with non-default algorithm") + } + return a.Sign(rand, data) +} + +func pickHostKey(hostKeys []Signer, algo string) AlgorithmSigner { + for _, k := range hostKeys { + if s, ok := k.(MultiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + if !contains(s.Algorithms(), underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + continue + } + } + + if algo == k.PublicKey().Type() { + return algorithmSignerWrapper{k} + } + + k, ok := k.(AlgorithmSigner) + if !ok { + continue + } + for _, a := range algorithmsForKeyFormat(k.PublicKey().Type()) { + if algo == a { + return k + } + } + } + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + hostKey := pickHostKey(t.hostKeys, t.algorithms.hostKey) + if hostKey == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: internal error: negotiated unsupported signature type") + } + + r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey) + return r, err +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKey, err := ParsePublicKey(result.HostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, t.algorithms.hostKey, result); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + err = t.hostKeyCallback(t.dialAddress, t.remoteAddr, hostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return result, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af81d26 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf/bcrypt_pbkdf.go @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +// Copyright 2014 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package bcrypt_pbkdf implements bcrypt_pbkdf(3) from OpenBSD. +// +// See https://flak.tedunangst.com/post/bcrypt-pbkdf and +// https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c. +package bcrypt_pbkdf + +import ( + "crypto/sha512" + "errors" + "golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish" +) + +const blockSize = 32 + +// Key derives a key from the password, salt and rounds count, returning a +// []byte of length keyLen that can be used as cryptographic key. +func Key(password, salt []byte, rounds, keyLen int) ([]byte, error) { + if rounds < 1 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: number of rounds is too small") + } + if len(password) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: empty password") + } + if len(salt) == 0 || len(salt) > 1<<20 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: bad salt length") + } + if keyLen > 1024 { + return nil, errors.New("bcrypt_pbkdf: keyLen is too large") + } + + numBlocks := (keyLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize + key := make([]byte, numBlocks*blockSize) + + h := sha512.New() + h.Write(password) + shapass := h.Sum(nil) + + shasalt := make([]byte, 0, sha512.Size) + cnt, tmp := make([]byte, 4), make([]byte, blockSize) + for block := 1; block <= numBlocks; block++ { + h.Reset() + h.Write(salt) + cnt[0] = byte(block >> 24) + cnt[1] = byte(block >> 16) + cnt[2] = byte(block >> 8) + cnt[3] = byte(block) + h.Write(cnt) + bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) + + out := make([]byte, blockSize) + copy(out, tmp) + for i := 2; i <= rounds; i++ { + h.Reset() + h.Write(tmp) + bcryptHash(tmp, shapass, h.Sum(shasalt)) + for j := 0; j < len(out); j++ { + out[j] ^= tmp[j] + } + } + + for i, v := range out { + key[i*numBlocks+(block-1)] = v + } + } + return key[:keyLen], nil +} + +var magic = []byte("OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite") + +func bcryptHash(out, shapass, shasalt []byte) { + c, err := blowfish.NewSaltedCipher(shapass, shasalt) + if err != nil { + panic(err) + } + for i := 0; i < 64; i++ { + blowfish.ExpandKey(shasalt, c) + blowfish.ExpandKey(shapass, c) + } + copy(out, magic) + for i := 0; i < 32; i += 8 { + for j := 0; j < 64; j++ { + c.Encrypt(out[i:i+8], out[i:i+8]) + } + } + // Swap bytes due to different endianness. + for i := 0; i < 32; i += 4 { + out[i+3], out[i+2], out[i+1], out[i] = out[i], out[i+1], out[i+2], out[i+3] + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a05f79 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go @@ -0,0 +1,786 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +const ( + kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" + kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + kexAlgoDH14SHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256" + kexAlgoDH16SHA512 = "diffie-hellman-group16-sha512" + kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" + kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" + kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256" + + // For the following kex only the client half contains a production + // ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal + // implementation to satisfy the automated tests. + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" +) + +// kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange. +type kexResult struct { + // Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + H []byte + + // Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + K []byte + + // Host key as hashed into H. + HostKey []byte + + // Signature of H. + Signature []byte + + // A cryptographic hash function that matches the security + // level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for + // calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K. + Hash crypto.Hash + + // The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used + // to derive key material inside the transport. + SessionID []byte +} + +// handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the +// session hash. +type handshakeMagics struct { + clientVersion, serverVersion []byte + clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte +} + +func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) { + writeString(w, m.clientVersion) + writeString(w, m.serverVersion) + writeString(w, m.clientKexInit) + writeString(w, m.serverKexInit) +} + +// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms. +type kexAlgorithm interface { + // Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result + // with a hostkey. algo is the negotiated algorithm, and may + // be a certificate type. + Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (*kexResult, error) + + // Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is + // responsible for verifying the host key signature. + Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) +} + +// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. +type dhGroup struct { + g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int + hashFunc crypto.Hash +} + +func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var x *big.Int + for { + var err error + if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if x.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p) + kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + h := group.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHReply.Signature, + Hash: group.hashFunc, + }, nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil { + return + } + + var y *big.Int + for { + if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return + } + if y.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p) + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := group.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: group.hashFunc, + }, err +} + +// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as +// described in RFC 5656, section 4. +type ecdh struct { + curve elliptic.Curve +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{ + ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y), + } + + serialized := Marshal(&kexInit) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +// unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key. +func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) { + x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey) + if x == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure") + } + if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve") + } + return x, y, nil +} + +// validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for +// the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2 +func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool { + if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 { + return false + } + + if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { + return false + } + + // We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since + // + // - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit. + // (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST + // curves) + // + // - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small + // subgroup attacks. + return true +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple + // connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH + // generates a new key for each incoming connection. + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y) + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, serializedEphKey) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + + serialized := Marshal(&reply) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: sig, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC +// 5656, section 6.2.1 +func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash { + bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize + switch { + case bitSize <= 256: + return crypto.SHA256 + case bitSize <= 384: + return crypto.SHA384 + } + return crypto.SHA512 +} + +var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{} + +func init() { + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in + // RFC 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409. + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16) + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, + } + + // This are the groups called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and + // diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 in RFC 4253 and RFC 8268, + // and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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group14 := &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + } + + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, + hashFunc: crypto.SHA1, + } + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA256] = &dhGroup{ + g: group14.g, p: group14.p, pMinus1: group14.pMinus1, + hashFunc: crypto.SHA256, + } + + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group16-sha512 in RFC + // 8268 and Oakley Group 16 in RFC 3526. + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH16SHA512] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + hashFunc: crypto.SHA512, + } + + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256LibSSH] = &curve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256} +} + +// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256 (formerly known as +// curve25519-sha256@libssh.org) key exchange method, as described in RFC 8731. +type curve25519sha256 struct{} + +type curve25519KeyPair struct { + priv [32]byte + pub [32]byte +} + +func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv) + return nil +} + +// curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something +// convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the +// wrong order. +var curve25519Zeros [32]byte + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + var servPub, secret [32]byte + copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") + } + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var clientPub, secret [32]byte + copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:], + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +// dhGEXSHA implements the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and +// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols, +// as described in RFC 4419 +type dhGEXSHA struct { + hashFunc crypto.Hash +} + +const ( + dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangePreferredBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192 +) + +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + // Send GexRequest + kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{ + MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits, + PreferedBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits, + MaxBits: dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexGroup + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var msg kexDHGexGroupMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits + if msg.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || msg.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", msg.P.BitLen()) + } + + // Check if g is safe by verifying that 1 < g < p-1 + pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(msg.P, bigOne) + if msg.G.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || msg.G.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe") + } + + // Send GexInit + pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(msg.P, 1) + x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + X := new(big.Int).Exp(msg.G, x, msg.P) + kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexReply + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHGexReply kexDHGexReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexReply.Y.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexReply.Y, x, msg.P) + + // Check if k is safe by verifying that k > 1 and k < p - 1 + if kInt.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe") + } + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHGexReply.HostKey) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) + writeInt(h, msg.P) + writeInt(h, msg.G) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHGexReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHGexReply.Signature, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, nil +} + +// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256. +// +// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests. +func (gex dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv AlgorithmSigner, algo string) (result *kexResult, err error) { + // Receive GexRequest + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexRequest kexDHGexRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil { + return + } + + // Send GexGroup + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC + // 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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g := big.NewInt(2) + + msg := &kexDHGexGroupMsg{ + P: p, + G: g, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(msg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexInit + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexInit kexDHGexInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + pHalf := new(big.Int).Rsh(p, 1) + + y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return + } + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(g, y, p) + + pMinusOne := new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne) + if kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || kexDHGexInit.X.Cmp(pMinusOne) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + kInt := new(big.Int).Exp(kexDHGexInit.X, y, p) + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) + writeInt(h, p) + writeInt(h, g) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H, algo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHGexReply := kexDHGexReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHGexReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, err +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef1bad7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -0,0 +1,1717 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/ed25519" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/binary" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf" +) + +// Public key algorithms names. These values can appear in PublicKey.Type, +// ClientConfig.HostKeyAlgorithms, Signature.Format, or as AlgorithmSigner +// arguments. +const ( + KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" + KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss" + KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" + KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" + KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" + KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" + KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519" + KeyAlgoSKED25519 = "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com" + + // KeyAlgoRSASHA256 and KeyAlgoRSASHA512 are only public key algorithms, not + // public key formats, so they can't appear as a PublicKey.Type. The + // corresponding PublicKey.Type is KeyAlgoRSA. See RFC 8332, Section 2. + KeyAlgoRSASHA256 = "rsa-sha2-256" + KeyAlgoRSASHA512 = "rsa-sha2-512" +) + +const ( + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSA. + SigAlgoRSA = KeyAlgoRSA + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA256. + SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = KeyAlgoRSASHA256 + // Deprecated: use KeyAlgoRSASHA512. + SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = KeyAlgoRSASHA512 +) + +// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm. +// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm. +func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + switch algo { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + return parseRSA(in) + case KeyAlgoDSA: + return parseDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + return parseECDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoSKECDSA256: + return parseSKECDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoED25519: + return parseED25519(in) + case KeyAlgoSKED25519: + return parseSKEd25519(in) + case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoSKECDSA256v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, CertAlgoSKED25519v01: + cert, err := parseCert(in, certKeyAlgoNames[algo]) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return cert, nil, nil + } + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown key algorithm: %v", algo) +} + +// parseAuthorizedKey parses a public key in OpenSSH authorized_keys format +// (see sshd(8) manual page) once the options and key type fields have been +// removed. +func parseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, err error) { + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + