Files
secureblue/files/system/usr/share/ublue-os/just/70-secureblue.just.readme.md
Ivo Damjanović fefc64baba feat: stop overwriting 60-custom.just for better compatibility with upstream bluebuild and downstream user builds (#409)
* feat: create addjustconfig.sh to include custom commands at buildtime

* fix: 60-custom.just.readme.md to 61-custom.just.readme.md

* fix: Rename 60-custom.just to 61-custom.just

* feat: add just config script to enabled scripts

* fix: rename to 70-secureblue.just

* fix: Rename 61-custom.just.readme.md to 70-secureblue.just.readme.md

* fix: rename to 70-secureblue.just
2024-08-29 11:53:56 -07:00

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Included in set-kargs-hardening

Zero newly allocated pages and heaps, mitigating use-after-free vulnerabilities

init_on_alloc=1

Fills freed pages and heaps with zeroes, mitigating use-after-free vulnerabilities

init_on_free=1

Disables the merging of slabs, increasing difficulty of heap exploitation

slab_nomerge

Enables page allocator freelist randomization, reducing page allocation predictability

page_alloc.shuffle=1

Randomize kernel stack offset on each syscall, making certain types of attacks more difficult

randomize_kstack_offset=on

Disable vsyscall as it is both obsolete and enables an ROP attack vector

vsyscall=none

Enable kernel lockdown in the strictest mode

lockdown=confidentiality

Disable CPU-based entropy sources as it's not auditable and has resulted in vulnerabilities

random.trust_cpu=off

Disable trusting the use of the a seed passed by the bootloader

random.trust_bootloader=off

Mitigate DMA attacks by enabling IOMMU

iommu=force intel_iommu=on amd_iommu=force_isolation

Disable IOMMU bypass

iommu.passthrough=0

Synchronously invalidate IOMMU hardware TLBs

iommu.strict=1

Enable kernel page table isolation

pti=on

Only allows kernel modules that have been signed with a valid key to be loaded

module.sig_enforce=1

Automatically mitigate all known CPU vulnerabilities, including disabling SMT if necessary.

mitigations=auto,nosmt

Turn on spectre_v2 mitigations at boot time for all programs

spectre_v2=on

Disable spec store bypass for all programs

spec_store_bypass_disable=on

Enable the mechanism to flush the L1D cache on context switch.

l1d_flush=on

Mitigate unprivileged speculative access to data by using the microcode mitigation when available or by disabling AVX on affected systems where the microcode hasnt been updated to include the mitigation.

gather_data_sampling=force

Included in set-kargs-hardening-unstable

Fill IOMMU protection gap by setting the busmaster bit during early boot

efi=disable_early_pci_dma

Disable debugfs to prevent exposure of sensitive kernel information

debugfs=off