The ancient 3.2 ARM kernel for Helix4 has finally been replaced with 4.14.
The 3.2 kernel is too old to build under Stretch so any platforms still using it must be restricted to Jessie only.
Once these platforms are ported 4.14 the restriction can be removed.
- mlx-platform: backport patches from 4.19
- mlx-platform: Add support for register CPLD3_VER, RST_CUSE
Add NG system type support
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Shamray <oleksandrs@mellanox.com>
- mlx-platform: backport patches from 4.19
- mlx-platform: Add support for register CPLD3_VER, RST_CUSE
Add NG system type support
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Shamray <oleksandrs@mellanox.com>
We start using Linux RNG from initrd with low entropy pools and random
data quality might not be good. Kernel warns us about the problem with
following messages in dmesg(1):
[ 4.786307] random: onl-mounts: uninitialized urandom read (16 bytes read, 46 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.307536] random: onl-mounts: uninitialized urandom read (16 bytes read, 83 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.354480] random: blkid: uninitialized urandom read (6 bytes read, 89 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.366963] random: blkid: uninitialized urandom read (6 bytes read, 90 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.379385] random: blkid: uninitialized urandom read (6 bytes read, 90 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.391910] random: blkid: uninitialized urandom read (6 bytes read, 90 bits of entropy available)
[ 5.546389] random: onl-pki: uninitialized urandom read (16 bytes read, 96 bits of entropy available)
[ 8.881398] random: mktemp: uninitialized urandom read (6 bytes read, 109 bits of entropy available)
[ 9.026771] random: swiget: uninitialized urandom read (16 bytes read, 109 bits of entropy available)
Since main rootfs isn't mounted we can't load entropy saved from
previous runtime by systemd-random-seed (for systemd) and
/etc/init.d/urandom (for sysvinit).
Moreover even if we able to load this data, direct write to /dev/urandom
or /dev/random does not change entropy count according to random(4) man
page and /proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail contents after loading
data to /dev/urandom or /dev/random.
To address this we should generate pseudo random data suitable for use
as RNG seed based on frequently changed information in system and use
some cryptographic grade hash to hide this info from RNG.
Use MIT licensed initrng.py Python implementation for Linux RNG early
init to seed RNG before executing onl-mounts and other stuff from early
userspace in initramfs.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Popovich <sergey.popovich@ordnance.co>