i = len(in) + } + base64Key := in[:i] + + key := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Key))) + n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(key, base64Key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + key = key[:n] + out, err = ParsePublicKey(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + comment = string(bytes.TrimSpace(in[i:])) + return out, comment, nil +} + +// ParseKnownHosts parses an entry in the format of the known_hosts file. +// +// The known_hosts format is documented in the sshd(8) manual page. This +// function will parse a single entry from in. On successful return, marker +// will contain the optional marker value (i.e. "cert-authority" or "revoked") +// or else be empty, hosts will contain the hosts that this entry matches, +// pubKey will contain the public key and comment will contain any trailing +// comment at the end of the line. See the sshd(8) manual page for the various +// forms that a host string can take. +// +// The unparsed remainder of the input will be returned in rest. This function +// can be called repeatedly to parse multiple entries. +// +// If no entries were found in the input then err will be io.EOF. Otherwise a +// non-nil err value indicates a parse error. +func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey, comment string, rest []byte, err error) { + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + // Strip out the beginning of the known_host key. + // This is either an optional marker or a (set of) hostname(s). + keyFields := bytes.Fields(in) + if len(keyFields) < 3 || len(keyFields) > 5 { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid entry in known_hosts data") + } + + // keyFields[0] is either "@cert-authority", "@revoked" or a comma separated + // list of hosts + marker := "" + if keyFields[0][0] == '@' { + marker = string(keyFields[0][1:]) + keyFields = keyFields[1:] + } + + hosts := string(keyFields[0]) + // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. “ssh-rsa”). + // However, that information is duplicated inside the + // base64-encoded key and so is ignored here. + + key := bytes.Join(keyFields[2:], []byte(" ")) + if pubKey, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(key); err != nil { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, err + } + + return marker, strings.Split(hosts, ","), pubKey, comment, rest, nil + } + + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, io.EOF +} + +// ParseAuthorizedKey parses a public key from an authorized_keys +// file used in OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page. +func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []string, rest []byte, err error) { + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + + // No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at + // the beginning. + var b byte + inQuote := false + var candidateOptions []string + optionStart := 0 + for i, b = range in { + isEnd := !inQuote && (b == ' ' || b == '\t') + if (b == ',' && !inQuote) || isEnd { + if i-optionStart > 0 { + candidateOptions = append(candidateOptions, string(in[optionStart:i])) + } + optionStart = i + 1 + } + if isEnd { + break + } + if b == '"' && (i == 0 || (i > 0 && in[i-1] != '\\')) { + inQuote = !inQuote + } + } + for i < len(in) && (in[i] == ' ' || in[i] == '\t') { + i++ + } + if i == len(in) { + // Invalid line: unmatched quote + in = rest + continue + } + + in = in[i:] + i = bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + options = candidateOptions + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + + in = rest + continue + } + + return nil, "", nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") +} + +// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key formatted for use in +// the SSH wire protocol according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func ParsePublicKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, err error) { + algo, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + var rest []byte + out, rest, err = parsePubKey(in, string(algo)) + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: trailing junk in public key") + } + + return out, err +} + +// MarshalAuthorizedKey serializes key for inclusion in an OpenSSH +// authorized_keys file. The return value ends with newline. +func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte { + b := &bytes.Buffer{} + b.WriteString(key.Type()) + b.WriteByte(' ') + e := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, b) + e.Write(key.Marshal()) + e.Close() + b.WriteByte('\n') + return b.Bytes() +} + +// MarshalPrivateKey returns a PEM block with the private key serialized in the +// OpenSSH format. +func MarshalPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string) (*pem.Block, error) { + return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler) +} + +// MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a PEM block holding the encrypted +// private key serialized in the OpenSSH format. +func MarshalPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, passphrase []byte) (*pem.Block, error) { + return marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key, comment, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase)) +} + +// PublicKey represents a public key using an unspecified algorithm. +// +// Some PublicKeys provided by this package also implement CryptoPublicKey. +type PublicKey interface { + // Type returns the key format name, e.g. "ssh-rsa". + Type() string + + // Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format, with the name + // prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use the ParsePublicKey function. + Marshal() []byte + + // Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this key. This + // method will hash the data appropriately first. sig.Format is allowed to + // be any signature algorithm compatible with the key type, the caller + // should check if it has more stringent requirements. + Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error +} + +// CryptoPublicKey, if implemented by a PublicKey, +// returns the underlying crypto.PublicKey form of the key. +type CryptoPublicKey interface { + CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey +} + +// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key. +// +// Some Signers provided by this package also implement MultiAlgorithmSigner. +type Signer interface { + // PublicKey returns the associated PublicKey. + PublicKey() PublicKey + + // Sign returns a signature for the given data. This method will hash the + // data appropriately first. The signature algorithm is expected to match + // the key format returned by the PublicKey.Type method (and not to be any + // alternative algorithm supported by the key format). + Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) +} + +// An AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying an algorithm to +// use for signing. +// +// An AlgorithmSigner can't advertise the algorithms it supports, unless it also +// implements MultiAlgorithmSigner, so it should be prepared to be invoked with +// every algorithm supported by the public key format. +type AlgorithmSigner interface { + Signer + + // SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specifying a desired + // signing algorithm. Callers may pass an empty string for the algorithm in + // which case the AlgorithmSigner will use a default algorithm. This default + // doesn't currently control any behavior in this package. + SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) +} + +// MultiAlgorithmSigner is an AlgorithmSigner that also reports the algorithms +// supported by that signer. +type MultiAlgorithmSigner interface { + AlgorithmSigner + + // Algorithms returns the available algorithms in preference order. The list + // must not be empty, and it must not include certificate types. + Algorithms() []string +} + +// NewSignerWithAlgorithms returns a signer restricted to the specified +// algorithms. The algorithms must be set in preference order. The list must not +// be empty, and it must not include certificate types. An error is returned if +// the specified algorithms are incompatible with the public key type. +func NewSignerWithAlgorithms(signer AlgorithmSigner, algorithms []string) (MultiAlgorithmSigner, error) { + if len(algorithms) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: please specify at least one valid signing algorithm") + } + var signerAlgos []string + supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(underlyingAlgo(signer.PublicKey().Type())) + if s, ok := signer.(*multiAlgorithmSigner); ok { + signerAlgos = s.Algorithms() + } else { + signerAlgos = supportedAlgos + } + + for _, algo := range algorithms { + if !contains(supportedAlgos, algo) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported for key type %q", + algo, signer.PublicKey().Type()) + } + if !contains(signerAlgos, algo) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is restricted for the provided signer", algo) + } + } + return &multiAlgorithmSigner{ + AlgorithmSigner: signer, + supportedAlgorithms: algorithms, + }, nil +} + +type multiAlgorithmSigner struct { + AlgorithmSigner + supportedAlgorithms []string +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) Algorithms() []string { + return s.supportedAlgorithms +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm string) bool { + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = underlyingAlgo(s.PublicKey().Type()) + } + for _, algo := range s.supportedAlgorithms { + if algorithm == algo { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +func (s *multiAlgorithmSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if !s.isAlgorithmSupported(algorithm) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q is not supported: %v", algorithm, s.supportedAlgorithms) + } + return s.AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + +type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-rsa" +} + +// parseRSA parses an RSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseRSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if w.E.BitLen() > 24 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") + } + e := w.E.Int64() + if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent") + } + + var key rsa.PublicKey + key.E = int(e) + key.N = w.N + return (*rsaPublicKey)(&key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + e := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(r.E)) + // RSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseRSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + wirekey := struct { + Name string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + }{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + e, + r.N, + } + return Marshal(&wirekey) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + supportedAlgos := algorithmsForKeyFormat(r.Type()) + if !contains(supportedAlgos, sig.Format) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type()) + } + hash := hashFuncs[sig.Format] + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*rsa.PublicKey)(r) +} + +type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-dss" +} + +func checkDSAParams(param *dsa.Parameters) error { + // SSH specifies FIPS 186-2, which only provided a single size + // (1024 bits) DSA key. FIPS 186-3 allows for larger key + // sizes, which would confuse SSH. + if l := param.P.BitLen(); l != 1024 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA key size %d", l) + } + + return nil +} + +// parseDSA parses an DSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + param := dsa.Parameters{ + P: w.P, + Q: w.Q, + G: w.G, + } + if err := checkDSAParams(¶m); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := &dsaPublicKey{ + Parameters: param, + Y: w.Y, + } + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // DSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + }{ + k.Type(), + k.P, + k.Q, + k.G, + k.Y, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 4253, section 6.6, + // The value for 'dss_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing + // r, followed by s (which are 160-bit integers, without lengths or + // padding, unsigned, and in network byte order). + // For DSS purposes, sig.Blob should be exactly 40 bytes in length. + if len(sig.Blob) != 40 { + return errors.New("ssh: DSA signature parse error") + } + r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[:20]) + s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[20:]) + if dsa.Verify((*dsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, r, s) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*dsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +type dsaPrivateKey struct { + *dsa.PrivateKey +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return (*dsaPublicKey)(&k.PrivateKey.PublicKey) +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, k.PublicKey().Type()) +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Algorithms() []string { + return []string{k.PublicKey().Type()} +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + + h := hashFuncs[k.PublicKey().Type()].New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + sig := make([]byte, 40) + rb := r.Bytes() + sb := s.Bytes() + + copy(sig[20-len(rb):20], rb) + copy(sig[40-len(sb):], sb) + + return &Signature{ + Format: k.PublicKey().Type(), + Blob: sig, + }, nil +} + +type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID() +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string { + switch k.Params().BitSize { + case 256: + return "nistp256" + case 384: + return "nistp384" + case 521: + return "nistp521" + } + panic("ssh: unsupported ecdsa key size") +} + +type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoED25519 +} + +func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + return ed25519PublicKey(w.KeyBytes), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + w := struct { + Name string + KeyBytes []byte + }{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + []byte(k), + } + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + if l := len(k); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + if ok := ed25519.Verify(ed25519.PublicKey(k), b, sig.Blob); !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return ed25519.PublicKey(k) +} + +func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool { + return curve == elliptic.P256() || curve == elliptic.P384() || curve == elliptic.P521() +} + +// parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1. +func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey) + + switch w.Curve { + case "nistp256": + key.Curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + key.Curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + key.Curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") + } + + key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) + if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. + keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) + // ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + }{ + k.Type(), + k.nistID(), + keyBytes, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + + h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 5656, section 3.1.2, + // The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: + // mpint r + // mpint s + var ecSig struct { + R *big.Int + S *big.Int + } + + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +// skFields holds the additional fields present in U2F/FIDO2 signatures. +// See openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f 'SSH U2F Signatures' for details. +type skFields struct { + // Flags contains U2F/FIDO2 flags such as 'user present' + Flags byte + // Counter is a monotonic signature counter which can be + // used to detect concurrent use of a private key, should + // it be extracted from hardware. + Counter uint32 +} + +type skECDSAPublicKey struct { + // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. + // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. + application string + ecdsa.PublicKey +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoSKECDSA256 +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) nistID() string { + return "nistp256" +} + +func parseSKECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := new(skECDSAPublicKey) + key.application = w.Application + + if w.Curve != "nistp256" { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") + } + key.Curve = elliptic.P256() + + key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) + if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") + } + + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. + keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) + w := struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + Application string + }{ + k.Type(), + k.nistID(), + keyBytes, + k.application, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *skECDSAPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + + h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() + h.Write([]byte(k.application)) + appDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(data) + dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + var ecSig struct { + R *big.Int + S *big.Int + } + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + var skf skFields + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { + return err + } + + blob := struct { + ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + Flags byte + Counter uint32 + MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{ + appDigest, + skf.Flags, + skf.Counter, + dataDigest, + } + + original := Marshal(blob) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(original) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(&k.PublicKey), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +type skEd25519PublicKey struct { + // application is a URL-like string, typically "ssh:" for SSH. + // see openssh/PROTOCOL.u2f for details. + application string + ed25519.PublicKey +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoSKED25519 +} + +func parseSKEd25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if l := len(w.KeyBytes); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + key := new(skEd25519PublicKey) + key.application = w.Application + key.PublicKey = ed25519.PublicKey(w.KeyBytes) + + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + w := struct { + Name string + KeyBytes []byte + Application string + }{ + KeyAlgoSKED25519, + []byte(k.PublicKey), + k.application, + } + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *skEd25519PublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + if l := len(k.PublicKey); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return fmt.Errorf("invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + + h := hashFuncs[sig.Format].New() + h.Write([]byte(k.application)) + appDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + h.Reset() + h.Write(data) + dataDigest := h.Sum(nil) + + var edSig struct { + Signature []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &edSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + var skf skFields + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Rest, &skf); err != nil { + return err + } + + blob := struct { + ApplicationDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + Flags byte + Counter uint32 + MessageDigest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{ + appDigest, + skf.Flags, + skf.Counter, + dataDigest, + } + + original := Marshal(blob) + + if ok := ed25519.Verify(k.PublicKey, original, edSig.Signature); !