backport of commit c1c258a70b (#22082)

Co-authored-by: Yoko Hyakuna <yoko@hashicorp.com>
This commit is contained in:
hc-github-team-secure-vault-core
2023-07-27 11:11:03 -04:00
committed by GitHub
parent 0a0cffa282
commit 73311954f2
5 changed files with 84 additions and 11 deletions

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@@ -6,7 +6,13 @@ description: An overview of how Sentinel interacts with Vault Enterprise.
# Overview
-> **Note**: This feature requires [Vault Enterprise Plus](https://www.hashicorp.com/products/vault/).
<Note>
Sentinel requires [Vault
Enterprise](https://www.hashicorp.com/products/vault/pricing/) license, or an
[HCP Vault Plus](/hcp/docs/vault/tiers-and-features#plus-tier) cluster.
</Note>
Vault Enterprise integrates HashiCorp Sentinel to provide a rich set of access
control functionality. Because Vault is a security-focused product trusted with
@@ -42,22 +48,89 @@ Sentinel execution should be considered to be significantly slower than normal
ACL policy checking. If high performance is needed, testing should be performed
appropriately when introducing Sentinel policies.
### Policy enforcement levels
Sentinel policies have three enforcement levels to choose from.
| Level | Description |
| -------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| advisory | The policy is allowed to fail. Can be used as a tool to educate new users. |
| soft-mandatory | The policy must pass unless an override is specified. |
| hard-mandatory | The policy must pass. |
## Policy evaluation
During evaluation, all policy types, if they exist, must grant access.
Evaluation uses the following logic:
Vault evaluates incoming requests against policies of all types that are
applicable.
1. If the request is unauthenticated, skip to step 3. Otherwise, evaluate the
token's ACL policies. These must grant access; as always, a failure to be
granted capabilities on a path via ACL policies denies the request.
2. RGPs attached to the token are evaluated. All policies must pass according
![Policy evaluation](/img/diagram-policy-evaluation-workflow_light.png#light-theme-only)
![Policy evaluation](/img/diagram-policy-evaluation-workflow_dark.png#dark-theme-only)
1. If the request is unauthenticated, skip to evaluating the EGPs. Otherwise,
evaluate the token's ACL policies. These must grant access; as always, a
failure to be granted capabilities on a path via ACL policies denies the
request.
2. Evaluate RGPs attached to the client token. All policies must pass according
to their enforcement level.
3. EGPs set on the requested path, and any prefix-matching EGPs set on
less-specific paths, are evaluated. All policies must pass according to
their enforcement level.
3. Evaluate EGPs set on the requested path, and any prefix-matching EGPs set on
less-specific paths, are evaluated. All policies must pass according to their
enforcement level.
Any failure at any of these steps results in a denied request.
### RGPs and namespaces
Policies, auth methods, secrets engines, and tokens are locked into the
[namespace](/vault/docs/enterprise/namespaces) they are created in. However,
identity groups can pull in entities and groups from other namespaces.
<Tip>
Refer to the [Set up entities and groups section of the Secure Multi-Tenancy
with Namespaces
tutorial](/vault/tutorials/enterprise/namespaces#set-up-entities-and-groups) for
a step-by-step instruction.
</Tip>
Consider the following scenario.
The training namespace is a child namespace of the education namespace. The "Sun
Shine" entity created in the education namespace is a member of the "Tester"
group which is defined in the training namespace. The group members inherit the
group-level policy.
![Relationship](/img/diagram-rgp-namespace_light.png#light-theme-only)
![Relationship](/img/diagram-rgp-namespace_dark.png#dark-theme-only)
While ACL policies and EGPs set rules on a specific path, an RGP does not
specify a target path. RGPs are tied to tokens, identity entities, or identity
groups that you can write rules without specifying a path.
What if the deny-all RGP in the training namespace looked like:
<CodeBlockConfig filename="deny-all.sentinel">
```hcl
precond = rule {
identity.entity.metadata.org_id is "A012345X"
}
main = rule when precond {
false
}
```
</CodeBlockConfig>
Vault checks the requesting token's entity metadata. If the `org_id` metadata
exists and the value is `A012345X`, the request gets denied because the
enforcement level is hard-mandatory. It does not matter if the request invokes a
path starts with `/education` or `/education/training`, or even `/foo` because
there is no path associated with the deny-all RGP.
## Policy overriding
Vault supports normal Sentinel overriding behavior. Requests to override can be
@@ -83,7 +156,7 @@ necessary to pre-populate Identity entries or supply additional parameters with
the request if you require more information to use MFA than the endpoint is
able to glean from the original request alone.
# Using sentinel
# Using Sentinel
## Configuration

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