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey, +// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a +// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or +// P-521. DSA keys must use parameter size L1024N160. +func NewSignerFromKey(key interface{}) (Signer, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case crypto.Signer: + return NewSignerFromSigner(key) + case *dsa.PrivateKey: + return newDSAPrivateKey(key) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +func newDSAPrivateKey(key *dsa.PrivateKey) (Signer, error) { + if err := checkDSAParams(&key.PublicKey.Parameters); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &dsaPrivateKey{key}, nil +} + +type wrappedSigner struct { + signer crypto.Signer + pubKey PublicKey +} + +// NewSignerFromSigner takes any crypto.Signer implementation and +// returns a corresponding Signer interface. This can be used, for +// example, with keys kept in hardware modules. +func NewSignerFromSigner(signer crypto.Signer) (Signer, error) { + pubKey, err := NewPublicKey(signer.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &wrappedSigner{signer, pubKey}, nil +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pubKey +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, s.pubKey.Type()) +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) Algorithms() []string { + return algorithmsForKeyFormat(s.pubKey.Type()) +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = s.pubKey.Type() + } + + if !contains(s.Algorithms(), algorithm) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %q for key format %q", algorithm, s.pubKey.Type()) + } + + hashFunc := hashFuncs[algorithm] + var digest []byte + if hashFunc != 0 { + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(data) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } else { + digest = data + } + + signature, err := s.signer.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // crypto.Signer.Sign is expected to return an ASN.1-encoded signature + // for ECDSA and DSA, but that's not the encoding expected by SSH, so + // re-encode. + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey: + type asn1Signature struct { + R, S *big.Int + } + asn1Sig := new(asn1Signature) + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, asn1Sig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey: + signature = Marshal(asn1Sig) + + case *dsaPublicKey: + signature = make([]byte, 40) + r := asn1Sig.R.Bytes() + s := asn1Sig.S.Bytes() + copy(signature[20-len(r):20], r) + copy(signature[40-len(s):40], s) + } + } + + return &Signature{ + Format: algorithm, + Blob: signature, + }, nil +} + +// NewPublicKey takes an *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, +// or ed25519.PublicKey returns a corresponding PublicKey instance. +// ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or P-521. +func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *dsa.PublicKey: + return (*dsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case ed25519.PublicKey: + if l := len(key); l != ed25519.PublicKeySize { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid size %d for Ed25519 public key", l) + } + return ed25519PublicKey(key), nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +// ParsePrivateKey returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private key. It supports +// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey. If the private key is encrypted, it +// will return a PassphraseMissingError. +func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private +// key and passphrase. It supports the same keys as +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase. +func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// encryptedBlock tells whether a private key is +// encrypted by examining its Proc-Type header +// for a mention of ENCRYPTED +// according to RFC 1421 Section 4.6.1.1. +func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool { + return strings.Contains(block.Headers["Proc-Type"], "ENCRYPTED") +} + +// A PassphraseMissingError indicates that parsing this private key requires a +// passphrase. Use ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase. +type PassphraseMissingError struct { + // PublicKey will be set if the private key format includes an unencrypted + // public key along with the encrypted private key. + PublicKey PublicKey +} + +func (*PassphraseMissingError) Error() string { + return "ssh: this private key is passphrase protected" +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It supports +// RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and Ed25519 private keys in PKCS#1, PKCS#8, OpenSSL, and OpenSSH +// formats. If the private key is encrypted, it will return a PassphraseMissingError. +func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + + if encryptedBlock(block) { + return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} + } + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + // RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208 + case "PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + return ParseDSAPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY": + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, unencryptedOpenSSHKey) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a private key decrypted with +// passphrase from a PEM encoded private key. If the passphrase is wrong, it +// will return x509.IncorrectPasswordError. +func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passphrase []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + + if block.Type == "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY" { + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes, passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase)) + } + + if !encryptedBlock(block) || !x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: not an encrypted key") + } + + buf, err := x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passphrase) + if err != nil { + if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError { + return nil, err + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err) + } + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + return ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } +} + +// ParseDSAPrivateKey returns a DSA private key from its ASN.1 DER encoding, as +// specified by the OpenSSL DSA man page. +func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) { + var k struct { + Version int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + G *big.Int + Pub *big.Int + Priv *big.Int + } + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &k) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to parse DSA key: " + err.Error()) + } + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: garbage after DSA key") + } + + return &dsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: k.P, + Q: k.Q, + G: k.G, + }, + Y: k.Pub, + }, + X: k.Priv, + }, nil +} + +func unencryptedOpenSSHKey(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if kdfName != "none" || cipherName != "none" { + return nil, &PassphraseMissingError{} + } + if kdfOpts != "" { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key") + } + return privKeyBlock, nil +} + +func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHKey(passphrase []byte) openSSHDecryptFunc { + return func(cipherName, kdfName, kdfOpts string, privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if kdfName == "none" || cipherName == "none" { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: key is not password protected") + } + if kdfName != "bcrypt" { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown KDF %q, only supports %q", kdfName, "bcrypt") + } + + var opts struct { + Salt string + Rounds uint32 + } + if err := Unmarshal([]byte(kdfOpts), &opts); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, []byte(opts.Salt), int(opts.Rounds), 32+16) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] + + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + switch cipherName { + case "aes256-ctr": + ctr := cipher.NewCTR(c, iv) + ctr.XORKeyStream(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) + case "aes256-cbc": + if len(privKeyBlock)%c.BlockSize() != 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid encrypted private key length, not a multiple of the block size") + } + cbc := cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv) + cbc.CryptBlocks(privKeyBlock, privKeyBlock) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown cipher %q, only supports %q or %q", cipherName, "aes256-ctr", "aes256-cbc") + } + + return privKeyBlock, nil + } +} + +func unencryptedOpenSSHMarshaler(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { + key := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, 8) + return key, "none", "none", "", nil +} + +func passphraseProtectedOpenSSHMarshaler(passphrase []byte) openSSHEncryptFunc { + return func(privKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, string, string, string, error) { + salt := make([]byte, 16) + if _, err := rand.Read(salt); err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + opts := struct { + Salt []byte + Rounds uint32 + }{salt, 16} + + // Derive key to encrypt the private key block. + k, err := bcrypt_pbkdf.Key(passphrase, salt, int(opts.Rounds), 32+aes.BlockSize) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + // Add padding matching the block size of AES. + keyBlock := generateOpenSSHPadding(privKeyBlock, aes.BlockSize) + + // Encrypt the private key using the derived secret. + + dst := make([]byte, len(keyBlock)) + key, iv := k[:32], k[32:] + block, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", "", "", err + } + + stream := cipher.NewCTR(block, iv) + stream.XORKeyStream(dst, keyBlock) + + return dst, "aes256-ctr", "bcrypt", string(Marshal(opts)), nil + } +} + +const privateKeyAuthMagic = "openssh-key-v1\x00" + +type openSSHDecryptFunc func(CipherName, KdfName, KdfOpts string, PrivKeyBlock []byte) ([]byte, error) +type openSSHEncryptFunc func(PrivKeyBlock []byte) (ProtectedKeyBlock []byte, cipherName, kdfName, kdfOptions string, err error) + +type openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey struct { + CipherName string + KdfName string + KdfOpts string + NumKeys uint32 + PubKey []byte + PrivKeyBlock []byte +} + +type openSSHPrivateKey struct { + Check1 uint32 + Check2 uint32 + Keytype string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHRSAPrivateKey struct { + N *big.Int + E *big.Int + D *big.Int + Iqmp *big.Int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHEd25519PrivateKey struct { + Pub []byte + Priv []byte + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +type openSSHECDSAPrivateKey struct { + Curve string + Pub []byte + D *big.Int + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// parseOpenSSHPrivateKey parses an OpenSSH private key, using the decrypt +// function to unwrap the encrypted portion. unencryptedOpenSSHKey can be used +// as the decrypt function to parse an unencrypted private key. See +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key. +func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte, decrypt openSSHDecryptFunc) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { + if len(key) < len(privateKeyAuthMagic) || string(key[:len(privateKeyAuthMagic)]) != privateKeyAuthMagic { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format") + } + remaining := key[len(privateKeyAuthMagic):] + + var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(remaining, &w); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if w.NumKeys != 1 { + // We only support single key files, and so does OpenSSH. + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/4103a3ec7/sshkey.c#L4171 + return nil, errors.New("ssh: multi-key files are not supported") + } + + privKeyBlock, err := decrypt(w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, w.PrivKeyBlock) + if err != nil { + if err, ok := err.(*PassphraseMissingError); ok { + pub, errPub := ParsePublicKey(w.PubKey) + if errPub != nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: failed to parse embedded public key: %v", errPub) + } + err.PublicKey = pub + } + return nil, err + } + + var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(privKeyBlock, &pk1); err != nil || pk1.Check1 != pk1.Check2 { + if w.CipherName != "none" { + return nil, x509.IncorrectPasswordError + } + return nil, errors.New("ssh: malformed OpenSSH key") + } + + switch pk1.Keytype { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + var key openSSHRSAPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ + N: key.N, + E: int(key.E.Int64()), + }, + D: key.D, + Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q}, + } + + if err := pk.Validate(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk.Precompute() + + return pk, nil + case KeyAlgoED25519: + var key openSSHEd25519PrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(key.Priv) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: private key unexpected length") + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)) + copy(pk, key.Priv) + return &pk, nil + case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + var key openSSHECDSAPrivateKey + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(key.Pad); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var curve elliptic.Curve + switch key.Curve { + case "nistp256": + curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve: " + key.Curve) + } + + X, Y := elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, key.Pub) + if X == nil || Y == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to unmarshal public key") + } + + if key.D.Cmp(curve.Params().N) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: scalar is out of range") + } + + x, y := curve.ScalarBaseMult(key.D.Bytes()) + if x.Cmp(X) != 0 || y.Cmp(Y) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: public key does not match private key") + } + + return &ecdsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: ecdsa.PublicKey{ + Curve: curve, + X: X, + Y: Y, + }, + D: key.D, + }, nil + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled key type") + } +} + +func marshalOpenSSHPrivateKey(key crypto.PrivateKey, comment string, encrypt openSSHEncryptFunc) (*pem.Block, error) { + var w openSSHEncryptedPrivateKey + var pk1 openSSHPrivateKey + + // Random check bytes. + var check uint32 + if err := binary.Read(rand.Reader, binary.BigEndian, &check); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk1.Check1 = check + pk1.Check2 = check + w.NumKeys = 1 + + // Use a []byte directly on ed25519 keys. + if k, ok := key.(*ed25519.PrivateKey); ok { + key = *k + } + + switch k := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PrivateKey: + E := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(k.PublicKey.E)) + // Marshal public key: + // E and N are in reversed order in the public and private key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + }{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + E, k.PublicKey.N, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHRSAPrivateKey{ + N: k.PublicKey.N, + E: E, + D: k.D, + Iqmp: k.Precomputed.Qinv, + P: k.Primes[0], + Q: k.Primes[1], + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoRSA + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + case ed25519.PrivateKey: + pub := make([]byte, ed25519.PublicKeySize) + priv := make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize) + copy(pub, k[32:]) + copy(priv, k) + + // Marshal public key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + Pub []byte + }{ + KeyAlgoED25519, pub, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHEd25519PrivateKey{ + Pub: pub, + Priv: priv, + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = KeyAlgoED25519 + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + case *ecdsa.PrivateKey: + var curve, keyType string + switch name := k.Curve.Params().Name; name { + case "P-256": + curve = "nistp256" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA256 + case "P-384": + curve = "nistp384" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA384 + case "P-521": + curve = "nistp521" + keyType = KeyAlgoECDSA521 + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled elliptic curve " + name) + } + + pub := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.PublicKey.X, k.PublicKey.Y) + + // Marshal public key. + pubKey := struct { + KeyType string + Curve string + Pub []byte + }{ + keyType, curve, pub, + } + w.PubKey = Marshal(pubKey) + + // Marshal private key. + key := openSSHECDSAPrivateKey{ + Curve: curve, + Pub: pub, + D: k.D, + Comment: comment, + } + pk1.Keytype = keyType + pk1.Rest = Marshal(key) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", k) + } + + var err error + // Add padding and encrypt the key if necessary. + w.PrivKeyBlock, w.CipherName, w.KdfName, w.KdfOpts, err = encrypt(Marshal(pk1)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + b := Marshal(w) + block := &pem.Block{ + Type: "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY", + Bytes: append([]byte(privateKeyAuthMagic), b...), + } + return block, nil +} + +func checkOpenSSHKeyPadding(pad []byte) error { + for i, b := range pad { + if int(b) != i+1 { + return errors.New("ssh: padding not as expected") + } + } + return nil +} + +func generateOpenSSHPadding(block []byte, blockSize int) []byte { + for i, l := 0, len(block); (l+i)%blockSize != 0; i++ { + block = append(block, byte(i+1)) + } + return block +} + +// FingerprintLegacyMD5 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as described by RFC 4716 section 4. +func FingerprintLegacyMD5(pubKey PublicKey) string { + md5sum := md5.Sum(pubKey.Marshal()) + hexarray := make([]string, len(md5sum)) + for i, c := range md5sum { + hexarray[i] = hex.EncodeToString([]byte{c}) + } + return strings.Join(hexarray, ":") +} + +// FingerprintSHA256 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash. +// This format was introduced from OpenSSH 6.8. +// https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-3.2 (unpadded base64 encoding) +func FingerprintSHA256(pubKey PublicKey) string { + sha256sum := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Marshal()) + hash := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(sha256sum[:]) + return "SHA256:" + hash +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06a1b27 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Message authentication support + +import ( + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/sha512" + "hash" +) + +type macMode struct { + keySize int + etm bool + new func(key []byte) hash.Hash +} + +// truncatingMAC wraps around a hash.Hash and truncates the output digest to +// a given size. +type truncatingMAC struct { + length int + hmac hash.Hash +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + return t.hmac.Write(data) +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + out := t.hmac.Sum(in) + return out[:len(in)+t.length] +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Reset() { + t.hmac.Reset() +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int { + return t.length +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() } + +var macModes = map[string]*macMode{ + "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com": {64, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha2-512": {64, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha512.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha1.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)} + }}, +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b55f860 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,891 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "reflect" + "strconv" + "strings" +) + +// These are SSH message type numbers. They are scattered around several +// documents but many were taken from [SSH-PARAMETERS]. +const ( + msgIgnore = 2 + msgUnimplemented = 3 + msgDebug = 4 + msgNewKeys = 21 +) + +// SSH messages: +// +// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding SSH messages. +// They are marshaled using reflection with the marshal and unmarshal functions +// in this file. The only wrinkle is that a final member of type []byte with a +// ssh tag of "rest" receives the remainder of a packet when unmarshaling. + +// See RFC 4253, section 11.1. +const msgDisconnect = 1 + +// disconnectMsg is the message that signals a disconnect. It is also +// the error type returned from mux.Wait() +type disconnectMsg struct { + Reason uint32 `sshtype:"1"` + Message string + Language string +} + +func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message) +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 7.1. +const msgKexInit = 20 + +type kexInitMsg struct { + Cookie [16]byte `sshtype:"20"` + KexAlgos []string + ServerHostKeyAlgos []string + CiphersClientServer []string + CiphersServerClient []string + MACsClientServer []string + MACsServerClient []string + CompressionClientServer []string + CompressionServerClient []string + LanguagesClientServer []string + LanguagesServerClient []string + FirstKexFollows bool + Reserved uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 8. + +// Diffie-Hellman +const msgKexDHInit = 30 + +type kexDHInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHInit = 30 + +type kexECDHInitMsg struct { + ClientPubKey []byte `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHReply = 31 + +type kexECDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + EphemeralPubKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHReply = 31 + +type kexDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +// See RFC 4419, section 5. +const msgKexDHGexGroup = 31 + +type kexDHGexGroupMsg struct { + P *big.Int `sshtype:"31"` + G *big.Int +} + +const msgKexDHGexInit = 32 + +type kexDHGexInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"32"` +} + +const msgKexDHGexReply = 33 + +type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"33"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34 + +type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct { + MinBits uint32 `sshtype:"34"` + PreferedBits uint32 + MaxBits uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceRequest = 5 + +type serviceRequestMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"5"` +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceAccept = 6 + +type serviceAcceptMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"6"` +} + +// See RFC 8308, section 2.3 +const msgExtInfo = 7 + +type extInfoMsg struct { + NumExtensions uint32 `sshtype:"7"` + Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5. +const msgUserAuthRequest = 50 + +type userAuthRequestMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Used for debug printouts of packets. +type userAuthSuccessMsg struct { +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthFailure = 51 + +type userAuthFailureMsg struct { + Methods []string `sshtype:"51"` + PartialSuccess bool +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52 + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.4 +const msgUserAuthBanner = 53 + +type userAuthBannerMsg struct { + Message string `sshtype:"53"` + // unused, but required to allow message parsing + Language string +} + +// See RFC 4256, section 3.2 +const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60 +const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61 + +type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct { + Name string `sshtype:"60"` + Instruction string + Language string + NumPrompts uint32 + Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpen = 90 + +type channelOpenMsg struct { + ChanType string `sshtype:"90"` + PeersID uint32 + PeersWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +const msgChannelExtendedData = 95 +const msgChannelData = 94 + +// Used for debug print outs of packets. +type channelDataMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"` + Length uint32 + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91 + +type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"` + MyID uint32 + MyWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92 + +type channelOpenFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"` + Reason RejectionReason + Message string + Language string +} + +const msgChannelRequest = 98 + +type channelRequestMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"` + Request string + WantReply bool + RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelSuccess = 99 + +type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelFailure = 100 + +type channelRequestFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelClose = 97 + +type channelCloseMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelEOF = 96 + +type channelEOFMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgGlobalRequest = 80 + +type globalRequestMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"80"` + WantReply bool + Data []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestSuccess = 81 + +type globalRequestSuccessMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"81"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestFailure = 82 + +type globalRequestFailureMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"82"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.2 +const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93 + +type windowAdjustMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"` + AdditionalBytes uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 7 +const msgUserAuthPubKeyOk = 60 + +type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct { + Algo string `sshtype:"60"` + PubKey []byte +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60 + +type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct { + SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61 + +type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct { + Token []byte `sshtype:"61"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66 + +type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct { + MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.9 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64 + +type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct { + ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.8 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65 + +type userAuthGSSAPIError struct { + MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"` + MinorStatus uint32 + Message string + LanguageTag string +} + +// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 +const msgPing = 192 + +type pingMsg struct { + Data string `sshtype:"192"` +} + +// Transport layer OpenSSH extension. See [PROTOCOL], section 1.9 +const msgPong = 193 + +type pongMsg struct { + Data string `sshtype:"193"` +} + +// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which +// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character. +func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) { + tagStr := structType.Field(0).Tag.Get("sshtype") + + for _, tag := range strings.Split(tagStr, "|") { + i, err := strconv.Atoi(tag) + if err == nil { + tags = append(tags, byte(i)) + } + } + + return tags +} + +func fieldError(t reflect.Type, field int, problem string) error { + if problem != "" { + problem = ": " + problem + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unmarshal error for field %s of type %s%s", t.Field(field).Name, t.Name(), problem) +} + +var errShortRead = errors.New("ssh: short read") + +// Unmarshal parses data in SSH wire format into a structure. The out +// argument should be a pointer to struct. If the first member of the +// struct has the "sshtype" tag set to a '|'-separated set of numbers +// in decimal, the packet must start with one of those numbers. In +// case of error, Unmarshal returns a ParseError or +// UnexpectedMessageError. +func Unmarshal(data []byte, out interface{}) error { + v := reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem() + structType := v.Type() + expectedTypes := typeTags(structType) + + var expectedType byte + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + expectedType = expectedTypes[0] + } + + if len(data) == 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + goodType := false + for _, e := range expectedTypes { + if e > 0 && data[0] == e { + goodType = true + break + } + } + if !goodType { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected one of %v)", data[0], expectedTypes) + } + data = data[1:] + } + + var ok bool + for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + t := field.Type() + switch t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetBool(data[0] != 0) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + return fieldError(structType, i, "array of unsupported type") + } + if len(data) < t.Len() { + return errShortRead + } + for j, n := 0, t.Len(); j < n; j++ { + field.Index(j).Set(reflect.ValueOf(data[j])) + } + data = data[t.Len():] + case reflect.Uint64: + var u64 uint64 + if u64, data, ok = parseUint64(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(u64) + case reflect.Uint32: + var u32 uint32 + if u32, data, ok = parseUint32(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(u32)) + case reflect.Uint8: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(data[0])) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.String: + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return fieldError(structType, i, "") + } + field.SetString(string(s)) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if structType.Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") == "rest" { + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(data)) + data = nil + } else { + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(s)) + } + case reflect.String: + var nl []string + if nl, data, ok = parseNameList(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(nl)) + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, "slice of unsupported type") + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + if n, data, ok = parseInt(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(n)) + } else { + return fieldError(structType, i, "pointer to unsupported type") + } + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type: %v", t)) + } + } + + if len(data) != 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + return nil +} + +// Marshal serializes the message in msg to SSH wire format. The msg +// argument should be a struct or pointer to struct. If the first +// member has the "sshtype" tag set to a number in decimal, that +// number is prepended to the result. If the last of member has the +// "ssh" tag set to "rest", its contents are appended to the output. +func Marshal(msg interface{}) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 64) + return marshalStruct(out, msg) +} + +func marshalStruct(out []byte, msg interface{}) []byte { + v := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(msg)) + msgTypes := typeTags(v.Type()) + if len(msgTypes) > 0 { + out = append(out, msgTypes[0]) + } + + for i, n := 0, v.NumField(); i < n; i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + switch t := field.Type(); t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + var v uint8 + if field.Bool() { + v = 1 + } + out = append(out, v) + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("array of non-uint8 in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + for j, l := 0, t.Len(); j < l; j++ { + out = append(out, uint8(field.Index(j).Uint())) + } + case reflect.Uint32: + out = appendU32(out, uint32(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint64: + out = appendU64(out, uint64(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint8: + out = append(out, uint8(field.Uint())) + case reflect.String: + s := field.String() + out = appendInt(out, len(s)) + out = append(out, s...) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if v.Type().Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") != "rest" { + out = appendInt(out, field.Len()) + } + out = append(out, field.Bytes()...) + case reflect.String: + offset := len(out) + out = appendU32(out, 0) + if n := field.Len(); n > 0 { + for j := 0; j < n; j++ { + f := field.Index(j) + if j != 0 { + out = append(out, ',') + } + out = append(out, f.String()...) + } + // overwrite length value + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[offset:], uint32(len(out)-offset-4)) + } + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("slice of unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + nValue := reflect.ValueOf(&n) + nValue.Elem().Set(field) + needed := intLength(n) + oldLength := len(out) + + if cap(out)-len(out) < needed { + newOut := make([]byte, len(out), 2*(len(out)+needed)) + copy(newOut, out) + out = newOut + } + out = out[:oldLength+needed] + marshalInt(out[oldLength:], n) + } else { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("pointer to unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + } + } + + return out +} + +var bigOne = big.NewInt(1) + +func parseString(in []byte) (out, rest []byte, ok bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in) + in = in[4:] + if uint32(len(in)) < length { + return + } + out = in[:length] + rest = in[length:] + ok = true + return +} + +var ( + comma = []byte{','} + emptyNameList = []string{} +) + +func parseNameList(in []byte) (out []string, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + if len(contents) == 0 { + out = emptyNameList + return + } + parts := bytes.Split(contents, comma) + out = make([]string, len(parts)) + for i, part := range parts { + out[i] = string(part) + } + return +} + +func parseInt(in []byte) (out *big.Int, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + out = new(big.Int) + + if len(contents) > 0 && contents[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { + // This is a negative number + notBytes := make([]byte, len(contents)) + for i := range notBytes { + notBytes[i] = ^contents[i] + } + out.SetBytes(notBytes) + out.Add(out, bigOne) + out.Neg(out) + } else { + // Positive number + out.SetBytes(contents) + } + ok = true + return +} + +func parseUint32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in), in[4:], true +} + +func parseUint64(in []byte) (uint64, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 8 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(in), in[8:], true +} + +func intLength(n *big.Int) int { + length := 4 /* length bytes */ + if n.Sign() < 0 { + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bitLen := nMinus1.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0xff padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bitLen := n.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0x00 padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } + + return length +} + +func marshalUint32(to []byte, n uint32) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(to, n) + return to[4:] +} + +func marshalUint64(to []byte, n uint64) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(to, n) + return to[8:] +} + +func marshalInt(to []byte, n *big.Int) []byte { + lengthBytes := to + to = to[4:] + length := 0 + + if n.Sign() < 0 { + // A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement + // form. So we'll subtract 1 and invert. If the + // most-significant-bit isn't set then we'll need to pad the + // beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number negative. + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bytes := nMinus1.Bytes() + for i := range bytes { + bytes[i] ^= 0xff + } + if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 { + to[0] = 0xff + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bytes := n.Bytes() + if len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 { + // We'll have to pad this with a 0x00 in order to + // stop it looking like a negative number. + to[0] = 0 + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } + + lengthBytes[0] = byte(length >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(length >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(length >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(length) + return to +} + +func writeInt(w io.Writer, n *big.Int) { + length := intLength(n) + buf := make([]byte, length) + marshalInt(buf, n) + w.Write(buf) +} + +func writeString(w io.Writer, s []byte) { + var lengthBytes [4]byte + lengthBytes[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(len(s)) + w.Write(lengthBytes[:]) + w.Write(s) +} + +func stringLength(n int) int { + return 4 + n +} + +func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte { + to[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + to[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + to[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + to[3] = byte(len(s)) + to = to[4:] + copy(to, s) + return to[len(s):] +} + +var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil)) + +// Decode a packet into its corresponding message. +func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) { + var msg interface{} + switch packet[0] { + case msgDisconnect: + msg = new(disconnectMsg) + case msgServiceRequest: + msg = new(serviceRequestMsg) + case msgServiceAccept: + msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg) + case msgExtInfo: + msg = new(extInfoMsg) + case msgKexInit: + msg = new(kexInitMsg) + case msgKexDHInit: + msg = new(kexDHInitMsg) + case msgKexDHReply: + msg = new(kexDHReplyMsg) + case msgUserAuthRequest: + msg = new(userAuthRequestMsg) + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return new(userAuthSuccessMsg), nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + msg = new(userAuthFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + msg = new(userAuthPubKeyOkMsg) + case msgGlobalRequest: + msg = new(globalRequestMsg) + case msgRequestSuccess: + msg = new(globalRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgRequestFailure: + msg = new(globalRequestFailureMsg) + case msgChannelOpen: + msg = new(channelOpenMsg) + case msgChannelData: + msg = new(channelDataMsg) + case msgChannelOpenConfirm: + msg = new(channelOpenConfirmMsg) + case msgChannelOpenFailure: + msg = new(channelOpenFailureMsg) + case msgChannelWindowAdjust: + msg = new(windowAdjustMsg) + case msgChannelEOF: + msg = new(channelEOFMsg) + case msgChannelClose: + msg = new(channelCloseMsg) + case msgChannelRequest: + msg = new(channelRequestMsg) + case msgChannelSuccess: + msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgChannelFailure: + msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError) + default: + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0]) + } + if err := Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return msg, nil +} + +var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{ + msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg", + msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg", + msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg", + msgExtInfo: "extInfoMsg", + msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg", + msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg", + msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg", + msgUserAuthRequest: "userAuthRequestMsg", + msgUserAuthSuccess: "userAuthSuccessMsg", + msgUserAuthFailure: "userAuthFailureMsg", + msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: "userAuthPubKeyOkMsg", + msgGlobalRequest: "globalRequestMsg", + msgRequestSuccess: "globalRequestSuccessMsg", + msgRequestFailure: "globalRequestFailureMsg", + msgChannelOpen: "channelOpenMsg", + msgChannelData: "channelDataMsg", + msgChannelOpenConfirm: "channelOpenConfirmMsg", + msgChannelOpenFailure: "channelOpenFailureMsg", + msgChannelWindowAdjust: "windowAdjustMsg", + msgChannelEOF: "channelEOFMsg", + msgChannelClose: "channelCloseMsg", + msgChannelRequest: "channelRequestMsg", + msgChannelSuccess: "channelRequestSuccessMsg", + msgChannelFailure: "channelRequestFailureMsg", +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2d24c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" +) + +// debugMux, if set, causes messages in the connection protocol to be +// logged. +const debugMux = false + +// chanList is a thread safe channel list. +type chanList struct { + // protects concurrent access to chans + sync.Mutex + + // chans are indexed by the local id of the channel, which the + // other side should send in the PeersId field. + chans []*channel + + // This is a debugging aid: it offsets all IDs by this + // amount. This helps distinguish otherwise identical + // server/client muxes + offset uint32 +} + +// Assigns a channel ID to the given channel. +func (c *chanList) add(ch *channel) uint32 { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + for i := range c.chans { + if c.chans[i] == nil { + c.chans[i] = ch + return uint32(i) + c.offset + } + } + c.chans = append(c.chans, ch) + return uint32(len(c.chans)-1) + c.offset +} + +// getChan returns the channel for the given ID. +func (c *chanList) getChan(id uint32) *channel { + id -= c.offset + + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + return c.chans[id] + } + return nil +} + +func (c *chanList) remove(id uint32) { + id -= c.offset + c.Lock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + c.chans[id] = nil + } + c.Unlock() +} + +// dropAll forgets all channels it knows, returning them in a slice. +func (c *chanList) dropAll() []*channel { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + var r []*channel + + for _, ch := range c.chans { + if ch == nil { + continue + } + r = append(r, ch) + } + c.chans = nil + return r +} + +// mux represents the state for the SSH connection protocol, which +// multiplexes many channels onto a single packet transport. +type mux struct { + conn packetConn + chanList chanList + + incomingChannels chan NewChannel + + globalSentMu sync.Mutex + globalResponses chan interface{} + incomingRequests chan *Request + + errCond *sync.Cond + err error +} + +// When debugging, each new chanList instantiation has a different +// offset. +var globalOff uint32 + +func (m *mux) Wait() error { + m.errCond.L.Lock() + defer m.errCond.L.Unlock() + for m.err == nil { + m.errCond.Wait() + } + return m.err +} + +// newMux returns a mux that runs over the given connection. +func newMux(p packetConn) *mux { + m := &mux{ + conn: p, + incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize), + globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1), + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + errCond: newCond(), + } + if debugMux { + m.chanList.offset = atomic.AddUint32(&globalOff, 1) + } + + go m.loop() + return m +} + +func (m *mux) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + p := Marshal(msg) + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send global(%d): %#v", m.chanList.offset, msg) + } + return m.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) { + if wantReply { + m.globalSentMu.Lock() + defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock() + } + + if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{ + Type: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + Data: payload, + }); err != nil { + return false, nil, err + } + + if !wantReply { + return false, nil, nil + } + + msg, ok := <-m.globalResponses + if !ok { + return false, nil, io.EOF + } + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestFailureMsg: + return false, msg.Data, nil + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, msg.Data, nil + default: + return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to request: %#v", msg) + } +} + +// ackRequest must be called after processing a global request that +// has WantReply set. +func (m *mux) ackRequest(ok bool, data []byte) error { + if ok { + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestSuccessMsg{Data: data}) + } + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestFailureMsg{Data: data}) +} + +func (m *mux) Close() error { + return m.conn.Close() +} + +// loop runs the connection machine. It will process packets until an +// error is encountered. To synchronize on loop exit, use mux.Wait. +func (m *mux) loop() { + var err error + for err == nil { + err = m.onePacket() + } + + for _, ch := range m.chanList.dropAll() { + ch.close() + } + + close(m.incomingChannels) + close(m.incomingRequests) + close(m.globalResponses) + + m.conn.Close() + + m.errCond.L.Lock() + m.err = err + m.errCond.Broadcast() + m.errCond.L.Unlock() + + if debugMux { + log.Println("loop exit", err) + } +} + +// onePacket reads and processes one packet. +func (m *mux) onePacket() error { + packet, err := m.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if debugMux { + if packet[0] == msgChannelData || packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("decoding(%d): data packet - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, len(packet)) + } else { + p, _ := decode(packet) + log.Printf("decoding(%d): %d %#v - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, packet[0], p, len(packet)) + } + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelOpen: + return m.handleChannelOpen(packet) + case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure: + return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet) + case msgPing: + var msg pingMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("failed to unmarshal ping@openssh.com message: %w", err) + } + return m.sendMessage(pongMsg(msg)) + } + + // assume a channel packet. + if len(packet) < 5 { + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[1:]) + ch := m.chanList.getChan(id) + if ch == nil { + return m.handleUnknownChannelPacket(id, packet) + } + + return ch.handlePacket(packet) +} + +func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error { + msg, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestMsg: + m.incomingRequests <- &Request{ + Type: msg.Type, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.Data, + mux: m, + } + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg: + m.globalResponses <- msg + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg)) + } + + return nil +} + +// handleChannelOpen schedules a channel to be Accept()ed. +func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error { + var msg channelOpenMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: msg.PeersID, + Reason: ConnectionFailed, + Message: "invalid request", + Language: "en_US.UTF-8", + } + return m.sendMessage(failMsg) + } + + c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData) + c.remoteId = msg.PeersID + c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow) + m.incomingChannels <- c + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) OpenChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + ch, err := m.openChannel(chanType, extra) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) { + ch := m.newChannel(chanType, channelOutbound, extra) + + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + + open := channelOpenMsg{ + ChanType: chanType, + PeersWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + TypeSpecificData: extra, + PeersID: ch.localId, + } + if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch msg := (<-ch.msg).(type) { + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + return ch, nil + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + return nil, &OpenChannelError{msg.Reason, msg.Message} + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected packet in response to channel open: %T", msg) + } +} + +func (m *mux) handleUnknownChannelPacket(id uint32, packet []byte) error { + msg, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + // RFC 4254 section 5.4 says unrecognized channel requests should + // receive a failure response. + case *channelRequestMsg: + if msg.WantReply { + return m.sendMessage(channelRequestFailureMsg{ + PeersID: msg.PeersID, + }) + } + return nil + default: + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid channel %d", id) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..727c71b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go @@ -0,0 +1,783 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strings" +) + +// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are +// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user. +// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is +// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from +// the user-authentication phase to the application layer. +type Permissions struct { + // CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default + // permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with + // user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates + // defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to + // execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from + // the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces + // the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server + // implementations to enforce other critical options, such as + // "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake + // is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject + // connections that specify critical options that are unknown + // or not supported. + CriticalOptions map[string]string + + // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may + // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an + // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common + // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", + // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does + // not act on any extension, and it is up to server + // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to + // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server + // application layer. + Extensions map[string]string +} + +type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { + // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic + // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the + // results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN. + // GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions. + // This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with + // which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error. + AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error) + + // Server must be set. It's the implementation + // of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details. + Server GSSAPIServer +} + +// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. +type ServerConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. + Config + + hostKeys []Signer + + // NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without + // authenticating. + // To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true + // and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value. + NoClientAuth bool + + // NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user + // attempts to authenticate with auth method "none". + // NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or + // this func is unused. + NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error) + + // MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts + // permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of + // attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited + // to 6. + MaxAuthTries int + + // PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user + // attempts to authenticate using a password. + PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) + + // PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client + // offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error + // if the given public key can be used to authenticate the + // given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A + // call to this function does not guarantee that the key + // offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data + // depending on the public key, store it inside a + // Permissions.Extensions entry. + PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when + // keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC + // 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be + // used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple + // Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client + // should be presented a challenge even if the user is + // unknown. + KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) + + // AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication + // attempts. + AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) + + // ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in + // the public handshake. + // If empty, a reasonable default is used. + // Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with + // "SSH-2.0-". + ServerVersion string + + // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to + // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication. + BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string + + // GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used + // when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). + GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig +} + +// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host +// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server +// config must have at least one host key. +func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) { + for i, k := range s.hostKeys { + if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() { + s.hostKeys[i] = key + return + } + } + + s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key) +} + +// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is +// acceptable for a user. +type cachedPubKey struct { + user string + pubKeyData []byte + result error + perms *Permissions +} + +const maxCachedPubKeys = 16 + +// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients +// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to +// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public +// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn. +type pubKeyCache struct { + keys []cachedPubKey +} + +// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple. +func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) { + for _, k := range c.keys { + if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) { + return k, true + } + } + return cachedPubKey{}, false +} + +// add adds the given tuple to the cache. +func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { + if len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys { + c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate) + } +} + +// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the +// server +type ServerConn struct { + Conn + + // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a + // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. + Permissions *Permissions +} + +// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying +// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is +// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The +// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection +// will hang. +// +// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for +// authentication errors. +func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 { + fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6 + } + // Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges + for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges { + if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok { + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex) + } + } + + s := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, + } + perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf) + if err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, err + } + return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm, +// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate +// algorithm and may be a certificate type. +func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) { + sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return Marshal(sig), nil +} + +// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication. +func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys") + } + + if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && + config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || + config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") + } + + if config.ServerVersion != "" { + s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion) + } else { + s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */) + s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config) + + if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established. + s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID() + + var packet []byte + if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating") + } + serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{ + Service: serviceUserAuth, + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.mux = newMux(s.transport) + return perms, err +} + +func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error { + if addr == nil { + return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required") + } + + tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr) + } + + for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") { + if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil { + if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } else { + _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err) + } + + if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } + } + + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr) +} + +func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *connection, + sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) { + gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server + defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext() + var srcName string + for { + var ( + outToken []byte + needContinue bool + ) + outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(firstToken) + if err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + if len(outToken) != 0 { + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: outToken, + })); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method) + if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName) + return authErr, perms, nil +} + +// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the +// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old +// clients. +func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool { + // Compatibility for old clients. + // + // For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can + // be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm + // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com. + // + // With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 + // for signature format ssh-rsa. + if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) { + return true + } + // Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format. + return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat +} + +// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is +// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication +// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication +// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate. +type ServerAuthError struct { + // Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication + // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth. + Errors []error +} + +func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string { + var errs []string + for _, err := range l.Errors { + errs = append(errs, err.Error()) + } + return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]" +} + +// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no +// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal +// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries +// 'none' authentication to discover available methods. +// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn. +var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet") + +func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID() + var cache pubKeyCache + var perms *Permissions + + authFailures := 0 + var authErrs []error + var displayedBanner bool + +userAuthLoop: + for { + if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 { + discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ + Reason: 2, + Message: "too many authentication failures", + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nil, discMsg + } + + var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg + if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF { + return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} + } + return nil, err + } else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service) + } + + s.user = userAuthReq.User + + if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil { + displayedBanner = true + msg := config.BannerCallback(s) + if msg != "" { + bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{ + Message: msg, + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + perms = nil + authErr := ErrNoAuth + + switch userAuthReq.Method { + case "none": + if config.NoClientAuth { + if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil { + perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s) + } else { + authErr = nil + } + } + + // allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty + if authFailures == 0 { + authFailures-- + } + case "password": + if config.PasswordCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + payload = payload[1:] + password, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password) + case "keyboard-interactive": + if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") + break + } + + prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s} + perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge) + case "publickey": + if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + isQuery := payload[0] == 0 + payload = payload[1:] + algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + algo := string(algoBytes) + if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, underlyingAlgo(algo)) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo) + break + } + + pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData) + if !ok { + candidate.user = s.user + candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData + candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey) + if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" { + candidate.result = checkSourceAddress( + s.RemoteAddr(), + candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]) + } + cache.add(candidate) + } + + if isQuery { + // The client can query if the given public key + // would be okay. + + if len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + if candidate.result == nil { + okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{ + Algo: algo, + PubKey: pubKeyData, + } + if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + continue userAuthLoop + } + authErr = candidate.result + } else { + sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the + // decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g. + // ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public + // key type. The algorithm and public key type must be + // consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither. + if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", + pubKey.Type(), algo) + break + } + // Ensure the public key algo and signature algo + // are supported. Compare the private key + // algorithm name that corresponds to algo with + // sig.Format. This is usually the same, but + // for certs, the names differ. + if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, sig.Format) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format) + break + } + if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo) + break + } + + signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData) + + if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + authErr = candidate.result + perms = candidate.perms + } + case "gssapi-with-mic": + if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured") + break + } + gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig + userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication. + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported") + break + } + var i uint32 + present := false + for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ { + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) { + present = true + break + } + } + if !present { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism") + break + } + // Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3. + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{ + SupportMech: krb5OID, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4. + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID, + userAuthReq) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + default: + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method) + } + + authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr) + + if config.AuthLogCallback != nil { + config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr) + } + + if authErr == nil { + break userAuthLoop + } + + authFailures++ + if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries { + // If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the + // final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are + // no more authentication methods which can be attempted, + // and this message may cause the client to re-attempt + // authentication while we send the disconnect message. + // Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of + // the loop. + // + // The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this, + // RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure + // be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE + // message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect + // after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which + // message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure + // message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to + // disconnect, should we only send that message.) + // + // Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last + // failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically + // considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable + // to match that behavior. + continue + } + + var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg + if config.PasswordCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password") + } + if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey") + } + if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") + } + if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && + config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") + } + + if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return perms, nil +} + +// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by +// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn. +type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct { + *connection +} + +func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) { + if len(questions) != len(echos) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length") + } + + var prompts []byte + for i := range questions { + prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i]) + prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i]) + } + + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{ + Name: name, + Instruction: instruction, + NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)), + Prompts: prompts, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse { + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0]) + } + packet = packet[1:] + + n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet) + if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ { + ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + answers = append(answers, string(ans)) + packet = rest + } + if len(packet) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message") + } + + return answers, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..acef622 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,647 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Session implements an interactive session described in +// "RFC 4254, section 6". + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "sync" +) + +type Signal string + +// POSIX signals as listed in RFC 4254 Section 6.10. +const ( + SIGABRT Signal = "ABRT" + SIGALRM Signal = "ALRM" + SIGFPE Signal = "FPE" + SIGHUP Signal = "HUP" + SIGILL Signal = "ILL" + SIGINT Signal = "INT" + SIGKILL Signal = "KILL" + SIGPIPE Signal = "PIPE" + SIGQUIT Signal = "QUIT" + SIGSEGV Signal = "SEGV" + SIGTERM Signal = "TERM" + SIGUSR1 Signal = "USR1" + SIGUSR2 Signal = "USR2" +) + +var signals = map[Signal]int{ + SIGABRT: 6, + SIGALRM: 14, + SIGFPE: 8, + SIGHUP: 1, + SIGILL: 4, + SIGINT: 2, + SIGKILL: 9, + SIGPIPE: 13, + SIGQUIT: 3, + SIGSEGV: 11, + SIGTERM: 15, +} + +type TerminalModes map[uint8]uint32 + +// POSIX terminal mode flags as listed in RFC 4254 Section 8. +const ( + tty_OP_END = 0 + VINTR = 1 + VQUIT = 2 + VERASE = 3 + VKILL = 4 + VEOF = 5 + VEOL = 6 + VEOL2 = 7 + VSTART = 8 + VSTOP = 9 + VSUSP = 10 + VDSUSP = 11 + VREPRINT = 12 + VWERASE = 13 + VLNEXT = 14 + VFLUSH = 15 + VSWTCH = 16 + VSTATUS = 17 + VDISCARD = 18 + IGNPAR = 30 + PARMRK = 31 + INPCK = 32 + ISTRIP = 33 + INLCR = 34 + IGNCR = 35 + ICRNL = 36 + IUCLC = 37 + IXON = 38 + IXANY = 39 + IXOFF = 40 + IMAXBEL = 41 + IUTF8 = 42 // RFC 8160 + ISIG = 50 + ICANON = 51 + XCASE = 52 + ECHO = 53 + ECHOE = 54 + ECHOK = 55 + ECHONL = 56 + NOFLSH = 57 + TOSTOP = 58 + IEXTEN = 59 + ECHOCTL = 60 + ECHOKE = 61 + PENDIN = 62 + OPOST = 70 + OLCUC = 71 + ONLCR = 72 + OCRNL = 73 + ONOCR = 74 + ONLRET = 75 + CS7 = 90 + CS8 = 91 + PARENB = 92 + PARODD = 93 + TTY_OP_ISPEED = 128 + TTY_OP_OSPEED = 129 +) + +// A Session represents a connection to a remote command or shell. +type Session struct { + // Stdin specifies the remote process's standard input. + // If Stdin is nil, the remote process reads from an empty + // bytes.Buffer. + Stdin io.Reader + + // Stdout and Stderr specify the remote process's standard + // output and error. + // + // If either is nil, Run connects the corresponding file + // descriptor to an instance of io.Discard. There is a + // fixed amount of buffering that is shared for the two streams. + // If either blocks it may eventually cause the remote + // command to block. + Stdout io.Writer + Stderr io.Writer + + ch Channel // the channel backing this session + started bool // true once Start, Run or Shell is invoked. + copyFuncs []func() error + errors chan error // one send per copyFunc + + // true if pipe method is active + stdinpipe, stdoutpipe, stderrpipe bool + + // stdinPipeWriter is non-nil if StdinPipe has not been called + // and Stdin was specified by the user; it is the write end of + // a pipe connecting Session.Stdin to the stdin channel. + stdinPipeWriter io.WriteCloser + + exitStatus chan error +} + +// SendRequest sends an out-of-band channel request on the SSH channel +// underlying the session. +func (s *Session) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + return s.ch.SendRequest(name, wantReply, payload) +} + +func (s *Session) Close() error { + return s.ch.Close() +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.4. +type setenvRequest struct { + Name string + Value string +} + +// Setenv sets an environment variable that will be applied to any +// command executed by Shell or Run. +func (s *Session) Setenv(name, value string) error { + msg := setenvRequest{ + Name: name, + Value: value, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("env", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: setenv failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.2. +type ptyRequestMsg struct { + Term string + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 + Modelist string +} + +// RequestPty requests the association of a pty with the session on the remote host. +func (s *Session) RequestPty(term string, h, w int, termmodes TerminalModes) error { + var tm []byte + for k, v := range termmodes { + kv := struct { + Key byte + Val uint32 + }{k, v} + + tm = append(tm, Marshal(&kv)...) + } + tm = append(tm, tty_OP_END) + req := ptyRequestMsg{ + Term: term, + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + Modelist: string(tm), + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("pty-req", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: pty-req failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type subsystemRequestMsg struct { + Subsystem string +} + +// RequestSubsystem requests the association of a subsystem with the session on the remote host. +// A subsystem is a predefined command that runs in the background when the ssh session is initiated +func (s *Session) RequestSubsystem(subsystem string) error { + msg := subsystemRequestMsg{ + Subsystem: subsystem, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("subsystem", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: subsystem request failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.7. +type ptyWindowChangeMsg struct { + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 +} + +// WindowChange informs the remote host about a terminal window dimension change to h rows and w columns. +func (s *Session) WindowChange(h, w int) error { + req := ptyWindowChangeMsg{ + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + } + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("window-change", false, Marshal(&req)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.9. +type signalMsg struct { + Signal string +} + +// Signal sends the given signal to the remote process. +// sig is one of the SIG* constants. +func (s *Session) Signal(sig Signal) error { + msg := signalMsg{ + Signal: string(sig), + } + + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("signal", false, Marshal(&msg)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type execMsg struct { + Command string +} + +// Start runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start or Shell. +func (s *Session) Start(cmd string) error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + req := execMsg{ + Command: cmd, + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("exec", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: command %v failed", cmd) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +// Run runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, +// or CombinedOutput. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Run(cmd string) error { + err := s.Start(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.Wait() +} + +// Output runs cmd on the remote host and returns its standard output. +func (s *Session) Output(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + var b bytes.Buffer + s.Stdout = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.Bytes(), err +} + +type singleWriter struct { + b bytes.Buffer + mu sync.Mutex +} + +func (w *singleWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + return w.b.Write(p) +} + +// CombinedOutput runs cmd on the remote host and returns its combined +// standard output and standard error. +func (s *Session) CombinedOutput(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + var b singleWriter + s.Stdout = &b + s.Stderr = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.b.Bytes(), err +} + +// Shell starts a login shell on the remote host. A Session only +// accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, or CombinedOutput. +func (s *Session) Shell() error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("shell", true, nil) + if err == nil && !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: could not start shell") + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +func (s *Session) start() error { + s.started = true + + type F func(*Session) + for _, setupFd := range []F{(*Session).stdin, (*Session).stdout, (*Session).stderr} { + setupFd(s) + } + + s.errors = make(chan error, len(s.copyFuncs)) + for _, fn := range s.copyFuncs { + go func(fn func() error) { + s.errors <- fn() + }(fn) + } + return nil +} + +// Wait waits for the remote command to exit. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Wait() error { + if !s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session not started") + } + waitErr := <-s.exitStatus + + if s.stdinPipeWriter != nil { + s.stdinPipeWriter.Close() + } + var copyError error + for range s.copyFuncs { + if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil { + copyError = err + } + } + if waitErr != nil { + return waitErr + } + return copyError +} + +func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error { + wm := Waitmsg{status: -1} + // Wait for msg channel to be closed before returning. + for msg := range reqs { + switch msg.Type { + case "exit-status": + wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload)) + case "exit-signal": + var sigval struct { + Signal string + CoreDumped bool + Error string + Lang string + } + if err := Unmarshal(msg.Payload, &sigval); err != nil { + return err + } + + // Must sanitize strings? + wm.signal = sigval.Signal + wm.msg = sigval.Error + wm.lang = sigval.Lang + default: + // This handles keepalives and matches + // OpenSSH's behaviour. + if msg.WantReply { + msg.Reply(false, nil) + } + } + } + if wm.status == 0 { + return nil + } + if wm.status == -1 { + // exit-status was never sent from server + if wm.signal == "" { + // signal was not sent either. RFC 4254 + // section 6.10 recommends against this + // behavior, but it is allowed, so we let + // clients handle it. + return &ExitMissingError{} + } + wm.status = 128 + if _, ok := signals[Signal(wm.signal)]; ok { + wm.status += signals[Signal(wm.signal)] + } + } + + return &ExitError{wm} +} + +// ExitMissingError is returned if a session is torn down cleanly, but +// the server sends no confirmation of the exit status. +type ExitMissingError struct{} + +func (e *ExitMissingError) Error() string { + return "wait: remote command exited without exit status or exit signal" +} + +func (s *Session) stdin() { + if s.stdinpipe { + return + } + var stdin io.Reader + if s.Stdin == nil { + stdin = new(bytes.Buffer) + } else { + r, w := io.Pipe() + go func() { + _, err := io.Copy(w, s.Stdin) + w.CloseWithError(err) + }() + stdin, s.stdinPipeWriter = r, w + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.ch, stdin) + if err1 := s.ch.CloseWrite(); err == nil && err1 != io.EOF { + err = err1 + } + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stdout() { + if s.stdoutpipe { + return + } + if s.Stdout == nil { + s.Stdout = io.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stdout, s.ch) + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stderr() { + if s.stderrpipe { + return + } + if s.Stderr == nil { + s.Stderr = io.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stderr, s.ch.Stderr()) + return err + }) +} + +// sessionStdin reroutes Close to CloseWrite. +type sessionStdin struct { + io.Writer + ch Channel +} + +func (s *sessionStdin) Close() error { + return s.ch.CloseWrite() +} + +// StdinPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard input when the command starts. +func (s *Session) StdinPipe() (io.WriteCloser, error) { + if s.Stdin != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdin already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdinPipe after process started") + } + s.stdinpipe = true + return &sessionStdin{s.ch, s.ch}, nil +} + +// StdoutPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard output when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StdoutPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StdoutPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdoutPipe after process started") + } + s.stdoutpipe = true + return s.ch, nil +} + +// StderrPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard error when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StderrPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StderrPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StderrPipe after process started") + } + s.stderrpipe = true + return s.ch.Stderr(), nil +} + +// newSession returns a new interactive session on the remote host. +func newSession(ch Channel, reqs <-chan *Request) (*Session, error) { + s := &Session{ + ch: ch, + } + s.exitStatus = make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + s.exitStatus <- s.wait(reqs) + }() + + return s, nil +} + +// An ExitError reports unsuccessful completion of a remote command. +type ExitError struct { + Waitmsg +} + +func (e *ExitError) Error() string { + return e.Waitmsg.String() +} + +// Waitmsg stores the information about an exited remote command +// as reported by Wait. +type Waitmsg struct { + status int + signal string + msg string + lang string +} + +// ExitStatus returns the exit status of the remote command. +func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int { + return w.status +} + +// Signal returns the exit signal of the remote command if +// it was terminated violently. +func (w Waitmsg) Signal() string { + return w.signal +} + +// Msg returns the exit message given by the remote command +func (w Waitmsg) Msg() string { + return w.msg +} + +// Lang returns the language tag. See RFC 3066 +func (w Waitmsg) Lang() string { + return w.lang +} + +func (w Waitmsg) String() string { + str := fmt.Sprintf("Process exited with status %v", w.status) + if w.signal != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(" from signal %v", w.signal) + } + if w.msg != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(". Reason was: %v", w.msg) + } + return str +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..24bd7c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" +) + +var krb5OID []byte + +func init() { + krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh) +} + +// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins. +type GSSAPIClient interface { + // InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the + // ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil. + // The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to + // the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to + // AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting + // needContinue to false. To complete the context + // establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh + // server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true. + // In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the + // reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply + // token to InitSecContext via the token parameters. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error) + // GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places + // the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server. + // The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC() + // over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just + // established: + // string session identifier + // byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST + // string user name + // string service + // string "gssapi-with-mic" + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5. + GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error) + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins. +type GSSAPIServer interface { + // AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + // and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a + // outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client, + // where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext. + // If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this + // by setting the needContinue to false. To + // complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + // required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext + // will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it + // should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh + // client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the + // token parameters. + // The srcName return value is the authenticated username. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error) + // VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, + // fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2. + VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +var ( + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication, + // so we also support the krb5 mechanism only. + // See RFC 1964 section 1. + krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2} +) + +// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST +// See RFC 4462 section 3.2. +type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct { + N uint32 + OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier +} + +func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { + n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed") + } + s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{ + N: n, + OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n), + } + for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ { + var ( + desiredMech []byte + err error + ) + desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse string failed") + } + if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + } + return s, nil +} + +// See RFC 4462 section 3.6. +func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 0) + out = appendString(out, sessionID) + out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest) + out = appendString(out, username) + out = appendString(out, service) + out = appendString(out, authMethod) + return out +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b171b33 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "net" +) + +// streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +// +// See openssh-portable/PROTOCOL, section 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL#L235 +type streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg struct { + socketPath string + reserved0 string + reserved1 uint32 +} + +// forwardedStreamLocalPayload is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +type forwardedStreamLocalPayload struct { + SocketPath string + Reserved0 string +} + +// streamLocalChannelForwardMsg is a struct used for SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message +// with "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"/"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" string. +type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct { + socketPath string +} + +// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket. +func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + socketPath, + } + // send message + ok, _, err := c.SendRequest("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer") + } + ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + + return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil +} + +func (c *Client) dialStreamLocal(socketPath string) (Channel, error) { + msg := streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg{ + socketPath: socketPath, + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, err +} + +type unixListener struct { + socketPath string + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Close() error { + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + l.socketPath, + } + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *unixListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..80d35f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/rand" + "net" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Listen requests the remote peer open a listening socket on +// addr. Incoming connections will be available by calling Accept on +// the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the +// SSH connection may hang. +// N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix". +func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) { + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return c.ListenTCP(laddr) + case "unix": + return c.ListenUnix(addr) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// Automatic port allocation is broken with OpenSSH before 6.0. See +// also https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2017. In +// particular, OpenSSH 5.9 sends a channelOpenMsg with port number 0, +// rather than the actual port number. This means you can never open +// two different listeners with auto allocated ports. We work around +// this by trying explicit ports until we succeed. + +const openSSHPrefix = "OpenSSH_" + +var portRandomizer = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())) + +// isBrokenOpenSSHVersion returns true if the given version string +// specifies a version of OpenSSH that is known to have a bug in port +// forwarding. +func isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(versionStr string) bool { + i := strings.Index(versionStr, openSSHPrefix) + if i < 0 { + return false + } + i += len(openSSHPrefix) + j := i + for ; j < len(versionStr); j++ { + if versionStr[j] < '0' || versionStr[j] > '9' { + break + } + } + version, _ := strconv.Atoi(versionStr[i:j]) + return version < 6 +} + +// autoPortListenWorkaround simulates automatic port allocation by +// trying random ports repeatedly. +func (c *Client) autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + var sshListener net.Listener + var err error + const tries = 10 + for i := 0; i < tries; i++ { + addr := *laddr + addr.Port = 1024 + portRandomizer.Intn(60000) + sshListener, err = c.ListenTCP(&addr) + if err == nil { + laddr.Port = addr.Port + return sshListener, err + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: listen on random port failed after %d tries: %v", tries, err) +} + +// RFC 4254 7.1 +type channelForwardMsg struct { + addr string + rport uint32 +} + +// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections. +// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch +// goroutines until needed. +func (c *Client) handleForwards() { + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) +} + +// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket +// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling +// Accept on the returned net.Listener. +func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { + return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) + } + + m := channelForwardMsg{ + laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(laddr.Port), + } + // send message + ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: tcpip-forward request denied by peer") + } + + // If the original port was 0, then the remote side will + // supply a real port number in the response. + if laddr.Port == 0 { + var p struct { + Port uint32 + } + if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + laddr.Port = int(p.Port) + } + + // Register this forward, using the port number we obtained. + ch := c.forwards.add(laddr) + + return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil +} + +// forwardList stores a mapping between remote +// forward requests and the tcpListeners. +type forwardList struct { + sync.Mutex + entries []forwardEntry +} + +// forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a +// remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener. +type forwardEntry struct { + laddr net.Addr + c chan forward +} + +// forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The +// arguments to add/remove/lookup should be address as specified in +// the original forward-request. +type forward struct { + newCh NewChannel // the ssh client channel underlying this forward + raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection +} + +func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + f := forwardEntry{ + laddr: addr, + c: make(chan forward, 1), + } + l.entries = append(l.entries, f) + return f.c +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 7.2 +type forwardedTCPPayload struct { + Addr string + Port uint32 + OriginAddr string + OriginPort uint32 +} + +// parseTCPAddr parses the originating address from the remote into a *net.TCPAddr. +func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) { + if port == 0 || port > 65535 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port) + } + ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr)) + if ip == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr) + } + return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + var ( + laddr net.Addr + raddr net.Addr + err error + ) + switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType { + case "forwarded-tcpip": + var payload forwardedTCPPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-tcpip payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + + // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming + // addresses should list the address, in string + // format. It is implied that this should be an IP + // address, as it would be impossible to connect to it + // otherwise. + laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + + case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com": + var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + laddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: payload.SocketPath, + Net: "unix", + } + raddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + } + default: + panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType)) + } + if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok { + // Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming + // connections. + ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address") + continue + } + + } +} + +// remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its +// listener. +func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for i, f := range l.entries { + if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...) + close(f.c) + return + } + } +} + +// closeAll closes and clears all forwards. +func (l *forwardList) closeAll() { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + close(f.c) + } + l.entries = nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr} + return true + } + } + return false +} + +type tcpListener struct { + laddr *net.TCPAddr + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: l.laddr, + raddr: s.raddr, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Close() error { + m := channelForwardMsg{ + l.laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(l.laddr.Port), + } + + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr) + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return l.laddr +} + +// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. +// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr(). +func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + var ch Channel + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + // Parse the address into host and numeric port. + host, portString, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + port, err := strconv.ParseUint(portString, 10, 16) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ch, err = c.dial(net.IPv4zero.String(), 0, host, int(port)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Use a zero address for local and remote address. + zeroAddr := &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: zeroAddr, + raddr: zeroAddr, + }, nil + case "unix": + var err error + ch, err = c.dialStreamLocal(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: addr, + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// DialTCP connects to the remote address raddr on the network net, +// which must be "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6". If laddr is not nil, it is used +// as the local address for the connection. +func (c *Client) DialTCP(n string, laddr, raddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Conn, error) { + if laddr == nil { + laddr = &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + } + ch, err := c.dial(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port, raddr.IP.String(), raddr.Port) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: laddr, + raddr: raddr, + }, nil +} + +// RFC 4254 7.2 +type channelOpenDirectMsg struct { + raddr string + rport uint32 + laddr string + lport uint32 +} + +func (c *Client) dial(laddr string, lport int, raddr string, rport int) (Channel, error) { + msg := channelOpenDirectMsg{ + raddr: raddr, + rport: uint32(rport), + laddr: laddr, + lport: uint32(lport), + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-tcpip", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, err +} + +type tcpChan struct { + Channel // the backing channel +} + +// chanConn fulfills the net.Conn interface without +// the tcpChan having to hold laddr or raddr directly. +type chanConn struct { + Channel + laddr, raddr net.Addr +} + +// LocalAddr returns the local network address. +func (t *chanConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return t.laddr +} + +// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. +func (t *chanConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return t.raddr +} + +// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated +// with the connection. +func (t *chanConn) SetDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + if err := t.SetReadDeadline(deadline); err != nil { + return err + } + return t.SetWriteDeadline(deadline) +} + +// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline. +// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. +// After the deadline, the error from Read will implement net.Error +// with Timeout() == true. +func (t *chanConn) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + // for compatibility with previous version, + // the error message contains "tcpChan" + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} + +// SetWriteDeadline exists to satisfy the net.Conn interface +// but is not implemented by this type. It always returns an error. +func (t *chanConn) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da01580 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go @@ -0,0 +1,358 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "errors" + "io" + "log" +) + +// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the +// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing. +const debugTransport = false + +const ( + gcm128CipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" + gcm256CipherID = "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" + aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc" + tripledescbcID = "3des-cbc" +) + +// packetConn represents a transport that implements packet based +// operations. +type packetConn interface { + // Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer. + writePacket(packet []byte) error + + // Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking, + // i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is + // always non-empty. + readPacket() ([]byte, error) + + // Close closes the write-side of the connection. + Close() error +} + +// transport is the keyingTransport that implements the SSH packet +// protocol. +type transport struct { + reader connectionState + writer connectionState + + bufReader *bufio.Reader + bufWriter *bufio.Writer + rand io.Reader + isClient bool + io.Closer +} + +// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC +// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only. +type packetCipher interface { + // writeCipherPacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The + // contents of the packet are generally scrambled. + writeCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error + + // readCipherPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The + // returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of + // readPacket. + readCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) +} + +// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the +// connection. This is necessary because each direction has its own +// keys, and can even have its own algorithms +type connectionState struct { + packetCipher + seqNum uint32 + dir direction + pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher +} + +// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in +// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet +// respectively. +func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error { + ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + return nil +} + +func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + if len(p) == 0 { + return + } + who := "server" + if t.isClient { + who = "client" + } + what := "read" + if write { + what = "write" + } + + log.Println(what, who, p[0]) +} + +// Read and decrypt next packet. +func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { + for { + p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader) + if err != nil { + break + } + if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { + break + } + } + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + return p, err +} + +func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r) + s.seqNum++ + if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 { + err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet") + } + + if len(packet) > 0 { + switch packet[0] { + case msgNewKeys: + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message") + } + + case msgDisconnect: + // Transform a disconnect message into an + // error. Since this is lowest level at which + // we interpret message types, doing it here + // ensures that we don't have to handle it + // elsewhere. + var msg disconnectMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return nil, &msg + } + } + + // The packet may point to an internal buffer, so copy the + // packet out here. + fresh := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(fresh, packet) + + return fresh, err +} + +func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(packet, true) + } + return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet) +} + +func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys + + err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err = w.Flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + s.seqNum++ + if changeKeys { + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + default: + panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys") + } + } + return err +} + +func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transport { + t := &transport{ + bufReader: bufio.NewReader(rwc), + bufWriter: bufio.NewWriter(rwc), + rand: rand, + reader: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + writer: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + Closer: rwc, + } + t.isClient = isClient + + if isClient { + t.reader.dir = serverKeys + t.writer.dir = clientKeys + } else { + t.reader.dir = clientKeys + t.writer.dir = serverKeys + } + + return t +} + +type direction struct { + ivTag []byte + keyTag []byte + macKeyTag []byte +} + +var ( + serverKeys = direction{[]byte{'B'}, []byte{'D'}, []byte{'F'}} + clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}} +) + +// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as +// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys +// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys). +func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) { + cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] + + iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) + key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) + + generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) + + var macKey []byte + if !aeadCiphers[algs.Cipher] { + macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] + macKey = make([]byte, macMode.keySize) + generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) + } + + return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs) +} + +// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H +// and sessionId, as specified in RFC 4253, section 7.2. +func generateKeyMaterial(out, tag []byte, r *kexResult) { + var digestsSoFar []byte + + h := r.Hash.New() + for len(out) > 0 { + h.Reset() + h.Write(r.K) + h.Write(r.H) + + if len(digestsSoFar) == 0 { + h.Write(tag) + h.Write(r.SessionID) + } else { + h.Write(digestsSoFar) + } + + digest := h.Sum(nil) + n := copy(out, digest) + out = out[n:] + if len(out) > 0 { + digestsSoFar = append(digestsSoFar, digest...) + } + } +} + +const packageVersion = "SSH-2.0-Go" + +// Sends and receives a version line. The versionLine string should +// be US ASCII, start with "SSH-2.0-", and should not include a +// newline. exchangeVersions returns the other side's version line. +func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err error) { + // Contrary to the RFC, we do not ignore lines that don't + // start with "SSH-2.0-" to make the library usable with + // nonconforming servers. + for _, c := range versionLine { + // The spec disallows non US-ASCII chars, and + // specifically forbids null chars. + if c < 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk character in version line") + } + } + if _, err = rw.Write(append(versionLine, '\r', '\n')); err != nil { + return + } + + them, err = readVersion(rw) + return them, err +} + +// maxVersionStringBytes is the maximum number of bytes that we'll +// accept as a version string. RFC 4253 section 4.2 limits this at 255 +// chars +const maxVersionStringBytes = 255 + +// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2. +func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64) + var ok bool + var buf [1]byte + + for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ { + _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n + // but several SSH servers actually only send a \n. + if buf[0] == '\n' { + if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) { + // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines + // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that + // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total). + versionString = versionString[:0] + continue + } + ok = true + break + } + + // non ASCII chars are disallowed, but we are lenient, + // since Go doesn't use null-terminated strings. + + // The RFC allows a comment after a space, however, + // all of it (version and comments) goes into the + // session hash. + versionString = append(versionString, buf[0]) + } + + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: overflow reading version string") + } + + // There might be a '\r' on the end which we should remove. + if len(versionString) > 0 && versionString[len(versionString)-1] == '\r' { + versionString = versionString[:len(versionString)-1] + } + return versionString, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index 3867647..a14a21c 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.15.1 +# code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea v0.16.0 ## explicit; go 1.13 code.gitea.io/sdk/gitea # github.com/MichaelMure/go-term-markdown v0.1.4 @@ -85,6 +85,9 @@ github.com/danwakefield/fnmatch # github.com/davecgh/go-spew v1.1.2-0.20180830191138-d8f796af33cc ## explicit github.com/davecgh/go-spew/spew +# github.com/davidmz/go-pageant v1.0.2 +## explicit; go 1.16 +github.com/davidmz/go-pageant # github.com/disintegration/imaging v1.6.2 ## explicit github.com/disintegration/imaging @@ -101,6 +104,9 @@ github.com/fatih/color # github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify v1.6.0 ## explicit; go 1.16 github.com/fsnotify/fsnotify +# github.com/go-fed/httpsig v1.1.0 +## explicit; go 1.13 +github.com/go-fed/httpsig # github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 v4.5.0 ## explicit; go 1.16 github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v4 @@ -237,15 +243,28 @@ go.uber.org/atomic go.uber.org/multierr # golang.org/x/crypto v0.14.0 ## explicit; go 1.17 +golang.org/x/crypto/blake2b +golang.org/x/crypto/blake2s +golang.org/x/crypto/blowfish golang.org/x/crypto/cast5 +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/internal/field +golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 golang.org/x/crypto/hkdf +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/alias +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/poly1305 golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k +golang.org/x/crypto/ripemd160 golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/internal/bcrypt_pbkdf # golang.org/x/exp v0.0.0-20230905200255-921286631fa9 ## explicit; go 1.20 golang.org/x/exp/constraints